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  1. #1
    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Default Defining Insurgency

    As some of you may know, I have long viewed insurgency as a strategy, not a particular conflict or type of movement. I think this is important because it avoids debates I am never able to understand like "Was the Iraq conflict an insurgency or a civil war?" and "Is Hamas an insurgency?"

    Anyhow, I'm trying to fine-tune and refine the definition from this perspective for a book chapter I'm working on. Here's what I've got. I realize it's a really long and complicated definition, but it's the best I can do right now. Thoughts?

    Insurgency is a strategy used by a weak organization against a power structure and the organizations which dominate it. The weak organization may seek specific political objectives or a total transformation of the power structure. The strategy uses or threatens the use of violence. The weak organization seeks to postpone resolution of the conflict while it adjusts the power balance in its favor. An organization using insurgency assumes that postponing resolution will lead to a shift in the power balance in its favor. This normally means that the weak organization assumes it has superior will and coherence. A strategy of insurgency involves diminishing the importance of realms of conflict or battlespaces where the weak organization is inferior (e.g. the conventional military one) and emphasizing ones where its inferiority is less (e.g. the psychological). It involves building alliances or partnerships to augment the strength of the weak organization, directly augmenting the strength of the weak organization, and diminishing the strength of the state or other dominant organization. A strategy of insurgency is most often used by a non-state organization against a state but may also be used by a non-state organization against a transnational power structure (e.g. al Qaeda), or by a nation (e.g. Iran).

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    Default Proxies and International Obligations

    I agree that insurgency is a strategy, not necessarily a description of a conflict. However, I don't think it's a strategy limited to weak organizations. Major powers have used insurgencies, especially through supporting proxies, to achieve strategic goals they could not achieve directly. This was one of the founding principles of Special Forces.

    Perhaps you could argue that the system or environment the dominant power is trying to foster "dominates them" by imposing expectations on behavior (or to avoid perceptions of hypocrisy), leading them to take indirect action or work to undermine a rival in a way that avoids wider conflict.

    Also, I don't know if this is a general characteristic of ALL insurgencies, but every one I can think of focuses on undermining the legitimacy of its interlocutor while trying to promote its own (or its objective).

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    Default Some rough thoughts

    I think you get away from the focus on insurgency as a strategy when part of the definition defines the insurgent as a weak organization. I think this is generally true, but I also think an opponent may decide that using insurgency as a strategy may just be the preferred strategy. I need to think about this one and cite potential examples, or case histories. However, if a Nation State provides support to an insurgency, they could very well be the stronger military opponent in a developing nation.

    We know all war is an extension of politics, but not all war is political warfare as I define it. Regular/conventional warfare is focused on defeating the enemy’s military forces to achieve the stated political ends, while irregular warfare uses violence, psychological operations, subversion, sabotage, political agitation, etc. to directly target the political body in charge. The original Special Forces qualification course was called the PYSWAR course, which in my view indicates our founders had a clearer understanding of the character of this war than we do today. PSYWAR is not dumbed down to leaflet drops, but every action taken is intended to send a psychological message be it an attack, night letter, assassination, economic sabotage, etc.

    Final off the cuff comment, does insurgency ever transition into another form of conflict? For example, if the insurgents mass forces and conduct large scale attacks on the opponent’s military is it still an insurgency?

    Over the years I have become disillusioned with definitions, while at the same time realizing the need for them. We all intuitively know that every situation is different, but yet our initial response generally involves attempts to blindly apply a doctrinal solution based on how the problem is “defined” versus what the problem really is. Case in point is the narco-terrorism/insurgency in Mexico. I think many see it as a real threat to regional stability, but if Mexico calls it an insurgency that generally means they’ll employ COIN doctrine to counter it (I have no idea how Mexico views the problem, I am simply using this as example). I doubt that a COIN strategy will work. It is a unique problem requiring an unique strategy. How we define insurgency will influence how we approach it, so this is critically important.

    I have been a fan of your work for years now, and looking forward to reading your new book. Bill

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    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Interesting points, but myself don't think that supporting insurgents makes the U.S. an insurgent. The idea of undercutting the legitimacy of the existing power structure fits into my definition--since I stress trying to alter the power balance, that is just one of many methods of trying to weaken the existing power. And since I define it as a strategy, not a form of conflict, of course organizations can shift from insurgency to another strategy just as a nation can shift from one strategy to another. That's the reason that I've never found much use in trying to decide whether an organization is or is not an insurgency.

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    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post

    [I]Insurgency is a strategy used by a organization against a power structure and the organizations which dominate it.
    I would leave at this. It is a Strategy and two I like Bill Moore's comment about "weak" which is why I would take it out. It is a dangerous assumption to think that an Insurgency Strategy and or an Organization is somehow weak just because they use it IMO.

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    I really think that is vital because a strategy of insurgency is so difficult, takes so long, and has such a low probability of success that an organization is unlikely to use it if it has other options. And I really don't think that supporting an insurgency means that a state or other organization has become an insurgent or adopted a strategy of insurgency. I supported my wife when she gave birth, but that didn't make me a mother.

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    I really think that is vital because a strategy of insurgency is so difficult, takes so long, and has such a low probability of success that an organization is unlikely to use it if it has other options.
    Perhaps because the insurgent only wants to achieve a limited objective, and has no desire to transform the entire power structure? Just a thought.

    The weak organization may seek specific political objectives or a total transformation of the power structure.

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    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    I really think that is vital because a strategy of insurgency is so difficult, takes so long, and has such a low probability of success that an organization is unlikely to use it if it has other options. And I really don't think that supporting an insurgency means that a state or other organization has become an insurgent or adopted a strategy of insurgency. I supported my wife when she gave birth, but that didn't make me a mother.
    I use the SBW theory of Insurgency instead of the usual ones. Instead of thinking about it as a death by a thousand cuts, it is more like success through a thousand bites. It is subtle, it is hidden, it is based on Infiltration and Subversion, and every now and then some Targeted violence. But every step they take makes them stronger, which is why they can take a long time.

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    I think the definition of insurgency is fairly simple, it is defining the things that give rise to insurgency where it begins to get complicated. But here are some positions that I am working on:

    But rather than a strategy employed by some group, I would define insurgency more accurately as a Condition. Success lies in treating the condition, not countering the strategy or defeating the organizations that rise to exploit it.

    Insurgency:An illegal political challenge to a governing body that may be either violent or non-violent in terms of tactics employed and campaign design.

    Conditions of Insurgency: A state of mind. The conditions of insurgency arguably exist to some degree within every populace. In most cases such conditions are benign in that they are not strong enough to support the rise of a significant insurgent organization, even if manipulated by outside actors conducting UW or by ideological themes designed for this audience. As perceptions of poor governance increase so does the degree of the conditions of insurgency. Left unchecked these conditions are apt to be exploited by internal and/or external parties for purposes of their own that may or may not have the welfare of the affected populace in mind. Conditions of insurgency are caused by the government and assessed through the perspective of the populace.

    Poor Governance: Actions or inactions on the part of governance that contribute to create conditions of insurgency within one or more significant segments of the society they govern. Poor Governance is assessed through the perceptions of each significant segment of society separately as well as collectively. Objective metrics of effectiveness of governance are immaterial to assessments of goodness.

    Good Governance: Governance, that may be either effective or ineffective, that through the nature of its performance prevents the growth of conditions of insurgency. Subjective, and measured as assessed by each significant segment of a populace, perceptions of good governance will typically vary across a state. Where good governance exists insurgency is unlikely. Where good governance is lacking the conditions of insurgency will grow, creating vulnerability for exploitation by internal or external actors pursuing agendas that may, or may not represent the best interests of the populace. The most critical perceptions that contribute to good governance appear to be those of Legitimacy, Justice, Respect and Hope.

    Perception of Legitimacy: The most critical causal perception contributing to the conditions of insurgency in a society. Legitimate is not synonymous with Official. It is a recognition and acceptance on the part of any significant segment of a society of the rights and duties of governance to govern. This is independent of any official or legal status of governance or any recognition of this governance by others. Historically insurgent movements will ultimately fail when this condition exists, and prevail when it is absent. The absence of legitimacy is the cornerstone of despotism.

    Perception of Justice: A critical causal perception that contributes to the conditions of insurgency in a society as shaped by good or poor performance of governance. Justice is not synonymous Rule of Law. Perceptions of justice are based in how the populace feels about the rule of law as it is applied to them. Enforcing the Rule of Law upon a populace that perceives the law as unjust is tyranny and will make the conditions of insurgency worse.

    Perception of Respect: A critical causal perception that contributes to the conditions of insurgency in a society as shaped by good or poor performance of governance. Measured through the eyes of the populace, the widely help perception within any significant segment of a society that they are not excluded from full participation in governance and opportunity as a matter of status. Assessments by those outside the affected populace, to include by the government, are immaterial.

    Perception of Hope: A critical causal perception that contributes to the conditions of insurgency in a society as shaped by good or poor performance of governance. Hope resides in the absolute confidence within any significant segment of a society that they have available to them trusted, certain and legal means to change their governance. Hope is the great off-ramp for insurgency, as the presence of hope keeps politics within the established and accepted legal parameters.

    (these are all a work in progress and will evolve, but will be in a paper I put out soon that looks at many of the long-standing cliche's that dominate thinking on COIN)
    Last edited by Bob's World; 10-08-2010 at 11:42 PM.
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Default Joe Friday Analysis Of Insurgency.....Just The Facts Mam!

    Insurgency is a Method....used by a Motivated individual(s).....to exploit any available Opportunity.
    Last edited by slapout9; 10-08-2010 at 11:58 PM. Reason: spellin stuff

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    Looking at the RCJ definition:

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Insurgency:An illegal political challenge to a governing body that may be either violent or non-violent in terms of tactics employed and campaign design.
    and the Steve Metz definition:

    Insurgency is a strategy used by a weak organization against a power structure and the organizations which dominate it.
    One difference is immediately obvious. RCJ's definition involves a challenge to "a governing body", SM's merely requires a challenge to "a power structure and the organizations which dominate it". Under the former definition a "global insurgency" is not possible, as there is no global governing body. There is a global power structure with dominant organizations, so under the SM definition a global insurgency is possible.

    In the RCJ elucidation of the causes of insurgency, a significant word appears in significant places:

    Poor Governance:Poor Governance is assessed through the perceptions of each significant segment of society...

    [Governance, that may be either effective or ineffective, that through the nature of its performance prevents the growth of conditions of insurgency. Subjective, and measured as assessed by each significant segment of a populace
    What makes a segment of society "significant"? Is it the size of that segment, or its capacity to make noise, or its capacity for violence? The didtinction is, well, significant, because the modern media and the tactics of modern terrorism allow groups of relatively insignificant size to produce significant noise and significant violence. We cannot assume that whoever shouts loudest or blows things up speaks for a populace or a significant segment thereof.

    That distinction answers the question of why so many groups don't adopt the non-violent mass movement techniques that have proven effective elsewhere. They can't. They simply don't have enough popular support to make these tactics effective. That's why they resort to terrorist tactics in the first place.

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Where good governance exists insurgency is unlikely.
    Good governance may protect against insurgency, but it does not peotect against political violence perpetrated by small groups with passionately held beliefs that are not shared by the bulk of the populace. If I believe that the US needs to be an Aryan state with no homosexuals, or if I believe that Indonesia should be placed under Shariah law, and if I'm willing to kill to advance these causes, my definition of good governance is so fundamentally incompatible with that of the nation at large that any government seen as "good" by the majority is only going to provoke me to violence.

    It can be a mistake to mistake broad-based insurgency for the actions of a violent lunatic fringe. It can also be a mistake to mistake the actions of a violent lunatic fringe for a broad based insurgency. We can't assume that we're seeing one or the other, we have to assess each case according to its own unique conditions.
    Last edited by Dayuhan; 10-09-2010 at 01:22 AM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Insurgency:An illegal political challenge to a governing body that may be either violent or non-violent in terms of tactics employed and campaign design.
    John, so basically you believe in this definition? with your substitution/addition of regime?

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    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    I think the definition of insurgency is fairly simple, it is defining the things that give rise to insurgency where it begins to get complicated. But here are some positions that I am working on:

    But rather than a strategy employed by some group, I would define insurgency more accurately as a Condition. Success lies in treating the condition, not countering the strategy or defeating the organizations that rise to exploit it.

    Insurgency:An illegal political challenge to a governing body that may be either violent or non-violent in terms of tactics employed and campaign design.

    Conditions of Insurgency: A state of mind. The conditions of insurgency arguably exist to some degree within every populace. In most cases such conditions are benign in that they are not strong enough to support the rise of a significant insurgent organization, even if manipulated by outside actors conducting UW or by ideological themes designed for this audience. As perceptions of poor governance increase so does the degree of the conditions of insurgency. Left unchecked these conditions are apt to be exploited by internal and/or external parties for purposes of their own that may or may not have the welfare of the affected populace in mind. Conditions of insurgency are caused by the government and assessed through the perspective of the populace.

    Poor Governance: Actions or inactions on the part of governance that contribute to create conditions of insurgency within one or more significant segments of the society they govern. Poor Governance is assessed through the perceptions of each significant segment of society separately as well as collectively. Objective metrics of effectiveness of governance are immaterial to assessments of goodness.

    Good Governance: Governance, that may be either effective or ineffective, that through the nature of its performance prevents the growth of conditions of insurgency. Subjective, and measured as assessed by each significant segment of a populace, perceptions of good governance will typically vary across a state. Where good governance exists insurgency is unlikely. Where good governance is lacking the conditions of insurgency will grow, creating vulnerability for exploitation by internal or external actors pursuing agendas that may, or may not represent the best interests of the populace. The most critical perceptions that contribute to good governance appear to be those of Legitimacy, Justice, Respect and Hope.

    Perception of Legitimacy: The most critical causal perception contributing to the conditions of insurgency in a society. Legitimate is not synonymous with Official. It is a recognition and acceptance on the part of any significant segment of a society of the rights and duties of governance to govern. This is independent of any official or legal status of governance or any recognition of this governance by others. Historically insurgent movements will ultimately fail when this condition exists, and prevail when it is absent. The absence of legitimacy is the cornerstone of despotism.

    Perception of Justice: A critical causal perception that contributes to the conditions of insurgency in a society as shaped by good or poor performance of governance. Justice is not synonymous Rule of Law. Perceptions of justice are based in how the populace feels about the rule of law as it is applied to them. Enforcing the Rule of Law upon a populace that perceives the law as unjust is tyranny and will make the conditions of insurgency worse.

    Perception of Respect: A critical causal perception that contributes to the conditions of insurgency in a society as shaped by good or poor performance of governance. Measured through the eyes of the populace, the widely help perception within any significant segment of a society that they are not excluded from full participation in governance and opportunity as a matter of status. Assessments by those outside the affected populace, to include by the government, are immaterial.

    Perception of Hope: A critical causal perception that contributes to the conditions of insurgency in a society as shaped by good or poor performance of governance. Hope resides in the absolute confidence within any significant segment of a society that they have available to them trusted, certain and legal means to change their governance. Hope is the great off-ramp for insurgency, as the presence of hope keeps politics within the established and accepted legal parameters.

    (these are all a work in progress and will evolve, but will be in a paper I put out soon that looks at many of the long-standing cliche's that dominate thinking on COIN)
    My problem with definitions like that is that they are so thoroughly Western in perspective, with their emphasis on notions like legitimacy, good governance, and legality based on the Western experience. The unspoken assumption is that insurgencies occur because states don't adequately follow the Western-defined path, and will be defeated if states do.

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