Iraq Isn't the Philippines

[SWJED]

30 August Los Angeles Times commentary - Iraq Isn't the Philippines by Jon Wiener.

Does History provide any models suggesting that the unhappy war in Iraq might have a happy ending? Journalists and military experts are pointing hopefully to the U.S. war in the Philippines at the turn of the 20th century as an example of how Americans can fight a tough guerrilla insurgency and eventually win.

Max Boot, an Op-Ed columnist for the Los Angeles Times, has written that the U.S. victory in the Philippines provides a "useful reminder" that Americans can prevail in Iraq. Similar arguments have been made by Robert Kaplan in the Atlantic Monthly and by the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute.

But the same suggestion is also made by writers who are not pro-war Republican pundits. The most prominent exponent of the Philippines model for Iraq is Thomas E. Ricks, the Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter for the Washington Post, whose new book, "Fiasco: The American Military Misadventure in Iraq," has been at or near the top of the bestseller lists this month. "Fiasco" shows that the war has been a disaster, but Ricks is nevertheless against pulling out American troops — because, he says, the Philippines example proves that a long occupation beginning in military disaster can end with the creation of a democratic and stable state...

The Philippine war was part of the Spanish-American War of 1898, in which the U.S. promised to bring democracy to the Filipinos by freeing them from the Spaniards. But, as Ricks says, things there "began badly" when a powerful Philippine resistance movement challenged U.S. troops — "like Iraq in 2003." In 1902, after three years of guerrilla fighting, the United States declared victory, although American forces remained in the country for decades, administering it first as a colony and then as a commonwealth. The Philippines was granted independence in 1946 — after almost five decades of U.S. military occupation (interrupted by World War II). Today it's a functioning democracy.

The problem with this version of history is that it doesn't look closely enough at what happened in the Philippines.

First, it neglects the massive differences between the Philippines in 1900 and Iraq in 2006. The guerrillas in the Philippines fought the Army with old Spanish muskets and bolo knives; today's insurgents in Iraq employ sophisticated improvised explosive devices, rocket-propelled grenades and heat-seeking shoulder-fired missiles that can shoot down helicopters. And combat in Iraq takes place in a fully urbanized society where "pacification" is much more difficult than in the mostly rural islands of the Philippines.

Also, the Filipinos who fought the U.S. Army at the turn of the 20th century had no outside allies or sources of support. Today's Iraqi insurgents are at the center of a burgeoning anti-Americanism that has spread throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds, with supporters in Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.

And of course today there's also the media. Images of resistance fighters in Iraq, and of the victims of American attacks, are broadcast hourly throughout Iraq, Arab and Muslim countries and the rest of the world. Compared with the Philippines guerrillas of 1900, the Iraqi insurgents are much stronger and more capable and have a much broader base of support that extends beyond national boundaries...

[jcustis]

Interesting op-ed, and right on the money. Trying to compare the two situations is like apples and oranges. I'm going to dig up what Kaplan has to say.

[Steve Blair]

I tend to consider these sorts of pieces to be rather disingenious in that they always try to deny the use of any lessons that happen to predate Vietnam. There are always techniques that can be taken from earlier experiences. It's this mentality of "no old lessons are useful" that leads to the Army losing track of skills or experiences that would be useful today.

[Bill Moore]

The professor makes many valid points, and I don't agree that the intent is to neglect the military lessons of the past, as many of the TTP from several different conflicts may be viable in Iraq. I think the key take away is that you can't compare Iraq and the Philippines; they were two completely different problem sets. You design a strategy to solve a problem based on that problem and all the factors influencing that particular problem set. I think what he is saying is that you can't blindly template the tactics used in Malaysia, Nigeria, or the Philippines because they worked there and expect them to work in Iraq. Our strategy in Vietnam was flawed, but I laugh when I hear so called experts state that the British approach in Malaysia would have been a better approach. We were not only fighting insurgents, but NVA regulars. The insurgents were more of a fifth column. A Malaysian type strategy would have been doomed to failure in Vietnam, but it was a perfect strategy for the problem in Malaysia.

The author’s last paragraph is misleading and out of character with the rest of the article. I won't touch Iraq, but will revisit Vietnam as an example. I think we should have learned our lesson about limited wars during the Korean War, and if we weren't prepared to do all that was necessary to win in Vietnam, then we shouldn't have engaged there. I think limited war briefs well within the halls of Congress where hand wringing bureaucrats are willing to play at war, but not courageously commit. I believe in limited objectives, but not limited war. Going into Iran to rescue the hostages was a limited objective (it failed, but it still illustrates a limited objective). Going into S. Vietnam, but not being willing to defeat the state sponsor N. Vietnam was a limited war. What did President Johnson say, "they don't bomb an outhouse unless they have my permission"? We lost over 50,000 men, billions of dollars, national prestige, and the Vietnamese lost millions of people. As the author stated Vietnam is a better place now, but what he didn't say was how many thousands of S. Vietnamese were brutally murdered or put into reeducation camps, and millions opted to risk their lives to flee S. Vietnam under communist rule. Yes, S. Vietnam was not a nice place to be when we were there, but it was a hell of lot worse when we left. I think we should consider the words of a former CEO of Coca Cola who felt we could have converted Cuba and Vietnam over time, among other hostile communist nations at the time, by engaging them with trade and other business ventures. They may still call themselves communists, but in reality they would be capitalists and have a much better quality of life, a quality of life they wouldn't give up easily, meaning at that point we could have real influence without killing anyone. We would have common economic and social interests. Maybe our DIME is broke, but America's ideas are not, they work if given a chance.

[pinoyme]

Hi:

Greetings from the Philippines.
And my apologies to the Mod for trying to send a reply through the report command.

Yes, the Philippines is not Iraq.

But some lessons can be learned from the US victory in the Philippine-American War. I am a Filipino and hence, I will never call this an insurrection.

One factor causing the US victory was because Americans successfully won over much of the middle class at that time, who were then called the Ilustrados or "Enlightened Ones", because they were privileged enough to have been educated all the way to college--many even in Europe.

There were many other factors, of course. But space constraints confine me to this comment for now.

Incidentally, the Philippine revolutionary army was not that all poorly armed. It had a sizeable stock of Mausers--state of the art then and much better than the Krag. This German model served as the model for the Springfield '03.

As they say in my country, Mabuhay, which in Spanish means "Viva"

[Jedburgh]

Parameters, Spring '05: Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902

...No diplomat, soldier, or pundit can know with total accuracy which
tactics, techniques, and procedures will succeed in quelling a given insurrection. What is clear is that the odds of success decrease the further one strays from the basic, oft-tested principles of counterinsurgency: separate the population from the insurgents, give them more reasons to support the counterinsurgents, and deny the insurgents safe haven or support from any quarter. Having empirically shown these lessons in the Philippines, one might add another: empower leaders with the freedom to experiment with tactics, techniques, and procedures that achieve the mission while adapting to local conditions. It was the initiative by soldiers at different levels that derived the principles and techniques that won America’s first victory in quelling an overseas insurrection....

Military Review, May-Jun '05: Pacifying the Moros: American Military Government in the Southern Philippines, 1899-1913

...Understanding past U.S. actions in the southern Philippines is important because of the region’s status as a front in the current war on terrorism. The terrorist organization Abu Sayyaf has its refuge there, and U.S. Special Forces advisers have helped the Philippines Armed Forces operate against the group. In fact, in early 2002, a joint U.S.-Philippine action on Basilan drove the Abu Sayyaf from the island, but the group remains active...

[SWJED]

Post at the Belmont Club blog - The First Iraq:

Although history never quite repeats itself, current events often resemble earlier occasions so closely there is a temptation to draw lessons from them. Imagine a time when America found itself in a war against a foreign foe whose strategy was to inflict a constant rate of loss on the army; invited US and British reporters to feed antiwar elements with atrocity stories; when US commanders who expected a quick war against a corrupt and oligarchic native elite found they had roused the countryside against them. Imagine a time when the issue of this war was central to an American Presidential election, caused a split in one of the major parties and planted the seeds for a world war. Not Iraq. The war was Philippine-American War and the election of 1912.

According to the McKinley administration the enemy was not the Filipino population. It was the Spanish oppressor and later, the perfidious and parasitical indigenous landed elite. At the opposite end, "the goal, or end-state, sought by the Filipino Republic was a sovereign, independent, socially stable Philippines led by the illustrado oligarchy. ... The peasants, who provided the bulk of guerilla manpower, had interests different from their illustrado leaders." What flung the oligarchy and the peasants together momentarily was common opposition to the invading US Army. Far from being unsophisticated yokels, the strategic goal of Philippine Republic generals was to send home enough body bags to persuade the mainstream media of the day to electorally repudiate the Republican administration in Washington...

Much more at the link...

[pinoyme]

Hi:

Is it possible to delete my initial reply to the Belmont blog?

I had done so previously while filing the earlier post in a noisy hole-in-the-wall cybercafe full of kids screaming while playing online games.

I had realized that the post was off tangent vis-a-vis what the author truly posted.

But what was the point of his post really?

His dismissal of the ilustrado class--now, the Filipino middle, upper middle, and upper classes is too sweeping.

A few corrections regarding the Filipino-American War:

With the transfer of allegiance of most among the ilustrados to the American side, the Filipinos who remained fighting degenerated into millenarian groups.
There no longer was a rational, coherent political philosophy to guide them against the Americans.

When Aguinaldo was still in command, it was the ideals of the French revolution that drove the Philippine revolutionary army.

Not too long afterwards, those who remained fighting broke up into several millineriann groups with religous overtones. Most of these groups wanted to set up a heaven on earth here in the Philippines. A good number of their leaders styled themselves as "Popes".

How this is similar to Iraq today, I do not know. Does anybody in this newsgroup know if there are any similarities?

Incidentally, the Belmont blogger quoted Dean Bocobo as source for some of his facts on the Philippines. He is the grandson of Dean Jorge Bocobo, first Filipino dean of the University of the Philippines College of Law.

Bocobo's grandfather is an example of the opportunities Americans gave to Filipinos with talent. That's why many among the middle class were won over.

Nevertheless, there is one fact I must admit. The "rough tactics"--and I am trying to be very polite-- the American Army employed against the Philippine revolutionary army would never work today if the Fil-Amercian War had been fought now, instead of a century earlier.

And incidentally, learning about these "rough tactics" often served as the gateway to the radicalization of Filipino college students during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Among these was Dean Bocobo.

Fortunately, he has seen the light now.

Cheers.

[victory]

Could you tell me if the Filipinos were divided or united? Could division be a factor in converting the locals in Iraq?

I think this is why it has been so difficult in turning the middle class, or for that matter anyone in Iraq.

Hernan

[pinoyme]

Hi Mr. Victory:

The objective truth is that the Filipino leaders were divided.

One group led by Aguinaldo and Apolinario Mabini wanted to press on. Others such as Pedro Paterno believed in going over to the American side. Paterno's group wanted annexation of the Philippines and the possibility of the country becoming a state of the United States over time. This even if it took decades.

One word of caution. As with most Filipinos, I find it rather difficult to discuss the Filipino-American War with Americans.

The issue that really makes me uncomfortable is that the Filipino-American War was a war of imperialistic conquest. But then, this was the Age of Imperialism.

And, Yes, the Americans then were "naive imperialists" as one historian (or is it economic historian?) has put it. That's why Americans still enjoy plenty of goodwill here in the Philippines.


Cheers.

[Bill Moore]

Pinoyme,

First I like to join the others in thanking you for sharing your perspectives with the council. Second, I would like you to share your opinion on why (according to a couple of articles I have read in the past few months) the New People's Army (communist insurgent group) appears to be gaining strength? What is their appeal to the Philippine people? Has the NPA's objectives changed over the years? Do their leaders still believe in communist economic models?

[GPaulus]

Agreed, Iraq is not the Phillippines and it is not America, but we can learn a lesson from both in order to secure victory. It is clear that we must stop the hemorrhaging in Iraq. To do this we must borrow a chapter from our own US history and the Phillippines experience. The “Elusive Iraq Strategy” is not as elusive as one might think. I draw a corollary to Alvin Hanson, the architect of the "New Deal" during the great depression. General Chiarelli (past commander of troops in Iraq) said it himself that there is a total economic collapse in Iraq. "One of the reasons the insurgents are fighting is because they don't have economic opportunities. We need to create those opportunities, to stop the bloodshed." In a May article of Military Officer, a military engineer wrote, “the most striking thing in Iraq is the extreme poverty. I’ve been to the Philippines and saw poverty. But at least they could eat. Here there is sewage and trash on the ground. Shepherds take their sheep to eat from the trash.”

Imagine what chaos we would have if 70% of males 18 to 40 years old were unemployment in the big cities--New Orleans, and New York City and Chicago and Detroit.... Imagine if it occurred for more than three years and with each day, people had little hope for a brighter tomorrow. The real answer to the insurgency problem in Iraq is in the creation of "A Cause to Live For" that is greater than their perceived "Cause to die for...." The solution must stand on three pillars--economic first, military second (for security and stability), and political legitimacy. We must (in conjunction with the Iraqi Government,) “Stand-up Iraq” by converting military camps to secured employment camps on a gradual basis using an “Ink Blot” methodology to rally the Iraqi people to a common cause (rebuilding "their" country brick by brick and in restoring HOPE). This is the “Real Deal.” That said, it can’t be over emphasized that this plan must be an Iraqi government plan of the people, by the people, for the people, so that they shall not perish.

In my travels around the world, regardless of culture, regardless of race, regardless of religion, people have more in common than differences. People want an opportunity for a job that provides a living wage, they want their health and they want to spend time with their family--in the end, it is simply surprising how little it takes to satisfy the human who has nothing. And, finally they want shelter, security and safety. Note however, that security is a double edge sword. You must have security but too much takes money away from the recovery effort and little progress is made to demonstrate real improvements.

There is a huge misunderstanding .... There's a belief that we have a defined enemy out there, and once you either put those folks in jail or you kill them, the fighting will just stop. That's just not the case. There is a root cause of the insurgency in Iraq and it is not religion, not terrorism, not race, not sectarian rifts, it is poverty. I was there, I spent this last year of my life there. They are fighting for "primal needs"--money, food, power, control, survival etc. Their fight is not an ideological manifesto like the media leads us to believe. The IEDs are set by Iraqi males and not from an outside Jihad.

The plan must provide public works “pick and shovel” reconstruction jobs to the Iraqi people with compensation, but in exchange they must live on their secured local employment camp. It is government reconstruction at its most basic level.

Now the lesson from the Phillippines--The requirement for the men to live on the camp is a key strategy for success in that it takes workers off of the streets and out of lawless activities while providing income producing jobs. Isolate the insurgent from the general population. We have met the enemy and they are locals--males 18-40 years old.

[120mm]

Prior to the war, unemployment in Iraq was 60%, if we are to believe the INTSUMs. One major difference was the level of welfare, enforced military service, and Saddam Hussein's terror campaign.

Now how do we go about making those improvements in the midst of chaos? I'm wondering exactly how important Hussein's terror campaign was to the enforcement of order?

Not that we need to emulate it, but the realization may show us exactly how deep the pit is that we are in. I think the "bad guys" can interdict economic reforms much easier than we can implement them.

I also get real nervous when folks propose economic solutions to societal problems. I think that the leading cause of violence among 18-40 year old males is more likely that it is stimulating than it is economically-based.

[slapout9]

I also get real nervous when folks propose economic solutions to societal problems. I think that the leading cause of violence among 18-40 year old males is more likely that it is stimulating than it is economically-based.

120mm, this is a critical point. I think through the process of stimulation it also becomes addictive and is a very hard problem to solve.

[120mm]

I thought about this on my drive home last night. If you embrace the economic cause and treatment in Iraq, you are in effect correctly identifying a problem, but incorrectly nominating a solution.

An analogy: The Titanic sunk, because of improper heat-treating techniques of it's hull plates. If the hull plates weren't as brittle, the collision with the iceberg wouldn't have caused as much trauma. Therefore, once you have the collision, wouldn't it make sense to sit the entire crew down and have some nice classes on hull plate heat-treating? Of course, at that point, treating the cause would have no positive impact on outcomes.

So, if one wishes to treat the cause of the current violence in Iraq, you need to apply the tourniquet of "security" first. And, like a tourniquet, you are forced to cause damage in order to save the victim. Then, you can treat the base causes that "may" improve the long-term situation.