Yes, we seem to obsess on the Methods being used, instead of focusing the motives.Originally Posted by Bob's World
Yes, we seem to obsess on the Methods being used, instead of focusing the motives.
Bob's definition w/mod
Slap--
I accept (like and generally agree with) Bob's definition of insurgency as a condition with the substitution of Regime (as it is defined in the IR field -see above) for governing body.
As I noted, I am interested to see where Steve takes his argument given that he is choosing to discuss insurgency as a strategy. The problem he faces is that most folk in the field define strategy in ways similar to Bob. Which brings us to the strange social science notion of operational definition. Here a word means what the author says it means, however, that definition needs to be written so as to exclude all other possible meanings/interpretations.
Is that clearer or muddier?
Cheers
JohnT
I wanted to follow up on my earlier point about Americans, in particularly, using a consummately Western conceptualization.
In social science, the way to test a hypothesis is to ask, "If this hypothesis is true, what would I expect to observe?"
If the hypothesis is "'good governance' and 'legitimacy' defined as per U.S. doctrine are vital to or crucial to defeating in insurgency," then we'd expect to see counterinsurgency campaigns that do those things successful and those which do not unsuccessful.
I'll admit I haven't compiled the data and could be wrong, but I'd be willing to bet Dave Dilegge's last dollar that the historical data doesn't show that. I believe Americans cling to that notion less because it reflects reality than because it reflects our preconceptions, viz. that other people share our priorities, preferences, and perceptions.
I think the notion that insurgency arises when regimes do not reflect Western notions of good governance and legitimacy, and insurgencies are defeated when regimes do reflects the attitudes which drove European colonialism. This idea has become ingrained in American counterinsurgency thinking because this thinking was derived from European colonialists like Thompson and Galula.
Well based on Clausewitz's hypothesises/observations, insurgencies are defeated when the insurgents give up using military/violent means obtain their policy objective. Most the time that is because enough have been killed or captured, as in any form of armed conflict.
Based on that, I cannot see what "good governance" and/or "legitimacy" has to contribute other than being simplistic political opinions.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Hey Wilf,
I believe there is room in our little discussion for both the "political struggle" and the "military struggle", which go back, as John Fishel posted, to a common well:
So, we are dealing with "power" and "Powers", which would be my starting point - not really very "Western". The Powers of the East and Middle East had to deal with "insurgencies" before there were Powers in the West.from JTF
As to the causes of insurgency and its identification with a struggle for power: we are back to Hans Moregnthau's statement in all editions of his Politics Amongnations going back to 1948, "International politics, LIKE ALL POLITICS, is a struggle for power." (emphasis added) This, in turn, harks back to St. Carl aka CvC.
Maybe more of Morgenthau, realism and Powers tomorrow nite.
Regards
Mike
Insurgency is certainly not new. The Hebrew people in Egypt is a great example (of course they called upon the ultimate WMD to help make their case). I suspect the Hebrew people questioned very much the legitimacy of the Egyptian Pharaoh to govern over them in such a way as to be able to deny them the freedom to leave Egypt; that the rule of law as applied to them was unjust; that they were treated with disrespect as a matter of status; and that they had no hope under the law to change their situation. This gave rise to a tremendous condition of insurgency within this significant and distinct segment of the populace. All of this could have easily (as is often the case) been addressed by the Pharaoh by simply accommodating the reasonable issues of the Hebrew populace. This is, after all, what Kennedy and Johnson did with the Civil Rights Act in the US. Instead he opted to enforce the rule of law; as did King George with the American Colonies; pushing a subversive movement into full-blown insurgency.
Now, the Pharaoh did try capture/kill operations on the insurgent leader, but he lacked adequate ISR and the ability to penetrate the sanctuary that Moses found in Midian among a supportive populace.
Then God put Moses on a UW mission, much as bin Laden claims that he too has been put on a UW mission by God. (I would ask bin Laden to show us some miracles as Moses did, as his bona fides are a bit weak compared to how God supported his original UW actor).
So Moses returned, armed with an ideology to radicalize the Hebrew populace and create an insurgency. I would argue that he found success in getting unarmed slaves to stand up to the most powerful King and Army in the world because such strong conditions of insurgency existed among this target populace, and also he had selected an ideology that spoke to them and took positions that the Pharaoh was unable / unwilling to co-opt.
We all know this story. It is not a Western one. The principles that drove this populace are the same that drive populaces today. These are human principles, not western ones.
Of note, the Hebrews first employed non-violent tactics of insurgency, and escalated only after they proved ineffective.
Now I have seen nothing to indicate that AQ has any of the god-given legitimacy that the Hebrew people exercised in this case. In no way do I mean to infer they do by this little example. He does however have the power of fairly strong conditions of insurgency in many of the states across the Middle East where he is peddling his influence, so his message is taking root. This is not one large populace or one global insurgency, but several smaller ones being leveraged by AQ to serve a larger purpose that is AQ's alone, along with the many nationalist purposes.
This is fundamental human dynamics. Now, would WILF have advised the Pharaoh "insurgencies are defeated when the insurgents give up using military/violent means obtain their policy objective. Most the time that is because enough have been killed or captured, as in any form of armed conflict." ??
Insurgencies happen for a reason, and typically it is rooted in the actions of the government. The government never wants to hear this, and more rare still seeks to address it. Easier just to enforce the rule of law and to capture kill enough of the populace so as to make them stop complaining and get back to making bricks.
Last edited by Bob's World; 10-11-2010 at 09:50 PM.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Hello all, I'm a student of DR Fishel's who wondered into this thread and couldn't resist barging in. Hopefully I'll have some worthwhile points to make.
The endeavor we're discussing is really kind of odd; we have these things that we call insurgencies, now we're trying to figure out what group of words best describes 'insurgencies' so we know when to use the word and when not to. (It seems rather backward, where is the simplicity of giving ideas words? If it was good enough for God and Adam . . . ). At this point, either the Jones/Fishel definition of insurgency as a form of illegal action or the Metz/White/Moore definition of insurgency as a form of strategy is equally correct. The question is, which will be more useful for researchers, theorists, and practitioners in the future?
Let's compare the two again:
Or simplified:
1: a Challenge for Political Control
that is Illegal
and Internal
2: a Strategy
used by Weak Against Strong
that is Violent
to Postpone Resolution
and a whole bunch of notes on common characteristics of insurgencies.
Here's the difference I see: Option 1 creates a neat little box that we can fit most things we consider insurgencies into, but includes other things we don't usually think of as insurgencies as well. Option 2 is also pretty straightforward, but is even broader - it only comes to resemble 'insurgency' with the addition of more modifiers.
I prefer Option 1 because I find it simpler and easier to use (more useful), and because it more closely resembles my own opinions (more accurate).
I buy the assertion that 'insurgencies' are about 'legitimacy', and I don't see how the latter is a uniquely Western construct. Pretty much any society has a power structure with rules, and that power structure exists either with some level of consent of most of the society's members, or through sheer force. Any challenge for political control by members of the society (internal) against the power structure that breaks the rules of the power structure (illegal) is thus an insurgency, and is a result of someone thinking that the current power structure's rules weren't worth following (legitimacy) - I challenge the skeptics to give a non-Western example that violates one of those points. (It wouldn't be the first time I was wrong).
Some thoughts:
1) The term 'illegal' is not a value judgment against the insurgents (though some may read it as such)
2) The presence of a state of illegitimacy does not automatically lead to insurgencies (the power structure is good at nipping them in the bud), nor can insurgencies be stopped solely by creating legitimacy, but it does cut into the insurgency's source of support and prevents future outbreaks.
That runs the risk of becoming tautological: people oppose governments they don't like. The only way I can think of to make it non-tautological is to add a value component: a government becomes legitimate by operating according to some rule set.
That's where the cultural component comes in: we believe that legitmacy is not governing in accordance with majority approval, but governing according to a set of rules which we claim are universal (but I think are culturally defined).
For Americans, "good governance" means Western style government. I'm not sure any Afghan government that promotes women's rights would be legitimate, yet it would be exercising "good governance" as Americans define it.
Even the idea of "consent" has a cultural dimension. Most governments throughout history have ruled based on passive consent. But one of the innovations of the European Enlightenment was the notion of active consent. We Americans have extrapolated this in a universal feature rather than a culturally-based one.
So, I'll stick to my argument that we in the West use the phrase "legtimacy" to sugar coat a colonial mindset--that societies are "modern" and "stable" to the extent they reflect the principles of Western liberalism.
That would be true IF insurgency is simply a different form of war. I'm not sure how I feel about that notion. I know that some people I respect greatly like Ralph Peters take it.
At its essence, such an approach seeks to manage threats rather than resolve them. That may be the most realistic. The implication is that if we need to return every decade and kill more insurgents, that is better in the long run than trying to re-engineer a society, culture, economy, and political system.
Two things are clear, though. If we are to conceptualize insurgency as a variant of war, we need to abandon the notion that the goal of war is always decisive victory. Second, if we are to adopt that conceptualization, we need to make fundamental change to our doctrine and strategy.
Last edited by SteveMetz; 10-12-2010 at 02:31 PM.
Let me take a stab at illustrating the pitfalls of a political/value based definition of insurgency.
Rather than the regime-focused on that has been used here, how about a people-based one: A method used by oppressed people to punish an unjust, repressive, corrupt, and illegitimate regime when they have no peaceful way of doing so.
The point I'm trying to make here is that a value-based definition is inherently subjective. Subjective definitions are useful as "calls to action" but have limits if the purpose is purely analytical.
Insurgency
We spend a large amount of time defining things like what is an insurgency---why do look at the concept of "open source warfare' in far more detail than previously given to the topic here in SWJ.
It gets waved off as fast as it is mentioned but after the recent salafist web release of this magazine which in ENGLISH used the term "open source jihad" maybe it is now time to discuss the theory instead of running from it--it is really interesting that few in the IC and even fewer in the military even understand the concept. But tied to Kilcullens' "conflict ecosystem" it moves the conversation forward.
Monday, 11 October 2010
JOURNAL: Open Source Jihad
A resource manual for those who loathe tyrants… a disaster for the repressive imperialistic nations:the open source jihad is America's worst nightmare. Al Qaeda's stated goal for Inspire.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula put out a magazine this summer called Inspire. It's a slick glossy e-zine. What really makes it interesting isn't how slick the magazine is. Instead, it is the purpose of the magazine: to promote "open source jihad" by providing readers with the tools they need to plan, motivate, organize, and pull off effective attacks against Western targets (i.e. specifics on recipes for bombs that don't use controlled substances and how to's on secure Interent communications via the software Asrar Al-Mujahideen).
This is yet another example of how young, innovative insurgents around the world are embracing open source warfare (OSW).
Nothing new, really... back when I was young and silly we had copies of The Anarchist's Cookbook being passed around to eager hands, along with the little red book, The War of the Flea, etc. Of course most of the people who devoured them never got to the point of doing anything, and those who did were generally too disorganized and too incompetent to have much impact.
Taking an old concept and giving it a snappy new name from the world of computer science is a good way to get attention, but it's hardly revolutionary.
Never discount the "iceberg effect" in assessing a populace.
The diagram on page 29 of http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/docreposito...surgencies.pdf
is as good of breakdown of this as any.
Today in Afghanistan and Pakistan the foreign fighters come from three main sources
1. Arabs.
2. Uzbeks
3. Turks
No Chechans, and actually a surprising number of Germans.
It is also best to remember that the primary goals for all of these groups, and most of their members, lie back where they came from, not where they are at. If we want to disempower AQ we need to focus less on killing all who show up in the FATA, and more on helping the governments of the states they come from to understand and address the conditions that give rise to these guys. And I suspect that foreign fighters are probably the thinest slice of the top of the pyramid/iceberg of discontent.
Good pitch on foreign fighters here:
http://www.fpri.org/multimedia/20100...el5.afpak.html
A better understanding of insurgency and its roots gives us a better understanding of AQ and foreign fighters and how to better deal with them as well. Killing them in the FATA actually helps recruiting back home. Photos of dead foreign fighters are used to recruit new members back home.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Posting Permissions
Bookmarks