Originally Posted by
Bob's World
Now Tom, don't put words in my mouth.
No one ever said that when faced with a violent insurgency that it would not require violent reactions, only that such violent reactions are not war because the objectives are different than war because the opponent is your own populace and you're going to have to live with them when its over.
COIN is the business of civil government. Like all emergencies that exceed the control of the civil government the military is brought in as excess capacity to fill that requirement. Last in, First out. Just because the military showed up does not change a civil emergency into war either; though too often when the military shows up the civil government abdicates its responsibilities and the military turns it into war.
The American Civil Rights movement was largely a non-military response with a main effort of addressing the wrongs of government rather than defeating the wronged segment of the society. That was excellent COIN.
The co-opting of a conference to update the articles of Confederation in a young nation sliding into widespread insurgency in the summer of 1787 and re-writing the law of the land to control the damaging effects of raw democracy, but at the same time ensure checks and balances to prevent future abuses of a more powerful central government with a President; rather than simply calling out the Militia in each Colony to suppress the rebellions was also excellent COIN.
It is not the presence of military or the tactic of violence that makes war war. It is the purpose and nature of the conflict. The purpose and nature of COIN is that of civil emergency, and to address it as war typically makes it worse.
I'm not sure why so many are so hard-set that COIN must be war. I'm even more baffled why so many are so hard-set that when we assist a foreign nation with their COIN that we must be doing COIN as well and fighting their war as well. There is no upside from such an approach. It creates inappropriate perspectives and it also creates avoidable strategic risk for our nation.
What was the upside of taking over the role of COIN for the (illegitimate) government of South Vietnam and fighting their war for them?
What is the upside of taking over the role of COIN for the (equally illegitimate) government of Afghanistan and fighting their war for them?
What would the downside have been to the US's strategic interests if we would have not taken such a course in South Vietnam? We knew then as well as we know now that China was never going to suddenly become great friends with a unified Vietnam, regardless of what form of government they employed to wage their campaign to throw off unwanted Western influence.
What would the downside be to having Afghans decide what the government of Afghanistan should be? Does anyone really believe that even if the Taliban did ultimately prevail there that they would be able to revert to their old ways of dark age Islam? Does anyone really believe that AQ trainees would be swinging on the monkey bars at training camps again, unmolested by Western CT capabilities?
This is one of many problems with making something "war." War is like baseball, you keep playing until someone "wins" and someone "loses."
What good comes from a Government making their populace "lose"? No one wins in that scenario.
War is indeed politics. So is insurgency. But COIN is Governance and that is a very different thing indeed.
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