How? In what way? What would your prefered method of a "sanity/reality" check look like?Originally Posted by William F. Owen
How? In what way? What would your prefered method of a "sanity/reality" check look like?
Last edited by Tukhachevskii; 10-08-2010 at 12:11 PM.
Start with education, so that training makes more sense. It requires skill and skills can be taught. Beyond anything else it is the ability of an attacking force the generate SHOCK, SURPRISE, SUPPRESSION and ISOLATION, that will see them succeed. It is the resources/training/skill etc to do those things that causes the other side to give up, NOT "throw a BN against a Company."
The great fallacy of 3:1 is it assumes you know all about "1" so you can plan for "3." Time and space are relevant. If you can concentrate more of your force against a small part of the enemy and then exploit that success, you may roll him up with a very low loss exchange ratio - LER. LER is almost always the defining criteria of tactical success, in that a low/very low LER enables the winning side to exploit more effectively.
Contrast and compare the Falklands War Battle of Mount Harriet, with Mount Longdon.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Sir, thanks for the reply (I may have sounded overly "agressive" in the previous post). What kind of metric/rule-o-thumb would one deploy to ascertain the correct amount of "concentration"? (Isn't that what the 3:1 ration is meant to provde, a shorthand battlefield expedient/reflexive aid). Is that concentration of "fire", "forces" or both? IMO Mearsheimer gives a pretty good defence of the 3:1 rule as a "rule of thumb" but he is careful to qualify that based upon terrain and troops avaliable and limits it's application to a purely frontal offensive situation (i.e., a break through battle).
My interest has been well and truely piqued. Mearsheimer and Dupuy...and the Chimp article is about all I read at Uni on the 3:1 rule so I'd like to be pointed in the direction of further readng material along the lines you suggested (this time...pretty please)
Work by Jim Storr.I'd like to be pointed in the direction of further readng material along the lines you suggested (this time...pretty please
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Storr's book is a good first start and it is a good first start for a lot of things. Of importance is what he writes on victory and what it is. Surprise, suppression and shock are the key and none of these are really dependant upon numbers. If I inflict enough shock on you, it doesn't matter what the ratio is.
Force Ratio, like the "Troop/Civilian" ratio often put forward in Counterinsurgency/Irregular Warfare theory, is likely a number pulled from outer space that has no factual basis.
No.
The 3:1 was a product of experience gained over many years and many hard lessons.
I say again, IMHO, that in a training scenario where sections. platoons and companies are being exercised the 3:1 works well in that it exercises the drills that 99% of your force (the doers at that level) need in battle. The weakness (of developing straight jacket thinking) affects only the platoon commanders and the company commanders (four of the hundred odd - and then only one at any given time). This weakness can and should be rectified on platoon commander/company commander/combat team commander/battle group commander courses. One can't hold up one hundred odd soldiers training while the company commander (being exercised) and the DS argue the toss about some smart ass tactical innovation. That's what TEWTs are for.
Anyone want to guess what percentage of platoon and company commanders in any army have the smarts to be tactically innovative to never have to rely on rules of thumb and assumptions?
I would be very careful of that assumption. I see little evidence, that it is anything more than senior officers opinion. Based on Core Functions, we should seek a minimum of 4:1. The Russians have taught very high ratios from about 1922 onwards.
Good point and very true, BUT it needs to explicitly explained as a training vehicle alone, with no operational merit.I say again, IMHO, that in a training scenario where sections. platoons and companies are being exercised the 3:1 works well in that it exercises the drills that 99% of your force (the doers at that level) need in battle.
Again, good point, but if this is the case then the Exercise is very badly planned. The DS shouldn't be in a position to hold up the exercise. Sadly and traditionally, not the case.One can't hold up one hundred odd soldiers training while the company commander (being exercised) and the DS argue the toss about some smart ass tactical innovation. That's what TEWTs are for.
Soldiering is learnt skill. Commanders should be those identified as skilled in the relevant areas.Anyone want to guess what percentage of platoon and company commanders in any army have the smarts to be tactically innovative to never have to rely on rules of thumb and assumptions?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Prove it.
It's enough to say "experience...many years...hard lessons" but that doesn't mean it's true or based on any factual evidence - there are a few military maxims I see that fall into this catagory.
For every example of 3:1 you find, there are examples that disprove the theory with either 3:1 (or more) failing or 1:1/2:1 succeeding. Combat is a clash of human will within a chaotic system. There are too many variables at play if you pitted company X attacking platoon Y.
Would that be the same Jim Storr who helped draft ADP Land Operations?
The very same! - and that edition of ADP Land Ops that made some sense, and not the ones that clearly don't!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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