I own a Model 1840 Light Artillery Saber that shows signs of field use and also has the original leather straps still attached to the rings on the scabbard. It's marked 1860. I also have a Model 1840 NCO's Sword and leather scabbard that's in almost new condition. It was made by Ames and is dated 1864.Originally Posted by Van
Propellant lots etc:
It's not necessary to have PGMs to compensate for such variances. It's been standard procedures with several MRL systems to shoot one rocket, observe with radar, then self-destruct the rocket (timer) in the air in order to prevent that the following rocket salvo with corrected aim loses the surprise effect.
It adds a few seconds and is not very efficient with large rocket calibres, but it works.
There's also a trajectory correction system with which the launcher simply aims too high and the trajectory correction module in the rockets gets radio command to deploy air brakes at the perfect time to negate the distance error/dispersion.
Divisions/brigades:
It's been accepted in Europe since the Division 59 (a brigade-based design) that brigades are the way to go. The Americans learned the same in WW2 and re-learned it after the Pentomic excursion (maybe after ROAD, don't remember ROAD details now).
I'm still struggling to learn whyTF the division has come back to favour with so many people. It's obvious to me that we should delete the division level, not the corps level.
Brigades might actually be too large already. A very small brigade (two reinforced battalions worth) might be the way to go (=full circle to early 50's). We need very agile formations, and we've got much to do till we have them.
The Pentomic force structure with Battle Groups didn't work out.
It worked but didn't work out only because it was ahead of its time and
the Colonels didn't like it. That and the fact that the intended equipment got stalled in the bureaucracy and only started appearing in units AFTER the decision was made to revert to the tired and true -- and easier to control if you're into centralizing things -- Brigade of ROAD. The Pentomic concept had a great many good things, but it was designed for those who are willing to delegate and trust subordinates. Not the Army way...
Oh well, I might be one of the only people here who knows what Pentomic force structure and Battle Groups were. I read that it had something to do with dispersing units on a nuclear battlefield in Germany.
the Colonels didn't like it. That and the fact that the intended equipment got stalled in the bureaucracy and only started appearing in units AFTER the decision was made to revert to the tired and true -- and easier to control if you're into centralizing things -- Brigade of ROAD. The Pentomic concept had a great many good things, but it was designed for those who are willing to delegate and trust subordinates. Not the Army way...Pete, I think Ken actually served in the Pentomic Army. I know what it was, but only through reading about it.
Pentomic infantry divisvion consisted of five subunits commanded by colonels. The initial intent of the modularity mafia was to create five BCTs from division assets only. Hmmm - coincidence?
From what I read, Pentomic divisions did not include armor divisions which remained combat commands.
What happened to Sink or Swim?
Perhaps the BCT is not the best solution, but it has certainly been a step in the right direction. To revert back to a Division/Corps centric Army would be a complete devolution of combat effectiveness.
The Army's inability to delegate roles and responsibilities to lower echelons has contradicted and doomed the success of the BCT. I think that many have never wanted the BCT to succeed.
I think that Ken has hit the nail on the head. Today's Army does not perform well in a decentralized state. This, in my opinion, lends evidence to a larger problem... The Army's quality vs. quantity problem.the Colonels didn't like it. That and the fact that the intended equipment got stalled in the bureaucracy and only started appearing in units AFTER the decision was made to revert to the tired and true -- and easier to control if you're into centralizing things -- Brigade of ROAD. The Pentomic concept had a great many good things, but it was designed for those who are willing to delegate and trust subordinates. Not the Army way...
Lets be real and frank, the average (pick your rank) fails to embody the level of responsibility, proficiency, and professionalism necessary for the success of the BCT. Furthermore, the truly exemplary junior officers/NCOs have been virtually neutered of their authority/responsibilities. This has a detrimental effect on the entire Brigade.
What we need is the SOF mentality pushed out into the broader Army. Field grades should not be afraid to fire people, junior officers and NCOs must have the opportunity to succeed and/or fail. Eventually these mentalities will rub off onto the lower enlisted who will forgo their Halo tournament (video games) to concern themselves with putting rounds down range.
That system increases accuracy, but it will not give the the 1M CEP that you can get through the GPS/INS systems that GMLRS uses.
Rockets don't use propellant lots. They are standard. Artillery rounds do use the propellant lot code to determine MVV.
Sorry, I disagree. Although I like the idea of having brigade groups you'll still need an intermediary HQ between Corps and Bde if not because of span of control then information overload (I think the two might be connected. A purely divisional HQ outfit, no supporting arms (etc), purely devoted to C&C (anyone remember that game? brings back memories...) will be needed (as per UK practice). In fact, if 'm not mistaken the whole Uv/Ux/Uy/Uz (or whatever the acronymns are, Yanks really do love 'dem acronyms) is based on the concept that a "divisional" type HQ will be set up (on an ad hoc basis) to manage the bdes. Can't see a corps commander having to deal with up to 5 manouvre bdes, a couple o' support bdes, maybe an artillery bde or two (if the US still has those of course) and maybe an aviation bde (for starters). Of course if fewer bdes are attached you've just got an old school Div anyway. Come to think of it, IIRC I read somewhere that US doctrine calls for US commanders to plan two levels below them (hardly aufragstaktik, but if it works for them, who am I to judge). IFF (if and only if) that's the case then a Corps cdr is going to have to plan not only for the 5 bdes (my maths isn't as good as TAH's, or anyones for that matter, so 'll forgoe mentioning the other bdes
) but also for their constituent bns (lets say four) for a total of 20 and five Bde HQ. That's my take on it anyway.
Last edited by Tukhachevskii; 10-04-2010 at 09:29 AM.
I can describe a leadership & command method that easily allows for such a corps, the span of command is no insurmountable challenge. It's basically about horizontal cooperation instead of synchronization planning, Auftragstaktik and about a different training of leaders.
Military history has seen many highly successful operations with a very small amount of directions from corps or division down to brigades.
The challenge at the operational level doesn't seem to be the span of command, but the understanding of the situation and issuing missions in a timely fashion.
An emphasis on reconnaissance / skirmishing forces helps with the former, minimal staff sizes and careful selection & training of leaders and staff personnel helps with the latter.
Last edited by Fuchs; 10-04-2010 at 08:23 PM.
Straight up, I'm sceptical about that but would love to stand corrected and see this occur. I think it might run all very well so long as every thing was IAW THE PLAN but at the point of departure from THE PLAN, I think the corps staff, no matter how augmented by staff and technology, would be unable to keep up with events. The complexity would not come so much from the conduct of combat/kinetic operations but from the need to sustain those forces one their initial loadout was consumed and equipment began to require maintenance, recovery, etc...
A centralised headquarters would also be just that, centralised, keeping the next higher level of command and coord away from where operations are being conducted i.e. unless the missionspace is so small or the tempo so slow, the corps command can only be close to some not all of the actions that may need influence/guidance from the next level up...
Well, this may be the right time to mention that I'm not exactly convinced of planning or even a fan of planning. I'm more into creating opportunities and exploiting the same with cat-like reactions.
The force densities and the mobility of a well-organized and well-trained battalion exceed the horizon of a divisional headquarters anyway. To restrict brigades to Div Cmd and to lead a corps operation by issuing orders to two or three divisions isn't going to work well any more any way.
Such a mode adds too many restrictions, too many delays, too much friction ... let's just mention that it's a bad idea. The time of the division has passed away. it has actually passed away back in the 50's when NATO planned to defend a 1,000 km front-line in Central Europe with basically only 26 divisions instead of having 100-400 divisions on a 1,000 km front-line as Europe experienced it a few years earlier. The wide frontages required a mobility and agility which simply didn't fit into the division corset.
West Germany would have introduced a brigade-centric army without divisions based on late war experiences in the 50's, but didn't for entirely political reasons: The government had promised 12 "divisions" to Western Allies.
That's how outdated the division actually is.
OK... frunning the BS flag up the pole
I don't even know where to start... but I will do my best to be brief...
Mandatory caveat upfront... I too am a fan of reducing unnecessary levels of bureacracy where and when appropriate...
"I'm not exactly convinced of planning or even a fan of planning. I'm more into creating opportunities and exploiting the same with cat-like reactions."
Hmmmm.... Not sure which of the two to begin with... is it that you don't enjoy planning or is it that you don't find the activity of identifying likely future challenges and possible solution approaches very productive? Trust me, I hate planning too... it sucks... never ending series of what if's that the CDR wants examined... that said, perhaps not everyone has cat-like reactions or that they should have cat-like reactions... sometimes you have to go slow to go fast... maybe this approach is good up to a certain point... but to be honest I'm not a fan
"Such a mode adds too many restrictions, too many delays, too much friction ... let's just mention that it's a bad idea. The time of the division has passed away. it has actually passed away back in the 50's when NATO planned to defend a 1,000 km front-line in Central Europe with basically only 26 divisions instead of having 100-400 divisions on a 1,000 km front-line as Europe experienced it a few years earlier. The wide frontages required a mobility and agility which simply didn't fit into the division corset."
Which operations are you referencing? Division centric operations in DS/DS weren't overly pedantric... leash was logistical not an inability to operate without detailed orders... OIF 1 wasn't exactly plodding either on the combat side... again logistics was the leash (that and a biblical-esque mud shower)...
How exactly have Division staffs impeded BCT operations in OIF/OEF beyond initial combat operations???
"The West German Army would have moved to BCT centric forces if not for NATO..."
and the obvious reason that keeps popping up... Resourcing, Managing and synchronizing non-maneuver combat enablers/forces
Redundancy in these capabilities is not sustainable (pun intended)... or at least that seems to be the case in this instance
Live well and row
Last edited by Hacksaw; 10-04-2010 at 09:26 PM.
Hacksaw
Say hello to my 2 x 4
Based on my reading of German military history (Moltke the Elder and his political mirror image excepted-Bismarck) I'd say that's been a problem for a while. Yes, sure you can create opportunities on the battlefield, exploit gaps and infiltrate entire armour coprs into the Ardennes (for instance)...but then what? Dunkirk? Orsha?(i.e. the command conference duruing Op Barbarossa, eastern front). How the hell do you "plan" (sorry, dirty word) for contingencies (in a world of finite resources and a limited force size at your disposal)? How do you know which manourvre groups need to be augmented with extra armour/artillery/infantry/engineers? Where do you take an operational or even (if you're feeliong lucky) and operational pause to allow your log tail (or log pack if you're feeling corporate) catch up with you?
Oh look, we've penetrated 50 miles into Clairmont(Kelly Heroes reference there for all you fans!) shame we didn't have any bridging equipment or have sufficient logistics stored to maintain it given that our feline reflexes meant that all our unused CSS elements were commited to another bright spark suffering from over-activity! OTOH, ooooops, I really wich we'd thought this through (aka "planned") and had an extra few inf bns to secure our flanks (etc., etc., etc.). Or something along those lines.
Last edited by Tukhachevskii; 10-05-2010 at 01:23 PM. Reason: Added resource and force constraints qualifier
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