Storr's book is a good first start and it is a good first start for a lot of things. Of importance is what he writes on victory and what it is. Surprise, suppression and shock are the key and none of these are really dependant upon numbers. If I inflict enough shock on you, it doesn't matter what the ratio is.
Force Ratio, like the "Troop/Civilian" ratio often put forward in Counterinsurgency/Irregular Warfare theory, is likely a number pulled from outer space that has no factual basis.
No.Originally Posted by Infanteer
The 3:1 was a product of experience gained over many years and many hard lessons.
I say again, IMHO, that in a training scenario where sections. platoons and companies are being exercised the 3:1 works well in that it exercises the drills that 99% of your force (the doers at that level) need in battle. The weakness (of developing straight jacket thinking) affects only the platoon commanders and the company commanders (four of the hundred odd - and then only one at any given time). This weakness can and should be rectified on platoon commander/company commander/combat team commander/battle group commander courses. One can't hold up one hundred odd soldiers training while the company commander (being exercised) and the DS argue the toss about some smart ass tactical innovation. That's what TEWTs are for.
Anyone want to guess what percentage of platoon and company commanders in any army have the smarts to be tactically innovative to never have to rely on rules of thumb and assumptions?
I would be very careful of that assumption. I see little evidence, that it is anything more than senior officers opinion. Based on Core Functions, we should seek a minimum of 4:1. The Russians have taught very high ratios from about 1922 onwards.
Good point and very true, BUT it needs to explicitly explained as a training vehicle alone, with no operational merit.I say again, IMHO, that in a training scenario where sections. platoons and companies are being exercised the 3:1 works well in that it exercises the drills that 99% of your force (the doers at that level) need in battle.
Again, good point, but if this is the case then the Exercise is very badly planned. The DS shouldn't be in a position to hold up the exercise. Sadly and traditionally, not the case.One can't hold up one hundred odd soldiers training while the company commander (being exercised) and the DS argue the toss about some smart ass tactical innovation. That's what TEWTs are for.
Soldiering is learnt skill. Commanders should be those identified as skilled in the relevant areas.Anyone want to guess what percentage of platoon and company commanders in any army have the smarts to be tactically innovative to never have to rely on rules of thumb and assumptions?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
It evolved (the 3:1 ration in the attack) just as the principles of the 4 Phases of War did... as did the Principles of War and the principles relating to just about every action in the military (and were not pucked out the air). All are guidelines (and a point of departure) but one would IMHO be required to justify discarding any one principle. I agree that a straight jacketed mind is to be avoided among the officer corps (as T.E. Lawrence complained about the British officer being "too much body and not enough mind"). The problem as I see it is that the limited ability to find officers who have the ability to read a battle (at any level) and make intelligent judgement calls as where, how and with what force level to attack makes the use of such rules of thumb and assumptions vital. Then we see armies (where they line up the cannon fodder in waves) where I would suggest they screen out the characteristic of imagination among officers.
Fuchs mentioned the German approach at a given time and I mentioned Slim from Burma. There are times (we need to accept) when such tactical matters need to be imposed.
Yes, but does rifleman no 1 in the left forward section of the left forward platoon of the left forward company need to know that a battalion infiltration attack may have been the better option under those battlefield circumstances? If the officers and the senior NCOs know and understand that it is merely an exercise then that is all that matters.Good point and very true, BUT it needs to explicitly explained as a training vehicle alone, with no operational merit.
It really depends on who is being exercised doesn't it? If the whole company (for example) is being exercised then then the flow must be unimpeded and tactical disputes or disagreements can be dealt with after the fact.Again, good point, but if this is the case then the Exercise is very badly planned. The DS shouldn't be in a position to hold up the exercise. Sadly and traditionally, not the case.
Its all about the maintenance of the selected aim.
Yes, in the main. However, do not discount the natural attributes some bring to the table. As a young Troop (platoon) commander I noticed that certain of the troopies exhibited a knack and a level of understanding of combat soldiering way ahead of the pack (these were not necessarily leaders but could be a machine gunner or the like). When I moved on to officer training again one could detect the recognition and understanding in some of the eyes which simply said "OK I get it ... so when do we start." Then the crunch came when for the first time the crack-and-thump was real. Some faltered, some did OK and others (sometimes the most unlikely troopie) rose magnificently to the occasion. Not foreseeable.Soldiering is learnt skill. Commanders should be those identified as skilled in the relevant areas.
So yes much can be taught and indeed should... probably better than we are doing at the moment. And (seriously) if I were the Brits I would roll every Sandhurst cadet through Afghanistan on an op attachment to test them under fire as that would take the guesswork out of that matter.
Finally (and somewhat off topic), a while back in another thread I recommended to Red Rat that the best use for Kenya was not for trained soldiers (other than tracking courses) but certainly for all officer cadets and maybe certain levels of recruits to do a month out there as part of their training. This would take the form of a cross between Outward Bound, a military bushcraft course and an an environment training in some basic military skills. Here I emphasize it not being a selection course where you try to knock 90% off the course but rather where you aim to lift 100% of the courses up appreciably in terms of self worth, self confidence and character development. We would need a couple of rules of thumb for this training ... only kidding.
Last edited by JMA; 10-12-2010 at 10:36 PM.
Sorry, but a great deal is plucked out of the air. For example, the Principles of War - as first written by Fuller - have no basis in fact or even as useable principles as Col. Leonhard so ably pointed out. - there is a good thread on that here on SWJ.
I am talking about selecting officers based on what can be tested and assessed. The IDF system seems optimal, though would need modification to be used elsewhere. If what I hear about the Omani system is correct, then this also has merit. I agree combat reaction cannot be foreseen, but there is good evidence that you can weed-out even the expert poodle-fakers given a rigourous enough system.Yes, in the main. However, do not discount the natural attributes some bring to the table. ...... Not foreseeable.
before or after you have spent the money on making them officers?And (seriously) if I were the Brits I would roll every Sandhurst cadet through Afghanistan on an op attachment to test them under fire as that would take the guesswork out of that matter.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I've read some good material (usually in the form of Staff College papers) about the Israeli system. What do you hear about the Omani system?
You can only apply for officer training if you have completed basic training and 6 months in a unit. - and be recommended by the CO.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Well Fuller may well have written about the Principles of War but he was certainly not the first to do so. (Just like Livingston may have been the first Brit to see the Victoria Falls but was certainly not the first person to do so.)
Fuller's The Foundations of the Science of War is worth a browse from time to time as he has much to offer.
Here is a quote from chapter XI to prove/indicate/suggest that he did not just pluck the principles out of the air as some may suggest.
THE SEARCH AFTER PRINCIPLES
The value of principles in war has been a subject of much discussion. Some authorities have definitely stated that war has no principles ; others, when propounding the art of war, have made free use of the word without even understanding its meaning ; and still others, those who may be classed as educated soldiers, have made various attempts to establish principles on general inferences, and, as far as I am aware, without much scientific proof.
The necessity and utility of principles is hinted at by Clausewitz when he explains how difficult it is for men excited in battle" to preserve equilibrium of the mind."* Yet he does not directly state that the value of principles lies in their power to eliminate self when judgments have to be formed, and so assist us to maintain that mental equilibrium which is only possible when the mind is attuned to the law of economy of force.It is of some interest, I think, to trace this search after principles in modern times.
Lloyd, virtually, lays down three-namely, strength, agility, and universality which I have already examined. Jackson lays down four. He writes : "The principal points which relate to the management of a military action appear to be comprehended under the following heads.(I) A precise knowledge of what is to be done. . . . (2) A rapid and skilful occupation of such points, or positions, as give the best chance of commanding the objects. . . . (3) The employment of mechanical powers . . with just direction, united force, and persevering effect. (4) A retreat from the contest, when the end is unattainable, in a deliberate and correct manner."1 Broadly speaking, these may be called the principles of the object, of mobility, of concentration, of offensive power, and of security. Jomini lays down two. He says : " . . . employment of the forces should be regulated by two fundamental principles : the first being to obtain by free and rapid movements the advantage of bringing the mass of the troops against fractions of the enemy ; the second, to strike in the most decisive direction." Napoleon lays down no definite principles, yet he apparently worked by well-defined ones, for he once said in the hearing of Saint-Cyr : "If one day I can find the time, I will write a book in which I will describe the principles of war in so precise a manner that they will be at the disposal of all soldiers, so that war can be learnt as easily as science." 2 Clausewitz lays down four: (1) " To employ all the forces which we can make available with the utmost energy. .. (2) To concentrate our forces as much as it is possible at the point where the decisive blows are to be struck. . . ." (3) To lose no time, and to surprise the enemy ; and (4) " To follow up the success we gain with the utmost energy." 3 Finally, Foch lays down four: " The principles of economy of forces; the principle of freedom of action ; the principle of free disposal of forces; the principle of security, etc."4
I do not intend to examine these various principles. Some, as it will be seen later on, I consider to be correct, and others incorrect. To examine them would be to digress, since my object in this chapter is to attempt to show systematically how principles are, or may be, derived from the law of economy of force.
If man were so fashioned that he could know all things, he would be omniscient, and if to do all things, then, omnipotent ; and, possessing these two powers, he would see that every change which takes place in Nature is righteous, that is to say that it could not in the circumstances take place in any other manner -better or worse.
Man is, however, ignorant, fearful, and weak; consequently, if his aim is to progress, he must seek knowledge, courage, and strength, and the nearer he attains to the fullness of these conditions the more readily will he be able to economize the forces they include. When he has learnt to economize his knowledge, or rather its expenditure, he has discovered wisdom ; and when he has learnt how to economize the power of courage he has attained to self-command ; and when he has learnt how best to use his strength he has become skilful. The government of these three states is the province of the principles of war.
His book, his opinion.
Most countries believe their system is superior. Do you ever expect the Brits to accept that their Sandhurst selection is inferior? Or the yanks for that matter? Never.I am talking about selecting officers based on what can be tested and assessed. The IDF system seems optimal, though would need modification to be used elsewhere. If what I hear about the Omani system is correct, then this also has merit. I agree combat reaction cannot be foreseen, but there is good evidence that you can weed-out even the expert poodle-fakers given a rigourous enough system.
The aim needs to be constantly reviewed. "What characteristics are we looking for?" There is the certainty that the aim will become fuzzy unless you are vigilant.
We were talking about this in another thread which ran out of steam.
As early as possible in their training.before or after you have spent the money on making them officers?
This was as we discussed such training. And when these little pink poms get back burned brown by the African sun and having lost their puppy fat and had the pimples burned out I promise you they will be so different the family dog will bite them.
I'm still free in November
You might want to walk back on this considering what many (especially retired) U.S. soldiers think of their army personnel system. You sound like you missed the whole Vandergriff thing, for example.
It's not really important whether a system is inferior anyway. It takes some tactics in politics, but reformers can simply point out the potential for improvements without pointing at superior examples. There's usually an old experiment or study to point at - in worst case you can let someone produce it for your use.
Well aware. Foch's "Principles of War" dates from 1903 lectures. The Fuller version however were the ones passed into UK training and doctrine.
A book I know, along with the disastorous "Reformation of War" and "Lectures on the FSR". I could write a book on Fullers fallacies - indeed my current Thesis deals with his abysmal ideas on armour. I have little time for the man.Fuller's The Foundations of the Science of War is worth a browse from time to time as he has much to offer.
Based on many conversations over many years with a lot of serving officers, almost all seem to accept we could do officer training better. It is thus utterly bizarre that grass roots opinion does not translate into action.Most countries believe their system is superior. Do you ever expect the Brits to accept that their Sandhurst selection is inferior? Or the yanks for that matter? Never.
Objective as ever.And when these little pink poms get back burned brown by the African sun and having lost their puppy fat and had the pimples burned out I promise you they will be so different the family dog will bite them.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Prove it.
It's enough to say "experience...many years...hard lessons" but that doesn't mean it's true or based on any factual evidence - there are a few military maxims I see that fall into this catagory.
For every example of 3:1 you find, there are examples that disprove the theory with either 3:1 (or more) failing or 1:1/2:1 succeeding. Combat is a clash of human will within a chaotic system. There are too many variables at play if you pitted company X attacking platoon Y.
I am not going to get into a knock down drag out with you over this. Not that I would not in a heartbeat (being a now old but still aggressive infantryman) but because the moderators do not have a sense of humour in such circumstances.
The best I can offer is to refer to my reply to Wilf (above). I trust that is in order.
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