As way of background, I really began drilling into this topic in depth while I was at SOCPAC '04-'08. During that time I supported at least 5 different JSOTF-P Commanders, and 3 SOCPAC CGs, to include all of LTG Fridovich's tenure their. We we're immersed every day in the challenges of addressing potential threats to US interests from irregular threats in a tremendously large, diverse region where every state is extremely protective of their sovereignty (as they should be, most had to fight long bloody insurgencies to throw of colonial oppression to earn that sovereignty); where few feel they have a "terrorist" threat; where trust between states; is often low; and where the U.S. has a bit of a mixed reputation, largely positive, but taking some serious chin shots as we break glass all over the globe in the name of GWOT. Meanwhile, China is waging a very persistent and subtle influence building campaign. I feel most trust the US more than they trust China, but the prefer the Chinese approach gifts without strings attached (ok, they know and fear those strings, but they are long ones and many not be pulled for generations. The Chinese are patient like that). I also knocked out the two-year War
College program in my "spare" time, with my thesis on COG analysis for the GWOT.

COIN that focused on the insurgent didn't make sense as the results were so temporary. We worked a lot with the Philippines, and that country has been in a virtual constant state of insurgency since the first Spanish ship made landfall. There are many COIN "victories" in the Philippines; yet there is always insurgency. This is victory? It made no sense. So the insurgent clearly wasn't the problem. Same for ideology. Commies in the north, Muslims in the South; commies in the 50's and 60's regionally; Islamist today; etc. It was also very apparent that "defeating ideology" was not an effective approach either.
Many insurgent populaces live in poor conditions, but also many peaceful satisfied populaces. Many insurgents come from wealthy, educated backgrounds as well. Effective governance appeared to me as another bit of superficial analysis.

One by one I drilled into these concepts, and also concepts like "sanctuary."

The one commonality is the existence of some governing body that was perceived as the problem. Often several different segments of a populace would be supportive of very different insurgencies for very different reasons, and employ very different ideologies. But it always radiated out from the government.

So the key is the government, and this "badness" that radiates out from certain governments and not others. So I started looking at governments and how insurgent populaces felt about their governments. This led to a narrowing of factors. While there are many factors, the four I seized upon as the main causal factors seemed to me to be the most important. Most likely to create conditions of insurgency if they exist; and most likely to move a populace back toward "peace" if addressed.

It's a work in progress, that is nested with wise insights that have been drawn from insurgency and COIN over the years, but not constrained by positions that often are very popular, but just don't stand up to hard review. I throw my ideas out here because I want them to receive hard review. I know some won't stand up, and that's fine, because if one falls from hard review a new, better one will emerge from that same review.