Iraq Isn't the Philippines

[120mm]

Prior to the war, unemployment in Iraq was 60%, if we are to believe the INTSUMs. One major difference was the level of welfare, enforced military service, and Saddam Hussein's terror campaign.

Now how do we go about making those improvements in the midst of chaos? I'm wondering exactly how important Hussein's terror campaign was to the enforcement of order?

Not that we need to emulate it, but the realization may show us exactly how deep the pit is that we are in. I think the "bad guys" can interdict economic reforms much easier than we can implement them.

I also get real nervous when folks propose economic solutions to societal problems. I think that the leading cause of violence among 18-40 year old males is more likely that it is stimulating than it is economically-based.

[slapout9]

I also get real nervous when folks propose economic solutions to societal problems. I think that the leading cause of violence among 18-40 year old males is more likely that it is stimulating than it is economically-based.

120mm, this is a critical point. I think through the process of stimulation it also becomes addictive and is a very hard problem to solve.

[120mm]

I thought about this on my drive home last night. If you embrace the economic cause and treatment in Iraq, you are in effect correctly identifying a problem, but incorrectly nominating a solution.

An analogy: The Titanic sunk, because of improper heat-treating techniques of it's hull plates. If the hull plates weren't as brittle, the collision with the iceberg wouldn't have caused as much trauma. Therefore, once you have the collision, wouldn't it make sense to sit the entire crew down and have some nice classes on hull plate heat-treating? Of course, at that point, treating the cause would have no positive impact on outcomes.

So, if one wishes to treat the cause of the current violence in Iraq, you need to apply the tourniquet of "security" first. And, like a tourniquet, you are forced to cause damage in order to save the victim. Then, you can treat the base causes that "may" improve the long-term situation.

[GPaulus]

Regarding the economic solution proposed above. A key strategic point must be made. In COIN operations, it is essential to isolate the insurgents on the battle space. In the Philippines, we did this using a scorch and burn policy. Once isolated, the insurgents can be neutralized. However, in Iraq it is much different. The only way to isolate the insurgents is to create a “Cause to Live For, that is greater than their Cause to Die For.” Offer anyone that wants honest work the opportunity to help rebuild Iraq brick by brick. The Iraqi government’s role is to establish the local reconstruction work camps (Civilian Conservation Corps equivalent) and then enlist men 18-40 years old to live on the camps in exchange for pay and security. The insurgents are locals and most would choose an honest living if the conditions and opportunity for work were provided by their government. It is the “broken window theory” in its most basic form. Chaos breeds chaos. We must stop the chaos by taking care of the small things—refuge cleanup, remove broken down cars, burned out structures, fix the “broken windows.” Government legitimacy would come with the first payday for the men on the camp.

It is given that the work camps will have past insurgents on them--that is OK. The camps must be secured and be highly localized with no more than 1000 men and with no more then 100 men per work team. Many will do their work on the camp— plan work projects, keep the camp running, teach, train and educate. Others will go out into the community to do labor intensive reconstruction projects.

The military’s and ISF’s role is critical too. They must provide area security for these work teams and bases, and they must search down insurgents that are unwilling to commit to rebuilding Iraq. Security is still critical but security is a double edge sword—you must have just enough, but too much creates conditions for failure—a police state…the community becomes the inmates and the security becomes the guards.

Additionally, it must be understood that recovery cannot take root unless basic human needs are met. Aristotle said, “Poverty is the father of Crime, Revolution and Corruption.” The needs in Iraq are clearly based on Maslow’s hierarchy and apply to the community, and not just to individuals. In other words, the rebels fighting on the streets are doing so because it provides them the basic utility to meet their primal needs for food, water, shelter, income, power, belonging, esteem, and self-actualization. A corollary to Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs is that in as much as Maslow studied the response to human needs, he did not suggest that the converse of his theory is true—that is, when a society fails to provide for essential needs of its people, then its people will self-organize along lines using the lowest common denominator that has the ability to meet those primal needs from lowest to highest. In all cases, humans will organize along alliances that provide the greatest utility for meeting the hierarchical needs. This alliance may be along sectarian lines, tribal ties, gangs or even a nameless insurgency.

I am presenting my paper, “the Elusive Iraq Strategy--Creating a Cause to Live For” at the University of Mass, Boston. I hope to create a “Tipping Point” but I sincerely appreciate the frank dialogue and thoughtful discourse.

[120mm]

"The insurgents are locals and most would choose an honest living if the conditions and opportunity for work were provided by their government."

I completely disagree with this statement. I also think the economic causal model of crime is fallacious. As is the medical model. Though you can make a ton of money, and be a darling of certain political groups by expounding it.

Excitement and power are much more powerful causes than economic, especially when the "by-product" of crime/insurgency is money/power/support. OBL is not living in a cave because of economic reasons. Terrorists tend to be upper-middle class folks, and their economic needs tend to be filled before they start their movements.

I think this would make a great discussion topic, though, but it is slightly off-topic for the subject.

[tequila]

120mm --- Do you believe that most of the insurgents in Iraq are foreigners?

[120mm]

120mm --- Do you believe that most of the insurgents in Iraq are foreigners?

I don't think it's relevant to the economic cause of insurgency, which is what I am objecting to.

I wrote a nice missive on this, and it was lost in the ethernet. I do not have time to write it again, but may do a paper on it in the future.

Basically, my thesis is that warriors and criminals share common traits, separated by societal acceptance; and that the economic basis for war and crime is false; rather, both war and crime are committed because it is exciting and warriors and criminals both pursue excitement over all things.

Today, in Iraq, there is more economic opportunity for more people, than before the invasion, the difference being that there is less security, and Saddam found an ingenious, yet scummy way to sanction criminals/crime in his internal security forces.

[GPaulus]

This is a correct statement but dont confuse terrorists with insurgents. Terrorists are selfactualizing, whereas the insurgents are primal in their motives. This is a significant difference and misunderstanding among many. The major difference is that the insurgency targets are much more tactical, whereas the terrorist are more strategic in nature. It is important that the two be kept separate because the methods of engagement are significantly different and the momentum that is gained when one is attached to the other is synergistic. While I was there all of last year, the insurgents were local. Outsiders were well less than 1% of those in the fight.

The terrorist is politically motivated desiring to empose his ideological views. The insurgent is apolitical and much more primal in their motives as compared to terrorism. Insurgency warfare is not politically or religiously motivated. Notice how this flies in the face of the conventional war fighter’s paradigm proposed by Clausewitz, “War is the extension of politics by other means.” Insurgents don’t have a goal of winning although they would not mind seeing their enemy fail. They win if the struggle is protracted and continues to gain momentum—that breeds chaos. Finally, insurgency battles are small scale quick engagements that are executed locally within kilometers of their homes.

This is not to say that insurgents do not get outside support, momentum and efficacy from the outside, and from each other. They certainly gain influence and power from the outside and even funding or support may be from external sources but in the aggregate, there is not enough self-interest for large numbers of outsiders to physically risk fighting at the grass root level. And, those that do fight are doing so for reasons much different then the primal needs of the insurgents. The primary rebel movement however, is local insurgency.

[jcustis]

This is a correct statement but dont confuse terrorists with insurgents. Terrorists are selfactualizing, whereas the insurgents are primal in their motives. This is a significant difference and misunderstanding among many. The major difference is that the insurgency targets are much more tactical, whereas the terrorist are more strategic in nature. It is important that the two be kept separate because the methods of engagement are significantly different and the momentum that is gained when one is attached to the other is synergistic. While I was there all of last year, the insurgents were local. Outsiders were well less than 1% of those in the fight.

The terrorist is politically motivated desiring to empose his ideological views. The insurgent is apolitical and much more primal in their motives as compared to terrorism. Insurgency warfare is not politically or religiously motivated. Notice how this flies in the face of the conventional war fighter’s paradigm proposed by Clausewitz, “War is the extension of politics by other means.” Insurgents don’t have a goal of winning although they would not mind seeing their enemy fail. They win if the struggle is protracted and continues to gain momentum—that breeds chaos. Finally, insurgency battles are small scale quick engagements that are executed locally within kilometers of their homes.

This is not to say that insurgents do not get outside support, momentum and efficacy from the outside, and from each other. They certainly gain influence and power from the outside and even funding or support may be from external sources but in the aggregate, there is not enough self-interest for large numbers of outsiders to physically risk fighting at the grass root level. And, those that do fight are doing so for reasons much different then the primal needs of the insurgents. The primary rebel movement however, is local insurgency.

Sir,

I've read your various posts on insurgents vs. terrorists with interest, but I'm not quite sure I see compelling contrasts between the two classifiers. Would you care to start a new thread and develop these thoughts in more depth? For example, I can be a little slow at times, but I have a hard time understanding what you mean by this statement: "Terrorists are selfactualizing, whereas the insurgents are primal in their motives."

In particular, if we have both terrorists and insurgents opposing us in Iraq, how would you say they break out, percentage-wise, and what significant attacks would you attribute to either group?

[pinoyme]

Hi:

I finally got to read online the US Defense Department phamphlet on Lessons from the Huk Campaign.

This being the case, it might be interesting to read the NPA's analysis of the "Lava revisionist's clique's debacle due to their leftwing adventurism."

It's in the first chapter of Amado Guerrero's "Philippine Society and Revolution"
The author is none other than Jose Ma. Sison, the Maoist intellectual who led the so-called re-establishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines.


The book can be accessed online.

I do not know the exact URL address. Nevertheless, one can Google--or better still chacha (http:www.chacha.com) his name.

People subscribed to this newsgroup might get better insights on COIN strategies by reading him. A word of caution though, readers will have to be tolerant of the shrillness of the book's tenor.
And to think that Jose Ma. Sison was not only an English major while in college, but a writer of poetry as well.
Whether his poetry is good or wheter it sucks is nonetheless an issue better left to literary critics. :=)

Internet connectivity is now somewhat better in the Philippines. Hopefully, it shall finally be restored fully.

Cheers.

[Jedburgh]

...it might be interesting to read the NPA's analysis of the "Lava revisionist's clique's debacle due to their leftwing adventurism."

It's in the first chapter of Amado Guerrero's "Philippine Society and Revolution"
The author is none other than Jose Ma. Sison, the Maoist intellectual who led the so-called re-establishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

The book can be accessed online....

Here's the link: Philippine Society and Revolution

AUTHOR’S INTRODUCTION

Philippine Society and Revolution is an attempt to present in a comprehensive way from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought the main strands of Philippine history, the basic problem of the Filipino people, the prevailing social structure and the strategy and tactics and class logic of the revolutionary solution — which is the people’s democratic revolution.

This book serves to explain why the Communist Party of the Philippines has been reestablished to arouse and mobilize the broad masses of the people, chiefly the oppressed and exploited workers and peasants, against U.S. imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism now regnant in the present semicolonial and semifeudal society.

Philippine Society and Revolution can be used as a primer and can be studied in three consecutive or separate days by those interested in knowing the truth about the Philippines and in fighting for the genuine national and democratic interests of the entire Filipino people. The author offers this book as a starting point for every patriot in the land to make further class analysis and social investigation as the basis for concrete and sustained revolutionary action.