Returning to a Division Centric Army

[Ken White]

two star + 2 one star spaces plus the Staffs. In peacetime -- and the US Army has been at peace since 1945 -- flags and spaces mean more than capability and competence.That's why when we ostensibly went 'modular' we deliberately did not restructure the EAD echelons to cope with that 'modularity.'

The Div Cdrs insist on TACON of CSS elms in their AO because they want control of all forces in an AO if they're going to be held responsible for that AO. That is simply perfectly logical self protection in an Army that, at this time, hates decentralized execution and where few trust people they do not know -- a factor stems partly from mediocre training and partly from institutional bias....

Span of control depends little on the technology or communications ability available; those factors are a crutch to allow marginally competent commands / commanders to function with an enhanced degree of success. The tech stuff can be a force multiplier but there are absolutely no guarantees that it will be.

The effective span of control really rests on state of training or experience at all levels AND ability plus willingness of the Commander(s) to delegate and trust their subordinates. Really good units / people can do a span of 9 or 10, really poor units / people have trouble with 2. An average of 3 to 5, mission dependent, is a rule of thumb, -- and thus a design parameter -- and little more. It very much depends on people and that level of training or experience...

If you recruit, train, promote and retain your entire force for great competence you can design small elements with a large (~10) span of control. If you do the same things to achieve mass and thus aim for acceptable competence, you can got to a span of ~5. If you're in need of greater mass, you'll have to accept less competence and may be constrained to a span of two or three.

Since people change with time and the Peter Principle exists, there is little chance of ensuring an acceptable design size of the span for other than a year or two at a time. Any attempt to design for specific people and mission s will probably have to change when the parameters change; thus the need for a simple, generic organizational template / TOE that allows then current Commanders to tailor their forces for specific missions with little effort. If that is done reasonably well, then the span of control issue sorts itself out with no problems and you may well have a Bn commanding a 300 plus man Co Team; seven independent Platoon Task Forces and have two Co Cdrs assigned to CP guard along with their Hq elms.

[TAH]

two star + 2 one star spaces plus the Staffs. In peacetime -- and the US Army has been at peace since 1945 -- flags and spaces mean more than capability and competence.That's why when we ostensibly went 'modular' we deliberately did not restructure the EAD echelons to cope with that 'modularity.'

The Div Cdrs insist on TACON of CSS elms in their AO because they want control of all forces in an AO if they're going to be held responsible for that AO. That is simply perfectly logical self protection in an Army that, at this time, hates decentralized execution and where few trust people they do not know -- a factor stems partly from mediocre training and partly from institutional bias....

Since people change with time and the Peter Principle exists, \

1. But we did restructure EAD, no more COSCOMs, no more CSGs/ASGs, no more ACRs, no more Corps Artillery/FA HQs or Corps Eng Bde or dedicated, organized Corps anything.

2. Agree with your comments regarding controlling everything in your sandbox. Thought/think the Area Support part of CSS doctrine is flawed from the start.

3. Amazing how many times in the past few years I have mentioned the "Peter Principle" and had to explain it in detail. The Army is THE case study of it.

4. Read somwhere that two of the characteristics of organizations that easily and readily accept and introduce bold change are small and young. The US Army is neither small (500K+AC, 1M+ total) nor young (200+years)

TAH

[Tukhachevskii]

...what's the "Peter Principle" that both TAH and KW are refering to?

[Tom Odom]

...what's the "Peter Principle" that both TAH and KW are refering to?

promote people one grade above their level of competence

[Fuchs]

...what's the "Peter Principle" that both TAH and KW are refering to?

The Peter Principle is the principle that "in a hierarchy every employee tends to rise to their level of incompetence".
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_principle


It's one of the important rules of thumb about how people and organizations function. Others are Pareto Principle, a principle about bureaucracies (maximize until there's no further justification for growth) etc.

[Ken White]

1. But we did restructure EAD, no more COSCOMs, no more CSGs/ASGs, no more ACRs, no more Corps Artillery/FA HQs or Corps Eng Bde or dedicated, organized Corps anything.

Yep, did that -- but 'forgot' to remove the Div to force those organizations you cite to operate on an area basis and to do so without interfacing with a Div, thus forcing the structure to work a bit harder. Was that omission just an oversight? I suspect not...

The US Army is masterful at complying with the wishes of Congress -- without at all actually complying. Then some wonder why many subordinate Cdrs do only what they want to do.

2. Agree with your comments regarding controlling everything in your sandbox. Thought/think the Area Support part of CSS doctrine is flawed from the start.

It was / is flawed based on what is; not sure it's all that bad based on what should be.

Given the risk averse culture of today, the Div Cdr has little choice; I also suspect many CS/CSS Cdrs don't mind all that much -- that way they blame screwups on the Div; many people like a little cover, many also like to be told what to do and how to do it (it's easier that way) -- they have no place in a decent Army but they exist everywhere...

3...The Army is THE case study of it...

Yup, I'm a living example...

4. Read somwhere that two of the characteristics of organizations that easily and readily accept and introduce bold change are small and young. The US Army is neither small (500K+AC, 1M+ total) nor young (200+years)

However, the Army could easily develop small and young Corps, Bdes, what have you and support forces for 1.5 year activate and trainup; 1.5 year deployment cycle (2x6mo deployments / mission asgmts) and a year of stand down, schools prior to the next activation, etc. That could be done relatively easily within the Cbt Arms Regimental System and need not necessarily be done for a lot of CSS elements. Of course, that would require trusting Commanders and not micro managing. It would also mean the massive HRC infrastructure would probably be unnecessary. Those two things may be beyond us.

However, there are other ways to skin that. Lots of ways to foster innovation and imaginative operating techniques. Unfortunately, they would require admitting that what we've been doing since 1917 with little change was and is probably wrong...