Government is more important to certain parties than others. For example I really believe that we are dealing with what I call a "two-tier Insurgency" in Afghanistan. The top tier being that of the senior leadership of the TB and other groups, that are conducting what is best seen as a revolutionary insurgency, and is driven primarily by these factors of poor governance. (They don't recognize Karzai's legitimacy, they are excluded from any means of legally addressing that problem, and the Pashtuns as a whole are having their faces rubbed in it by the long suffering groups making up the old Northern Alliance.) This is the key to stability in Afghanistan and requires reconciliation. Not necessarily reconciliation with particular individuals or groups, but rather reconciliation of these issues of Poor Governance. We largely ignore this aspect of the insurgency and instead focus on the lower tier. This is our comfort zone.
The Lower tier is a resistance movement made up of the rank and file. They are largely self-governing, want or expect little from government; but do demand to be treated with respect, and can see from the very presence of the Coalition, with foreign advisors sitting at the shoulder of virtually every official, that the government has no true legitimacy. They fight because the Coalition is there, because they get paid, and because it is the honorable Pashtun thing to do. Most of us who frequent SWJ, if we were Pashtun, would be right there with them.
We focus the vast bulk of security efforts, development efforts and governance efforts at the bottom tier; yet this is a resistance. So long as the top tier remains committed to the effort and so long as the coalition is present there will be a bottom tier. You cannot defeat this insurgency by digging at the bottom, that is what the "nation building" strategy has us do. Foolishness.
We ignore the top, as that forces hard decisions in regards to GIROA, and we've adopted a definition of COIN that says our job is to keep GIROA in power rather than to focus on what best supports our interests. Where is the full court press to fix legitimacy? Where is the full court press to shred this abortion of a Constitution that enables Karzai's poor governance every bit as much as our military protection of his regime?
We called it a war, so we're fighting the war, we are trying to WIN when we should be working to simply enable conditions that support the rather minor interests we may have in this region.
By shifting our main effort to political/diplomatic efforts at the top, and reconciling the key causal issues at that level the lower tier of the insurgency will largely take care of itself. Our current approach merely enables Karzai to delay making any substantive changes at his level. He understands this very well. Some may call him the puppet, but he is more the puppet master in how he leverages Western fears to support what he knows full well is an unsustainable system of governance.
Its frustrating. Fighting season is about over for the year. We should pull all of our troops back into the FOBs and rotate the bulk of them home. We should then put Mr. Karzai on clear notice that how many come back and what we have them do is largely dependent on how successful he is in fixing his constitution and reconciling the issues that drive the top-tier of the insurgency. This also give us time to get our own strategy straight and our operational design as well.
People need to understand that be it Marjah or Zari, or the Arghendab, or anywhere else in Afghanistan, if we do "Shape-Clear-Hold-Build" on our little checklists; but the insurgency all around that little temporary pocket of effort is still at a solid Phase II Strategic Stalemate, we haven't made any enduring progress at all. Our phases of COIN mean nothing, it is the Phase the insurgency is in that means everything. Even then, phases are designed to flex based up the level of resistance, so the only true success is when you get the insurgency to Phase 0. You can't make that happen with S-C-H-B aimed at the lower tier of the insurgency. You make it happen by focusing on the issues driving the Top Tier.
(Oh, and Bill, I really rarely think much about Malaya as I see it as a COIN operation were we learned the wrong lessons because we don't understand what of all the things that were done actually contributed to the success. Besides addressing governance, the fact that it is a lower portion of a Peninsula and the government dominated the sea and air is probably the second largest factor to the success there. (Probably why South Korea is a success as well) So I have only selected a couple issues that are indeed relevant in comparison with Vietnam. I can't speak for Dr. Nagl. I bought his book years ago, but was never able to get though it because I agree, most comparison between Malaya and Nam are of little value.)
Last edited by Bob's World; 10-11-2010 at 07:00 PM.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Well based on Clausewitz's hypothesises/observations, insurgencies are defeated when the insurgents give up using military/violent means obtain their policy objective. Most the time that is because enough have been killed or captured, as in any form of armed conflict.Originally Posted by SteveMetz
Based on that, I cannot see what "good governance" and/or "legitimacy" has to contribute other than being simplistic political opinions.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Hey Wilf,
I believe there is room in our little discussion for both the "political struggle" and the "military struggle", which go back, as John Fishel posted, to a common well:
So, we are dealing with "power" and "Powers", which would be my starting point - not really very "Western". The Powers of the East and Middle East had to deal with "insurgencies" before there were Powers in the West.from JTF
As to the causes of insurgency and its identification with a struggle for power: we are back to Hans Moregnthau's statement in all editions of his Politics Amongnations going back to 1948, "International politics, LIKE ALL POLITICS, is a struggle for power." (emphasis added) This, in turn, harks back to St. Carl aka CvC.
Maybe more of Morgenthau, realism and Powers tomorrow nite.
Regards
Mike
Insurgency is certainly not new. The Hebrew people in Egypt is a great example (of course they called upon the ultimate WMD to help make their case). I suspect the Hebrew people questioned very much the legitimacy of the Egyptian Pharaoh to govern over them in such a way as to be able to deny them the freedom to leave Egypt; that the rule of law as applied to them was unjust; that they were treated with disrespect as a matter of status; and that they had no hope under the law to change their situation. This gave rise to a tremendous condition of insurgency within this significant and distinct segment of the populace. All of this could have easily (as is often the case) been addressed by the Pharaoh by simply accommodating the reasonable issues of the Hebrew populace. This is, after all, what Kennedy and Johnson did with the Civil Rights Act in the US. Instead he opted to enforce the rule of law; as did King George with the American Colonies; pushing a subversive movement into full-blown insurgency.
Now, the Pharaoh did try capture/kill operations on the insurgent leader, but he lacked adequate ISR and the ability to penetrate the sanctuary that Moses found in Midian among a supportive populace.
Then God put Moses on a UW mission, much as bin Laden claims that he too has been put on a UW mission by God. (I would ask bin Laden to show us some miracles as Moses did, as his bona fides are a bit weak compared to how God supported his original UW actor).
So Moses returned, armed with an ideology to radicalize the Hebrew populace and create an insurgency. I would argue that he found success in getting unarmed slaves to stand up to the most powerful King and Army in the world because such strong conditions of insurgency existed among this target populace, and also he had selected an ideology that spoke to them and took positions that the Pharaoh was unable / unwilling to co-opt.
We all know this story. It is not a Western one. The principles that drove this populace are the same that drive populaces today. These are human principles, not western ones.
Of note, the Hebrews first employed non-violent tactics of insurgency, and escalated only after they proved ineffective.
Now I have seen nothing to indicate that AQ has any of the god-given legitimacy that the Hebrew people exercised in this case. In no way do I mean to infer they do by this little example. He does however have the power of fairly strong conditions of insurgency in many of the states across the Middle East where he is peddling his influence, so his message is taking root. This is not one large populace or one global insurgency, but several smaller ones being leveraged by AQ to serve a larger purpose that is AQ's alone, along with the many nationalist purposes.
This is fundamental human dynamics. Now, would WILF have advised the Pharaoh "insurgencies are defeated when the insurgents give up using military/violent means obtain their policy objective. Most the time that is because enough have been killed or captured, as in any form of armed conflict." ??
Insurgencies happen for a reason, and typically it is rooted in the actions of the government. The government never wants to hear this, and more rare still seeks to address it. Easier just to enforce the rule of law and to capture kill enough of the populace so as to make them stop complaining and get back to making bricks.
Last edited by Bob's World; 10-11-2010 at 09:50 PM.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Hello all, I'm a student of DR Fishel's who wondered into this thread and couldn't resist barging in. Hopefully I'll have some worthwhile points to make.
The endeavor we're discussing is really kind of odd; we have these things that we call insurgencies, now we're trying to figure out what group of words best describes 'insurgencies' so we know when to use the word and when not to. (It seems rather backward, where is the simplicity of giving ideas words? If it was good enough for God and Adam . . . ). At this point, either the Jones/Fishel definition of insurgency as a form of illegal action or the Metz/White/Moore definition of insurgency as a form of strategy is equally correct. The question is, which will be more useful for researchers, theorists, and practitioners in the future?
Let's compare the two again:
Or simplified:
1: a Challenge for Political Control
that is Illegal
and Internal
2: a Strategy
used by Weak Against Strong
that is Violent
to Postpone Resolution
and a whole bunch of notes on common characteristics of insurgencies.
Here's the difference I see: Option 1 creates a neat little box that we can fit most things we consider insurgencies into, but includes other things we don't usually think of as insurgencies as well. Option 2 is also pretty straightforward, but is even broader - it only comes to resemble 'insurgency' with the addition of more modifiers.
I prefer Option 1 because I find it simpler and easier to use (more useful), and because it more closely resembles my own opinions (more accurate).
I buy the assertion that 'insurgencies' are about 'legitimacy', and I don't see how the latter is a uniquely Western construct. Pretty much any society has a power structure with rules, and that power structure exists either with some level of consent of most of the society's members, or through sheer force. Any challenge for political control by members of the society (internal) against the power structure that breaks the rules of the power structure (illegal) is thus an insurgency, and is a result of someone thinking that the current power structure's rules weren't worth following (legitimacy) - I challenge the skeptics to give a non-Western example that violates one of those points. (It wouldn't be the first time I was wrong).
Some thoughts:
1) The term 'illegal' is not a value judgment against the insurgents (though some may read it as such)
2) The presence of a state of illegitimacy does not automatically lead to insurgencies (the power structure is good at nipping them in the bud), nor can insurgencies be stopped solely by creating legitimacy, but it does cut into the insurgency's source of support and prevents future outbreaks.
That runs the risk of becoming tautological: people oppose governments they don't like. The only way I can think of to make it non-tautological is to add a value component: a government becomes legitimate by operating according to some rule set.
That's where the cultural component comes in: we believe that legitmacy is not governing in accordance with majority approval, but governing according to a set of rules which we claim are universal (but I think are culturally defined).
For Americans, "good governance" means Western style government. I'm not sure any Afghan government that promotes women's rights would be legitimate, yet it would be exercising "good governance" as Americans define it.
Even the idea of "consent" has a cultural dimension. Most governments throughout history have ruled based on passive consent. But one of the innovations of the European Enlightenment was the notion of active consent. We Americans have extrapolated this in a universal feature rather than a culturally-based one.
So, I'll stick to my argument that we in the West use the phrase "legtimacy" to sugar coat a colonial mindset--that societies are "modern" and "stable" to the extent they reflect the principles of Western liberalism.
Steve,
I completely agree that "Legitimacy" is a much abused term, but also that I have tried to narrowly define it to simply whether or not a distinct segment of a populace recognizes and accepts the right and duty of some body to govern them. I don't think the absence of this automatically causes insurgency, nor does it make insurgency inevitable; but I do believe that it is the primary causal factor and that for anyone doing COIN or supporting someone else's COIN that it's presence or repair should be the main effort.
Hope is the great off-ramp for insurgency, the presence of trusted, certain, legal means to affect change of governance. This is very much a culturally driven thing. The Afghans have a great process that they trust and believe in, but that was suppressed by the Taliban. We killed what the Taliban suppressed and replaced it with elections that mean little in this culture and are so easy to manipulate in a centralized (again our creation), patronage system that all hope was lost. Repairing hope should be right behind addressing legitimacy.
Justice and Respect are major contributing factors. We obsess on Rule of Law, which when enforced on a populace that believes the law to be unjust is most likely to make the situation worse and expand the support base of the insurgency. Respect is universal, be it basic human dignity, or be it a proud, accomplished man like George Washington being told by his own government that he was not worthy of a regular commission in the King's army due solely to the place of his birth.
Currently we attack the organizations; we seek to defeat ideologies; we capture/kill leaders; we seek to produce effectiveness of government services; we seek to deny ungoverned spaces; etc. We essentially arm ourselves with a handful of cliché's and then set out in pursuit of the symptoms of the problem. Done with enough vigor this will in fact suppress an insurgency. Similarly, if a state is willing to exert enough control, it can also prevent insurgency from breaking out in a major way. Neither of those approaches are really acceptable to the America I believe in.
By understanding that bad government action can create the growth of a "condition of insurgency" among a single or multiple segments of its society, and by better understanding what actually feeds that condition, and what metrics really matter, we can then make better decisions about where to engage at all, and if we do opt to engage, how to do so in a manner that is apt to produce the best effect.
It's a work in progress.
Bob
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
I personally don't find that very useful. It would make the democracy movements in places like China and Iran insurgencies. In fact, it would mean that governments have the ability to determine what is or is not an insurgency by the laws it passes.
I think we're kind of talking past each other. I was looking for a definition that is purely analytical, stripped of political and value connotations. Your use--which is certainly every bit as valid but simply different--is more focused on political and value connotations. This is like the difference between a political scientist talking about "democracy" or "fascism" and a politician using the same words.
Following that, I still see your use as tautological. What you're saying is that people oppose a government when they don't accept its right to rule. Where it gets tricky is in deriving implications from that.
We assume that the "right to rule" derives from things like governing according to the rule of law and attaining power through a transparent, formal process. But--and this is the point--we also assume this is universal. I just don't think so. For most governments throughout history, the right to rule derived from creating and sustaining stability, pure and simple--the "mandate of heaven"--or simply from being from the correct family. The vast majority of governments throughout history have been authoritarian, and most have been considered legitimate in terms of a working majority of the people who mattered accepting them (and most people throughout history have not been political significant.)
Let me give an example of the process of cultural "mirror imaging"--assuming that others see the world the way we do. We often say that everyone wants "justice." That is true. But most cultures define "justice" differently than the Western notion. The Western notion is that justice is determined by process. In other cultures, only the outcome determines whether justice has been served. If a guilty person is lynched, that is justice. They do not see having a guilty person go free because he or she could afford a better lawyer or found a legal loophole to be "justice." So they do not see our method as necessarily promoting justice.
In Islam, the legitimacy of a government is determined not by how it is selected, but whether its members are pious and it rules in accordance with sharia. I'm hard pressed to find that notion in FM 3-24.
Last edited by SteveMetz; 10-12-2010 at 11:34 AM.
Steve and Bob,We assume that the "right to rule" derives from things like governing according to the rule of law and attaining power through a transparent, formal process. But--and this is the point--we also assume this is universal. I just don't think so. For most governments throughout history, the right to rule derived from creating and sustaining stability, pure and simple--the "mandate of heaven"--or simply from being from the correct family. The vast majority of governments throughout history have been authoritarian, and most have been considered legitimate in terms of a working majority of the people who mattered accepting them (and most people throughout history have not been political significant.)
May be we can come to the definition of an insurgency to and only to the events which occure when a population/a part of a population is dissatisfy with its rulers or government and use violence to overcome the monopole of violence of a government in order to set a new government.
Now, the only limits is how you qualify/quantify that violence to make the distinction between a riot and an insurgency.
Also, the question of legitimacy through Rule of Law has little to see with an insurgency. It just means that a government follows the law. If the law is to have a kingdom and the kings rules by the law: you do have rule of law. There's a necessity to differenciate Rule of Law and the idea of democracy as the less worst form of government. Also, Rule of Law is differenciated from Human Rights. The idea of Rule of Law is Human Rights + democracy is just a remain from the Cold War ideological battle.
The main key point, in my opinion, is: does a government, in its form and practice of governance, satisfy the people. The rest is purely ideological and not technical (in a politic science understanding).
M-A
To me, this is still seeing the world through a Western cultural lens. In the vast majority of states throughout history, the vast majority of the people were politically insignificant. The government didn't have to concern itself with satisfying them. The whole concept of a politically significant "people" is a Western notion.
Let me take a stab at illustrating the pitfalls of a political/value based definition of insurgency.
Rather than the regime-focused on that has been used here, how about a people-based one: A method used by oppressed people to punish an unjust, repressive, corrupt, and illegitimate regime when they have no peaceful way of doing so.
The point I'm trying to make here is that a value-based definition is inherently subjective. Subjective definitions are useful as "calls to action" but have limits if the purpose is purely analytical.
Well, as an odd mix of "former Green Beret, former Prosecutor" I suspect I may look at rule of law uniquely. But Justice is far more important than the rule of law for me, and certainly in regards to insurgency. As often as not it is the rule of law that is used to oppress a society as it is to liberate the same.
As to definitions, I don't think this is like "The Highlander" where "there can be only one..." Such drama leads to debating words rather than seeking understanding; and I know that Steve is as committed as I am, not to be "right" but rather to help shape better understanding of a complex problem.
There is value in understanding that in certain contexts insurgency can be thought of as a strategy, and have that conversation. Similarly there is value in looking at it as conditions that come to exist within a populace and having that conversation. All of this contributes to greater understanding and moves us forward beyond some well-worn clichés that each contain a nugget of truth wrapped in thick coating of old wife's tale.
But Steve, I do think one point is critical to the American look at these things, you said:
"that governments have the ability to determine what is or is not an insurgency by the laws it passes."
That is exactly my point. These things are completely situational. Just as the U.S. Constitution has prevented the growth and development of countless such uprisings; so too has the absence of such governmental action resulted in continuous uprising in places like the Philippines. This is indeed wholly within governmental control to set the bar based on their own culture, their own tolerance for popular feedback. Some countries set the bar too low though, and they are the ones that are challenged. To set it too high is anarchy.
And nothing I write is a defense or attack on US military doctrine on insurgency. The point being that what the US military thinks or does not think insurgency is only shapes how the US military looks at and engages insurgency; it does nothing to shape what insurgency is. In fact, I am on record I see FM 3-24 as "Zombie COIN" - a soulless tome that like a zombie looks and generally acts properly, but for lack of a soul is just a shade off. The soul that FM3-24 lacks is a foundation in an understanding of insurgency itself.
I know it is in re-write currently. My advice to that team is to focus on what exactly is insurgency, and multiple definitions are fine for its many aspects; to lay that down up front, and then weave that "soul" through the manual to apply that critical nuance that is missing from much of the current one.
All insurgency is indeed in the eye of the beholder, shaped by their respective cultures. Similarly all governments have it within their power to allow their legitimacy to come from what is locally accepted (from god, birth, vote, Shura, or whatever) and to ensure that local perceptions of justice and respect are supported. And when they don't, every populace faced with such Despotism needs to know that America stands for the principle that "..it is their Right, it is their Duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future Security."
We need to put our American rulers away and stop measuring whether or not some populace somewhere is right or wrong; or if some government is good or bad. The populace holds the ruler and they get to do the measuring. That is what America stands for.
We muddy the dignity of insurgency when we call every form or populace uprising insurgency (Mexico is NOT an insurgency); and we trap ourselves into a family of bad options when we see all COIN as war, and all US action in support of someone else's COIN as also being COIN for ourselves.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Since I've been arguing throughout this thread that the values-based definition of insurgency, which dominates Western doctrine and strategy, is a reflection of the colonialist worldview, I need to point out that there are two very different critiques of imperialism and this worldview.
The one from the left originated with Lenin, was refined by a number of Third World intellectuals and political leaders, picked up by the post Vietnam American left, and represented today by people like Noam Chomsky and Chalmers Johnson. It's essence is moral subjectivism: the imperial mindset is wrong because Western values are no better than non-Western ones.
The critique from the right is best typified today by the writing of Andrew Bacevich. It is based on the notion that America is ill suited for the imperial mission. That it has adverse effects on us like leading us toward a militarized foreign policy, and placing us in partnership with unsavory, even evil people.
My own position is the latter.
I wasn't arguing that everything is sitautional (That's a truism that doesn't tell us much.) I was arguing that by your definition, what makes something an insurgency is whether the government decides to pass a law which makes it one rather than decisions made by the insurgents themselves to opt for insurgency.
And aren't you simply arguing that the existence of violent opposition to the state proves the state is flawed? I mean, I can't argue with that, but again I'm not sure what it tells us.
Plus, the U.S. has certainly had violent opposition. But its leaders felt strong enough to opt for conventional war rather than a strategy of insurgency. The UK faced a protracted insurgency. Was this because the US and UK governments set the bar too low for popular feedback?
You can't always get what you what but you may expect what you need...
May be, I am a westerner so I can't avoid having such default. But my point was rather that people are satisfy with the form of government they have because it allow them to conduct normal life activity with a little interference from the government. A dictatorship that allows you to make business and provides you a satisfying legal environment may be seen as a satisfying government by the population. Therefore there is no reasons to rebel against it ans start an insurgency.
Even if people had an insignificant weight in politic for long time in most of the history, the fact that they were "satisfied" does count. The day they are unsatisfied they rebel and you end up with an insurgency.
I do agree that leninist approach does see the population as marginal in term of decision making but population, even in the eyes of Lenin, does remain an important component as they are the army of the revolutionary intellectuals. (Communist revolutionnaires were the first to win hearts and minds).
What/who triggers an insurgency is different from who does constitute the combattants.
Satisfying the people is not providing a "etat providence" as in Europ or a "US like democracy", it is not even based on access to services... I take it as a form of government that does match with people expectation from State/Government involvement and interraction in their daily life.
It is also clear that most of the time (if not always) the group starting an insurgency has a political weight much more important than the masses and populace. In my opinion, we do come to the same end: a small group with a large individual political weight trying to size power through violence = a large group of individual with limited individual political weight trying to size power through violence.
To size power both need a populace support to be abble to militarily defeate the government.
And to gain that populace support, both promisse to the people a government that will provide them a more satisfying form of governance. The rural based communist revolutions are all based on the promisse of land reform and smaller taxes: what the rural populations will see as more satisfying. (Even if that is not true as JMM demonstrated in a previous threat with Viet Nam).
Last edited by M-A Lagrange; 10-12-2010 at 02:34 PM.
That would be true IF insurgency is simply a different form of war. I'm not sure how I feel about that notion. I know that some people I respect greatly like Ralph Peters take it.
At its essence, such an approach seeks to manage threats rather than resolve them. That may be the most realistic. The implication is that if we need to return every decade and kill more insurgents, that is better in the long run than trying to re-engineer a society, culture, economy, and political system.
Two things are clear, though. If we are to conceptualize insurgency as a variant of war, we need to abandon the notion that the goal of war is always decisive victory. Second, if we are to adopt that conceptualization, we need to make fundamental change to our doctrine and strategy.
Last edited by SteveMetz; 10-12-2010 at 02:31 PM.
Wise words Steve. All systems have a purpose and when ever you violate that purpose sooner or later the system will either adapt or it will begin to dis-integrate. Our system (country) was created by "Operational Design" one of the first of it's kind. And we were never designed to be an Imperial Power so when ever we violate our very purpose as a nation(system) we will almost always get into a lot of trouble.
My sense is that what you described WAS the essence of Cold War insurgencies. There were political and economic systems which did not reflect the interests of large segments of the population, particularly peasants. Historically, the interests of peasants did not matter. When the peasantry was mobilized, their interests DID matter and sometimes it required violence to force the system to adjust to this.
But the question is: Is this a universal conceptualization or was it specific to the 20th century? Does it explain contemporary insurgencies?
I don't know the anwer but have a suspcion that it is not.
Well, the American Civil War does not really fit within my definition of insurgency, as the people worked through the law, through government, and it was the government of the various states that declared their independence from the Central US Government. Considering that each of these states began as a colony, and then became fully sovereign states that agreed to work with each other (while retaining all sovereignty in themselves) under the articles, and then surrendering a portion of that sovereignty under the Constitution with the belief that they could always withdraw from the Union if they decided it didn't work out; their actions were reasonable under the law. Not acceptable, but reasonable. I believe President Jackson put an end to the legality of such a withdrawal, but the Civil War drew from the first real test of that law. It was warfare, pure and simple between two sovereigns. When the Union prevailed it validated the Jackson holding.
Now, that said:
Did "conditions of insurgency" exist in the South? Yes.
Did the southern populace choose a "strategy of insurgency"? No.
Could they have? Yes.
Could the nation have devolved into insurgency at the end of the Civil War? Certainly.
Why did that not happen? Certainly there were those who wanted to, but the full and immediate focus on true reconciliation by Grant at Appomattox and Lincoln; the bringing the South back into the fold as full partners; and yes, the full and complete military defeat coupled with a defeat of the will of the majority of the populace to resist, all combined to put this to rest. The loud voices that pushed to punish the south following the war were every bit as dangerous to the survival of the union as the loud voices to secede were prior to the war. I think the wounds are largely healed now, but that took several generations.
Oh, and what does my approach tell us:
1. That it is Governments who cause insurgency, not Populaces.
- Therefore resolution comes through understanding the populace and addressing the failures of governance.
2. Each populace assesses it situation with its governance through its own lens.
- Any objective measure of what insurgency is or is not would require the universal application of someone else's lens; and would therefore be universally inaccurate.
3. There are certain critical aspects of governance that seem to contribute the most to conditions of insurgency.
- What actions or inactions might cause such perceptions is unique to each recipient society.
- A diverse state like Iraq, or Afghanistan, or the Philippines with multiple distinct societies assessing their own unique perceptions of a single, poor government, may well give rise to multiple insurgencies that are each very unique. What they all hold in common is that they are responses to poor governance. The solution lies in understanding these unique perspective, in understanding what perceptions are most critical to promoting insurgency, and focusing on fixing the aspects of governance that are driving them.
I admit I turn the equation upside down. I place the responsibility on government to govern well, and I fully support the right and duty of the populace to act illegally when no legal means exists, when government refuses to do so.
A right is something that cannot be taken away.
A duty is something one must perform.
I personally am not ready to re-write the documents or modify the principles upon which this nation was founded simply because our current approaches to foreign policy have made them inconvenient. I feel strongly about that, and sometimes that emotion slips into my work.
Now, I realize this is an American document, so I am not saying that we need to force every government in the world to recognize this same right, this same duty for their own populace. What I am saying, is that when we dedicate ourselves to supporting those governments that do not, we set ourselves up for fair criticism for supporting the suppression or rights in other populaces that we demand for ourselves. Many an insurgent populace has held up the American Declaration (Vietnam and Algeria to name but two) and looked to America for help in their plight. We do not have a great record in answering those calls. I think when we look for ways to move forward, we will do best by first looking back to our own roots and being more empathetic of challenges faced by others today that in many ways mirror our own.
Today we are attacked most vigorously and most persistently by the populaces of our allies. We really need to think about that.
Last edited by Bob's World; 10-12-2010 at 02:50 PM.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
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