Defining Insurgency

[Ken White]

What I'm saying is that these definitions of conventional and unconventional warfare may be a bit arbitrary...This feeds into the notion of full-spectrum operations, that some things can have elements of both conventional and unconventional warfare at the same time. It isn't wise to let SOCOM be the UW experts, and to make armor and mech infantry the Fulda Gap guys. Both communities have to be able to adapt to the situation at hand.

Well said and quite true. There's nothing wrong with SF -- not SOCOM, two different kettles of Squid, Catfish and the occasional Frog there -- having the lead and primacy in FID but they need to be able to do the MCO UW stuff as well. Likewise for the GPF, they've got to be able to do the whole spectrum.

Your point on arbitrary definition and delineations is important. That sort of stuff leads to overly focused views of the world; target fixation is a dangerous thing. Every war is different. We cannot forget that and trying to believe or convince folks that all types have a similar cause or an effect or methodologies that can be codified is really dangerous.

Uniforms are cool, no problem figuring out what to wear in the morning. Uniformity is okay if not taken to excess as the US Army far too often tends to do.

Uniformity of thought is a killer.

[jmm99]

Maybe, someone out there can solve this technical problem.

I said I and others had a problem with the original link, in Jedburgh's original thread. Using that link:

http://www.usgcoin.org/library/USGDo...s/AD416553.pdf

I get this from IE 8.0 (same IE version, but a different computer and network from this afternoon): Internet Explorer cannot display the webpage.

If I reduce the url to this:

http://www.usgcoin.org

I get: Internet Explorer cannot display the webpage.

This afternoon (since it's a different network). I got: Sorry, "www.usgcoin.org" is unavailable or could not be found.

I'd love to read through summaries of 24 "new" insurgencies in "The Casebook on Insurgency". Please, can some very kind soul give us a link we can use ? COL Maxwell to the rescue ?

-------------------------
I'd do some things in addition to what the quote in 1966 Human Factors suggests (let's not be quite so "immediate"). Human Factors and its companion, 1963 Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare - SORO, discuss my "political struggle" stuff as well.

Depends on your power position vice the other guy, who is stronger and who is weaker in each given geographic, demographic, etc., etc. (area study). All that seesaws; no two situations are exactly alike; and generalities are just that.

Basic courses of action - don't think of them as phases or stages - situational awareness would seem useful:

- use the power of vexation and provocation in the other guy's balliwick

- manage savagery and chaos (perhaps, via relative insecurity) in contested areas

- establish military, police & political control in your own balliiwick

The last is the immediate concern for both Powers to the conflict - "strategic base areas" or whatever you want to call them.

As to the first point, either side may invade the other's balliwick - and, if it wants an acceptable outcome, probably will. The question is when. You might want to do some preliminary stuff first.

Cheers

Mike

[Bob's World]

Ken,

Not a general, just a concerned, thinking civilian like yourself.

I will admit that I am searching for your point. I suspect we both understand that the Pied Piper is a fairy tale. No one can come along to some well governed populace with their magic flute of ideology and create an insurgency. The conditions must exist in advance.

Oh, and we had Israel do some wet work for us as quid pro quo to support their bid for indepencence.

I have my thousands (ok modest exaggeration admitted) of insurgencies, I'm still waiting for you to come up with just one where my model does not apply. I need that exception to prove the rule.

We aren't good at COIN. We don't understand insurgency well. We don't know our own history, and we sure as hell don't know the history of others. We can do better than this. If everyone just nods their head and says "good idea, boss," or if no one asks "why" we won't get in front of this.

Is it disturbing to think that US foreign policy laid much of the foundation that Bin Laden has built his UW campaign up? Yes, absolutely. But if we just go out and kill him and his handful of compadres and do nothing to change ourselves, to tear down that foundation, some other group will get up on it and really hurt us next time. Is 9/11 our fault? Absolutely not. Do we need to take responsibility for how our actions contributed to the conditions that Bin Laden feeds upon? Absolutely yes.

[Dayuhan]

I'll repeat here what I think is the biggest flaw in your theory: Government's limited ability to deal with irreconcilable differences within a governed population. Your theory, by placing all responsibility on government, assumes that government always has the capacity to satisfy all its people enough to prevent insurgency from occurring or defeating insurgency through government reform. I don't think this is universally true. It also fails to consider cases where government simply cannot meet the demands of a populace.

I'll try to illustrate this point with a bit of reductio ad absurdum:

You can illustrate it well without the reductio...

Look at the insurgencies in the southern Philippines and in southern Thailand. Of course you can blame these on "bad governance", but the issue goes well beyond that. In both cases the dominant national culture and the bulk of the populace is faced with a minority that they regard as inherently inferior and untrustworthy, to which they are unwilling to extend equality or in many cases even tolerance. Of course you could say that government should rise above this, but governments do tend to reflect the cultures from which they emerge. At root the issue is not bad governance but a fundamentally irreconcilable gap between two populaces that find themselves rolled into one nation. In each case the government simply reflects the prevailing prejudice of the dominant majority of the populace, as one would expect.

[Ken White]

Not a general, just a concerned, thinking civilian like yourself.

You left out the more important adjectives, old and stubborn...

I will admit that I am searching for your point. I suspect we both understand that the Pied Piper is a fairy tale. No one can come along to some well governed populace with their magic flute of ideology and create an insurgency. The conditions must exist in advance.

Oh, I think you've found my point. As well as that of Bill Moore, Dayuhan, Mike and others. You just acknowledged that bad governance is not a cause of but rather a facilitator of insurgencies. None of us have ever questioned that, the question was that you -- sometimes -- say it is THE sole causation...

Since you have now agreed with us, we can take the rest of the week off...

Oh, and we had Israel do some wet work for us as quid pro quo to support their bid for indepencence.

Uh huh. Right, I've heard those rumors as well -- in the last few years. Funny they didn't float around at the time. Since that independence occurred in 1948 over the strenuous objections of most of foreign policy crowd in DC -- Marshall, then SecState, is reliably reputed to have told Truman "Mr. President, I serve at your pleasure but you should know that if you recognize Israel, I will not be able to vote for you in the next election." He was not alone and for most of the 50s and 60s, there was a strong anti-Israeli bias in DoD and the Intel clique -- probably mostly related to the potential to get sucked into a war that would really be little to none of our business, that and budget competition. That 'wet work' -- really hokey fiction term, that -- May not be an old wives tale but it sure is suspect.

I have my thousands (ok modest exaggeration admitted) of insurgencies, I'm still waiting for you to come up with just one where my model does not apply. I need that exception to prove the rule.

I've done that and so have others; you can search those responses up if you wish. You did note that in this thread and today I mentioned two, ala Riel and Chin, where your model doesn't apply -- plus one where it not only doesn't apply, the reverse was true? The good governance was tossed out in an effort to retain slavery which said good Government had banned. Not to mention the Mexican Revolutions (plural...).

Others have been mentioned; you tend to not accept them not by directly refuting the case but by sliding to one side or the other and aiming at OBL or some such...

We aren't good at COIN. We don't understand insurgency well. We don't know our own history, and we sure as hell don't know the history of others. We can do better than this. If everyone just nods their head and says "good idea, boss," or if no one asks "why" we won't get in front of this.

You and I have agreed on this many times. I still agree and am not disputing any of that.

Is it disturbing to think that US foreign policy laid much of the foundation that Bin Laden has built his UW campaign up? Yes, absolutely. But if we just go out and kill him and his handful of compadres and do nothing to change ourselves, to tear down that foundation, some other group will get up on it and really hurt us next time. Is 9/11 our fault? Absolutely not.

All true and we have previously agreed on all that -- so why bring it up now?

Do we need to take responsibility for how our actions contributed to the conditions that Bin Laden feeds upon? Absolutely yes.

Who has said that we are not or have not?

May I suggest that taking responsibility and undoing the past are two very different things? One can rant for days on the dumb (many) and evil (few) things we have done and that will change nothing. One can acknowledge responsibility and that changes nothing.

However, one can change ones approach and preclude further errors. You have suggested some strong and positive steps in that direction with which I agree. You have suggested others with which I do not disagree but have urged caution or an indirect approach.

The foremost of those is that you seem to wish to ignore the way the US government really works. My point to you for a couple of years is that what you wish for will not happen because you appear to insist the system change to the way you think it should operate. It won't. You cannot ignore the domestic politics in this huge nation and their effects on our relations and interface with the rest of the world.

Now that you've realized and acknowledged that poor governance is sometimes a cause of insurgency and that it is most always a facilitator and hopefully that it is sometimes not really an issue at all, if only rarely, you've taken the first step toward true enlightenment. Now for US domestic politics, election and budget cycles...

[Dayuhan]

We aren't good at COIN. We don't understand insurgency well. We don't know our own history, and we sure as hell don't know the history of others. We can do better than this.

Agree with the first two sentences, but when you get to "we can do better" I balk. All very well to point out that insurgency arises from defects in government, and it's generally true... but the moment we set out to do something about the relationship between government and populace in another country we are seriously overstepping any reasonable boundary to our rights, responsibilities, and capacities. Unless both parties want us to mediate the dispute we have no business trying to insert ourselves as referee in someone else's game.

I absolutely agree that we should not be installing dictators (or installing governments at all) or protecting them from their own people. We've actually cut that way back since the cold war, it's a dying practice. That does not mean we need to go around trying to tell other governments how to relate to their people: all we accomplish by doing that is to simultaneously antagonize, the government, the populaces, and any actual or incipient insurgents that happen to be about.

Is it disturbing to think that US foreign policy laid much of the foundation that Bin Laden has built his UW campaign up? Yes, absolutely. But if we just go out and kill him and his handful of compadres and do nothing to change ourselves, to tear down that foundation, some other group will get up on it and really hurt us next time. Is 9/11 our fault? Absolutely not. Do we need to take responsibility for how our actions contributed to the conditions that Bin Laden feeds upon? Absolutely yes.

Whoa, hold on. AQ wasn't founded on American intervention, it was founded on Soviet intervention. When that intervention ended AQ attempted the UW campaign you describe, primarily in Saudi Arabia. That campaign failed miserably. It didn't fail because of government repression: you and I both know that if an insurgent movement has real popular support repression only builds it. It didn't fail because the Saudis love the royals. It failed because the bulk of the Saudi populace, even those that disliked their government, did not see what bin Laden offered as a viable alternative. They were quite willing to support his jihad as long as it was somewhere else, but when he brought it home they didn't buy it. A few did, but not nearly enough to build the critical mass needed to move from incipient insurgency to active insurgency. That does not in any way invalidate your assessment of the general causes of insurgency, but it the idea that we can or should try to undercut AQ by fixing the Saudi government just seems to me to be utterly inconsistent with reality. We can't fix their government, and we don't have to.

I think your general assessment of the cause of insurgency (opposition by a populace or portion thereof to perceived bad governance) is for the most part accurate. When you move into your list of what causes popular discontent, though, it really does seem like you're imposing western values to an inordinate extent. For one thing, in many parts of the world the two things a populace wants most from a government are security and prosperity, two things you don't mention much... and many populaces out there will tolerate what we would consider gross intrusions on liberty and justice as long as they have security and prosperity. Maybe that's not how we would feel, but it's not about us.

When you step from specific casuses into the realm of what the US can or should do to resolve government/populace issues in other countries... there I think you move into some very risky country indeed.

[jmm99]

and at CADS - despite the fact that you have done away with one of my introductory clauses: There's this nutty SF COL I know who says .....

---------------------------------
From 1963 Undergrounds (pp.166-167) (not the "bible" in its every word, BTW; but some good points even for today) (emphasis added):

OBJECTIVES OF COUNTERMEASURES

At the beginning of an underground movement government countermeasures are limited by lack of information about the nature of an enemy which is coming into being. Although the ultimate aim of all government countermeasures is to destroy the leadership and organization of an underground, initially the government must find out who the enemy is. Therefore the government's first objective is to identify the underground leaders, usually by infiltrating the movement. Next the government tries to prevent growth of the underground by restricting its access to the populace and to supplies. To do this the government may seek the cooperation of the people for intelligence purposes, offering them both protection from threats by the underground and evidence that the government measures are in their best interests.

In the second stage of development of the underground the objective of government countermeasures depends upon whether the underground is a resistance or a revolutionary movement and on circumstances external to the underground itself. The aim may be either pacification or control. Pacification entails obtaining a large amount of popular support and willing cooperation. Control does not require such a high degree of popular support; if the government's security forces control resources and production facilities, and the lines of communication and transportation in strategic areas, that may be sufficient. In both resistance and revolutionary situations pacification is preferable, because a progovernment populace requires a minimum of physical restraint and permits the government to use security forces for other duties. If an occupying government aims for pacification in a resistance situation, a great many troops will be needed originally for occupation duty. In practice it has proved expedient during a military campaign for an occupier merely to establish control without attempting to achieve pacification.
.....
In revolutionary war, however, control alone cannot be a sufficient aim for the government. The ultimate objective must be pacification even though the government may be required to restrict personal freedom to such an extent that martial law is invoked. Such restrictions may cause resentment and aid the revolutionary movement by adding credence to its claims of government persecution. On the other hand, failure to undertake prompt and effective countermeasures may permit tho illegal organization to grow rapidly. In dealing with revolution, a government typically works under several handicaps: (1) the revolution is usually well underway before control measures are applied, and therefore the security forces are on the defensive at the offset; (2) security forces are often subject to legal restraints; and (3) the government faces conflicting goals--to suppress the revolution and gain the active support of the people.

A different slant from "immediate" use of military force. I'd use some different terms (e.g., "mobilization of the masses" for "pacification", which to me is a form of "control" - Undergrounds uses "control" in its more coercive meaning).

Regards

[M-A Lagrange]

I think your general assessment of the cause of insurgency (opposition by a populace or portion thereof to perceived bad governance) is for the most part accurate. When you move into your list of what causes popular discontent, though, it really does seem like you're imposing western values to an inordinate extent. For one thing, in many parts of the world the two things a populace wants most from a government are security and prosperity, two things you don't mention much... and many populaces out there will tolerate what we would consider gross intrusions on liberty and justice as long as they have security and prosperity. Maybe that's not how we would feel, but it's not about us.

200% true. I do face this “live on stage”. I personally do not buy the form of government people (politicians/military mainly) are building where I am but it’s not my choice, it’s theirs.
I believe we are going to the question: what is the end of COIN?
Is that securing a friendly government access to power (even if it’s the most atrocious dictatorship) or do the US want to spread democracy as a grand strategy for their foreign affairs and initiate changes in non democratic governments?

Also, what we can acknowledge is that it’s easier to conduct COIN to preserve a non democratic government which does govern with arbitrary than conduct COIN to establish a democracy (or a failed democracy at the best if you are cynical).

I was discussing this with a Russian political analyst and he was the first to state that even a failed government is better than no government. And that’s probably the main key point: until which point that approach is viable and not counterproductive. Supporting/installing a government for the sake of having someone to speak with does not work. Then do insurgents propose something that you can work with is also another question. Chad is a good example. Idriss Deby is not the best to work with for anyone (US, France…) but for the moment he is a better interlocutor than insurgents for both France and US. Also in Chad, the population involvement into politic is lower than 0. But as they do not give a dam about any kind of government, they are pleased with what ever they have as long as it has no contact with them.
We may have here a limit of Bob’s model (which I like very much by the way).

[William F. Owen]

One cannot expect violence to turn off instantly - it's not a spigot. There will be violence before and after an armed conflict. The level of violence simply does not rise to that level (which gets into another discussion of what is "war" and what is "armed conflict").

Again I concur. Look at Ulster. The aim is to reduce the level of violance to where "normal politics" can take over. The point is the Government cannot "use violence" as part of the normal transmission of policy. The time and the place is important.

If fact, violence can cause folks to change sides in the opposite direction. E.g., the executions of the 1916 Easter Rebellion rebels pursuant to military commission sentences (perfectly legal violence) ended up making the republican movement (IRB, etc.) respectable in the eyes of many Irish who initially opposed the 1916 Rebellion itself.

So what you are telling me is that ineffective killing does not work, and that the action didn't match the policy objective? If so, I agree. The military operations that under-pinned UK operations in Ireland after WW1, were woeful. The UK basically "failed to fight," because the policy object had been set a "dominion status," prior to WW1.

[Outlaw 7]

We spend a large amount of time defining things like what is an insurgency---why do look at the concept of "open source warfare' in far more detail than previously given to the topic here in SWJ.

It gets waved off as fast as it is mentioned but after the recent salafist web release of this magazine which in ENGLISH used the term "open source jihad" maybe it is now time to discuss the theory instead of running from it--it is really interesting that few in the IC and even fewer in the military even understand the concept. But tied to Kilcullens' "conflict ecosystem" it moves the conversation forward.

Monday, 11 October 2010
JOURNAL: Open Source Jihad
A resource manual for those who loathe tyrants… a disaster for the repressive imperialistic nations:the open source jihad is America's worst nightmare. Al Qaeda's stated goal for Inspire.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula put out a magazine this summer called Inspire. It's a slick glossy e-zine. What really makes it interesting isn't how slick the magazine is. Instead, it is the purpose of the magazine: to promote "open source jihad" by providing readers with the tools they need to plan, motivate, organize, and pull off effective attacks against Western targets (i.e. specifics on recipes for bombs that don't use controlled substances and how to's on secure Interent communications via the software Asrar Al-Mujahideen).

This is yet another example of how young, innovative insurgents around the world are embracing open source warfare (OSW).

[Bob's World]

We are limited by our words. The ones we use, and how they are received and understood by others.

Dayuhan frequently points out that there is no insurgency in Saudi Arabia. Certainly that word is not used there. However:
- by some accounts upwards of 9,000 Saudis have been detained by the government indefinitely on terrorism charges since 2003. Closed trials began in 2008 and with some 300 convictions as of July.
- creation of exit options for militants. The authorities declared month-long general amnesties in mid-2004 and mid-2006. (Saudi version of "go to jail or join the army" Except for them it is "go to jail or go join Al Qaeda and wage your fight against other aspects of your cause, as we will not let you wage it here)
- Most of the 9/11 attackers were Saudis
- Most of the foreign fighters for AQ in Iraq were Saudis.

I only point this out, as this is a classic suppression campaign of insurgency. If one lives in a state such as Saudi Arabia these tactics work for them, but they also keep the ranks of AQ full to do their business elsewhere. Sure, SA is AQ's primary target, but they are patient to go after easier targets first. SA understands this, but they are walking a fine balance here, and such amnesties can be sold as "hard on terrorists" to one community, and "supporting jihad" to another.

But this goes back to my definition. Insurgency is not the presence of some named organization actively operating within a country conducting illegal violence to take down the state. Insurgency is a condition that exists within the populace. It is a condition created by the government measured as perceived by the populace.

Most Saudis want reasonable changes. My understanding is that many feel that the Royals have drifted from their religious path. Not enough Church and State is a big concern for the citizens. Others would like reforms of Justice, a judiciary that is not under total control of the Royals. All of this is exacerbated by declining incomes, greater gaps between the governed and those who govern. etc Is there hope in Saudi Arabia? Not if hope is defined as having trusted, certain, legal means to affect change. Saudis pay no taxes. Saudi government quips "No representation without taxation." Someday that will be inscribed right below "Let them eat cake." In the book of "Stupid things leaders say who are in denial about the conditions of insurgency in their country."

So, is there no insurgency in Saudi Arabia, or is there no insurgency based on our current definitions that focus on the insurgent rather than the conditions within the populace?

A few simple, reasonable adjustments of governance would reduce the conditions in Saudi Arabia to well within phase 0. Doing this would cut off the supply of recruits to AQ like no other LOO. As Jefferson noted in our Declaration "..Experience hath shewn, that Mankind are more disposed to suffer, while Evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the Forms to which they are accustomed." The Saudi populace is indeed accustomed to their current form of government and would rather support it than resist it; but it has drifted across a line. Better to ease it back now than to allow it to explode to a level where it finally meets our definition of insurgency

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan frequently points out that there is no insurgency in Saudi Arabia. Certainly that word is not used there. However:
- by some accounts upwards of 9,000 Saudis have been detained by the government indefinitely on terrorism charges since 2003. Closed trials began in 2008 and with some 300 convictions as of July.

This is true. What matters, though, is the reaction of the general populace. For example, when the Shah of Iran cracked down on Islamic militants, the populace took to the streets and the resistance snowballed, because the militants were just the tip of the iceberg: they had real popular support. That hasn't happened in Saudi Arabia, because the popular support just isn't there. That does not mean the populace loves their government, it means they don't see what the AQ types are peddling as a viable alternative. AQ has made converts, but they have not converted the populace; far from it.

- Most of the 9/11 attackers were Saudis
- Most of the foreign fighters for AQ in Iraq were Saudis.

We're talking about how many people here? Not a populace, that's for sure.

But this goes back to my definition. Insurgency is not the presence of some named organization actively operating within a country conducting illegal violence to take down the state. Insurgency is a condition that exists within the populace. It is a condition created by the government measured as perceived by the populace.

I think at some point you have to distinguish between the condition, which exists largely as a function of our western-conditioned perception, and the translation of that amorphous and immeasurable condition into action. It is only when there is action that we can begin to observe the extent to which the populace actually perceives what we think they perceive, or the extent to which they are willing to act on their perceptions.

Most Saudis want reasonable changes. My understanding is that many feel that the Royals have drifted from their religious path. Not enough Church and State is a big concern for the citizens. Others would like reforms of Justice, a judiciary that is not under total control of the Royals. All of this is exacerbated by declining incomes, greater gaps between the governed and those who govern. etc Is there hope in Saudi Arabia? Not if hope is defined as having trusted, certain, legal means to affect change.

How do we know what "most Saudis" want? Aren't there some assumptions involved there?

I think you'd find that lots of people want lots of things, many of them contradictory. Certainly there are those who feel that the government is insufficiently religious, but that's not by any means all, and many of those still don't buy the AQ line. Even among the conservative religious hierarchy AQ is often viewed as a loose cannon and as a potential competitor for influence among the flock. We cannot put simple interpretations or assumptions on these matters, because they're a long way from simple.

If you look at recent data I think you'll find that Saudi incomes have increased quite dramatically in the last 6-7 years. The oil glut was a hard time in the Kingdom, but for better or worse the price surge brought a major reprieve. Many hundreds of billions got poured out; they're still pouring and the effect is very real. For better or for worse, the spending has had a major blunting effect on the translation of anti-government sentiment into action, as it is wont to do. It's a buyoff and how long it will last remains to be seen, but the money looks to keep flowing for some time. As with China, I doubt that there will be enough popular impetus to generate significant political change until there's a significant economic dislocation.

So, is there no insurgency in Saudi Arabia, or is there no insurgency based on our current definitions that focus on the insurgent rather than the conditions within the populace?

How do you measure "conditions within the populace"? Are you talking about conditions within the populace, or about our perceptions of those conditions, or our assumptions about those conditions?

A few simple, reasonable adjustments of governance would reduce the conditions in Saudi Arabia to well within phase 0... Better to ease it back now than to allow it to explode to a level where it finally meets our definition of [I]insurgency[I]

That may be true, but we cannot adjust the conditions of Saudi governance. We can't ease it back to anything, and we can't allow it to do anything. It is not within our control, and attempting to control it would only blow up in our faces. We are not controlling or sustaining the Saudi government; they do what they want. We've defended them against outside aggression, and we would do so again, but that's a completely different matter. The relations between that government and that populace are not our business, they are wholly outside our control, and there is no reasonable way for us to usefully intervene.

[Dayuhan]

We spend a large amount of time defining things like what is an insurgency---why do look at the concept of "open source warfare' in far more detail than previously given to the topic here in SWJ.

It gets waved off as fast as it is mentioned but after the recent salafist web release of this magazine which in ENGLISH used the term "open source jihad" maybe it is now time to discuss the theory instead of running from it--it is really interesting that few in the IC and even fewer in the military even understand the concept. But tied to Kilcullens' "conflict ecosystem" it moves the conversation forward.

Monday, 11 October 2010
JOURNAL: Open Source Jihad
A resource manual for those who loathe tyrants… a disaster for the repressive imperialistic nations:the open source jihad is America's worst nightmare. Al Qaeda's stated goal for Inspire.

Nothing new, really... back when I was young and silly we had copies of The Anarchist's Cookbook being passed around to eager hands, along with the little red book, The War of the Flea, etc. Of course most of the people who devoured them never got to the point of doing anything, and those who did were generally too disorganized and too incompetent to have much impact.

Taking an old concept and giving it a snappy new name from the world of computer science is a good way to get attention, but it's hardly revolutionary.

[Bob's World]

Never discount the "iceberg effect" in assessing a populace.

The diagram on page 29 of http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/docreposito...surgencies.pdf
is as good of breakdown of this as any.

Today in Afghanistan and Pakistan the foreign fighters come from three main sources

1. Arabs.
2. Uzbeks
3. Turks

No Chechans, and actually a surprising number of Germans.

It is also best to remember that the primary goals for all of these groups, and most of their members, lie back where they came from, not where they are at. If we want to disempower AQ we need to focus less on killing all who show up in the FATA, and more on helping the governments of the states they come from to understand and address the conditions that give rise to these guys. And I suspect that foreign fighters are probably the thinest slice of the top of the pyramid/iceberg of discontent.

Good pitch on foreign fighters here:

http://www.fpri.org/multimedia/20100...el5.afpak.html

A better understanding of insurgency and its roots gives us a better understanding of AQ and foreign fighters and how to better deal with them as well. Killing them in the FATA actually helps recruiting back home. Photos of dead foreign fighters are used to recruit new members back home.

[Tukhachevskii]

but I had to reply to these statements. What follows is tantamount to a rant (and rambles towards the end too) and I apologise to Bob’s World for any offence. Despite the wording of the below post I am attacking your statements not you (using emoticons are no help in this regard), in particular these three gems from separate posts...

Is it disturbing to think that US foreign policy laid much of the foundation that Bin Laden has built his UW campaign up?

When we begin to hold governments accountable for their actions we begin to get in front of the current conditions of insurgency that are being exploited by AQ's UW campaign.

&

COIN is Governance

COIN is most certainly NOT governance. COIN begins where governance ends. As far as I am concerned if there’s no military action (war by any other name) going on then it’s not COIN it’s social outreach (politics). It’s the military aspect that makes it COIN (the logical extension to riot police). In the words of Carl Schmitt, a declaration of war is a declaration of enmity. In other words (theoretically speaking in the spirit of Clausewitz) those who declare war (armed conflict for political purposes) are no longer friends. They are enemies and thus, in the domestic context, cease to be citizens and therefore cease to have the right to be citizens until such a time as they re-acknowledge the authority of the government (if I’m not mistaken this is in a nutshell how the IRA and the Loyalists were brought to heel). If they are supported by an external third party then it’s bordering on war proper (by proxy). Until they come to heel or acknowledge your government (and system of laws) they are no longer your citizens and therefore they are combatants (the law be damned), if people are trying to kill me I won’t let the law stand in my way (“In time of war law stays silent”). I believe in reciprocity; if they fight civilised so will I. I detect in your somewhat fashionable relativistic prose (which I would agree with if I didn’t think you were hiding behind it simply to make a point) that you are actually still a universalist with your pronunciation of the justness of any insurgent’s cause. That is a subjective not a universal judgement. There is no Natural Law to which you can appeal (one needs at least two people who agree to understand the functioning of the universe in a certain way before they can say that it functions so. Natural law is not a universal structuring principle, it is opinion shared by the likeminded). By your account the attacks on London in 2005 were justified because it was a failure in governance; a failure on the government’s part to accommodate Islamic goals, which is tantamount to appeasement and collaboration. The reasons for the attack are obvious to veryone who cars to listen.

The logical consequence of your proposition is that to disarm Muslim terrorists/ insurgents/ revolutionaries/just plain vanilla Muslims (delete as appropriate) all governments have to do is to recognise their demands as legitimate (which is the tacit presupposition of your proposition) and thus hand over every state in the world to our local (un)friendly Muslim (of course, the rather happier corollary is that armed opposition to Islam also becomes “just”, but I doubt they’d be so even handed). Your view of AQ is also slightly jaundiced suffice to say. The idea that we are the cause of AQ ignores Islamic theology and history (sort of like dismissing Hitler’s racisim). The Kilcullen view that we merely satisfy Islamic desires assumes that there is a point at which they will be satisfied...anyone who understands Islam (i.e., its historical apriori/deep grammar) know's differently. AQ is but one manifestation/symptom of a wider, global problem that of the reconnection of the previously sundered parts of the Islamic terrain through, ironically, the technological revolution of modernity/ globalisation and the reawakening of its sense of mission.

But for the military success of the first khalifs Islam would never have become a universal religion. Every exertion was made to keep the troops of the Faithful complete. The leaders followed only Mohammed's example when they represented fighting for Allah's cause as the most enviable occupation. The duty of military service was constantly impressed upon the Moslims; the lust of booty and the desire for martyrdom, to which the Qoran assigned the highest reward, were excited to the utmost. At a later period, it became necessary in the interests of order to temper the result of this excitement by traditions in which those of the Faithful who died in the exercise of a peaceful, honest profession were declared to be witnesses to the Faith as well as those who were slain in battle against the enemies of God,—traditions in which the real and greater holy war was described as the struggle against evil passions. The necessity of such a mitigating reaction, the spirit in which the chapters on holy war of Mohammedan law books are conceived, and the galvanizing power which down to our own day is contained in a call to arms in the name of Allah, all this shows that in the beginning of Islam the love of battle had been instigated at the expense of everything else.
-Hurgronje, Mohammedanism, p. 88-89

And in the words of W. H. Norton, ‘The Influence of the Desert on Early Islam’, The Journal of Religion, Vol. 4, No. 4, July, 1924, p. 394;

Sometimes the essential spirit of a religion is best seen when magnified in its fanatical sects. It would really seem that the more orthodox and pious a Moslem sect, the more ferocious and bloodthirsty is it.

That, sir, has absolutely nothing to do with governance.

To defeat AQ (and every other Muslim self-starter that decides to fulfil their universal obligation to Jihad which has nothing to do with US or European foreign policy, which is just an excuse the Left use to advance their own agenda) we have two options, allow me to quote the late, great von Clausewitz (note that so-called “Attritionist” and “Manouvrist” approaches are considered two sides of the same coin [COIN?] by CVC)...

‘If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. The total means at his disposal and the strength of his will. The extent of the means at his disposal is a matter, though not exclusively, of figures, and should be measurable. But the strength of his will is much less easy to determine and can only be gauged approximately by the strength of the motive animating it.

Given the deleterious effects of liberal prejudices regarding attacking Islam at the root (i.e., its generative grammar/COG- The Quran, Mohammed , the Shari’a and Sunna) the only other option is the one we took with the Nazis. In the words of an Arab who almost rid us of our present enemies....

“... only force of arms can bring a stop to this idiocy”. ―Abu Tahir Sulayman Al-Jannabi

Or in the words of El-Lawrence...

An opinion can be argued with: a conviction is best shot. The logical end of a war of creeds is the final destruction of one[.]
-The Evolution of a Revolt by T. E. Lawrence p.6

That’s all I have to say on the matter. I know I rambled onto other issues toward the end but I consider them part and parcel of the same strategic malaise afflicting our respect nations in the current fight. I appreciate that many consider me plain wrong regarding Islam and its relationship to Islamism (“there he goes again...”!), so be it. That’s your prerogative...I have no problem with being Churchill to your Halifax (no doubt the great man is turning in his grave at the comparison).

And yet we had plenty of warnings, if we had only made use of them. The danger did not come on us unawares. It burst on us suddenly, 'tis true; but it’s coming was foreshadowed plainly enough to open our eyes, if we had not been wilfully blind.

- Gen. G. T. Chesney, The Battle for Dorking: Reminiscences of a Volunteer (London: Grant
Richards Ltd., 1871/1914), p. 17

[Bob's World]

A good checklist for COIN (pre-violence as well as post)
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/..._Questions.pdf

and how the region that encompasses most of a proposed "Caliphate" fares:

http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/...0_Map_MENA.pdf

What Freedom House assesses as "Free" - "Partly Free" - "Not Free" could just as easily be assessed as "Low Conditions of Insurgency" - "Moderate Conditions of Insurgency" and "High Conditions of insurgency"

Of note the onus for all of the factors measured lay with the government, and not some rabble rousing internal or external actor. Governments acted consciously to allow these perceptions to develop. What the U.S. must ask itself, is how much has a foreign policy rooted in Containment of the Soviets impacted these populaces since 1945; and how might the perceptions of the need for those policies to persist 21 years beyond the Soviet collapse be today?

Also worth asking is how many of these governments feel enabled to act with such impunity toward their own populaces due to their relationships with the U.S.?

Finally, and most importantly, ask and answer those questions not from your own perspective, but try to empathize with what the perspective of a 20 year-old man from one of these countries might perceive the answers to be...

[Steve Blair]

A good checklist for COIN (pre-violence as well as post)
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/..._Questions.pdf

Now we know we're doomed...there's a checklist....

[jmm99]

telling you this:

from Wilf
So what you are telling me is that ineffective killing does not work, and that the action didn't match the policy objective? If so, I agree. The military operations that under-pinned UK operations in Ireland after WW1, were woeful. The UK basically "failed to fight," because the policy object had been set a "dominion status," prior to WW1.

The killing and capturing of the 1916 Irish rebels (many more were detained than executed) were very effective in taking down the violent Irish Republican membership from top to bottom. Those killings and detentions (less a few exceptional summary executions) were also quite legal and pursuant to trials or review proceedings mostly before military commissions. Those killings and detentions were very much in pursuance of the UKG's policy objectives: to quell and then try the rebels using military forces and military law.

Of course, prior to the 1916 Easter Rebellion, the IRB and its paramilitary allies were very much minority groups. In a West Cork ryding (later a hotbed of IRA activity under Collins), the "Sinn Feiner" came in a distant third to two "Home Rule" candidates.

The 1914 non-resolution of the Unionist-Home Rule negotiations basically put Home Rule on the shelf until WWI ended - folks didn't think it would last as long as it did. Home Rule was not Dominion status by any means, but called only for a separate Irish Parliament and government administration from Dublin (which was the Crown-Ireland relationship from 1200 to 1800).

The rebels were confronted by southern Irish military (Royal Irish Regiment and Royal Dublin Fusiliers) and police (RIC) stationed in the Dublin area. In 1916, there were far more (by orders of magnitude) southern Irish serviing in the British Army than there were rebels at the Post Office. The rebels were initially disparaged in southern Ireland.

My point - a simple one - is that a coercive military solution, even though it can be effective and pursuant to governmental policy as to first order effects, can have much more serious negative higher order effects. And, in the case of Ireland (1916-1919, when the real fight began), did result in much more serious negative higher order effects. In another case, a non-coercive political solution might also lead to dismal results in the end.

It's easy in hindsight to claim that those higher order effects ought to have been taken into account; or that a much different "COIN" strategy ought to have been elected (milder or harsher, dependent of the critic). I'm not arguing any of those positions re: 1916-1919 because that would be speculative history. What I am saying is that exclusive reliance on an absolutist cookie-cutter course of action (whether hard or soft) can and probably will lead to unexpected negative consequences.

Regards

Mike

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PS: I speak of the Royal Irish Regiment (1684–1922), not the current RIR incarnation, which is a northern Irish unit. The Dublin Fusiliers were obviously southern.

[Pete]

Your point on arbitrary definition and delineations is important. That sort of stuff leads to overly focused views of the world; target fixation is a dangerous thing. Every war is different. We cannot forget that and trying to believe or convince folks that all types have a similar cause or an effect or methodologies that can be codified is really dangerous.

These different categories of warfare shouldn't be sealed up in separate compartments from each other; military professionals shouldn't assume that just because a certain service, branch of service, or command is the proponent or SME on a certain type of warfare that it's outside of their lane and therefore someone else's responsibility.

When I was in 7th Infantry Division on a JRX in 1983 I attended a briefing by the battalion S-3 of a unit in the Division Support Command in which he said that the battalion had a comprehensive perimeter around it. It was a bald-faced lie -- there wasn't even a guard at the entrance to its position to screen incoming vehicles. No MGs, not even guys with M16s, nobody at all. My first sergeant (1st ID, Vietnam, CIB) had commented that anyone could drive into the position and toss grenades wherever they wanted to.

In the artillery CSMs and first sergeants usually establish perimeters, so I told the CSM of the DISCOM battalion that things were seriously amiss. The next day the XO of the unit told me I had made the CO of the battalion really angry, and the day after that the commander of the battalion told me he refused to put out a perimeter unless his supported infantry brigade gave him a platoon to man it, "just like in Vietnam," he said.

(My personal opinion is that he was derelect in his duties as far as tactics went. To hell with it, the battalion CO was Medical Service Corps and I had received training at the Infantry School. The episode described above was a major factor in my being given the old heave-ho out of the Army a year later.)

When the U.S. Army screws up big time it is usually because of interfaces between different organizations, or the belief that solving a particular problem is someone else's responsibility. The same thing could be said about these categories of war, they're everyone's responsibility, not just a specific branch or school.

[jmm99]

To provide some rigor (and access to some original documents) to my assertions re: 1916 and the executions (far fewer than the detentions), the National Library provides a good overview of the participants in the 1916 Rebellion, PDF Version of the Exhibition.

The decision making process leading to the executions involved John Maxwell (assigned the task of cleaning up the mess); and the choice between three methods of proceeding: (1) via the civilian criminal courts under normal criminal law (not seriously considered by HMG for the Dublin rebels); (2) via Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) regulations for general courts martial with full courts of thirteen members, a professional judge, legal advocate and held in public; or (3) via field general courts martial without defence counsel, without jury (other than the officer board) and in camera.

After the rebellion began and before Maxwell reached Dublin, martial law had been declared for the city and county of Dublin by then Lord Lieutenant Lord Wimborne. While that proclamation did not foreclose the milder civilian criminal courts and DORA courts venues, it certainly gave Maxwell the authority to proceed by field general courts martial as allowed under martial law.

The issue seems to have become whether London consented to Maxwell's use of martial law - was Maxwell something of a "rogue officer" ? Indeed, that canard was proved "not so" from this original document (from "1916 in the de Valera papers"):

The executions

On 3 May French writes to Maxwell concerning the executions and Asquith’s surprise at the speed of events:

‘The prime minister expressed himself as “surprised” at the rapidity of the trial and executions — I pointed out that you were carrying out your instructions exactly & correctly and in strict accordance with military and martial law. He quite understands but asked me to warn you not to give the impression that all the Sinn Féiners would suffer death — I told him that the fact of 3 of them having been amended to much less severe sentences was evidence enough of the attitude you were adopting towards them and that I thought it much better to leave you alone to your own discretion. He agreed to this.’

Therefore, thanks to this document, we know that the COA followed by Maxwell was pursuant to the policy accepted by both his military and civilian superiors.

The National Library's "Aftermath" discusses some of the reasons why the executions and detentions produced consequences which Maxwell and French did not intend - and from which Asquith tried to wiggle away. See House of Commons debate (starting at p.3 pdf) which occured as the trials and executions were proceeding.

Regards

Mike