War is War

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan, Bob,
With all my respect for both of you, the point is not do the US have the capacity to make them do what we want but rather do the US have the capacity to understand what they want to be done for them.

I agree, absolutely, and I think all too often we simply assume that others want what we think we'd want in their place, or that what we want is so self-evidently righteous that everybody else must want it as well. This is why I think we need to back off on installing governments, trying to change governments, or trying to insert ourselves as self-appointed champions of any other populace. These actions might, in very rare cases, be necessary or desirable, but if we go around pushing our presence where it is neither needed nor wanted we are likely to accomplish little and create a lot of trouble.

[Bob's World]

The government we succeeded best in fixing is our own. Our interests were more pure, so our efforts less biased. The Constitution is a miracle of "government fixing"; and the Civil Rights Act an equal miracle of government fixing as well.

When we go to other's countries though, we always apply a double standard of what is good for the people, and cant all efforts at shaping government to build and sustain something that is good for the US and US interests first. We'll stand for principles of Democracy and Self-Determination all the way up to the point that it might put some interest at risk, then we start compromising.

We would sell out the people so long as we got what WE wanted from their governments. This is where we need to adjust how we do business. These people had no real power, no real way to affect us before. NOW they do. AQ is leveraging this as well for their ends.

We're already elbow deep in all of these governments. I'm just saying we need to change what we think is important and how we go about servicing those interests to be more sensitive to how it affects the people. Otherwise we will just keep running from problem to problem trying to prop it all up.

COIN is not war, it is governance working through a civil emergency for the HN.
FID is not war either, it is an action arm of foreign policy to prevent/repair problems that are threatening our interests.

Once we get the context right, the rest will fall in place.

[Dayuhan]

The government we succeeded best in fixing is our own. Our interests were more pure, so our efforts less biased.

Our interests were more restricted, not necessarily more pure. The property-owning elite that ran the show in those days looked after their own interests quite effectively.

When we go to other people's countries though, we always apply a double standard of what is good for the people, and cant all efforts at shaping government to build and sustain something that is good for the US and US interests first. We'll stand for principles of Democracy and Self-Determination all the way up to the point that it might put some interest at risk, then we start compromising.

Who are we to say that Democracy = self-determination, or that democracy is best for everyone? There are people in the world who fear democracy, which they equate with chaos and western domination, more than they fear authoritarian government. Are we going to intervene to give them what they don't want?

We would sell out the people so long as we got what WE wanted from their governments. This is where we need to adjust how we do business. These people had no real power, no real way to affect us before. NOW they do. AQ is leveraging this as well for their ends.

AQ has not leveraged this very effectively, despite prodigious effort. The only thing AQ has managed to leverage effectively is widespread resentment of and opposition to foreign military intrusion in Muslim lands.

We generally (well, not always) know what we want. We can determine the extent to which we wish to pursue what we want. We do not know what other populaces want, and if we try to intervene on behalf of another populace we will not be pursuing what they want, but what we think they ought to want. I don't see this working very well.

We're already elbow deep in all of these governments. I'm just saying we need to change what we think is important and how we go about servicing those interests to be more sensitive to how it affects the people.

Which governments, other than those of Iraq and Afghanistan? I think you consistently overrate our involvement in foreign governments, our support for other governments, the degree to which other governments rely on us, and our capacity to influence other governments... all very critical factors if we propose to go out and try to position ourselves as self-appointed champions of other countries populaces.

COIN is not war, it is governance working through a civil emergency for the HN. FID is not war either, it is an action arm of foreign policy to prevent/repair problems that are threatening our interests. Once we get the context right, the rest will fall in place.

We can decide to stop calling what we're doing in Afghanistan "war". I suspect that will not have any impact on how the Afghans see it: they will still see an occupying foreign power and a puppet government. What will change if we "get the context right"?

We still have the same choice. At the extremes, that choice is between continuing to support Karzai in the (probably vain) hope that his government will improve, and dropping Karzai and presumably leaving a civil war, which will be won not by the party the Afghans see as legitimate but by whoever can field the most effective armed force. Or we can try to cobble together a middle ground, possibly combining the worst features of both. Not a pretty picture, but it's where we led ourselves with the decision to try to design and install a government for another country.

We meddle at our peril, and good intentions don't always achieve good results. We need to remember that before we go messing in the affairs of other countries, and that includes any attempt to interpose ourselves uninvited into the relationship between any other government and its populaces.

[Bob's World]

D,

Realizing that if I say "black" you'll say "white" even if I am describing coal, I will offer a couple of points.

The U.S. has one of the oldest governments in the world. Yes, the rich, landed white guys were protecting themselves from the ravages of pure democracy, but what they produced is a marvel of good governance and COIN (note: not a marvel of effective governance, as effective governments tend to be quite despotic). They opted to change the government rather than just oppress the populace, and they did so in a manner that guarded their own interests, but also the rights of every citizen from the abuses of government or majority rule both.

And the US is and will remain engaged in the world. There is no changing that fact. HOW we engage is however completely (currently) within our control. Containment worked for the Cold War, it has not worked well since. A Clinton patch of "intervention" was a half-measure as was Bush's "preemption." It is time to retire containment or at least subjugate it to a supporting role. We cannot "contain" AQ and to run about attempting to Pre-empt their UW efforts is a fool's errand.

It is time for a new Grand Strategy, and actually, I think President Obama is offering one. I don't believe it is being operationalized very well, because we have so much damn containment inertia at play.

So, engage we must, and engage we will. Shaking off the inertia of Cold War containment and devising and defining new ways to move forward are the keys to our success. Whatever those ways are, they, IMO, must be built around the fact that people are more impowered than ever before, and we can either work with them or against them; and with our clinging to containment, we are currently working against them.

[Dayuhan]

The U.S. has one of the oldest governments in the world. Yes, the rich, landed white guys were protecting themselves from the ravages of pure democracy, but what they produced is a marvel of good governance and COIN (note: not a marvel of effective governance, as effective governments tend to be quite despotic). They opted to change the government rather than just oppress the populace, and they did so in a manner that guarded their own interests, but also the rights of every citizen from the abuses of government or majority rule both.

We shouldn't confuse what was made with what it grew into. The US has seen government oppression of the citizenry, it's been involved in genocide, it's made war on other nations under dubious pretenses, it's witnessed corruption on an enormous scale. It grew through all of these. While the capacity to grow was a remarkable achievement, we shouldn't pretend that the US Government rolled off the printing press in its current form. It didn't. We can't replicate it in other countries, and we shouldn't try: they need to find their own ways and in many cases those ways may bear little resemblance to our way.

It is time for a new Grand Strategy, and actually, I think President Obama is offering one. I don't believe it is being operationalized very well, because we have so much damn containment inertia at play.

So, engage we must, and engage we will. Shaking off the inertia of Cold War containment and devising and defining new ways to move forward are the keys to our success. Whatever those ways are, they, IMO, must be built around the fact that people are more impowered than ever before, and we can either work with them or against them; and with our clinging to containment, we are currently working against them.

I don't disagree. I just don't think that aggressively inserting our presence into the internal affairs of other countries is a viable way to this end. We may be able to provide assistance in some cases, to some extent, if and only if we are asked to do so. Trying to leap into other people's frays as the self-appointed champion of populaces who have not asked for our help, and whose desires and motivations we do not understand... well, that seems to me a recipe for disaster. The answer to bad intervention is not something we imagine to be "good intervention". The answer to bad intervention is less intervention, and intervention that is more subtle, less direct, and more multilateral whenever possible.

[jmm99]

as used here and in many of your recent posts:

from BW
COIN is not war, it is governance working through a civil emergency for the HN.

1. Could you tell me what a "civil emergency" looks like, and also provide some examples where that concept has been used.

2. Your concept of a "civil emergency" must include some sort of law or proclamation that makes it so. Do you have any examples ?

3. Finally, let's take the simplest situation - no foreign power intervening, no FID, etc. Just the incumbant government and one insurgent group confined within the borders of the country. The incumbant government declares a "civil emergency" as you define it.

Is that "civil emergency" a 1949 Common Article 3 situation, a 1977 Additional Protocol I situation (if the insurgents call themselves "freedom fighters", "national liberation movement", etc.) and/or a 1977 Additional Protocol II situation (the options range from CA 3 to all three); or do none of the Generva Conventions apply ?

Your choice of law may severely restrict whatever military options (if any) that you want to undertake.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

Starting with this:

from D
The answer to bad intervention is not something we imagine to be "good intervention". The answer to bad intervention is less intervention, and intervention that is more subtle, less direct, and more multilateral whenever possible.

we have to pick a country - so, the USA.

1. Do you set geographical limits to US intervention, realizing that is a "Never Again, but ..." default - or, is the World a US oyster ?

2. If multilateralism is involved, is the preferred US default to work through regional organizations, or ad hoc coalitions of the "willing", or bilateral alliances ?

3. Does "more subtle, less direct" foreclose or limit US military options; and if so, what are the "rules to engage" ?

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

as used here and in many of your recent posts:



1. Could you tell me what a "civil emergency" looks like, and also provide some examples where that concept has been used.

2. Your concept of a "civil emergency" must include some sort of law or proclamation that makes it so. Do you have any examples ?

3. Finally, let's take the simplest situation - no foreign power intervening, no FID, etc. Just the incumbant government and one insurgent group confined within the borders of the country. The incumbant government declares a "civil emergency" as you define it.

Is that "civil emergency" a 1949 Common Article 3 situation, a 1977 Additional Protocol I situation (if the insurgents call themselves "freedom fighters", "national liberation movement", etc.) and/or a 1977 Additional Protocol II situation (the options range from CA 3 to all three); or do none of the Generva Conventions apply ?

Your choice of law may severely restrict whatever military options (if any) that you want to undertake.

Regards

Mike

Mike,

Historians are as sloppy as any when it comes to pinning names on things. Sometimes politics demands something is played up as "war" that is not, or played down that is. I do believe the Brits called Malaya an "Emergency."

I think the key distinction is not what terms to historians like to use, or what terms do politicians like to use, or what terms military commanders like to use. For me the key distinction is the nature of the problem and how it is caused and best resolved.

As I said earlier, war is an extension of politics, but COIN is an extension of governance.

Certainly when the insurgent is strong enough and inclined to violence there can be a lot of combat involved in efforts to govern; but most of that is exacerbated by the fact that COIN is typically tossed to the "war" pile when it gets that violent.

Just as I don't think degree of violence is a good measure of when insurgency becomes civil war; I similarly do not think degree of violence is a good measure to determine when an illegal effort to change governance shifts somehow from a subversion to a civil emergency to a war.

I just can't find any examples where waging war on insurgency has resolved insurgency. In Malaya they waged war on insurgency and that draws the focus of analysis, but parallel to that they also addressed the conditions of poor governance that really fueled the insurgency to begin with. Compare that to Vietnam where we also waged war against the insurgency, but did nothing to address the conditions of poor govenance. Instead we focus on effectiveness, but that is not what causes insurgency.

I really encourage people to read the short account on Malaya here in this product:

Casebook on insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts; Special Operations Research Office, The American University, Washington, DC. December 1962.
http://www.usgcoin.org/library/USGDo...s/AD416553.pdf

Read this with an eye to the causal conditions of Legitimacy, Justice, Respect and Hope as I define them in my model and then look at how the British treated the ethnic chinese citizens. Look at how the kept the 'High Commissioner as the final say on all governance; how they denied the Chinese the vote and how they outlawed the MCP after the MCP had worked wtih them to defeat the Japanese. Abuse after abuse, disrespect as a matter of status; denial of legal hope and a total usurpation of legitimate government to a major segment of the populace (38.6%) who really felt that they had earned independence in defeating the Japanese, only to be marginalized and pushed aside.

So much is placed on Communism. That is just the tool they used to stand up to Tyranny; causation rested firmly in British hands.

But that said, give the Brits credit for recognizing and addressing the conditions of poor governance, and shame of the U.S. for flagrantly ignoring them in Vietnam, and now again in Afghanistan. We're too busy fighting a "war" as the "COIN" force to notice that we're barking up the wrong tree.

As to the law, if the law does not allow government what government needs to do to protect and serve the populace, change the law. Similarly if the law does not allow a populace to legally challenge poor governance, change the law. After all, the law works for us, not the other way around. When it becomes an obstacle to doing the right thing, then it is the law that is wrong. When it enables government to do the wrong thing, it again is the law that is wrong. Afghanistan's constitution is the worse kind of law, and I frankly cannot believe that more people are not screaming for change. Besides me and the Taliban, I mean.

[jmm99]

you've been proposing in seemingly megabyte quantity, a theoretical approach to "COIN" which is neither fish nor fowl - i.e., it is not "war (armed conflict)" in its pure form; but it does not seem to me to be a pure political-LE effort either (an example of that being the US Civil Rights Struggle).

You have been using the term "civil emergency"; for which, I posited that you have a framework for its presentation, including its fit legally - since you are a lawyer; and also deal with the national security-strategy interface, which requires reference to both diplomacy and international law.

Instead, I get this:

from BW
Historians are as sloppy as any when it comes to pinning names on things. Sometimes politics demands something is played up as "war" that is not, or played down that is. I do believe the Brits called Malaya an "Emergency."

Both of us know that the British construct in Malaya was not the same as what you are presenting; and I know what the Brits called it.

My first question was the meaning of what Robert Jones, JD, COL USA, calls a "civil emergency", followed by two more questions basic to that concept - if it really exists other than as nice-sounding words. You've answered none of them. Like the gal said: no mon; no fun.

BTW: Your Malaya link (to SORO pub) didn't work for me.

For Malaya, I like Riley Sunderland's 5 part monograph set:

1964 01 Army Operations in Malaya, 1947-1960.pdf
1964 02 Organizing Counterinsurgency in Malaya, 1947-1960.pdf
1964 03 Antiguerrilla Intelligence in Malaya, 1948-1960.pdf
1964 04 Resettlement and Food Control in Malaya.pdf
1964 05 Winning the Hearts and Minds of the People in Malaya, 1948-1960.pdf

and Bob Komer's 1972, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect.pdf - all online pubs available for free at RAND. And the Brit books (e.g., Thompson and Kitson).

Regards (but disappointed at the non-answer)

Mike

[Dayuhan]

1. Do you set geographical limits to US intervention, realizing that is a "Never Again, but ..." default - or, is the World a US oyster ?

I wouldn't set a geographical limit; the world isn't our oyster but it isn't that big a place either. Wherever we go, though, we need to have clear, achievable, limited goals that are consistent with our interests and capacities, and we need to pay a lot more attention to the possibility (probability, in many cases) of unintended consequences.

If we're intervening to assist another party, whether conventionally or unconventionally, we need to keep those same requirements in mind, and also to have a very clear view of the goals, interests, and position of the party we are assisting.

Our default approach to messing in the internal affairs of others should be, simply, don't. If that default comes under question, the next two questions are "must we" and "can we". Both must be assessed with a degree of realism that approaches cynicism. If we must and we can, we intervene to the least possible extent consistent with goals.

One hopes we have learned enough that we will never again hear "install a government" proposed as a step in an intervention process. Kind of like those home improvement instructions that begin with "remove roof and temporarily set aside".

2. If multilateralism is involved, is the preferred US default to work through regional organizations, or ad hoc coalitions of the "willing", or bilateral alliances ?

No preferred default. Each situation is its own case and we do what we can and what we must, with as much restraint as possible, in each. In general, I'd say rules, preferred models, default choices are all to be avoided: they make it too easy to react without thinking.

. Does "more subtle, less direct" foreclose or limit US military options; and if so, what are the "rules to engage" ?

Foreclose, no; limit, yes. Certainly there are situations where force is the only option, but we need a very clear, level-headed assessment to determine whether any given situation actually requires it. Again we come back to clear, limited, and achievable goals. We need to be sure that military force is used to achieve goals suitable to achievement with force: you use military force to kill someone who is trying to kill you, you don't use it to install a government or generate "development".

There's a lot of common sense in this to me... think before you act, know what you're trying to accomplish, use the right tool for the job, don't stick your equipment where it doesn't belong. Of course life is seldom simple or clear, but the guiding principles need to emphasize restraint and recognize from the start that we are neither global cop nor global saviour.

I don't really disagree with RCJ's assessment of the origins of insurgency. I think he's a bit too absolutist about it, and that his model needs the flexibility to recognize the exceptions and variations that are inevitable when models meet the real world. I also think his occasional proposal of conducting UW in other nations as self-appointed champion of the populace is, despite the best of intentions, a recipe for disaster.

That's off the top of my head at 6:30AM, and not meant as a formal prescription for grand strategy... not as if anyone listens anyway!

[jmm99]

You wanna speak up a little bit - I think I missed about half of what you said.

I'll stick your answers (thanks) in the file cabinet with the rest of my thoughts.

Cheers

Mike

[Ken White]

There's a lot of common sense in this to me... think before you act, know what you're trying to accomplish, use the right tool for the job, don't stick your equipment where it doesn't belong. Of course life is seldom simple or clear, but the guiding principles need to emphasize restraint and recognize from the start that we are neither global cop nor global saviour.

I agree with all you wrote. This paragraph, in particular leads to the next:

I don't really disagree with RCJ's assessment of the origins of insurgency. I think he's a bit too absolutist about it, and that his model needs the flexibility to recognize the exceptions and variations that are inevitable when models meet the real world. I also think his occasional proposal of conducting UW in other nations as self-appointed champion of the populace is, despite the best of intentions, a recipe for disaster.

Totally agree. RCJ has some excellent idea that merit deep consideration. However, he does -- and too many in the US policy arena do -- indeed suffer from excess absolutism (for examples, read any political speech by most senior Politicians from both US parties over the last 40 year...). RCJ himself is an exemplar; he often advocates not sticking our nose in the business of others and in the same posts sometimes advocates "helping" other nations with their problems.

Your 'take each case on it own merits' is the correct course, logically few will disagree yet that absolutist tendency takes over, egos overrule common sense and off we go again being the champion of the oppressed. De Opresso Liber is a bad motto because it encourages such adventures...

That's off the top of my head at 6:30AM, and not meant as a formal prescription for grand strategy... not as if anyone listens anyway!

Well, you're doing better than a slew of Think Tanklets, Prating Pundits and Pandering Politicians...

[slapout9]

I don't disagree. I just don't think that aggressively inserting our presence into the internal affairs of other countries is a viable way to this end. We may be able to provide assistance in some cases, to some extent, if and only if we are asked to do so. Trying to leap into other people's frays as the self-appointed champion of populaces who have not asked for our help, and whose desires and motivations we do not understand... well, that seems to me a recipe for disaster. The answer to bad intervention is not something we imagine to be "good intervention". The answer to bad intervention is less intervention, and intervention that is more subtle, less direct, and more multilateral whenever possible.

I think this a good description of the Moral Level of War. Something that the US seems to struggle with.

[Bob's World]

Mike,

I gave you a quick answer as I was dashing out the door for an appointment. I owe you a better answer. Look at the definitions I posted on Steve Metz's thread in the mean time and I'll put something up tomorrow morning.

As to being a bit "absolutist," guilty, but no more so than CvC's trinity is "absolutist." Of course he got little respect until he was long dead, so I have something to look forward to...

I'm fighting an inertia of focusing on symptoms and blaming insurgents, so sometimes I push too hard, I know. Its just damn tough to get politicians to take responsibility for anything, but I am committed to pinning insurgency on them yet!

(More importantly I owe it to the men. We keep throwing our brave young men and women at the symptoms of the problem. Having spent much of the last year in southern Afghanistan as Marjah and the run up to Kandahar went down; then going up to the Embassy and working it at that level for a month prior to having a silly physical problem personally that put me into the medevac pipeline and spending several days with great Americans who were broken in body, but strong in spirit, as we worked our way back to CONUS, I take this personal. I know we can get smarter. And if I can make politicians sweat instead of allowing soldiers to bleed, I will consider it a win.)

[Dayuhan]

I take it a bit personally too, having lived in the middle of it... well, ok, in the middle of the fringe of it... for something over 30 years of the Commie threat, the Islamic threat, etc. After all that, the only thing that scares me more than mercenary Americans coming to advance their own interests is missionary Americans coming to rescue the populace.

If we're talking about Afghanistan, though, we must always remember that we didn't go there to rescue a bad government from its populace, we chose to impose a government on a populace that didn't want to be governed. For that choice we have paid a high price, and unfortunately those who made the choice aren't the ones paying the price. This is why I say we must be a whole lot more careful and restrained before we go out and decide what's good for anyone else.

I think this a good description of the Moral Level of War. Something that the US seems to struggle with.

"Moral" and "struggle" go together, do they not? If we're not struggling with our definition of morality it's time to be very afraid, because that means we've declared it absolute and ceased to question it.

[jmm99]

this:

from BW
(More importantly I owe it to the men. We keep throwing our brave young men and women at the symptoms of the problem. Having spent much of the last year in southern Afghanistan as Marjah and the run up to Kandahar went down; then going up to the Embassy and working it at that level for a month prior to having a silly physical problem personally that put me into the medevac pipeline and spending several days with great Americans who were broken in body, but strong in spirit, as we worked our way back to CONUS, I take this personal. I know we can get smarter. And if I can make politicians sweat instead of allowing soldiers to bleed, I will consider it a win.)

Because my distrust of lawyer-politicians is nearly absolute, I endorse some bright line limitations, which Dayuhan would prefer not to have.

Thus, my "Never Again, but ..." as the default. That doesn't mean that one has to retreat into some form of pre-1854 Japanese isolationism, or that I'm seeking a retreat into the past. My non-interventionist types are those mixed Guardians-Heroes (in Brian Linn's jargon) such as post-WWI Jack Pershing and Billy Mitchell, who were both very forward looking.

All of that (my rant) is moving off the point of "War is War"; and much more to the point of "Should we be having this war ?".

I have read the "Metzian" and "Jonesian" constructs. His "Insurgency is a strategy ....... " is followed by 9 subpoints. Your "[Insurgency is] a Condition ....." is followed by 8 subpoints. Copied both to a desktop note so I could follow your discussion. What you two seem to be dealing with is a strategic definition of "insurgency" - for what purpose (military, political, both) ?

Anyway, that's not my bag. The terms "insurgent" and "belligerent" have historical legal meanings, but they (like the term "war") have been largely supplanted in legal practice by the existence or not of an "armed conflict"; and, if so, whether that "armed conflict" is international or non-international. Violent Non-State Actors, whether Transnational or Domestic, can be handled without great legal difficulties within those confines. Of course, lawyer-politicians and/or knuckleheads can screw up anything.

My narrow, legal difficulties with what you say are with what seems a mix of military and civil actions; military ruled by Laws of War and civilian by Rule of Law is the usual division. Transition between Laws of War and Rule of Law is not that easy and fraught with problems, as someone like Polarbear could attest.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

It requires multi-discipline approaches to crack this nut. Mono-cultures will tend to make the problem fit within their capabilities. Toss insurgency to the military and what do you get? COIN=War. I understand why the status quo position exists, but I still believe better answers exist.

[Dayuhan]

All of that (my rant) is moving off the point of "War is War"; and much more to the point of "Should we be having this war ?".

A very valid point. We can refer to any given situation as war, civil emergency, police action, whatever. We still have to decide, for each unique case, whether and to what extent we need to be involved.

[jmm99]

For Bob's edification or embarassment, his points 2-8 (as I've numbered them - point 1 is his definition of insurgency):

2. Conditions of Insurgency: A state of mind. The conditions of insurgency arguably exist to some degree within every populace. In most cases such conditions are benign in that they are not strong enough to support the rise of a significant insurgent organization, even if manipulated by outside actors conducting UW or by ideological themes designed for this audience. As perceptions of poor governance increase so does the degree of the conditions of insurgency. Left unchecked these conditions are apt to be exploited by internal and/or external parties for purposes of their own that may or may not have the welfare of the affected populace in mind. Conditions of insurgency are caused by the government and assessed through the perspective of the populace.

3. Poor Governance: Actions or inactions on the part of governance that contribute to create conditions of insurgency within one or more significant segments of the society they govern. Poor Governance is assessed through the perceptions of each significant segment of society separately as well as collectively. Objective metrics of effectiveness of governance are immaterial to assessments of goodness.

4. Good Governance: Governance, that may be either effective or ineffective, that through the nature of its performance prevents the growth of conditions of insurgency. Subjective, and measured as assessed by each significant segment of a populace, perceptions of good governance will typically vary across a state. Where good governance exists insurgency is unlikely. Where good governance is lacking the conditions of insurgency will grow, creating vulnerability for exploitation by internal or external actors pursuing agendas that may, or may not represent the best interests of the populace. The most critical perceptions that contribute to good governance appear to be those of Legitimacy, Justice, Respect and Hope.

5. Perception of Legitimacy: The most critical causal perception contributing to the conditions of insurgency in a society. Legitimate is not synonymous with Official. It is a recognition and acceptance on the part of any significant segment of a society of the rights and duties of governance to govern. This is independent of any official or legal status of governance or any recognition of this governance by others. Historically insurgent movements will ultimately fail when this condition exists, and prevail when it is absent. The absence of legitimacy is the cornerstone of despotism.

6. Perception of Justice: A critical causal perception that contributes to the conditions of insurgency in a society as shaped by good or poor performance of governance. Justice is not synonymous Rule of Law. Perceptions of justice are based in how the populace feels about the rule of law as it is applied to them. Enforcing the Rule of Law upon a populace that perceives the law as unjust is tyranny and will make the conditions of insurgency worse.

7. Perception of Respect: A critical causal perception that contributes to the conditions of insurgency in a society as shaped by good or poor performance of governance. Measured through the eyes of the populace, the widely help perception within any significant segment of a society that they are not excluded from full participation in governance and opportunity as a matter of status. Assessments by those outside the affected populace, to include by the government, are immaterial.

8. Perception of Hope: A critical causal perception that contributes to the conditions of insurgency in a society as shaped by good or poor performance of governance. Hope resides in the absolute confidence within any significant segment of a society that they have available to them trusted, certain and legal means to change their governance. Hope is the great off-ramp for insurgency, as the presence of hope keeps politics within the established and accepted legal parameters.

are all factors that I'd take into account (possibly using different words) in mounting a purely political effort (struggle) vice a violent or a non-violent opposition group. So, is this stuff "war" or not ??

What that paradigm does not take into account are situations (say in different parts of the country) where the purely political effort must be mixed with some violence (as in Vietnamese Pacification), or where the political effort has to be deferred until military control can be established. Those situations seem to me to be the tough ones to resolve as to who should be doing what.

My own view is that the US should avoid getting involved in these messes, unless the mess is directly affecting us in a very substantial way where the costs of not getting involved will be materially greater than the costs of involvement.

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

So, is this stuff "war" or not ??

If the people involved are killing each other and calling it war, that's probably what it is. Whether or not it is or should be our war is another question altogether.

My own view is that the US should avoid getting involved in these messes, unless the mess is directly affecting us in a very substantial way where the costs of not getting involved will be materially greater than the costs of involvement.

I would only add that the calculation of relative cost must be realistic to the point of harshness and that the full range of possible (and probable) unintended consequences must be included in that evaluation. Basing cost/benefit analyses on overly optimistic assumptions has got us into trouble in the past.