Originally Posted by John T. Fishel
Hi John,
1- If Insurgency is not a Strategy, what do you think it is?
2-I very much agree that it is always about legitamacy.
Hi John,
1- If Insurgency is not a Strategy, what do you think it is?
2-I very much agree that it is always about legitamacy.
"We have nothing to fear from Afghanistan, and the best thing to do is to leave it as much as possible to itself. It may not be very flattering to our 'amour propre', but I feel sure I am right when I say that the less the Afghans see of us the less they will dislike us. Should Russia in future years attempt to conquer Afghanistan, or invade India through it, we should have a better chance of attaching the Afghans to our interest if we avoid all interference with them in the meantime."
General Roberts, 1880. Switch out "Russia" (for now) with AQ or any other threat and it is as true today as it was then.
I mention this because as John points out, it really comes down to Legitimacy. I break it out on purpose to the components that I see as most important, as "legitimacy" is word that is too often used to mean "offical." GIROA is very official, but they are horribly illegitimate, and it is the crux of the problem there.
Now, Karzai is a sharp guy, and he could fix it if he wanted to, but he would have far less power and far less income if he did so; besides with the Coalition protecting him and sending him Billions, why should he change???
This is the tough love conversation we need to have. Get serious about fixing legitimacy with our help, or be forced to fix it on your own without our funding and security support. We enable bad behavior, we enable poor governance, we enable the causation of the insurgency through our mis-guided efforts to counter the insurgency. Ironic.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Yes, we seem to obsess on the Methods being used, instead of focusing the motives.
Bob's definition w/mod
Slap--
I accept (like and generally agree with) Bob's definition of insurgency as a condition with the substitution of Regime (as it is defined in the IR field -see above) for governing body.
As I noted, I am interested to see where Steve takes his argument given that he is choosing to discuss insurgency as a strategy. The problem he faces is that most folk in the field define strategy in ways similar to Bob. Which brings us to the strange social science notion of operational definition. Here a word means what the author says it means, however, that definition needs to be written so as to exclude all other possible meanings/interpretations.
Is that clearer or muddier?
Cheers
JohnT
I wanted to follow up on my earlier point about Americans, in particularly, using a consummately Western conceptualization.
In social science, the way to test a hypothesis is to ask, "If this hypothesis is true, what would I expect to observe?"
If the hypothesis is "'good governance' and 'legitimacy' defined as per U.S. doctrine are vital to or crucial to defeating in insurgency," then we'd expect to see counterinsurgency campaigns that do those things successful and those which do not unsuccessful.
I'll admit I haven't compiled the data and could be wrong, but I'd be willing to bet Dave Dilegge's last dollar that the historical data doesn't show that. I believe Americans cling to that notion less because it reflects reality than because it reflects our preconceptions, viz. that other people share our priorities, preferences, and perceptions.
I think the notion that insurgency arises when regimes do not reflect Western notions of good governance and legitimacy, and insurgencies are defeated when regimes do reflects the attitudes which drove European colonialism. This idea has become ingrained in American counterinsurgency thinking because this thinking was derived from European colonialists like Thompson and Galula.
Well based on Clausewitz's hypothesises/observations, insurgencies are defeated when the insurgents give up using military/violent means obtain their policy objective. Most the time that is because enough have been killed or captured, as in any form of armed conflict.
Based on that, I cannot see what "good governance" and/or "legitimacy" has to contribute other than being simplistic political opinions.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Hey Wilf,
I believe there is room in our little discussion for both the "political struggle" and the "military struggle", which go back, as John Fishel posted, to a common well:
So, we are dealing with "power" and "Powers", which would be my starting point - not really very "Western". The Powers of the East and Middle East had to deal with "insurgencies" before there were Powers in the West.from JTF
As to the causes of insurgency and its identification with a struggle for power: we are back to Hans Moregnthau's statement in all editions of his Politics Amongnations going back to 1948, "International politics, LIKE ALL POLITICS, is a struggle for power." (emphasis added) This, in turn, harks back to St. Carl aka CvC.
Maybe more of Morgenthau, realism and Powers tomorrow nite.
Regards
Mike
Insurgency is certainly not new. The Hebrew people in Egypt is a great example (of course they called upon the ultimate WMD to help make their case). I suspect the Hebrew people questioned very much the legitimacy of the Egyptian Pharaoh to govern over them in such a way as to be able to deny them the freedom to leave Egypt; that the rule of law as applied to them was unjust; that they were treated with disrespect as a matter of status; and that they had no hope under the law to change their situation. This gave rise to a tremendous condition of insurgency within this significant and distinct segment of the populace. All of this could have easily (as is often the case) been addressed by the Pharaoh by simply accommodating the reasonable issues of the Hebrew populace. This is, after all, what Kennedy and Johnson did with the Civil Rights Act in the US. Instead he opted to enforce the rule of law; as did King George with the American Colonies; pushing a subversive movement into full-blown insurgency.
Now, the Pharaoh did try capture/kill operations on the insurgent leader, but he lacked adequate ISR and the ability to penetrate the sanctuary that Moses found in Midian among a supportive populace.
Then God put Moses on a UW mission, much as bin Laden claims that he too has been put on a UW mission by God. (I would ask bin Laden to show us some miracles as Moses did, as his bona fides are a bit weak compared to how God supported his original UW actor).
So Moses returned, armed with an ideology to radicalize the Hebrew populace and create an insurgency. I would argue that he found success in getting unarmed slaves to stand up to the most powerful King and Army in the world because such strong conditions of insurgency existed among this target populace, and also he had selected an ideology that spoke to them and took positions that the Pharaoh was unable / unwilling to co-opt.
We all know this story. It is not a Western one. The principles that drove this populace are the same that drive populaces today. These are human principles, not western ones.
Of note, the Hebrews first employed non-violent tactics of insurgency, and escalated only after they proved ineffective.
Now I have seen nothing to indicate that AQ has any of the god-given legitimacy that the Hebrew people exercised in this case. In no way do I mean to infer they do by this little example. He does however have the power of fairly strong conditions of insurgency in many of the states across the Middle East where he is peddling his influence, so his message is taking root. This is not one large populace or one global insurgency, but several smaller ones being leveraged by AQ to serve a larger purpose that is AQ's alone, along with the many nationalist purposes.
This is fundamental human dynamics. Now, would WILF have advised the Pharaoh "insurgencies are defeated when the insurgents give up using military/violent means obtain their policy objective. Most the time that is because enough have been killed or captured, as in any form of armed conflict." ??
Insurgencies happen for a reason, and typically it is rooted in the actions of the government. The government never wants to hear this, and more rare still seeks to address it. Easier just to enforce the rule of law and to capture kill enough of the populace so as to make them stop complaining and get back to making bricks.
Last edited by Bob's World; 10-11-2010 at 09:50 PM.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
That would be true IF insurgency is simply a different form of war. I'm not sure how I feel about that notion. I know that some people I respect greatly like Ralph Peters take it.
At its essence, such an approach seeks to manage threats rather than resolve them. That may be the most realistic. The implication is that if we need to return every decade and kill more insurgents, that is better in the long run than trying to re-engineer a society, culture, economy, and political system.
Two things are clear, though. If we are to conceptualize insurgency as a variant of war, we need to abandon the notion that the goal of war is always decisive victory. Second, if we are to adopt that conceptualization, we need to make fundamental change to our doctrine and strategy.
Last edited by SteveMetz; 10-12-2010 at 02:31 PM.
Let me take a stab at illustrating the pitfalls of a political/value based definition of insurgency.
Rather than the regime-focused on that has been used here, how about a people-based one: A method used by oppressed people to punish an unjust, repressive, corrupt, and illegitimate regime when they have no peaceful way of doing so.
The point I'm trying to make here is that a value-based definition is inherently subjective. Subjective definitions are useful as "calls to action" but have limits if the purpose is purely analytical.
Insurgency
We spend a large amount of time defining things like what is an insurgency---why do look at the concept of "open source warfare' in far more detail than previously given to the topic here in SWJ.
It gets waved off as fast as it is mentioned but after the recent salafist web release of this magazine which in ENGLISH used the term "open source jihad" maybe it is now time to discuss the theory instead of running from it--it is really interesting that few in the IC and even fewer in the military even understand the concept. But tied to Kilcullens' "conflict ecosystem" it moves the conversation forward.
Monday, 11 October 2010
JOURNAL: Open Source Jihad
A resource manual for those who loathe tyrants… a disaster for the repressive imperialistic nations:the open source jihad is America's worst nightmare. Al Qaeda's stated goal for Inspire.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula put out a magazine this summer called Inspire. It's a slick glossy e-zine. What really makes it interesting isn't how slick the magazine is. Instead, it is the purpose of the magazine: to promote "open source jihad" by providing readers with the tools they need to plan, motivate, organize, and pull off effective attacks against Western targets (i.e. specifics on recipes for bombs that don't use controlled substances and how to's on secure Interent communications via the software Asrar Al-Mujahideen).
This is yet another example of how young, innovative insurgents around the world are embracing open source warfare (OSW).
Nothing new, really... back when I was young and silly we had copies of The Anarchist's Cookbook being passed around to eager hands, along with the little red book, The War of the Flea, etc. Of course most of the people who devoured them never got to the point of doing anything, and those who did were generally too disorganized and too incompetent to have much impact.
Taking an old concept and giving it a snappy new name from the world of computer science is a good way to get attention, but it's hardly revolutionary.
Never discount the "iceberg effect" in assessing a populace.
The diagram on page 29 of http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/docreposito...surgencies.pdf
is as good of breakdown of this as any.
Today in Afghanistan and Pakistan the foreign fighters come from three main sources
1. Arabs.
2. Uzbeks
3. Turks
No Chechans, and actually a surprising number of Germans.
It is also best to remember that the primary goals for all of these groups, and most of their members, lie back where they came from, not where they are at. If we want to disempower AQ we need to focus less on killing all who show up in the FATA, and more on helping the governments of the states they come from to understand and address the conditions that give rise to these guys. And I suspect that foreign fighters are probably the thinest slice of the top of the pyramid/iceberg of discontent.
Good pitch on foreign fighters here:
http://www.fpri.org/multimedia/20100...el5.afpak.html
A better understanding of insurgency and its roots gives us a better understanding of AQ and foreign fighters and how to better deal with them as well. Killing them in the FATA actually helps recruiting back home. Photos of dead foreign fighters are used to recruit new members back home.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Slap
One can have the exact same discussion on terroism and terrorists with the same results.
Best
Tom
Yes, you could. Which is why I believe we spend to much time on trying to counter Methods (every "gang/group" uses them). We don't focus enough on the Motive. When you understand the Motive then you can begin to develop Methods to counter them.
Well I certainly see terrorism as a tactic, and the same with counterterrorism.
Often, when the conditions of insurgency exist, groups with too much brain and not enough brawn to try to go toe to toe with the government symmetrically, but who opt for violent tactics over non-violent tactics, will employ the tactic of terrorism to advance their cause.
Similarly, those who emerge from communities that are not experiencing conditions of insurgency significant enough to support the emergence of insurgent groups will often employ tactics of terrorism. This can be a McVeigh from the heartland of America who believes the federal government must be attacked; or perhaps a young man in Paris who's own community is not to the level of supporting insurgent groups (yet) but he acts out in support of a group he strongly affiliates that he believes is being oppressed, or that the oppression is supported, by the government he attacks.
Or it can be by a profit motivated group like a Mexican drug cartel.
Many would argue it is also a tactic employed by governments to break the will of the populaces of the states they wage war against. (Though in equal number there are those who take the position that a state cannot conduct an act of terrorism, which I find a bit self-serving. "I write the rules, so I can't break the rules")
Perhaps a bridge concept is this idea I am developing about the conditions of insurgency.
The conditions of insurgency could be quite high, but there not be any insurgent groups actively working. This could be like in Saudi Arabia where to act out is to disappear, or it could be just because that catalytic event to set things in motion has not happened yet.
So, the Act of insurgency is different than the condition of insurgency. The act may well be considered a strategy, that then in turn employ some mix of violent and non-violent tactics. But success is not from attacking the groups that emerge. Success is not from countering either the tactics or the strategy. Success is from addressing the conditions. The rest you must contend with, but the conditions are what one must understand and resolve.
Typically waging war against the organizations, strategies or tactics is counter-productive to addressing the conditions.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
This is where I disagree slightly. There are no conditions of Insurgency. There are conditions of Illegitimacy someone and it is always a someone(s) that claims to have some moral right to pass a rule/law that benefits the few at the expense of the many. When these conditions of Illegitimacy exist it will eventually lead to some type of an Insurgency/Strategy to correct the "Moral Bomb" that is about to explode.
Slap, Ok, there is no right answer, and we're both dropping rounds with effects on target. I prefer my breakdown as I have it, as I don't want to pack too much into one box. I very intentionally unpacked Justice and respect and hope as I feel it helps to assess the situation and design solutions.
If you say simply "fix legitimacy" we send in the elections team, conduct elections and then say "there, they held elections so conditions of legitmacy are establshed." Whoa nelly, not so fast... Too simple results in solutions that are too simplistic. Even with the four criteria I use I still routinely get "yes, but what do you want us to do??"
To reduce the entire complexity of insurgency to one concept is like the law student tale of the student who kept reducing his outline for his contracts class until he had it compressed from 100+ pages ultimately down to a single word nemonic. Then when he sat for the test he forgot that word... Too much compression can be a bad thing.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
But you see that is my point. That is what we would probably do but that does not make it legitimate to the population in focus. Maybe they don't want an election system that creates continuous turmoil and uncertainty,maybe they would rather have something else. There are other systems out there that are better(in the populations eyes) and we are going to learn and accept that or we will end up with a very hard road to travel.
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