Defining Insurgency

[Bill Moore]

I think you get away from the focus on insurgency as a strategy when part of the definition defines the insurgent as a weak organization. I think this is generally true, but I also think an opponent may decide that using insurgency as a strategy may just be the preferred strategy. I need to think about this one and cite potential examples, or case histories. However, if a Nation State provides support to an insurgency, they could very well be the stronger military opponent in a developing nation.

We know all war is an extension of politics, but not all war is political warfare as I define it. Regular/conventional warfare is focused on defeating the enemy’s military forces to achieve the stated political ends, while irregular warfare uses violence, psychological operations, subversion, sabotage, political agitation, etc. to directly target the political body in charge. The original Special Forces qualification course was called the PYSWAR course, which in my view indicates our founders had a clearer understanding of the character of this war than we do today. PSYWAR is not dumbed down to leaflet drops, but every action taken is intended to send a psychological message be it an attack, night letter, assassination, economic sabotage, etc.

Final off the cuff comment, does insurgency ever transition into another form of conflict? For example, if the insurgents mass forces and conduct large scale attacks on the opponent’s military is it still an insurgency?

Over the years I have become disillusioned with definitions, while at the same time realizing the need for them. We all intuitively know that every situation is different, but yet our initial response generally involves attempts to blindly apply a doctrinal solution based on how the problem is “defined” versus what the problem really is. Case in point is the narco-terrorism/insurgency in Mexico. I think many see it as a real threat to regional stability, but if Mexico calls it an insurgency that generally means they’ll employ COIN doctrine to counter it (I have no idea how Mexico views the problem, I am simply using this as example). I doubt that a COIN strategy will work. It is a unique problem requiring an unique strategy. How we define insurgency will influence how we approach it, so this is critically important.

I have been a fan of your work for years now, and looking forward to reading your new book. Bill

[SteveMetz]

Interesting points, but myself don't think that supporting insurgents makes the U.S. an insurgent. The idea of undercutting the legitimacy of the existing power structure fits into my definition--since I stress trying to alter the power balance, that is just one of many methods of trying to weaken the existing power. And since I define it as a strategy, not a form of conflict, of course organizations can shift from insurgency to another strategy just as a nation can shift from one strategy to another. That's the reason that I've never found much use in trying to decide whether an organization is or is not an insurgency.