The emphasis was on "committed" in regard to "8 companies". Storr links it also to organization and appears to dismiss whatever the other units are doing (reserve, security..) as uninteresting.
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I wrote a lengthy response with an example of a typically complex action, but this is not the right place for such details. This has to suffice:


The current system is not very indicative or the actual potential for another reason; a different system would need a different doctrine and different training. It's doable.
Guderian is known as champion of armoured divisions and as influence on tank development and production. His most important contribution was another one, though: He transformed his armour commanders into commanders which were useful in his new system. He had to exorcise the fear of open flanks and slowness, for example. He had to select daring officers with the inner urge to move forward. The officer corps of 1935 wasn't suitable for the armoured division actions of 1940. Those actions would have appeared foolish and impossible in 1935 to most officers (and actually kept looking foolish & impossible up to their success in May 1940). They WERE impossible with 1935's officers.

The corps concept which I'm thinking of would require a different officer training, even if applied in Germany.