I use the SBW theory of Insurgency instead of the usual ones. Instead of thinking about it as a death by a thousand cuts, it is more like success through a thousand bites. It is subtle, it is hidden, it is based on Infiltration and Subversion, and every now and then some Targeted violence. But every step they take makes them stronger, which is why they can take a long time.Originally Posted by SteveMetz
I think the definition of insurgency is fairly simple, it is defining the things that give rise to insurgency where it begins to get complicated. But here are some positions that I am working on:
But rather than a strategy employed by some group, I would define insurgency more accurately as a Condition. Success lies in treating the condition, not countering the strategy or defeating the organizations that rise to exploit it.
Insurgency:An illegal political challenge to a governing body that may be either violent or non-violent in terms of tactics employed and campaign design.
Conditions of Insurgency: A state of mind. The conditions of insurgency arguably exist to some degree within every populace. In most cases such conditions are benign in that they are not strong enough to support the rise of a significant insurgent organization, even if manipulated by outside actors conducting UW or by ideological themes designed for this audience. As perceptions of poor governance increase so does the degree of the conditions of insurgency. Left unchecked these conditions are apt to be exploited by internal and/or external parties for purposes of their own that may or may not have the welfare of the affected populace in mind. Conditions of insurgency are caused by the government and assessed through the perspective of the populace.
Poor Governance: Actions or inactions on the part of governance that contribute to create conditions of insurgency within one or more significant segments of the society they govern. Poor Governance is assessed through the perceptions of each significant segment of society separately as well as collectively. Objective metrics of effectiveness of governance are immaterial to assessments of goodness.
Good Governance: Governance, that may be either effective or ineffective, that through the nature of its performance prevents the growth of conditions of insurgency. Subjective, and measured as assessed by each significant segment of a populace, perceptions of good governance will typically vary across a state. Where good governance exists insurgency is unlikely. Where good governance is lacking the conditions of insurgency will grow, creating vulnerability for exploitation by internal or external actors pursuing agendas that may, or may not represent the best interests of the populace. The most critical perceptions that contribute to good governance appear to be those of Legitimacy, Justice, Respect and Hope.
Perception of Legitimacy: The most critical causal perception contributing to the conditions of insurgency in a society. Legitimate is not synonymous with Official. It is a recognition and acceptance on the part of any significant segment of a society of the rights and duties of governance to govern. This is independent of any official or legal status of governance or any recognition of this governance by others. Historically insurgent movements will ultimately fail when this condition exists, and prevail when it is absent. The absence of legitimacy is the cornerstone of despotism.
Perception of Justice: A critical causal perception that contributes to the conditions of insurgency in a society as shaped by good or poor performance of governance. Justice is not synonymous Rule of Law. Perceptions of justice are based in how the populace feels about the rule of law as it is applied to them. Enforcing the Rule of Law upon a populace that perceives the law as unjust is tyranny and will make the conditions of insurgency worse.
Perception of Respect: A critical causal perception that contributes to the conditions of insurgency in a society as shaped by good or poor performance of governance. Measured through the eyes of the populace, the widely help perception within any significant segment of a society that they are not excluded from full participation in governance and opportunity as a matter of status. Assessments by those outside the affected populace, to include by the government, are immaterial.
Perception of Hope: A critical causal perception that contributes to the conditions of insurgency in a society as shaped by good or poor performance of governance. Hope resides in the absolute confidence within any significant segment of a society that they have available to them trusted, certain and legal means to change their governance. Hope is the great off-ramp for insurgency, as the presence of hope keeps politics within the established and accepted legal parameters.
(these are all a work in progress and will evolve, but will be in a paper I put out soon that looks at many of the long-standing cliche's that dominate thinking on COIN)
Last edited by Bob's World; 10-08-2010 at 11:42 PM.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Joe Friday Analysis Of Insurgency.....Just The Facts Mam!
Insurgency is a Method....used by a Motivated individual(s).....to exploit any available Opportunity.
Last edited by slapout9; 10-08-2010 at 11:58 PM. Reason: spellin stuff
I need to drink whiskey with Slap someday...
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Looking at the RCJ definition:
and the Steve Metz definition:
One difference is immediately obvious. RCJ's definition involves a challenge to "a governing body", SM's merely requires a challenge to "a power structure and the organizations which dominate it". Under the former definition a "global insurgency" is not possible, as there is no global governing body. There is a global power structure with dominant organizations, so under the SM definition a global insurgency is possible.Insurgency is a strategy used by a weak organization against a power structure and the organizations which dominate it.
In the RCJ elucidation of the causes of insurgency, a significant word appears in significant places:
What makes a segment of society "significant"? Is it the size of that segment, or its capacity to make noise, or its capacity for violence? The didtinction is, well, significant, because the modern media and the tactics of modern terrorism allow groups of relatively insignificant size to produce significant noise and significant violence. We cannot assume that whoever shouts loudest or blows things up speaks for a populace or a significant segment thereof.Poor Governance:Poor Governance is assessed through the perceptions of each significant segment of society...
[Governance, that may be either effective or ineffective, that through the nature of its performance prevents the growth of conditions of insurgency. Subjective, and measured as assessed by each significant segment of a populace
That distinction answers the question of why so many groups don't adopt the non-violent mass movement techniques that have proven effective elsewhere. They can't. They simply don't have enough popular support to make these tactics effective. That's why they resort to terrorist tactics in the first place.
Good governance may protect against insurgency, but it does not peotect against political violence perpetrated by small groups with passionately held beliefs that are not shared by the bulk of the populace. If I believe that the US needs to be an Aryan state with no homosexuals, or if I believe that Indonesia should be placed under Shariah law, and if I'm willing to kill to advance these causes, my definition of good governance is so fundamentally incompatible with that of the nation at large that any government seen as "good" by the majority is only going to provoke me to violence.
It can be a mistake to mistake broad-based insurgency for the actions of a violent lunatic fringe. It can also be a mistake to mistake the actions of a violent lunatic fringe for a broad based insurgency. We can't assume that we're seeing one or the other, we have to assess each case according to its own unique conditions.
Last edited by Dayuhan; 10-09-2010 at 01:22 AM.
Some illegal challenges are not insurgency. I personally do not thing that Mexico is facing insurgency. I think the Mexican populace, as an example, does not think it is subject to poor governance, so much as subject to criminal competition with governance.
We tend to lump problems by the wrong criteria. A lot of insurgencies around the globe that all work to some degree with one UW actor does not, for example, equate to a "global insurgency."
I try to find distinctions that matter. Many may exist, but not all matter. Mike does a good job of pointing out that under the law some facts are evidence, and some are not. Of those that are some are relevant and some are not. Of those that are relevant, some are material and some are not. I don't think we do a good job of focusing on what is truly important when we deal with insurgencies, and instead, quite reasonably, focus on what is urgent.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Steve,
I agree with RCJ in that an insurgency is difficult to define when including the conditions that give rise to an insurgency. Providing predictions of behaviour such as "seeks to postpone resolution of the conflict while it adjusts the power balance in its favor" renders the definition problematic.
These organisational characteristics that are built into your definition are antithetical to your outlook of insurgency as merely a "strategy".
Likewise your assumption of the insurgent as a weak organisation is too restrictive (I agree with Powerpoint Samurai and Bill on this point); it may be that, in a particular conflict/theatre, that actor may employ an insurgency strategy in conditions or relative weakness (not absolute) or through choice.
I wouldnt call insurgency a strategy, i would rather call as bob said it a
Also when you look at the translations of the word insurgency, in for example dutch (opstand : uprising ) or in french ( insurger : insurrection ), this way i think it is better to say that "insurgency" tells us something about the origins of the conflict rather then the way it is being fought."An illegal political challenge to a governing body that may be either violent or non-violent in terms of tactics employed and campaign design."
On the other hand your definition would be a pretty good definition of the strategical part of guerilla warfare.
As way of background, I really began drilling into this topic in depth while I was at SOCPAC '04-'08. During that time I supported at least 5 different JSOTF-P Commanders, and 3 SOCPAC CGs, to include all of LTG Fridovich's tenure their. We we're immersed every day in the challenges of addressing potential threats to US interests from irregular threats in a tremendously large, diverse region where every state is extremely protective of their sovereignty (as they should be, most had to fight long bloody insurgencies to throw of colonial oppression to earn that sovereignty); where few feel they have a "terrorist" threat; where trust between states; is often low; and where the U.S. has a bit of a mixed reputation, largely positive, but taking some serious chin shots as we break glass all over the globe in the name of GWOT. Meanwhile, China is waging a very persistent and subtle influence building campaign. I feel most trust the US more than they trust China, but the prefer the Chinese approach gifts without strings attached (ok, they know and fear those strings, but they are long ones and many not be pulled for generations. The Chinese are patient like that). I also knocked out the two-year War
College program in my "spare" time, with my thesis on COG analysis for the GWOT.
COIN that focused on the insurgent didn't make sense as the results were so temporary. We worked a lot with the Philippines, and that country has been in a virtual constant state of insurgency since the first Spanish ship made landfall. There are many COIN "victories" in the Philippines; yet there is always insurgency. This is victory? It made no sense. So the insurgent clearly wasn't the problem. Same for ideology. Commies in the north, Muslims in the South; commies in the 50's and 60's regionally; Islamist today; etc. It was also very apparent that "defeating ideology" was not an effective approach either.
Many insurgent populaces live in poor conditions, but also many peaceful satisfied populaces. Many insurgents come from wealthy, educated backgrounds as well. Effective governance appeared to me as another bit of superficial analysis.
One by one I drilled into these concepts, and also concepts like "sanctuary."
The one commonality is the existence of some governing body that was perceived as the problem. Often several different segments of a populace would be supportive of very different insurgencies for very different reasons, and employ very different ideologies. But it always radiated out from the government.
So the key is the government, and this "badness" that radiates out from certain governments and not others. So I started looking at governments and how insurgent populaces felt about their governments. This led to a narrowing of factors. While there are many factors, the four I seized upon as the main causal factors seemed to me to be the most important. Most likely to create conditions of insurgency if they exist; and most likely to move a populace back toward "peace" if addressed.
It's a work in progress, that is nested with wise insights that have been drawn from insurgency and COIN over the years, but not constrained by positions that often are very popular, but just don't stand up to hard review. I throw my ideas out here because I want them to receive hard review. I know some won't stand up, and that's fine, because if one falls from hard review a new, better one will emerge from that same review.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
I personally don't find that very useful. It would make the democracy movements in places like China and Iran insurgencies. In fact, it would mean that governments have the ability to determine what is or is not an insurgency by the laws it passes.
John, so basically you believe in this definition? with your substitution/addition of regime?
From the "War is war" thread
Addressing those concepts here rather than there seems more appropriate.from BW
.... from a piece I am working on on "Perspectives on Insurgency":
Traditional Perspective: “Insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) are complex subsets of warfare.”
Updated: Insurgency is an illegal political challenge to a governing body that may be either violent or non-violent in terms of tactics employed and campaign design. COIN is the action of that governing body working to prevent or resolve the civil emergency.
As to the "Traditional Perspective", I'd suggest that it could be presented as:
“Insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) are complex subsets of politfare and/or warfare.”
"Politfare" being the "conduct of" or "journey into" political action (see etymology of "fare"). Note this is not a rigorous definition, but merely a classification, such as "Homo S and Homo N are complex subsets of Hominidae."
The "and/or" is inserted to recognize that multiple variants can occur even when only two parties are involved: each party could use political action only, military action only, or a mix of both.
--------------------------------
As to the updated definition:
If the political challenge is non-violent, why is it "illegal" and who makes it so ?Updated: Insurgency is an illegal political challenge to a governing body that may be either violent or non-violent in terms of tactics employed and campaign design. COIN is the action of that governing body working to prevent or resolve the civil emergency.
Similar thought, if the political challenge is non-violent, why should it be or develop into a "civil emergency" (whatever that is) ?
That definition might apply in an authoritarian country with a very rigid one-party line (all deviations from which, violent and non-violent, are "illegal" and all deviants are "insurgents" - "we shoot counter-revolutionaries.") and with an enhanced state security service which always operates in emergency mode.
------------------------
In Geneva-speak re: armed conflicts, we have to have at least two opposing "Powers" to the armed conflict; and, by analogy, at least two opposing "Powers" to political conflicts.
While Geneva-speak talks of "Powers", it does not really define the term - we know it when we see it.
Regards
Mike
I left out the critical word of "internal" as well. If the challenger is from outside it is UW.
So, how about:
Insurgency: An illegal internal political challenge to a regime that may be either violent or non-violent in terms of tactics employed and campaign design.
the keys being that:
A. The challenging party comes from a populace governed by the regime being challenged,
B. The challenge is illegal,
C. The purpose is political,
D. The tactics can be violent or non-violent.
So, this excludes many situations that often get lumped under "Insurgency"
A. Mexican drug violence. This is profit and power driven, not political. These organizations to not represent a poorly governed populace. (This means that much more kinetic approaches would likely be appropriate against these guys, but the causation of illegal drug demand will ensure that they are always replaced just as causation of poor governance will ensure that insurgent organizations are always replaced).
B. Global insurgency. Only if there is a global government, and there is not. Many distinct insurgencies and global AQ UW, yes.
C. Indian wars. They were separate populaces with their own governance.
D. Rwanda? I need to look into this one, I think it may be closer to what is going on in Mexico currently than to insurgency.
Similarly, many things currently called "terrorism" are actually insurgency.
A. Saudi Arabia. The government there never lets these movements gain much traction, but the causation is the poor governance of the regime, and the goals are to illegally challenge it. For PR purposes they don't call it insurgency.
It would be a worthwhile project to sort and stack these problem sets and look at what wer are really dealing with, and then tailor responses accordingly.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Mike: great question on the "Who makes it illegal"
The regime does. This goes to the "Hope" component of my Good Governance definition. By denying the populace legal, certain, and trusted means to affect change, the government leaves a populace faced with poor governance, with Conditions of Insurgency, no choice but to endure or to act out illegally.
Therefore, what is "insurgency" in a state with no freedom of the press or right to assemble, or freedom of speech, is just a bunch of Tea Partyers out exercising their rights in America.
This goes to why I am so impressed with what a great COIN document our constitution is. It is preventing insurgency every day, and we don't even notice. If we did not have this document, we would have military checkpoints, etc all over the place like they do in Afghanistan, and we would definitely notice.
Good Governance is Good COIN.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Bob, I agree, except...
The term regime allows for global insurgency if regime is defined as I have used it.
One of the interesting aspects of all of these Small Wars is that, in general, they all encompass the tactics and strategies applied by insurgents - to a greater or lesser degree. This means that the principles of COIN apply equally to a true COIN or a drug war or imperial policing - with adaptation to the circumstances. In all the cases you mention, the war is about competing legitimacies. Note that the drug cartels in Mexico are seeking to legitimze there control of trafficking corridors without having to take on the responsibility (or expense) of maintaining infrastructure and services - and they apparently want to extend that level of control into the US. To do so successfully, their role and presence has to be perceived by the inhabitants of the corridors as legitimate to some extent.
Cheers
JohnT
Supply and Demand.
Demand for illegal drugs in the US drives a requirement for an illegal supplier. If filling that demand also makes said illegal supplier rich and powerful, he may expand his area of interests to other fields...
Demand for Good Governance drives Insurgency. If no effective legal means are available to the populace then someone will come along and leverage that demand. It may be a mix of internal and external actors, but they have unique status based on their unique roles.
The key to true success in both of these cases is the effective reduction of demand, while while mitigating the damage caused by the supplier's efforts. The tactics may be similar, but the focus of where they applied are very different. For example, In Afghanistan the source of "Demand" is the Government of Afghanistan. Focus there. In Mexico the source of Demand is the American Government (yes our populace buys the drugs, but our government makes them illegal and has been unwilling to take the hard steps to curb it).
On the surface they look very similar, but they both demand very different solutions to resolve them. This is like integration calculus. Step one is to be able to identify what type of problem it is so that you can apply the correct type of solution. Even once one's identified the right type of problem there are still a hundred ways to screw it up. But if you misidentify the problem, no matter how well you work through all the reduction steps, one's answer will still be wrong. (Who knew that getting an F in integration and having to retake the class would later help me to better understand insurgency...)
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Is this completely true ?
We have an External Power which supports one of two Internal Powers (say "Power B"). To the External Power, it is waging UW vs Power A (and vice versa). However, Power A still could regard Power B as an "insurgent" and as a Power in a non-international armed conflict. Sorta Vietnam, ain't it ?from BW
I left out the critical word of "internal" as well. If the challenger is from outside it is UW.
The UW conflict could be an international armed conflict if both the External Power and Power A are states. Your example of AQ (IMO: agree that AQ as a TVNSA wages UW, not a "global insurgency", using inter alia domestic insurgencies as tools) vice a state Power would be a non-international armed conflict, since AQ is not a nation-state and has neither accepted nor applied the 1949 GCs (as required by Common Article 2).
My other questions and comments still apply from the post above.
Regards
Mike
OK, got the answer that
the "regime" (formerly "governing body") declares the internal political challenge "illegal". I don't know where that will take us, but for the moment I'll ride along.
My question for BW, brother Fishel and anyone else is how do I determine which "Power" in the country is the "regime" ?
Hint: I do have views on that issue which are pretty much carved in stone, Defending Hamdan, starting primarily with this post, 1949 GC III - Art. 2 - Text & History, and ending on second page of that thread.
Cheers
Mike
My problem with definitions like that is that they are so thoroughly Western in perspective, with their emphasis on notions like legitimacy, good governance, and legality based on the Western experience. The unspoken assumption is that insurgencies occur because states don't adequately follow the Western-defined path, and will be defeated if states do.
Read Bob's definitions again
Steve, Bob's definitions are carefully crafted in the sense that they are not uniquely Western. Indeed, each of them relies on local interpretation and perception.
As an example that would fall within Bob's definition of legitimacy let me offer one indicator (variable) from Manwaring's original SSI study - "lack of perceived corruption." Corruption is commonly understood as the missuse of public position for personal gain and exists in all cultures. What is unique in each culture is their definition of missuse. So many things that a Westerner would see as corruption are perfectly acceptable in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, or Panama. I would also note that what is perceived as corrupt behavior also changes over time so something that was perfectly acceptable 20 years ago no longer is today. Still, there is a core to the notion of corruption that transcends culture. I believe that Bob has caught this kind of core in his definitions.
Cheers
JohnT
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