War is War

[SJPONeill]

Bob,

The CT were how the Commonwealth forces in Malaya referred to the insurgents as part of their IO campaign to deny them legitimacy. They may have been supported by the ethnic Chinese community and that is debatable but even if they were, that Chinese community was only a small proportion of the actual population of Malaya so you can not claim that the CT/MNLA had broad popular support.

The Taliban in AFG are insurgents - so....? We're discussing their level of popular support and I'd argue that it isn't that high in AFG either - if it were, then that campaign would probably be all done and dusted in their favour by now.

AQ in Iraq - ditto.

Republicans in Northern Ireland: Insurgents. "...A revolutionary nationalist movement to remove the illegitimate (in the eyes of the populace...) British government..." Which portion of the populace? Unless you're going back to the 1920s, I think you'll find that the majority of the populace there didn't actually hold that belief.

Militia in Timor Leste: "...Not super familiar, if they were locals they were insurgents..." Once again, that's irrelevant - the question is how much popular support did they have and the answer is not much. Some good books on this campaignsnow and David Kilcullen also covers his part in it as a company commander in Accidental Guerrilla...

Mau Mau in Kenya: "...Insurgents...." So....? Their level of popular support was low...

Under your FID model, most of WW2 consisted of a series of FID campaigns. The 2010 version of JP 3.22 FID defines it as:

"...the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security...."

That's fine up to the point where the intervention is supporting the host nation's programmes but once intervention operations cross beyond that point into the situations of Vietnam, Iraq and AFG, or Malaya, Indochine and Algerie where the line between host nation and intervening nation are blurred, then you are into something that is other than, and bigger than, FID....


Simon

[Presley Cannady]

I will continue posting on this topic, but I am interested in other opinions. My question is, who on this forum thinks "war is war"? And if you do, what does that mean? And how does that help the current soldiers?

By simple reflexive property, "war is war." If you're asking (as your posts suggest) whether or not the phrase captures a view that violence is central in war, then yes...violence is central--by definition. If you and your adversary somehow agree to turn off the spigot, you're no longer in a war. You're in something else. Call it a rivalry, or a marriage. If you're ambitious, you might take a shot at predicting to what extent you can dial back the violence and still win, but you'll have to account for at least two things largely outside of your control:

1) Your enemy's stomach for gore.
2) The war zone population's natural sympathy one way or the other.

This assumes, of course, you want to win. Given all this postmodern yakking about people not even knowing what "winning" means anymore...well, you know.

[Dayuhan]

Actually there is a huge difference between invasion and UW.

In the wider sense yes, in terms of taking responsibility for the consequences of our actions, less so.

I've said myself many times that there's a huge difference between a government falling to an invasion and a government falling to a revolution. if a revolutionary force is organized and capable enough to successfully remove an existing government there will be someone able to govern in the aftermath. They may not govern well, but they will be able to govern.

When we chose to intervene, the Northern Alliance controlled less than 5% of the country, essentially just the Panjshir Valley and an isolated enclave in the NE. Their most effective leader was dead. Their ethnic composition made it difficult for them to form lasting alliances with groups elsewhere in the country. They were not a rising force. Quite the opposite; without our intervention they would probably not have lasted much longer.

Our intervention took this marginal, fading group to Kabul. This would not have happened without our intervention, and the consequences of that decision are on us, whatever strategy we used to execute it.

The reason we got got into the current fix we are in is because we wanted to use Afghanistan as a base of operations to continure our pursuit of AQ, so we stayed, manipulated the form, nature, and leadership of the government, then commited ourselves to keeping it in power. Those were choices, and bad ones.

That's one of the reasons. We also had the idea that if we could create a functioning Afghan government we could, in the long run, prevent any future AQ resurgence. There were also politics involved: we felt compelled to dfemonstrate our benevolent goals by bringing democracy, women's rights, development, and all that other good stuff. In part this was political show, but we do also suffer the occasional missionary impulse. American foreign policy is often an off and frequently unreconciled blend of the mercenary and the missionary, and we are often most dangerous, to ourselves and others, when in the grip of the missionary impulse.

I certainly agree that our decision to try to install a government that suited us in Afghanistan was a mistake.

The point of all this to me (at least the point that's relevant to this thread) is that I believe that the oft-pronounced dictum that COIN is our future, and the belief that our wars of the near and medium future will closely resemble the ones we're in now, is not necessarily true. There's no inherent reason why we have to be involved in COIN as these conflicts wind down. Other than these insurgencies that our choices created, there are few if any insurgencies, anywhere, that require anything more that a limited FID role from us. Many don't even require that. If we want to back away from COIN, we can do it by backing away from this bizarre impulse to remove and replace governments. It's not something we need to do, and based on assessment of efforts to date I'd have to say it hasn't worked out well for us. We should be thinking hard and well before we try it again.

We have gotten into a (bad) habit of manipulating governments so that we have a friendly government in power, and overlooking how in many cases those relationships are distancing those same governments from their own populaces, enabling them to trim civil rights and act with impunity.

I think you're vastly overestimating the impact of our relationships with these governments on their relationships with their populaces. Our influence just isn't that great. These governments are relating to their populaces in the manner that is traditional and habitual in these parts of the world. That may and probably will change over time, but the degree to which we can influence it - and the degree to which we enable it - is very limited.

Instead of sustaining poor governance in power we are better served in "forcing" (coercing, influencing, threating to take our ball and go home, theatening to support their insurgent populace rather than them if they persist in their oppressive ways, etc. It is a range of options.

I think, again, that you vastly overstate the degree to which we sustain these governments. Our aid is just not that large or significant, and many of these governments don't get aid from us at all. There are a few that do rely on us (Afghanistan and Yemen come to mind) but these haven't the capacity to reform, or even to govern, in any event. If we try to reform them, they'll put on as much of a show as they can but do very little, because that's all they can do. If we walk away they'll collapse. They may eventually be able to reform themselves, but it's likely to take decades.

The idea that we have the duty, right, or capacity to coerce or influence other governments to do what we think they should is to me an example of the missionary impulse I referred to above. I realize that the intentions are good, but I doubt very much that the outcome will be.

[Bob's World]

Bob,

The CT were how the Commonwealth forces in Malaya referred to the insurgents as part of their IO campaign to deny them legitimacy. They may have been supported by the ethnic Chinese community and that is debatable but even if they were, that Chinese community was only a small proportion of the actual population of Malaya so you can not claim that the CT/MNLA had broad popular support.

The Taliban in AFG are insurgents - so....? We're discussing their level of popular support and I'd argue that it isn't that high in AFG either - if it were, then that campaign would probably be all done and dusted in their favour by now.

AQ in Iraq - ditto.

Republicans in Northern Ireland: Insurgents. "...A revolutionary nationalist movement to remove the illegitimate (in the eyes of the populace...) British government..." Which portion of the populace? Unless you're going back to the 1920s, I think you'll find that the majority of the populace there didn't actually hold that belief.

Militia in Timor Leste: "...Not super familiar, if they were locals they were insurgents..." Once again, that's irrelevant - the question is how much popular support did they have and the answer is not much. Some good books on this campaigns now and David Kilcullen also covers his part in it as a company commander in Accidental Guerrilla...

Mau Mau in Kenya: "...Insurgents...." So....? Their level of popular support was low...

Under your FID model, most of WW2 consisted of a series of FID campaigns. The 2010 version of JP 3.22 FID defines it as:



That's fine up to the point where the intervention is supporting the host nation's programmes but once intervention operations cross beyond that point into the situations of Vietnam, Iraq and AFG, or Malaya, Indochine and Algerie where the line between host nation and intervening nation are blurred, then you are into something that is other than, and bigger than, FID....


Simon

A lot of people get fixated on percentages, as if the segment of the populace experiencing conditions of insurgency and therefore generally supportive of the insurgent cause is less than a majority it doesn't matter.

Fact is that these are populaces that were denied legal, effective means to affect change of government in every case listed; so they were forced to take illegal approaches to advance their concerns. Is 5% of the populace enough? 10%? Depends by case, but arguing percentages is the type of moot rationalization that the Counterinsurgent often wallows in. Just as they wallow in "facts" in regards to the insurgents stated rationale for mounting an illegal opposition. Small percentages of the total populace, with perhaps broader support within some distinct segment is enough. Facts as assessed by others are moot as it is all about how this segment of the populace feels about their governance. I think more often than not, what is sufficient causation for such a segment of populace is considered irrational by the government (usually to their ultimate chagrin).

That is why COIN really just very very rarely would ever fall into a category where one would approach it with best effect through warfare. Good governments identify and address such concerns as a matter of course, or have established trusted and certain processes for the populace to at least vent legally, whether they get their way or not. When such outlets (hope) are denied, small things become what we call here "small wars." Most are tragically avoidable by governments simply being less arrogant and self-serving and more wiling to represent and answer to the will of the populace they are supposed to serve.

[SJPONeill]

an armed rebellion that enjoys a broad base of popular support.

Bob, those are the words that YOU used and I don't think that you can credibly argue that 5% or even 10% = a "...broad base of popular support..." In fact, in Malaya, the lack of the broad base was one of the key reasons that the COIN campaign was so successful and why perhaps so many derived so many false lessons from that campaign.

Fact is that these are populaces that were denied legal, effective means to affect change of government in every case listed; so they were forced to take illegal approaches to advance their concerns.

Popular myth does not equal fact: your statement above is not correct other than in that there are always disaffected elements in every society who seek to circumvent the due processes...in each of the examples i gave they DID exists workables means for affecting change: the 'insurgents' were only forced into the methods they adopted because they DID NOT enjoy the level of popular support that would have made legitimate means feasible for them...Hungary 56 and Prague 68 would be better examples to support your 'argument'...

That is why COIN really just very very rarely would ever fall into a category where one would approach it with best effect through warfare.

Correct but only in that a fundamental aspect of COIN is the need for a comprehensive approach (UK/Commonwealth) or unified action (US) that harnesses broader instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives. ONE of this is military force: if there was no need in a specific scenario for the application, or threat, of force to achieve those objectives then it wouldn't (yet) be a COIN campaign - it would be law enforcement or perhaps internal security...at most, perhaps, FID...

[Bob's World]

Bob, those are the words that YOU used and I don't think that you can credibly argue that 5% or even 10% = a "...broad base of popular support..." In fact, in Malaya, the lack of the broad base was one of the key reasons that the COIN campaign was so successful and why perhaps so many derived so many false lessons from that campaign.



Popular myth does not equal fact: your statement above is not correct other than in that there are always disaffected elements in every society who seek to circumvent the due processes...in each of the examples i gave they DID exists workable means for affecting change: the 'insurgents' were only forced into the methods they adopted because they DID NOT enjoy the level of popular support that would have made legitimate means feasible for them...Hungary 56 and Prague 68 would be better examples to support your 'argument'...



Correct but only in that a fundamental aspect of COIN is the need for a comprehensive approach (UK/Commonwealth) or unified action (US) that harnesses broader instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives. ONE of this is military force: if there was no need in a specific scenario for the application, or threat, of force to achieve those objectives then it wouldn't (yet) be a COIN campaign - it would be law enforcement or perhaps internal security...at most, perhaps, FID...

1. "Broad" is within some segment of the populace, not the populace as a whole.

2. I suspect the reason COIN was so successful in Malaysia was due primarily to the replacement of a government "broadly" seen as illegitimate (drawing its legitimacy from Great Britain) with one more broadly seen as drawing its legitimacy from the people of Malaysia.

We often do things that work or don't work and we never really know why, so we attribute that success or failure to things that had little to really do with it. This is why so much of what is drawn from the study of COIN without also drilling into the realm of insurgency, comes up just a shade off.

Like the whole "separate the insurgent from the populace". Well, the insurgent is part of the populace, what one really needs to do is separate the UW actor from the segment of the populace where conditions of insurgency exist. This was one of the great truisms from Malaysia. But again, I suspect the largely understated and misunderstood changes to governance were the real reason that the COIN campaign had enduring effects.

Another truism that is driving much of our rationale for staying in AFPAK in such a large way is the belief that sanctuary comes from "ungoverned spaces." I think far more accurately sanctuary comes from a mix of legal status (hiding behind a sovereign border, being outside the law, being a non-state actor, etc), the support of a poorly governed populace (a populace experiencing conditions of insurgency), and some mix of favorable terrain, veg, etc that allows one to hide from ISR. An apartment in NYC works.

We need to study insurgency more to better understand WHY certain approaches work or don't. Once we do that we can design better approaches for dealing with similar problems in the future. This is what I try to do, and why I remain convinced that "COIN is not war."

[Presley Cannady]

2. I suspect the reason COIN was so successful in Malaysia was due primarily to the replacement of a government "broadly" seen as illegitimate (drawing its legitimacy from Great Britain) with one more broadly seen as drawing its legitimacy from the people of Malaysia.

Broadly seen by who?

[SJPONeill]

1. "Broad" is within some segment of the populace, not the populace as a whole.

So not broad then...

2. I suspect the reason COIN was so successful in Malaysia was due primarily to the replacement of a government "broadly" seen as illegitimate (drawing its legitimacy from Great Britain) with one more broadly seen as drawing its legitimacy from the people of Malaysia.

A little less suspecting and a little more researching necessary, I think...Malaysia and Malaya and not quite the same thing for starters. Apart from a small ethnically-distinct group, who saw the immediately post-WW2 administration in Malaya as illegitimate? Malaya was not India with all its attendant issues. The secret to most successful COIN campaigns is actually addressing the core/root issues while not openly appearing to do so...

We often do things that work or don't work and we never really know why, so we attribute that success or failure to things that had little to really do with it. This is why so much of what is drawn from the study of COIN without also drilling into the realm of insurgency, comes up just a shade off.

Like the whole "separate the insurgent from the populace". Well, the insurgent is part of the populace, what one really needs to do is separate the UW actor from the segment of the populace where conditions of insurgency exist. This was one of the great truisms from Malaysia. But again, I suspect the largely understated and misunderstood changes to governance were the real reason that the COIN campaign had enduring effects.

No truism but fact - the campaign in Malaya was won in a large part by the fact that the CT/MNLA were likely ethnic Chinese, a minority and visually different part of the population that was easy to isolate from the larger population. Malaya was also a peninsula that made it difficult for any offshore support (assuming such even existed closer than China) to get the insurgents and which removed an chance of external sanctuaries. The campaign was pretty much over before there were any legislative changes in Malaya and it becoming Malaysia. The more enduring problem it has had to work through has been its relationship with Singapore.

Another truism that is driving much of our rationale for staying in AFPAK in such a large way is the belief that sanctuary comes from "ungoverned spaces." I think far more accurately sanctuary comes from a mix of legal status (hiding behind a sovereign border, being outside the law, being a non-state actor, etc), the support of a poorly governed populace (a populace experiencing conditions of insurgency), and some mix of favorable terrain, veg, etc that allows one to hide from ISR. An apartment in NYC works.

Agree

We need to study insurgency more to better understand WHY certain approaches work or don't. Once we do that we can design better approaches for dealing with similar problems in the future.

Agree again...aren't we all...

This is what I try to do, and why I remain convinced that "COIN is not war."

While a true COIN campaign must have a comprehensive approach/unified action, there is often little to distinguish the military aspects of it from war...ask a company commander in Kandahar or Helmand provinces how his job differs from that of his granddad marching across WW2 Europe or up around the Chosin Reservoir...

[Bob's World]

Every form of maneuver is a frontal assault for the lead squad. All combat similarly is very war-like for the troops on the ground. True, and so what?

What does that have to do with the nature of the event as a whole?

If one leaps out of an airplane they are essentially flying all the way until they impact with the ground. Best not to confuse falling with flying just because on so many levels it appears the same. Combat does not equal war. What makes it war is if it is a problem that can be resolved through warfare. Combat opns are a supporting aspect of COIN. The problem is that we say COIN is war, we make the military the lead, and then they set out to defeat the insurgent. Often they succeed in that task. Over, and over, and over again in many cases. This is the "resurgency" that Dr. Metz spoke to.

To actually resolve an insurgency one must address the conditions of insurgency within the populace. These conditions are caused by the government, and they must be resolved by the government, typically by changing itself, not merely crushing that segment of the populace that dare to complain.

As to Malaya, we tend to focus on the military tactics rather than the much more significant movements at the political level to remove the illegitimate colonial government, grant the ethnic chinese populace the right to vote, conduct reconciliation and generally address the conditions of insurgency. Once the conditions were addressed the insurgents simply faded away for lack of relevance. the military operations merely helped shape the conditions. Insurgencies are fought in the countryside, and that violence is very warlike. They are won or lost, however, in the capital, and that is typically much more simply ensuring the people have good governance.

Oh, and as you requested, here is 3 minutes of wiki research to back my position:

"Resolving the Emergency

On October 6, 1951 the MNLA ambushed and killed the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney. The killing has been described as a major factor in causing the Malayan population to roundly reject the MNLA campaign, and also as leading to widespread fear due to the perception that "if even the High Commissioner was no longer safe, there was little hope of protection and safety for the man-in-the-street in Malaya."[11] More recently, MNLA leader Chin Peng stated that the killing had little effect, and that the communists anyway radically altered their strategy that month in their "October Resolutions".[12] The October Resolutions, a response to the Briggs Plan, involved a change of tactics by reducing attacks on economic targets and civilians, increasing efforts to go into political organisation and subversion, and bolstering the supply network from the Min Yuen as well as jungle farming.

Gurney's successor, Lieutenant General Gerald Templer, was instructed by the British government to push for immediate measures to give Chinese ethnic residents the right to vote. He also pursued the Briggs Plan, and sped up the formation of a Malayan army. At the same time he made it clear that the Emergency itself was the main impediment to accelerating decolonisation. He also increased financial rewards for detecting guerrillas by any civilians and expanded the intelligence network (Special Branch).

[edit] Government's Declaration of Amnesty
On September 8, 1955, the Government of the Federation of Malaya issued a declaration of amnesty to the Communists.[13] The Government of Singapore issued an identical offer at the same time. Tunku Abdul Rahman, as Chief Minister, made good the offer of an amnesty but promised there would be no negotiations with the MNLA. The terms of the amnesty were:

Those of you who come in and surrender will not be prosecuted for any offense connected with the Emergency, which you have committed under Communist direction, either before this date or in ignorance of this declaration.
You may surrender now and to whom you like including to members of the public.
There will be no general "ceasefire" but the security forces will be on alert to help those who wish to accept this offer and for this purpose local "ceasefire" will be arranged.
The Government will conduct investigations on those who surrender. Those who show that they are genuinely intent to be loyal to the Government of Malaya and to give up their Communist activities will be helped to regain their normal position in society and be reunited with their families. As regards the remainder, restrictions will have to be placed on their liberty but if any of them wish to go to China, their request will be given due consideration.[14]
Following the declaration, an intensive publicity campaign on a hitherto unprecedented scale was launched by the Government. Alliance Ministers in the Federal Government travelled extensively up and down the country exhorting the people to call upon the Communists to lay down their arms and take advantage of the amnesty. The response from the public was good. Public demonstrations and processions were held in towns and villages. Despite the campaign, few Communists surrendered to the authorities. It was evident that the Communists, having had ample warning of its declaration, conducted intensive anti-amnesty propaganda in their ranks and among the mass organizations, tightened discipline and warned that defection would be severely punished. Some critics in the political circles commented that the amnesty was too restrictive and little more than a restatement of the surrender terms which have been in force for a long period. The critics advocated a more realistic and liberal approach of direct negotiations with the MCP to work out a settlement of the issue. Leading officials of the Labour Party had, as part of the settlement, not exclude the possibility of recognition of the MCP as a political organization. Within the Alliance itself, influential elements in both the MCA and UMNO were endeavouring to persuade the Chief Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman to hold negotiations with the MCP.[14]

[edit] The Baling Talks
Main article: The Baling Talks
Realizing that his conflict had not come to any fruition, Chin Peng sought a referendum with the ruling British government alongside many Malayan officials in 1955. The talk took place in the Government English School at Baling on December 28. The MCP was represented by Chin Peng, the Secretary-General, Rashid Maidin and Chen Tien, head of the MCP's Central Propaganda Department; on the other side were three elected national representatives, Tunku Abdul Rahman, Dato's Tan Cheng-Lock and David Saul Marshall, the Chief Minister of Singapore. The meeting was intended to pursue a mutual end to the conflict but the Malayan government representatives, led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, dismissed all of Chin Peng's demands. As a result, the conflict heightened and, in response, New Zealand sent NZSAS soldiers, No. 14 Squadron RNZAF No.41(Bristol Freighter)Squadron and later No. 75 Squadron RNZAF, and other Commonwealth members also sent troops to aid the British.

Following the failure of the talks, Tunku decided to withdraw the amnesty on 8 February 1956, five months after it had been offered, stating that he would not be willing to meet the Communists again unless they indicated beforehand their desire to see him with a view to making "a complete surrender".[15] Despite the failure of the talks, the MCP made every effort to resume peace talks with Malayan Government, without success. Instead, discussions began in the new Emergency Operations Council to intensify the "People's War" against the guerillas. In July 1957, a few weeks before Independence, the MCP made another attempt at peace talks, suggesting the following conditions for a negotiated peace:

its members should be given privileges enjoyed by citizens
a guarantee that political as well as armed members of the MCP would not be punished.
Tunku Abdul Rahman, however, did not respond to the MCP's proposals.

With the independence of Malaya under Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman on 31 August 1957, the insurrection lost its rationale as a war of colonial liberation. The last serious resistance from MRLA guerrillas ended with a surrender in the Telok Anson marsh area in 1958. The remaining MRLA forces fled to the Thai border and further east.

[Dayuhan]

We need to study insurgency more to better understand WHY certain approaches work or don't. Once we do that we can design better approaches for dealing with similar problems in the future. This is what I try to do, and why I remain convinced that "COIN is not war."

Would it be reasonable to say that COIN typically requires a military component (war) and a non-military component (not war) and is unlikely to succeed if both components are not effectively managed?

It seems to me that our problems in COIN scenarios stem largely from a tendency to vastly overestimate our ability to manage the non-military aspect of COIN ("creating good governance" for someone else is easy to say, very hard to do) and a tendency to use military forces to try to manage the non-military aspects of COIN, a role that they are not trained or equipped to fill.

In general I'd agree that good governance is the best prevention and the best cure to insurgency. In some cases, though, the formula does fall down, especially when faced with niche groups that feature extreme devotion to a cause that the rest of the population is ambivalent about or opposed to... or in cases where different portions of a populace have mutually exclusive and irreconcilable demands or expectations from government.

[Backwards Observer]

MPAJA's Chin Peng receives Burma Star and 1939/45 Star from Admiral Mountbatten, January 6, 1946. (small photo)

Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army - Wikipedia

Chin Peng - 2009 Article in Malaysia Star

"40 Commando RM" with heads published in The Daily Worker, May 10, 1952. (large photo)

"War in the jungle is not a nice thing but we cannot forego the necessity for exact identification of communist dead." (Field Marshall Templer in a telegram to Colonial Secretary Lyttleton in response to the publication of the photo in the Daily Worker) (photo and quote from alias Chin Peng, pp.302-304)

alias Chin Peng - amazon UK

[Global Scout]

Fact is that these are populaces that were denied legal, effective means to affect change of government in every case listed; so they were forced to take illegal approaches to advance their concerns.

this is only true in some cases, in others you're damn right there is no legal means for a minority to establish a communist form of government or implement Shari'a law. In your view the government is always the villian, and the insurgent always has a just cause. That is baloney.

[SJPONeill]

On September 8, 1955, the Government of the Federation of Malaya issued a declaration of amnesty to the Communists.[13] The Government of Singapore issued an identical offer at the same time.

Pretty 'good' considering that Singapore wasn't created as a state until 1964...there are a number of other errors in that extract as well...The Emergency was not officially declared over until 1960. Commonwealth combat operations continued up til that point, and the last CT did not surrender until 1988...I remember that because it was the cue for us to no longer carry live ammunition when working in Malaysia...

I might have a bit of an unfair advantage because i have spent a lot of time in that region but wikipedia...?

[M-A Lagrange]

Would it be reasonable to say that COIN typically requires a military component (war) and a non-military component (not war) and is unlikely to succeed if both components are not effectively managed?

It seems to me that our problems in COIN scenarios stem largely from a tendency to vastly overestimate our ability to manage the non-military aspect of COIN ("creating good governance" for someone else is easy to say, very hard to do) and a tendency to use military forces to try to manage the non-military aspects of COIN, a role that they are not trained or equipped to fill.

Dayuhan,

You are taking the words out of my mouth.
The problem is that too many believe that it would need a huge amount of money and everybody will be willing especially the host government. They just forget that they are part of the military component (the host nation) and therefore are not playing the game in a naive way. Especially as host government is also trying (This at all times) to do the things their own way and screew or use/abuse the efforts of external friendly powers (Every body dreams to be independant).
Forgetting that the civil apparatus of the host government is taking part to the general military effort and sometimes (most of the times) has a different understanding of the civil/military cooperation and sharing of responsability and hierarchy undermines a lot the civil component in the COIN effort.

[Backwards Observer]

Pretty 'good' considering that Singapore wasn't created as a state until 1964...

After a period of friction between Singapore and the central government in Kuala Lumpur, Singapore separated from Malaysia on August 9, 1965, and became an independent republic. (U.S. State Dept.)

Singapore - Background entry at U.S. Dept. of State

In 1963, the British declared Singapore, the Malay states and Sabah and Sarawak as one independent nation -- Malaysia. But Singapore's membership in this union lasted only two years. In 1965, it was booted out of the federation, owing to disagreements on several fronts including racial issues. (singapore.com)

Singapore History at singapore.com

Singapore: Independence - 9 August 1965 (from Malaysian Federation) (CIA World Factbook)

Singapore - Background at CIA World Factbook

Singapore officially gained sovereignty on 9 August 1965. (Wikipedia entry)

Singapore - Wikipedia

Still, who is to say what really happened?

[SJPONeill]

It seems to me that our problems in COIN scenarios stem largely from a tendency to vastly overestimate our ability to manage the non-military aspect of COIN ("creating good governance" for someone else is easy to say, very hard to do) and a tendency to use military forces to try to manage the non-military aspects of COIN, a role that they are not trained or equipped to fill.

Or take it one step further and make that tendency our ability to step up to the plate when no one else will...really what should have happened in places like Iraq and Timor Leste when no one else (a fairly generic group) would step up and provide a security envrionment in which those forces of governance, which includes physical and societal reconstruction, could operate, is that the military should have taken a hike and just left the place to unravel...unfortunately we don't work like that and as part of this whole ethos and values things, we feel bound to step up and do the right thing...Military forces aren't doing those non-military aspects of COIN because they want to but because no one else will...

[Dayuhan]

as part of this whole ethos and values things, we feel bound to step up and do the right thing...Military forces aren't doing those non-military aspects of COIN because they want to but because no one else will

True enough, and I certainly don't hold the military at fault for the decision of the civilian government to assign tasks to the military that the military is not trained or equipped to accomplish. I would like to see our government think a bit more carefully before assuming that any of their components, military or otherwise, have the capacity to install a functioning government in another country. We would also do well to think twice before meddling in the way other governments deal with their populaces, or before assuming that we know what any given populace wants.

[Bob's World]

Well, I said 3 minute of research, but even if the dates were inaccurate the key points were not. The conflict was shaped by terrific military operations (all combat is not war even though all war requires combat); favorable terrain (no legal borders with poorly governed populaces next door to dash across and take sanctuary within); but was resolved when the political thorn (British colonialism) was taken out of the Lion's paw (the Malayan populace).

When I talk to Brits they see their colonial period as a largely economic venture that did little harm and brought a lot of good to a wide area. Very benign, and very differently than how Americans see that same era and activities; and I suspect other former colonies not made up of British immigrants see it in a harsher light still. They say they rolled it back country by country of their own accord and not due to any outside pressure. Just good business. This struck me, as many Americans I speak to about our operations about the globe, manipulating governments to enable economic and security activities are seen as being far different and far less abusive that what people suffered under the British Empire. Americans pride themselves in being so clever and good as to reap all of the benefits of an Empire without actually being Imperialists. This is our vision of ourselves. I suspect others share different images of America.

What is my point? My point is that the conditions of insurgency are determined from the perspectives of the affected populaces. The Brits then (and other European Colonial powers) did not fully appreciate how those people felt about that experience as they assessed if from their own perspective. Hell, leaders in England could not even empathize with the leaders in the American Colonies, and they shared the same ancestors, heritage, language, religion and King. Similarly, America today does not fully appreciate how our post-WWII actions are perceived; so when there is push back we write it off to a hand full of radicalized bad actors rather than assessing it as a clear metric that we may be off track and need to redesign our program of engagement.

Most histories on COIN dwell on the military operations that took place, the various programs with the populaces, the ideology, tactics and leadership of the insurgent organizations involved, etc. One has to read between the lines to extract clues as to WHY did this really happen, HOW did these people feel, What were the early signs of brewing trouble and HOW could these conflicts have been avoided; and so on.

But, it is only after policy and government has failed that such situations call for military assistance, and once that assistance is applied it dominates all thought. The military helps the civilian leadership more by taking less of this upon themselves. We enable civil leadership to simply throw up their hands and say "oh my, some evil men have radicalized part of the populace and they are waging illegal acts of terror and war against the state, please go defeat them so that we can get back to business as usual."

We've (the military of various countries) done this in most of these insurgencies around the global as they pop up; and on a larger scale we have done it with Al Qaeda as well with their efforts to employ UW to leverage several such movements to serve their goals and agendas.

If we keep doing the same thing, we will keep getting the same result. The only insurgencies that we have ever truly resolved are the ones where we ultimately (aside from the military action) actually fixed the governmental issues that were causing the problem. Many times I suspect that was as much accident as planned, or seen as minor supporting effort to the military "war". Now there will always be those like Mr Global Scout within the military community who act like someone just stole his football and ran off with it when they propose that COIN is not war, and that combat operations cannot resolve an insurgency. There will also always be those like Mr. Dayuhan who say (reasonably) that we have no more right demand adjustments of governance than we do to invade with our armies. That's fair, but it does not change the fact that the status quo strategic approach to insurgency is not very effective, and the "new" tactics of nation building do little to address that fact. In fact, nation-building approaches in many ways make the issues of causation even worse, and are certainly even more onerous and expensive on the intervening power.

I'll try to lay out a few short steps that I think the military community should do to begin turning this corner:

1. Hold Civilian Leadership accountable.
- Do not declare that COIN is war, but rather that it is a civil emergency
- Demand the retention of civilian leadership throughout that emergency and apply military resources through the same processes that we would for any other civil emergency.
- Hold Host Nations accountable as well. Clearly state that they are the COIN force and that the intervening forces are the FID force. Then stay in your lanes.
- Make it clear that the military is not required because some radicalized threat appeared of its own volition; but that the slow failures of civilian leadership over years have led us to this sad place, and those failures must be understood and addressed as the main effort, while the military wages a supporting effort to allow that to occur. Be hard on civilian leadership, god knows they're being hard on us.

2. Rewrite military doctrine to capture this change, shifting COIN and FID from the "War" section over to the section of military doctrine where military support to civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and that for security assistance activities.

3. Point out to the White House and Congress that the military is being called upon with ever greater frequency and intensity to manage the friction coming off of our foreign policy. Tell our senior leaders to stop sitting back and worrying about when the military is going to finally end the war so that they can get back to business as usual, but rather when are they going produce the body of new policy and law that goes after addressing these root causes more effectively so that the military can get back to the business of deterring war and preparing to wage the same. This is not the fault of any one administration or Congress; these conditions grew from 45-89, and have been producing violent product with greater frequency and intensity ever since. It is, however, the responsibility of the current administration and congress to fix it. We may be able to pass the bill for these conflicts to future generations, but we should not pass them the problem as well with just a military band-aid slapped on it.

3. Stop allowing the Intel community and the Ideology experts to lead our understanding of these problems around by the nose. These are issues of governance; threat groups and the ideologies they apply are mere symptoms of how the problems are currently manifesting. Rely more heavily on political and social scientists and historians.

4. Make a critical planning assumption that however we assess the problem is likely to be heavily biased to making our own actions far more benign than they are perceived to be by the populaces these conflicts are emerging from. Do not write that all off to radicalization.

5. Make the following four areas the focus of our assessments and activities:
A. Ensuring that we are not somehow disrupting or co-opting the populaces of other lands control over their governments in such a way that they come to believe that those governments no longer draw legitimacy from sources they recognize and accept.

B. Worry less about the rule of law and more about justice under the law. Ensure our own actions are not merely legal (particularly when we are perceived to shape the laws that apply, and ignore the ones we don't like) but that we are also perceived by those on the receiving end as just. To those in the wings as well, as they are the ones whose support we will need, or who will wonder if they are next.

C. Take a strong stance on status-based discrimination. Be it race, religion, ethnic, political or regional. Understand where such discrimination exists and be doubly cautious in our engagements in those places as they have ready-made populace bases for insurgency.

D. Encourage off-ramps. Work with governments to establish and employ procedures and processes tailored for their respective cultures that guard against abuses of government and identify and protect individual rights. Ensure mechanisms for voicing concerns to governance are perceived by the populace as trusted, certain and legal. Again, be doubly cautious in working with any government that refuses to create such off ramps, as their populace has no choice but insurgency to effect change.

6. Recognize AQ for what it is; a political group that employs terrorist tactics and the tools of globalization to conduct a UW campaign to seek their goals. Do not conflate all of those separate insurgent/dissident groups into a monolithic "global insurgency." Break the problem down to its components, and then focus on the issues above, rather than a simple threat-based approach aimed at the groups that participate.

[Dayuhan]

Americans pride themselves in being so clever and good as to reap all of the benefits of an Empire without actually being Imperialists.

Anyone who thinks that is suffering under a monumental delusion. We don't get the benefits of empire. The benefit of empire was that you got to buy dirt cheap raw material from the colonies and the colonies were forced to consume manufactured goods from you. Anyone who's looked at our trade balance knows we are not reaping the benefits of empire. What good is an empire if it doesn't turn a profit? Isn't that the point? What benefit do we reap from our alleged pseudo-empire?

when there is push back we write it off to a hand full of radicalized bad actors rather than assessing it as a clear metric that we may be off track and need to redesign our program of engagement.

AQ is often described as a "push back" against provocation from the West, but I'm not at all sure that's accurate and I suspect that we may be trying to toss AQ into the same basket as Cold War resistance to western-sponsored dictators. That basket doesn't entirely fit: AQ is less a backlash than an proactive effort to pursue a specific agenda.

One has to read between the lines to extract clues as to WHY did this really happen, HOW did these people feel, What were the early signs of brewing trouble and HOW could these conflicts have been avoided; and so on.

With this I agree, but we also have to be very careful about imposing our own assumptions about what people feel and think. We often don't know what any given populace thinks. In any given populace there will be wide variations of interests and opinions, and these are often largely hidden from us. We sometimes assume that people think what we think we would think if we were in their place; a serious mistake.

We enable civil leadership to simply throw up their hands and say "oh my, some evil men have radicalized part of the populace and they are waging illegal acts of terror and war against the state, please go defeat them so that we can get back to business as usual."

That's a concise and accurate description of a type of intervention we've seen many times before: an allied government is threatened by growing insurgency, and we finally intervene to rescue it. That is not the position we are in now: in both Afghanistan and Iraq we did not intervene to rescue a threatened government, we intervened before the government existed. We cannot apply the former paradigm to the latter situation. It doesn't fit.

Is there any allied government today asking the US to send combat troops to rescue it from insurgency? I'd submit that while this framework applied to many of our cold war engagements, it's largely obsolete now. Which of our allies is now threatened by an insurgency that calls for more than limited FID - if even that - from us? If we want to get out of the COIN business, all we need to do is get out of the regime change business.

The only insurgencies that we have ever truly resolved are the ones where we ultimately (aside from the military action) actually fixed the governmental issues that were causing the problem.

Where have we ever actually succeeded in "fixing" another government?

There will also always be those like Mr. Dayuhan who say (reasonably) that we have no more right demand adjustments of governance than we do to invade with our armies.

The "right" is an abstraction, and infinitely arguable. The capacity is more important and easier to assess. It's all very well to talk about fixing other governments, pressuring them to govern better, forcing them to "listen to their populace", etc, but this assumes that they have the capacity to do what we want, and that we have the capacity to make them do what we want them to do. If one or both of these capacities is absent, we will not be able to translate that talk into effective action. I suspect that you consistently overestimate both capacities.

[M-A Lagrange]

The "right" is an abstraction, and infinitely arguable. The capacity is more important and easier to assess. It's all very well to talk about fixing other governments, pressuring them to govern better, forcing them to "listen to their populace", etc, but this assumes that they have the capacity to do what we want, and that we have the capacity to make them do what we want them to do. If one or both of these capacities is absent, we will not be able to translate that talk into effective action. I suspect that you consistently overestimate both capacities.

Dayuhan, Bob,
With all my respect for both of you, the point is not do the US have the capacity to make them do what we want but rather do the US have the capacity to understand what they want to be done for them.
As in so many partnership like this there is the expressed need: what the demander believe he can reasonably ask for. AND what the demander really wants but believe he cannot ask because he also has an analyse and understanding of what his partner is ready to provide so he adapts his demands (what is called the unexpressed need).
All the difficulty is to accurately identify what is the unexpressed need. A difficult exercise because that need is purposely hidden because it can, sometimes, be in contradiction with the partner (the US) objectives.
And then evaluate how the expressed need will allow the US to reach its objective in responding to it and not aggrave the situation by not responding to the unexpressed need.