The Danger of Conflation: AQ through Intel eyes

[Bob's World]

Actually my primary concern with Pakistan has very little to do with AQ or the Taliban and has everything to do with how our pursuit of both is changing the delicate balance of deterrence between Pakistan and India.

I think we apply a very incomplete and narrow definition to "sanctuary" (ungoverned spaces); and a very broad definition of AQ to combine to lead us to an incredibly destabilizing family of engagement. All of this seems to be done as if we think it has no affect on Pak-Indian deterrence

Instability in Afghanistan through Muj and now Taliban agents is an important aspect of Pakistan's deterrence with India. As is stability in the tribal areas of Pakistan through largely allowing those populaces to be self-governing. With all of our intervention and forcing of Pakistan to adopt a very powerful conflict of interests (maintaining good relations with the US overtly, while covertly pursuing instability operations to support their deterrence against India). What effect on deterrence? Add to this India getting more involved in Afghanistan as well.

Deterrence is a delicate balance game, walking a fine line between actions that provoke and actions that deter. When the balance point changes, mistakes are more apt to happen.

Is it a victory for western interest in South Asia if we atrit AQ but provoke a nuclear exchange between Indian and Pakistan at the same time?? I don't think so. When Secretary Clinton recently spoke on Pakistan's nuclear weapons she made no indication that the thought had ever entered her head that we could be disrupting the balance of deterrence. Loose nukes are not the greatest risk. State employment of nukes is.

[Entropy]

I would argue 1 and 2 are AQ and its UW network. We should quietly, ruthlessly and persistently capture/kill 1 and disrupt 2.

How do you reconcile that with this:

Actually my primary concern with Pakistan has very little to do with AQ or the Taliban and has everything to do with how our pursuit of both is changing the delicate balance of deterrence between Pakistan and India.

...considering that most of those in category 1 and many in 2 are in those "ungoverned" Pakistani spaces? If not drone strikes, then what? The drone strikes are extremely unpopular among the domestic Pakistani population and I think they are having a destabilizing effect on Pakistan itself. Is there something else that can kill/capture 1 and disrupt 2 in without all the negative effects of drone strikes?

This article is actually pretty good in how it lays out the fact that AQ is a larger problem today than they were 9 years ago

That's a common assertion - one that I think is supported by little evidence.

[Bob's World]

How do you reconcile that with this:



...considering that most of those in category 1 and many in 2 are in those "ungoverned" Pakistani spaces? If not drone strikes, then what? The drone strikes are extremely unpopular among the domestic Pakistani population and I think they are having a destabilizing effect on Pakistan itself. Is there something else that can kill/capture 1 and disrupt 2 in without all the negative effects of drone strikes?



That's a common assertion - one that I think is supported by little evidence.

I don't believe there are any ungoverned spaces in Afghanistan or Pakistan either one. Plenty of self-governed spaces, through sophisticated, historic and cultural processes that have little to do with Kabul or Islamabad; but governed all the same. We disrespect the governance of this region and these people when we do not recognize the role and importance of this very legitimate, but often "unofficial" governance.

Which leads us to reconciling my comments. We focus on getting permissions from and participation with the official governance in the capitals, and worry about western concepts of sovereignty as we have come to define them over the years and then use to measure the "success" or "failure" of other societies with. It is by forcing a conflict of interest on the official Pakistan government to extend and assert itself upon the self-governing Pashtuns that creates the friction; it is the violation of Western concepts of sovereignty that creates the friction.

I suspect that if we allow Pakistan to go back to the business of restraining their official extension of governance to the Indus river valley we could work out a very reasonable accommodation with the Pashtun populace that is cast within concepts of Pashtunwali rather than Westphalia.

Back in 2002 I read a report from a SOF Commander on the ground with the Pakistani military on their very first excursion up into the tribal areas post 9/11. As the Pakistan military were going about their business in a village, our guy was off to the side talking with the village elders. One comment stuck him significantly enough to include it in his report. It struck me as well as I read it in the basement of the Pentagon at 0200 working on SOF portion of the morning brief for the Army Staff.

"You must understand" he said, "We really do not like the government forces coming up into our territory. You, however, we do not mind. You are here for revenge, and revenge we understand."

We applied a Western solution to an Eastern problem. It is not working.
We need to understand that the number one concern of Pakistan is India.
We need to understand that Pakistan allows self-governance of the tribal areas for a reason.
We need to understand that instability in, and influence over, Afghanistan will always be a critical national interest for Pakistan regardless of how much of our money they take.
We need to understand that Western ways and perspectives are not inherently superior to the ways and perspectives of others.

I would recommend we develop a campaign for going after Tier 1 and 2 AQ in Pakistan that carefully avoids tier 3, and that is negotiated with the tribal leaders of the region and shaped by concepts of revenge and Pashtunwali. I suspect that a Pakistan relieved of the pressure of extending governance and Westphalian concepts into the tribal areas will be very open to such a deal. Devils in the details, but I think it is a far more sound approach than the current one.


As to Evidence of AQ's expansion of influence, that is really rooted in the eyes of the beholder. A shopkeeper, a farmer and a hunter all walk through the same forest; if later asked as to what they saw, you would get three very different answers. I know we have done very little to reduce the conditions of insurgency across Islam that AQ feeds upon with their UW campaign. I know AQ is in more of those areas now than they used to be. I know that Western influence is less in those same regions due to the very nature of our GWOT responses to date. I appreciate that the "caliphate" is far more a conceptual bit of recruiting propaganda than a true physical goal for an organization that appreciates better than we do that their greatest form of sanctuary is their very non-state status and the support of the poorly governed populaces they associate with.

Even if AQ were wiped out to the man tomorrow, all of the conditions they feed upon are still there, and if anything enhanced by our our GWOT engagement. AQ is a symptom, they are a supplier stepping up to address a demand. Our fear should be that we somehow defeat this flawed supplier and allow them to replaced by a more effective one.

By understanding conflation and breaking the problem back into its respective pieces we can then tailor our engagement much more effectively. To just bundle it all up into a ball and then smash that ball with a hammer is frankly stupid. Proving yet again, that smart people do stupid things. This is fixable. This still time to shift the majority of our focus to demand and to narrow the scope of how we engage supply.