Force Ratios (the old 3-to-1 rule)

[William F. Owen]

It evolved (the 3:1 ration in the attack) just as the principles of the 4 Phases of War did... as did the Principles of War and the principles relating to just about every action in the military (and were not pucked out the air)

Sorry, but a great deal is plucked out of the air. For example, the Principles of War - as first written by Fuller - have no basis in fact or even as useable principles as Col. Leonhard so ably pointed out. - there is a good thread on that here on SWJ.

Yes, in the main. However, do not discount the natural attributes some bring to the table. ...... Not foreseeable.

I am talking about selecting officers based on what can be tested and assessed. The IDF system seems optimal, though would need modification to be used elsewhere. If what I hear about the Omani system is correct, then this also has merit. I agree combat reaction cannot be foreseen, but there is good evidence that you can weed-out even the expert poodle-fakers given a rigourous enough system.

And (seriously) if I were the Brits I would roll every Sandhurst cadet through Afghanistan on an op attachment to test them under fire as that would take the guesswork out of that matter.

before or after you have spent the money on making them officers?

[Infanteer]

I am talking about selecting officers based on what can be tested and assessed. The IDF system seems optimal, though would need modification to be used elsewhere. If what I hear about the Omani system is correct, then this also has merit. I agree combat reaction cannot be foreseen, but there is good evidence that you can weed-out even the expert poodle-fakers given a rigourous enough system.

I've read some good material (usually in the form of Staff College papers) about the Israeli system. What do you hear about the Omani system?

[William F. Owen]

What do you hear about the Omani system?

You can only apply for officer training if you have completed basic training and 6 months in a unit. - and be recommended by the CO.

[JMA]

Sorry, but a great deal is plucked out of the air. For example, the Principles of War - as first written by Fuller - have no basis in fact or even as useable principles as Col. Leonhard so ably pointed out. - there is a good thread on that here on SWJ.

Well Fuller may well have written about the Principles of War but he was certainly not the first to do so. (Just like Livingston may have been the first Brit to see the Victoria Falls but was certainly not the first person to do so.)

Fuller's The Foundations of the Science of War is worth a browse from time to time as he has much to offer.

Here is a quote from chapter XI to prove/indicate/suggest that he did not just pluck the principles out of the air as some may suggest.

THE SEARCH AFTER PRINCIPLES

The value of principles in war has been a subject of much discussion. Some authorities have definitely stated that war has no principles ; others, when propounding the art of war, have made free use of the word without even understanding its meaning ; and still others, those who may be classed as educated soldiers, have made various attempts to establish principles on general inferences, and, as far as I am aware, without much scientific proof.

The necessity and utility of principles is hinted at by Clausewitz when he explains how difficult it is for men excited in battle" to preserve equilibrium of the mind."* Yet he does not directly state that the value of principles lies in their power to eliminate self when judgments have to be formed, and so assist us to maintain that mental equilibrium which is only possible when the mind is attuned to the law of economy of force.It is of some interest, I think, to trace this search after principles in modern times.

Lloyd, virtually, lays down three-namely, strength, agility, and universality which I have already examined. Jackson lays down four. He writes : "The principal points which relate to the management of a military action appear to be comprehended under the following heads.(I) A precise knowledge of what is to be done. . . . (2) A rapid and skilful occupation of such points, or positions, as give the best chance of commanding the objects. . . . (3) The employment of mechanical powers . . with just direction, united force, and persevering effect. (4) A retreat from the contest, when the end is unattainable, in a deliberate and correct manner."1 Broadly speaking, these may be called the principles of the object, of mobility, of concentration, of offensive power, and of security. Jomini lays down two. He says : " . . . employment of the forces should be regulated by two fundamental principles : the first being to obtain by free and rapid movements the advantage of bringing the mass of the troops against fractions of the enemy ; the second, to strike in the most decisive direction." Napoleon lays down no definite principles, yet he apparently worked by well-defined ones, for he once said in the hearing of Saint-Cyr : "If one day I can find the time, I will write a book in which I will describe the principles of war in so precise a manner that they will be at the disposal of all soldiers, so that war can be learnt as easily as science." 2 Clausewitz lays down four: (1) " To employ all the forces which we can make available with the utmost energy. .. (2) To concentrate our forces as much as it is possible at the point where the decisive blows are to be struck. . . ." (3) To lose no time, and to surprise the enemy ; and (4) " To follow up the success we gain with the utmost energy." 3 Finally, Foch lays down four: " The principles of economy of forces; the principle of freedom of action ; the principle of free disposal of forces; the principle of security, etc."4

I do not intend to examine these various principles. Some, as it will be seen later on, I consider to be correct, and others incorrect. To examine them would be to digress, since my object in this chapter is to attempt to show systematically how principles are, or may be, derived from the law of economy of force.

If man were so fashioned that he could know all things, he would be omniscient, and if to do all things, then, omnipotent ; and, possessing these two powers, he would see that every change which takes place in Nature is righteous, that is to say that it could not in the circumstances take place in any other manner -better or worse.

Man is, however, ignorant, fearful, and weak; consequently, if his aim is to progress, he must seek knowledge, courage, and strength, and the nearer he attains to the fullness of these conditions the more readily will he be able to economize the forces they include. When he has learnt to economize his knowledge, or rather its expenditure, he has discovered wisdom ; and when he has learnt how to economize the power of courage he has attained to self-command ; and when he has learnt how best to use his strength he has become skilful. The government of these three states is the province of the principles of war.

His book, his opinion.

I am talking about selecting officers based on what can be tested and assessed. The IDF system seems optimal, though would need modification to be used elsewhere. If what I hear about the Omani system is correct, then this also has merit. I agree combat reaction cannot be foreseen, but there is good evidence that you can weed-out even the expert poodle-fakers given a rigourous enough system.

Most countries believe their system is superior. Do you ever expect the Brits to accept that their Sandhurst selection is inferior? Or the yanks for that matter? Never.

The aim needs to be constantly reviewed. "What characteristics are we looking for?" There is the certainty that the aim will become fuzzy unless you are vigilant.

We were talking about this in another thread which ran out of steam.

before or after you have spent the money on making them officers?

As early as possible in their training.

This was as we discussed such training. And when these little pink poms get back burned brown by the African sun and having lost their puppy fat and had the pimples burned out I promise you they will be so different the family dog will bite them.

I'm still free in November

[Fuchs]

Most countries believe their system is superior. Do you ever expect the Brits to accept that their Sandhurst selection is inferior? Or the yanks for that matter? Never.

You might want to walk back on this considering what many (especially retired) U.S. soldiers think of their army personnel system. You sound like you missed the whole Vandergriff thing, for example.


It's not really important whether a system is inferior anyway. It takes some tactics in politics, but reformers can simply point out the potential for improvements without pointing at superior examples. There's usually an old experiment or study to point at - in worst case you can let someone produce it for your use.

[JMA]

You might want to walk back on this considering what many (especially retired) U.S. soldiers think of their army personnel system. You sound like you missed the whole Vandergriff thing, for example.

Always happy to be proved wrong. I would, however, ask you to look at my comment in the narrow confines of the officer selection process before acceptance on the actual officers course (which the context of my discussion with Wilf.)

Further I have noted that an increasing number of retired Brit officers are also starting to have a lot to say once their pensions are secure. Interesting reading and perhaps they make some money on lecture tours but do they change anything? This is what you are alluding to with the especially retired comment?

It's not really important whether a system is inferior anyway. It takes some tactics in politics, but reformers can simply point out the potential for improvements without pointing at superior examples. There's usually an old experiment or study to point at - in worst case you can let someone produce it for your use.

Again perhaps you are using too broad a brush here again. Improved officer selection systems will only come from within. For a military, any military, to accept a selection process from another (outsider) is tantamount to accepting that it was inferior in this regard. Will not happen.

[William F. Owen]

Well Fuller may well have written about the Principles of War but he was certainly not the first to do so. (Just like Livingston may have been the first Brit to see the Victoria Falls but was certainly not the first person to do so.)

Well aware. Foch's "Principles of War" dates from 1903 lectures. The Fuller version however were the ones passed into UK training and doctrine.

Fuller's The Foundations of the Science of War is worth a browse from time to time as he has much to offer.

A book I know, along with the disastorous "Reformation of War" and "Lectures on the FSR". I could write a book on Fullers fallacies - indeed my current Thesis deals with his abysmal ideas on armour. I have little time for the man.

Most countries believe their system is superior. Do you ever expect the Brits to accept that their Sandhurst selection is inferior? Or the yanks for that matter? Never.

Based on many conversations over many years with a lot of serving officers, almost all seem to accept we could do officer training better. It is thus utterly bizarre that grass roots opinion does not translate into action.

And when these little pink poms get back burned brown by the African sun and having lost their puppy fat and had the pimples burned out I promise you they will be so different the family dog will bite them.

Objective as ever.

[JMA]

Well aware. Foch's "Principles of War" dates from 1903 lectures. The Fuller version however were the ones passed into UK training and doctrine.

OK, lets move on from this now shall we? We have established that Fuller did not merely pluck his 9 Principles of War out of the air then.

A book I know, along with the disastorous "Reformation of War" and "Lectures on the FSR". I could write a book on Fullers fallacies - indeed my current Thesis deals with his abysmal ideas on armour. I have little time for the man.

For better or worse nations need their own military thinkers to shake things up a bit... and this is what Fuller and Liddell-Hart certainly did... (and perhaps the status you aspire to?)

Abysmal ideas on armour? Yea I guess with 80 odd years of hindsight one could pick holes in any theory from those times.

Based on many conversations over many years with a lot of serving officers, almost all seem to accept we could do officer training better. It is thus utterly bizarre that grass roots opinion does not translate into action.

Not so difficult to understand. First rule in securing a pension is "do not make waves or rock the boat." The second aspect is that sometimes we need a period of reflection away from a situation so close to the action where we can't see the wood for the trees.

Objective as ever.

Of course. Its called reverse psychology. Let an outsider suggest something to the Brits and one can rest assured that they would rather die than accept advice.

On the training mentioned, yes, certainly even a local Outward Bound course built early into the the training will do wonders... but a similar strongly military approach in an exotic location away from mommy and daddy with no cell phone reception or Internet will be a life changing experience for 18/9 year olds.

[William F. Owen]

For better or worse nations need their own military thinkers to shake things up a bit... and this is what Fuller and Liddell-Hart certainly did... (and perhaps the status you aspire to?)

Shake things up? They had a substantially malign influence. That people still hold thier ideas to be useful and insightful essentially shows the mess military thought is in.

Abysmal ideas on armour? Yea I guess with 80 odd years of hindsight one could pick holes in any theory from those times.

You may want to actually read what Fuller in particular wrote. The result of his rather wooly thinking, was no good tanks for the UK until 1944! Not a mistake the Germans or Russians made ONCE THEY REJECTED Fullers ideas. If you want to start a separate thread on Fuller, go ahead.

I certainly do not aspire to the Fuller/Liddell-hart status. I actually aim at the opposite, based on observing them.
a.) Speak only to an informed community.
b.) Avoid taking credit.
c.) Accept responsibility.
d.) Subject ideas to rigour and avoid coming up with new ideas, where none are needed had someone actually read some books and done some work.

Not so difficult to understand. First rule in securing a pension is "do not make waves or rock the boat." The second aspect is that sometimes we need a period of reflection away from a situation so close to the action where we can't see the wood for the trees.

Concur. Understandable yes, forgivable no.

On the training mentioned, yes, certainly even a local Outward Bound course built early into the the training will do wonders... but a similar strongly military approach in an exotic location away from mommy and daddy with no cell phone reception or Internet will be a life changing experience for 18/9 year olds.

That maybe true, but "being tough" has never been a British Army problem. The problem is ideas and practice, not mental or physical robustness. The British Army got the "getting tough" bit as right as anyone, long ago. No evidence that this is the problem.

[Fuchs]

The poor tank designs of the British till the Centurion were afaik rather the result of an under-appreciation of good guns (too small turret diameter) and shoddy engineering. No other army had the same emphasis on leadership as the German one, so there's no particular British fault in regard to radio equipment and lack of three-an turrets.

Tukachevsky envisaged a division of tank tasks similar to the British and French recipes and it didn't turn out that badly simply because Russian engineers began to appreciate the value of a long 76mm gun in 1939 and were able to fit it into both new major designs.

relevant book

[William F. Owen]

The poor tank designs of the British till the Centurion were afaik rather the result of an under-appreciation of good guns (too small turret diameter) and shoddy engineering. No other army had the same emphasis on leadership as the German one, so there's no particular British fault in regard to radio equipment and lack of three-an turrets.

That is not what the research done in support of MRES Thesis suggests, though you would be right about the German emphasis on Command.

Tukachevsky envisaged a division of tank tasks similar to the British and French recipes and it didn't turn out that badly simply because Russian engineers began to appreciate the value of a long 76mm gun in 1939 and were able to fit it into both new major designs.

He may have done, but Stalin had him killed and the Soviets reverted to some better proven ideas. A lot of folks have put words in Tukachevsky's mouth. The 76mm gun was one of several things that enabled largely successful tanks designs.

[JMA]

[snip]
That maybe true, but "being tough" has never been a British Army problem. The problem is ideas and practice, not mental or physical robustness. The British Army got the "getting tough" bit as right as anyone, long ago. No evidence that this is the problem.

This was the reply in response to my:

On the training mentioned, yes, certainly even a local Outward Bound course built early into the the training will do wonders... but a similar strongly military approach in an exotic location away from mommy and daddy with no cell phone reception or Internet will be a life changing experience for 18/9 year olds.

I assume you are the same William F. Owen who wrote Patrol-based infantry doctrine?

If that is so then we are closer to agreement than it appears (unless you just like a good argument

I maintain that the infantryman can no longer just be a bayonet... no matter how tough.

As William F. Owen said:

The PB Soldier must be a robust and determined individual, with a useable level of common sense, and arguably some modern armies do contain a significant percentage of such men, and even women...

...A PB Soldier is taught to navigate and live in the field as an individual. He is required to accomplish tests of navigation in both urban and rural terrain, possibly utilizing not just conventional maps but also aerial photographs and sketches. He must prove himself reliant when isolated and he must achieve a useable basic level of first aid and NBC skills. He is taught individual field craft and stalking in much the same way snipers are traditionally trained, and ultimately, he is taught to shoot under field rather than range conditions.

And yes I agree with that too.

That is why I advocate the kind of individual training I outlined above. See it like a rising tide needing to lift all the ships rather than just cherry-picking the best of the rest and probably underutilising them.

Take your average citizen and mold him to the best of his potential into the kind of individually skilled soldier needed on the modern battlefield. Get them young. Go to your traditional recruiting areas and fund/subsidize their attendance on a normal commercial Outward Bound course while still at school. Threat them like Premiership football clubs academies do their young and promising. Invite them to your Regimental days. Train them up in various proficiencies (like the Boy Scouts) etc etc

Now why Kenya is a good option is that what I would propose for the training at the various levels is because it would probably be problematic in the UK given the lunatic Health and Safety gestapo that exist.

(BTW have you updated that 2006 piece? If so where.)

[William F. Owen]

I assume you are the same William F. Owen who wrote Patrol-based infantry doctrine?

If that is so then we are closer to agreement than it appears (unless you just like a good argument

I am.... and all the ideas contained in that article are actually a plea to recover to the basics, and raise the bar. In point of fact, there is little wrong with the actual practice of UK infantry training. The fault lies with the ideas that underpin it. UK infantry tends to be very well built, but just poorly designed, if that makes sense.

See it like a rising tide needing to lift all the ships rather than just cherry-picking the best of the rest and probably underutilising them.

Concur. Good analogy.

Now why Kenya is a good option is that what I would propose for the training at the various levels is because it would probably be problematic in the UK given the lunatic Health and Safety gestapo that exist.

Lunatic Health and Safety exist anywhere that UK troops do. Kenya makes not odds. There is also Cyprus, which is probably one of the best Coy and Platoon training areas anywhere in the world. - BUT, I also believe that some infantry training in the cold and wet is very essential, as that sort of environment really tests determination and personal administration.

(BTW have you updated that 2006 piece? If so where.)

No, but watch this space.