Page 1 of 8 123 ... LastLast
Results 1 to 20 of 149

Thread: Defining Insurgency

  1. #1
    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jan 2007
    Location
    Carlisle, PA
    Posts
    1,488

    Default Defining Insurgency

    As some of you may know, I have long viewed insurgency as a strategy, not a particular conflict or type of movement. I think this is important because it avoids debates I am never able to understand like "Was the Iraq conflict an insurgency or a civil war?" and "Is Hamas an insurgency?"

    Anyhow, I'm trying to fine-tune and refine the definition from this perspective for a book chapter I'm working on. Here's what I've got. I realize it's a really long and complicated definition, but it's the best I can do right now. Thoughts?

    Insurgency is a strategy used by a weak organization against a power structure and the organizations which dominate it. The weak organization may seek specific political objectives or a total transformation of the power structure. The strategy uses or threatens the use of violence. The weak organization seeks to postpone resolution of the conflict while it adjusts the power balance in its favor. An organization using insurgency assumes that postponing resolution will lead to a shift in the power balance in its favor. This normally means that the weak organization assumes it has superior will and coherence. A strategy of insurgency involves diminishing the importance of realms of conflict or battlespaces where the weak organization is inferior (e.g. the conventional military one) and emphasizing ones where its inferiority is less (e.g. the psychological). It involves building alliances or partnerships to augment the strength of the weak organization, directly augmenting the strength of the weak organization, and diminishing the strength of the state or other dominant organization. A strategy of insurgency is most often used by a non-state organization against a state but may also be used by a non-state organization against a transnational power structure (e.g. al Qaeda), or by a nation (e.g. Iran).

  2. #2
    Registered User
    Join Date
    Oct 2010
    Posts
    1

    Default Proxies and International Obligations

    I agree that insurgency is a strategy, not necessarily a description of a conflict. However, I don't think it's a strategy limited to weak organizations. Major powers have used insurgencies, especially through supporting proxies, to achieve strategic goals they could not achieve directly. This was one of the founding principles of Special Forces.

    Perhaps you could argue that the system or environment the dominant power is trying to foster "dominates them" by imposing expectations on behavior (or to avoid perceptions of hypocrisy), leading them to take indirect action or work to undermine a rival in a way that avoids wider conflict.

    Also, I don't know if this is a general characteristic of ALL insurgencies, but every one I can think of focuses on undermining the legitimacy of its interlocutor while trying to promote its own (or its objective).

  3. #3
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Posts
    3,169

    Default Some rough thoughts

    I think you get away from the focus on insurgency as a strategy when part of the definition defines the insurgent as a weak organization. I think this is generally true, but I also think an opponent may decide that using insurgency as a strategy may just be the preferred strategy. I need to think about this one and cite potential examples, or case histories. However, if a Nation State provides support to an insurgency, they could very well be the stronger military opponent in a developing nation.

    We know all war is an extension of politics, but not all war is political warfare as I define it. Regular/conventional warfare is focused on defeating the enemy’s military forces to achieve the stated political ends, while irregular warfare uses violence, psychological operations, subversion, sabotage, political agitation, etc. to directly target the political body in charge. The original Special Forces qualification course was called the PYSWAR course, which in my view indicates our founders had a clearer understanding of the character of this war than we do today. PSYWAR is not dumbed down to leaflet drops, but every action taken is intended to send a psychological message be it an attack, night letter, assassination, economic sabotage, etc.

    Final off the cuff comment, does insurgency ever transition into another form of conflict? For example, if the insurgents mass forces and conduct large scale attacks on the opponent’s military is it still an insurgency?

    Over the years I have become disillusioned with definitions, while at the same time realizing the need for them. We all intuitively know that every situation is different, but yet our initial response generally involves attempts to blindly apply a doctrinal solution based on how the problem is “defined” versus what the problem really is. Case in point is the narco-terrorism/insurgency in Mexico. I think many see it as a real threat to regional stability, but if Mexico calls it an insurgency that generally means they’ll employ COIN doctrine to counter it (I have no idea how Mexico views the problem, I am simply using this as example). I doubt that a COIN strategy will work. It is a unique problem requiring an unique strategy. How we define insurgency will influence how we approach it, so this is critically important.

    I have been a fan of your work for years now, and looking forward to reading your new book. Bill

  4. #4
    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jan 2007
    Location
    Carlisle, PA
    Posts
    1,488

    Default

    Interesting points, but myself don't think that supporting insurgents makes the U.S. an insurgent. The idea of undercutting the legitimacy of the existing power structure fits into my definition--since I stress trying to alter the power balance, that is just one of many methods of trying to weaken the existing power. And since I define it as a strategy, not a form of conflict, of course organizations can shift from insurgency to another strategy just as a nation can shift from one strategy to another. That's the reason that I've never found much use in trying to decide whether an organization is or is not an insurgency.

  5. #5
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Posts
    4,818

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post

    [I]Insurgency is a strategy used by a organization against a power structure and the organizations which dominate it.
    I would leave at this. It is a Strategy and two I like Bill Moore's comment about "weak" which is why I would take it out. It is a dangerous assumption to think that an Insurgency Strategy and or an Organization is somehow weak just because they use it IMO.

  6. #6
    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jan 2007
    Location
    Carlisle, PA
    Posts
    1,488

    Default

    I really think that is vital because a strategy of insurgency is so difficult, takes so long, and has such a low probability of success that an organization is unlikely to use it if it has other options. And I really don't think that supporting an insurgency means that a state or other organization has become an insurgent or adopted a strategy of insurgency. I supported my wife when she gave birth, but that didn't make me a mother.

  7. #7
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Posts
    3,169

    Default

    I really think that is vital because a strategy of insurgency is so difficult, takes so long, and has such a low probability of success that an organization is unlikely to use it if it has other options.
    Perhaps because the insurgent only wants to achieve a limited objective, and has no desire to transform the entire power structure? Just a thought.

    The weak organization may seek specific political objectives or a total transformation of the power structure.

  8. #8
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Posts
    4,818

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    I really think that is vital because a strategy of insurgency is so difficult, takes so long, and has such a low probability of success that an organization is unlikely to use it if it has other options. And I really don't think that supporting an insurgency means that a state or other organization has become an insurgent or adopted a strategy of insurgency. I supported my wife when she gave birth, but that didn't make me a mother.
    I use the SBW theory of Insurgency instead of the usual ones. Instead of thinking about it as a death by a thousand cuts, it is more like success through a thousand bites. It is subtle, it is hidden, it is based on Infiltration and Subversion, and every now and then some Targeted violence. But every step they take makes them stronger, which is why they can take a long time.

  9. #9
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2008
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    2,706

    Default

    I think the definition of insurgency is fairly simple, it is defining the things that give rise to insurgency where it begins to get complicated. But here are some positions that I am working on:

    But rather than a strategy employed by some group, I would define insurgency more accurately as a Condition. Success lies in treating the condition, not countering the strategy or defeating the organizations that rise to exploit it.

    Insurgency:An illegal political challenge to a governing body that may be either violent or non-violent in terms of tactics employed and campaign design.

    Conditions of Insurgency: A state of mind. The conditions of insurgency arguably exist to some degree within every populace. In most cases such conditions are benign in that they are not strong enough to support the rise of a significant insurgent organization, even if manipulated by outside actors conducting UW or by ideological themes designed for this audience. As perceptions of poor governance increase so does the degree of the conditions of insurgency. Left unchecked these conditions are apt to be exploited by internal and/or external parties for purposes of their own that may or may not have the welfare of the affected populace in mind. Conditions of insurgency are caused by the government and assessed through the perspective of the populace.

    Poor Governance: Actions or inactions on the part of governance that contribute to create conditions of insurgency within one or more significant segments of the society they govern. Poor Governance is assessed through the perceptions of each significant segment of society separately as well as collectively. Objective metrics of effectiveness of governance are immaterial to assessments of goodness.

    Good Governance: Governance, that may be either effective or ineffective, that through the nature of its performance prevents the growth of conditions of insurgency. Subjective, and measured as assessed by each significant segment of a populace, perceptions of good governance will typically vary across a state. Where good governance exists insurgency is unlikely. Where good governance is lacking the conditions of insurgency will grow, creating vulnerability for exploitation by internal or external actors pursuing agendas that may, or may not represent the best interests of the populace. The most critical perceptions that contribute to good governance appear to be those of Legitimacy, Justice, Respect and Hope.

    Perception of Legitimacy: The most critical causal perception contributing to the conditions of insurgency in a society. Legitimate is not synonymous with Official. It is a recognition and acceptance on the part of any significant segment of a society of the rights and duties of governance to govern. This is independent of any official or legal status of governance or any recognition of this governance by others. Historically insurgent movements will ultimately fail when this condition exists, and prevail when it is absent. The absence of legitimacy is the cornerstone of despotism.

    Perception of Justice: A critical causal perception that contributes to the conditions of insurgency in a society as shaped by good or poor performance of governance. Justice is not synonymous Rule of Law. Perceptions of justice are based in how the populace feels about the rule of law as it is applied to them. Enforcing the Rule of Law upon a populace that perceives the law as unjust is tyranny and will make the conditions of insurgency worse.

    Perception of Respect: A critical causal perception that contributes to the conditions of insurgency in a society as shaped by good or poor performance of governance. Measured through the eyes of the populace, the widely help perception within any significant segment of a society that they are not excluded from full participation in governance and opportunity as a matter of status. Assessments by those outside the affected populace, to include by the government, are immaterial.

    Perception of Hope: A critical causal perception that contributes to the conditions of insurgency in a society as shaped by good or poor performance of governance. Hope resides in the absolute confidence within any significant segment of a society that they have available to them trusted, certain and legal means to change their governance. Hope is the great off-ramp for insurgency, as the presence of hope keeps politics within the established and accepted legal parameters.

    (these are all a work in progress and will evolve, but will be in a paper I put out soon that looks at many of the long-standing cliche's that dominate thinking on COIN)
    Last edited by Bob's World; 10-08-2010 at 11:42 PM.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  10. #10
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Posts
    4,818

    Default Joe Friday Analysis Of Insurgency.....Just The Facts Mam!

    Insurgency is a Method....used by a Motivated individual(s).....to exploit any available Opportunity.
    Last edited by slapout9; 10-08-2010 at 11:58 PM. Reason: spellin stuff

  11. #11
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2008
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    2,706

    Default

    I need to drink whiskey with Slap someday...
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  12. #12
    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2009
    Location
    Latitude 17° 5' 11N, Longitude 120° 54' 24E, altitude 1499m. Right where I want to be.
    Posts
    3,137

    Default

    Looking at the RCJ definition:

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Insurgency:An illegal political challenge to a governing body that may be either violent or non-violent in terms of tactics employed and campaign design.
    and the Steve Metz definition:

    Insurgency is a strategy used by a weak organization against a power structure and the organizations which dominate it.
    One difference is immediately obvious. RCJ's definition involves a challenge to "a governing body", SM's merely requires a challenge to "a power structure and the organizations which dominate it". Under the former definition a "global insurgency" is not possible, as there is no global governing body. There is a global power structure with dominant organizations, so under the SM definition a global insurgency is possible.

    In the RCJ elucidation of the causes of insurgency, a significant word appears in significant places:

    Poor Governance:Poor Governance is assessed through the perceptions of each significant segment of society...

    [Governance, that may be either effective or ineffective, that through the nature of its performance prevents the growth of conditions of insurgency. Subjective, and measured as assessed by each significant segment of a populace
    What makes a segment of society "significant"? Is it the size of that segment, or its capacity to make noise, or its capacity for violence? The didtinction is, well, significant, because the modern media and the tactics of modern terrorism allow groups of relatively insignificant size to produce significant noise and significant violence. We cannot assume that whoever shouts loudest or blows things up speaks for a populace or a significant segment thereof.

    That distinction answers the question of why so many groups don't adopt the non-violent mass movement techniques that have proven effective elsewhere. They can't. They simply don't have enough popular support to make these tactics effective. That's why they resort to terrorist tactics in the first place.

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Where good governance exists insurgency is unlikely.
    Good governance may protect against insurgency, but it does not peotect against political violence perpetrated by small groups with passionately held beliefs that are not shared by the bulk of the populace. If I believe that the US needs to be an Aryan state with no homosexuals, or if I believe that Indonesia should be placed under Shariah law, and if I'm willing to kill to advance these causes, my definition of good governance is so fundamentally incompatible with that of the nation at large that any government seen as "good" by the majority is only going to provoke me to violence.

    It can be a mistake to mistake broad-based insurgency for the actions of a violent lunatic fringe. It can also be a mistake to mistake the actions of a violent lunatic fringe for a broad based insurgency. We can't assume that we're seeing one or the other, we have to assess each case according to its own unique conditions.
    Last edited by Dayuhan; 10-09-2010 at 01:22 AM.

  13. #13
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2008
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    2,706

    Default

    Some illegal challenges are not insurgency. I personally do not thing that Mexico is facing insurgency. I think the Mexican populace, as an example, does not think it is subject to poor governance, so much as subject to criminal competition with governance.

    We tend to lump problems by the wrong criteria. A lot of insurgencies around the globe that all work to some degree with one UW actor does not, for example, equate to a "global insurgency."

    I try to find distinctions that matter. Many may exist, but not all matter. Mike does a good job of pointing out that under the law some facts are evidence, and some are not. Of those that are some are relevant and some are not. Of those that are relevant, some are material and some are not. I don't think we do a good job of focusing on what is truly important when we deal with insurgencies, and instead, quite reasonably, focus on what is urgent.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  14. #14
    Registered User
    Join Date
    Jul 2010
    Location
    Australia
    Posts
    3

    Default

    Steve,

    I agree with RCJ in that an insurgency is difficult to define when including the conditions that give rise to an insurgency. Providing predictions of behaviour such as "seeks to postpone resolution of the conflict while it adjusts the power balance in its favor" renders the definition problematic.

    These organisational characteristics that are built into your definition are antithetical to your outlook of insurgency as merely a "strategy".

    Likewise your assumption of the insurgent as a weak organisation is too restrictive (I agree with Powerpoint Samurai and Bill on this point); it may be that, in a particular conflict/theatre, that actor may employ an insurgency strategy in conditions or relative weakness (not absolute) or through choice.

  15. #15
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Aug 2010
    Posts
    25

    Default

    I wouldnt call insurgency a strategy, i would rather call as bob said it a
    "An illegal political challenge to a governing body that may be either violent or non-violent in terms of tactics employed and campaign design."
    Also when you look at the translations of the word insurgency, in for example dutch (opstand : uprising ) or in french ( insurger : insurrection ), this way i think it is better to say that "insurgency" tells us something about the origins of the conflict rather then the way it is being fought.

    On the other hand your definition would be a pretty good definition of the strategical part of guerilla warfare.

  16. #16
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2008
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    2,706

    Default

    As way of background, I really began drilling into this topic in depth while I was at SOCPAC '04-'08. During that time I supported at least 5 different JSOTF-P Commanders, and 3 SOCPAC CGs, to include all of LTG Fridovich's tenure their. We we're immersed every day in the challenges of addressing potential threats to US interests from irregular threats in a tremendously large, diverse region where every state is extremely protective of their sovereignty (as they should be, most had to fight long bloody insurgencies to throw of colonial oppression to earn that sovereignty); where few feel they have a "terrorist" threat; where trust between states; is often low; and where the U.S. has a bit of a mixed reputation, largely positive, but taking some serious chin shots as we break glass all over the globe in the name of GWOT. Meanwhile, China is waging a very persistent and subtle influence building campaign. I feel most trust the US more than they trust China, but the prefer the Chinese approach gifts without strings attached (ok, they know and fear those strings, but they are long ones and many not be pulled for generations. The Chinese are patient like that). I also knocked out the two-year War
    College program in my "spare" time, with my thesis on COG analysis for the GWOT.

    COIN that focused on the insurgent didn't make sense as the results were so temporary. We worked a lot with the Philippines, and that country has been in a virtual constant state of insurgency since the first Spanish ship made landfall. There are many COIN "victories" in the Philippines; yet there is always insurgency. This is victory? It made no sense. So the insurgent clearly wasn't the problem. Same for ideology. Commies in the north, Muslims in the South; commies in the 50's and 60's regionally; Islamist today; etc. It was also very apparent that "defeating ideology" was not an effective approach either.
    Many insurgent populaces live in poor conditions, but also many peaceful satisfied populaces. Many insurgents come from wealthy, educated backgrounds as well. Effective governance appeared to me as another bit of superficial analysis.

    One by one I drilled into these concepts, and also concepts like "sanctuary."

    The one commonality is the existence of some governing body that was perceived as the problem. Often several different segments of a populace would be supportive of very different insurgencies for very different reasons, and employ very different ideologies. But it always radiated out from the government.

    So the key is the government, and this "badness" that radiates out from certain governments and not others. So I started looking at governments and how insurgent populaces felt about their governments. This led to a narrowing of factors. While there are many factors, the four I seized upon as the main causal factors seemed to me to be the most important. Most likely to create conditions of insurgency if they exist; and most likely to move a populace back toward "peace" if addressed.

    It's a work in progress, that is nested with wise insights that have been drawn from insurgency and COIN over the years, but not constrained by positions that often are very popular, but just don't stand up to hard review. I throw my ideas out here because I want them to receive hard review. I know some won't stand up, and that's fine, because if one falls from hard review a new, better one will emerge from that same review.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  17. #17
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Feb 2007
    Location
    Rancho La Espada, Blanchard, OK
    Posts
    1,065

    Default Insurgency - definitions

    Steve, while I tend to disagree with your formulation of insuregency as a strategy, that is, of course, your right. If it is useful for you to see it in those terms, have at it. As always, I am intrigued to see what you come up with.

    Bob, I would modify your definition to read Regime (in the technical IR sense of a set of rules governing a system) instead of governing body. this would meet the objection that insurgency cannot be a global phenomenon without doing damage to the notion that it is usually a national one.

    Regarding your causal varables: While I have no problem with them they ar all intellectually linked to legitimacy. In our quantitative analysis back in the 80s all of these ideas clustered under the Factor that we later labelled Legitimacy. In this sense, then, all insurgencies are conflicts over legitimacy.

    Cheers

    JohnT

  18. #18
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Posts
    4,818

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by John T. Fishel View Post
    Steve, while I tend to disagree with your formulation of insuregency as a strategy, that is, of course, your right. If it is useful for you to see it in those terms, have at it. As always, I am intrigued to see what you come up with.


    JohnT

    Hi John,
    1- If Insurgency is not a Strategy, what do you think it is?
    2-I very much agree that it is always about legitamacy.

  19. #19
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2008
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    2,706

    Default

    "We have nothing to fear from Afghanistan, and the best thing to do is to leave it as much as possible to itself. It may not be very flattering to our 'amour propre', but I feel sure I am right when I say that the less the Afghans see of us the less they will dislike us. Should Russia in future years attempt to conquer Afghanistan, or invade India through it, we should have a better chance of attaching the Afghans to our interest if we avoid all interference with them in the meantime."

    General Roberts, 1880. Switch out "Russia" (for now) with AQ or any other threat and it is as true today as it was then.

    I mention this because as John points out, it really comes down to Legitimacy. I break it out on purpose to the components that I see as most important, as "legitimacy" is word that is too often used to mean "offical." GIROA is very official, but they are horribly illegitimate, and it is the crux of the problem there.

    Now, Karzai is a sharp guy, and he could fix it if he wanted to, but he would have far less power and far less income if he did so; besides with the Coalition protecting him and sending him Billions, why should he change???

    This is the tough love conversation we need to have. Get serious about fixing legitimacy with our help, or be forced to fix it on your own without our funding and security support. We enable bad behavior, we enable poor governance, we enable the causation of the insurgency through our mis-guided efforts to counter the insurgency. Ironic.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  20. #20
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Posts
    4,818

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    I mention this because as John points out, it really comes down to Legitimacy. I break it out on purpose to the components that I see as most important, as "legitimacy" is word that is too often used to mean "offical." GIROA is very official, but they are horribly illegitimate, and it is the crux of the problem there.

    Now, Karzai is a sharp guy, and he could fix it if he wanted to, but he would have far less power and far less income if he did so; besides with the Coalition protecting him and sending him Billions, why should he change???
    Yes, we seem to obsess on the Methods being used, instead of focusing the motives.

Similar Threads

  1. Thailand (catch all)
    By Jedburgh in forum Asia-Pacific
    Replies: 64
    Last Post: 08-31-2015, 06:34 AM
  2. Insurgency in the 21st Century
    By SteveMetz in forum Futurists & Theorists
    Replies: 25
    Last Post: 02-17-2010, 05:59 PM
  3. Insurgency and Civil COIN indicators
    By stu in forum Social Sciences, Moral, and Religious
    Replies: 5
    Last Post: 08-24-2009, 02:01 PM
  4. Profusion of Rebel Groups Helps Them Survive
    By DDilegge in forum Who is Fighting Whom? How and Why?
    Replies: 18
    Last Post: 01-25-2007, 01:47 PM

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •