Force Ratios (the old 3-to-1 rule)

[Tukhachevskii]

If you can concentrate more of your force against a small part of the enemy and then exploit that success, you may roll him up with a very low loss exchange ratio - LER.

Sir, thanks for the reply (I may have sounded overly "agressive" in the previous post). What kind of metric/rule-o-thumb would one deploy to ascertain the correct amount of "concentration"? (Isn't that what the 3:1 ration is meant to provde, a shorthand battlefield expedient/reflexive aid). Is that concentration of "fire", "forces" or both? IMO Mearsheimer gives a pretty good defence of the 3:1 rule as a "rule of thumb" but he is careful to qualify that based upon terrain and troops avaliable and limits it's application to a purely frontal offensive situation (i.e., a break through battle).

My interest has been well and truely piqued. Mearsheimer and Dupuy...and the Chimp article is about all I read at Uni on the 3:1 rule so I'd like to be pointed in the direction of further readng material along the lines you suggested (this time...pretty please)

[William F. Owen]

I'd like to be pointed in the direction of further readng material along the lines you suggested (this time...pretty please)

Work by Jim Storr.

[Infanteer]

Storr's book is a good first start and it is a good first start for a lot of things. Of importance is what he writes on victory and what it is. Surprise, suppression and shock are the key and none of these are really dependant upon numbers. If I inflict enough shock on you, it doesn't matter what the ratio is.

Force Ratio, like the "Troop/Civilian" ratio often put forward in Counterinsurgency/Irregular Warfare theory, is likely a number pulled from outer space that has no factual basis.

[JMA]

Force Ratio, like the "Troop/Civilian" ratio often put forward in Counterinsurgency/Irregular Warfare theory, is likely a number pulled from outer space that has no factual basis.

No.

The 3:1 was a product of experience gained over many years and many hard lessons.

I say again, IMHO, that in a training scenario where sections. platoons and companies are being exercised the 3:1 works well in that it exercises the drills that 99% of your force (the doers at that level) need in battle. The weakness (of developing straight jacket thinking) affects only the platoon commanders and the company commanders (four of the hundred odd - and then only one at any given time). This weakness can and should be rectified on platoon commander/company commander/combat team commander/battle group commander courses. One can't hold up one hundred odd soldiers training while the company commander (being exercised) and the DS argue the toss about some smart ass tactical innovation. That's what TEWTs are for.

Anyone want to guess what percentage of platoon and company commanders in any army have the smarts to be tactically innovative to never have to rely on rules of thumb and assumptions?

[William F. Owen]

The 3:1 was a product of experience gained over many years and many hard lessons.

I would be very careful of that assumption. I see little evidence, that it is anything more than senior officers opinion. Based on Core Functions, we should seek a minimum of 4:1. The Russians have taught very high ratios from about 1922 onwards.

I say again, IMHO, that in a training scenario where sections. platoons and companies are being exercised the 3:1 works well in that it exercises the drills that 99% of your force (the doers at that level) need in battle.

Good point and very true, BUT it needs to explicitly explained as a training vehicle alone, with no operational merit.

One can't hold up one hundred odd soldiers training while the company commander (being exercised) and the DS argue the toss about some smart ass tactical innovation. That's what TEWTs are for.

Again, good point, but if this is the case then the Exercise is very badly planned. The DS shouldn't be in a position to hold up the exercise. Sadly and traditionally, not the case.

Anyone want to guess what percentage of platoon and company commanders in any army have the smarts to be tactically innovative to never have to rely on rules of thumb and assumptions?

Soldiering is learnt skill. Commanders should be those identified as skilled in the relevant areas.

[JMA]

I would be very careful of that assumption. I see little evidence, that it is anything more than senior officers opinion. Based on Core Functions, we should seek a minimum of 4:1. The Russians have taught very high ratios from about 1922 onwards.

It evolved (the 3:1 ration in the attack) just as the principles of the 4 Phases of War did... as did the Principles of War and the principles relating to just about every action in the military (and were not pucked out the air). All are guidelines (and a point of departure) but one would IMHO be required to justify discarding any one principle. I agree that a straight jacketed mind is to be avoided among the officer corps (as T.E. Lawrence complained about the British officer being "too much body and not enough mind"). The problem as I see it is that the limited ability to find officers who have the ability to read a battle (at any level) and make intelligent judgement calls as where, how and with what force level to attack makes the use of such rules of thumb and assumptions vital. Then we see armies (where they line up the cannon fodder in waves) where I would suggest they screen out the characteristic of imagination among officers.

Fuchs mentioned the German approach at a given time and I mentioned Slim from Burma. There are times (we need to accept) when such tactical matters need to be imposed.

Good point and very true, BUT it needs to explicitly explained as a training vehicle alone, with no operational merit.

Yes, but does rifleman no 1 in the left forward section of the left forward platoon of the left forward company need to know that a battalion infiltration attack may have been the better option under those battlefield circumstances? If the officers and the senior NCOs know and understand that it is merely an exercise then that is all that matters.

Again, good point, but if this is the case then the Exercise is very badly planned. The DS shouldn't be in a position to hold up the exercise. Sadly and traditionally, not the case.

It really depends on who is being exercised doesn't it? If the whole company (for example) is being exercised then then the flow must be unimpeded and tactical disputes or disagreements can be dealt with after the fact.

Its all about the maintenance of the selected aim.

Soldiering is learnt skill. Commanders should be those identified as skilled in the relevant areas.

Yes, in the main. However, do not discount the natural attributes some bring to the table. As a young Troop (platoon) commander I noticed that certain of the troopies exhibited a knack and a level of understanding of combat soldiering way ahead of the pack (these were not necessarily leaders but could be a machine gunner or the like). When I moved on to officer training again one could detect the recognition and understanding in some of the eyes which simply said "OK I get it ... so when do we start." Then the crunch came when for the first time the crack-and-thump was real. Some faltered, some did OK and others (sometimes the most unlikely troopie) rose magnificently to the occasion. Not foreseeable.

So yes much can be taught and indeed should... probably better than we are doing at the moment. And (seriously) if I were the Brits I would roll every Sandhurst cadet through Afghanistan on an op attachment to test them under fire as that would take the guesswork out of that matter.

Finally (and somewhat off topic), a while back in another thread I recommended to Red Rat that the best use for Kenya was not for trained soldiers (other than tracking courses) but certainly for all officer cadets and maybe certain levels of recruits to do a month out there as part of their training. This would take the form of a cross between Outward Bound, a military bushcraft course and an an environment training in some basic military skills. Here I emphasize it not being a selection course where you try to knock 90% off the course but rather where you aim to lift 100% of the courses up appreciably in terms of self worth, self confidence and character development. We would need a couple of rules of thumb for this training ... only kidding.

[William F. Owen]

It evolved (the 3:1 ration in the attack) just as the principles of the 4 Phases of War did... as did the Principles of War and the principles relating to just about every action in the military (and were not pucked out the air)

Sorry, but a great deal is plucked out of the air. For example, the Principles of War - as first written by Fuller - have no basis in fact or even as useable principles as Col. Leonhard so ably pointed out. - there is a good thread on that here on SWJ.

Yes, in the main. However, do not discount the natural attributes some bring to the table. ...... Not foreseeable.

I am talking about selecting officers based on what can be tested and assessed. The IDF system seems optimal, though would need modification to be used elsewhere. If what I hear about the Omani system is correct, then this also has merit. I agree combat reaction cannot be foreseen, but there is good evidence that you can weed-out even the expert poodle-fakers given a rigourous enough system.

And (seriously) if I were the Brits I would roll every Sandhurst cadet through Afghanistan on an op attachment to test them under fire as that would take the guesswork out of that matter.

before or after you have spent the money on making them officers?

[Infanteer]

No.

The 3:1 was a product of experience gained over many years and many hard lessons.

Prove it.

It's enough to say "experience...many years...hard lessons" but that doesn't mean it's true or based on any factual evidence - there are a few military maxims I see that fall into this catagory.

For every example of 3:1 you find, there are examples that disprove the theory with either 3:1 (or more) failing or 1:1/2:1 succeeding. Combat is a clash of human will within a chaotic system. There are too many variables at play if you pitted company X attacking platoon Y.

[JMA]

Prove it.

It's enough to say "experience...many years...hard lessons" but that doesn't mean it's true or based on any factual evidence - there are a few military maxims I see that fall into this catagory.

For every example of 3:1 you find, there are examples that disprove the theory with either 3:1 (or more) failing or 1:1/2:1 succeeding. Combat is a clash of human will within a chaotic system. There are too many variables at play if you pitted company X attacking platoon Y.

I am not going to get into a knock down drag out with you over this. Not that I would not in a heartbeat (being a now old but still aggressive infantryman) but because the moderators do not have a sense of humour in such circumstances.

The best I can offer is to refer to my reply to Wilf (above). I trust that is in order.

[Tukhachevskii]

Work by Jim Storr.

Would that be the same Jim Storr who helped draft ADP Land Operations?

[William F. Owen]

Would that be the same Jim Storr who helped draft ADP Land Operations?

The very same! - and that edition of ADP Land Ops that made some sense, and not the ones that clearly don't!