Defining Insurgency

[William F. Owen]

What I am saying is that exclusive reliance on an absolutist cookie-cutter course of action (whether hard or soft) can and probably will lead to unexpected negative consequences.

OK, but what I am saying is that is the government policy is to "counter the insurgents" then the destruction/defeat/suppression of the enemy armed force is required. What makes it "required" is the outcome of not seeking to do it = the "rebels" win.

[M-A Lagrange]

Wilf,

I believe the point Mike is trying to make is that sometimes a response perceived as too strong or too violent by a governement can actually participate to build support to the insurgents and not rally support to a government.

It is true and normal that a government respond to violence by tracking down the insurgent. But the way it is perceived by the population is important too. You need to take in consideration not only the part of population that support the government but also the population that is potentially supporting the insurgents.
As with Ireland.

M-A

[Dayuhan]

Today in Afghanistan and Pakistan the foreign fighters come from three main sources
1. Arabs.
2. Uzbeks
3. Turks

No Chechans, and actually a surprising number of Germans.

It is also best to remember that the primary goals for all of these groups, and most of their members, lie back where they came from, not where they are at. If we want to disempower AQ we need to focus less on killing all who show up in the FATA, and more on helping the governments of the states they come from to understand and address the conditions that give rise to these guys.

How do you know what the goals of these individuals are? It’s best to remember that AQ was able to recruit foreign fighters just as easily, maybe more easily, for his jihad against the Soviets, which had nothing at all to do with the home front. A charismatic recruiter with a good pitch and an audience of testosterone-addled young males can pull a few hundred to fight for practically anything, there’s no basis there to deduce an insurgency. I think you're imposing assumptions here.

If we want to solve the cforeign fighter problem, we might want to think less about changing the governments in their home countries, which we can't change anyway, and more about the basic conditions enabling them: the existence of a jihad. They can't travel to join the fight if there's no fight to join. Foreign fighters aren't created by bad governance in Saudi Arabia or Turkey or Libya or Germany, they're created by the opportunity to go fight a foreign invader in Muslim lands. If we want fewer foreign fighters, fewer large scale extended military occupations in Muslim space will achieve that goal... and unlike change to foreign governments, this is at least within our control. We cannot change the way the governments of these countries treat their people. We can change our own habit of providing foreign fighters with a standing target. We can "address the conditions that give rise to these guys" simply by reducing direct, extended, large scale military intervention and by eschewing regime changes that require us to provide extended military sustenance to the regimes we install.

A good checklist for COIN (pre-violence as well as post)
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/..._Questions.pdf

and how the region that encompasses most of a proposed "Caliphate" fares:

http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/...0_Map_MENA.pdf

An excellent summary of those Western assumptions that were discussed earlier, but does nothing at all to measure local sentiment, local attitudes toward governance, or local conditions… and therefore a completely inadequate way of measuring the proposed condition of insurgency. How do you measure the attitudes of a populace except through their actions?

What the U.S. must ask itself, is how much has a foreign policy rooted in Containment of the Soviets impacted these populaces since 1945; and how might the perceptions of the need for those policies to persist 21 years beyond the Soviet collapse be today?

Why start at 1945? And why assume that US foreign policy is the cause of what we’re seeing? Maybe this is simply the local habit of governance… has it altered significantly since 1945? What basis have we to assume that US foreign policy has shaped local patterns of governance?

Also worth asking is how many of these governments feel enabled to act with such impunity toward their own populaces due to their relationships with the U.S.?

I think you drastically overestimate that supposed enabling factor, and I can’t see any evidence that it’s there at all. What government do you think is so enabled, and why exactly do you think it is so enabled?

Finally, and most importantly, ask and answer those questions not from your own perspective, but try to empathize with what the perspective of a 20 year-old man from one of these countries might perceive the answers to be..

Might also look at the perspective of the 40 year olds, and reflect that few nations anywhere allow 20 year olds to set policy… for good reasons.

Here’s another example of an externally imposed assumption, from a prior post…

Is there hope in Saudi Arabia? Not if hope is defined as having trusted, certain, legal means to affect change.

I doubt that many people in the region under discussion, or even in the West, share that definition. For most, “hope” lies in the belief that next year will be better than this year, that our children’s lives will be better than ours, and that we will have security and a little more prosperity than we do now.

I think you look too much for what you want, and thus assume others want, and not enough at what people fear. After many years around the Arabian Gulf area, I think people there fear chaos far more than they fear tyranny: they know very well that they are sitting on top of something the whole world wants, and many believe – with good reason – that if they show any internal dissension or inconsistency the outsiders will come in and take it. Two comments that reappear with almost metronomic regularity in conversation in that part of the world, with only minor variation…

Osama is good, he is brave and pious and we support his jihad… but if he takes power here we will go to war and we will lose everything.

America wants us to have democracy so we will fight each other and the CIA can manipulate our elections and take our oil for nothing.

I actually think that if the bulk of that region’s populace had a choice between AQ-style Isalmism, American-sponsored democracy, and the status quo, they would take the status quo… not because they like it best but because they fear it least.

I don’t know how much time you’ve spent in the Gulf in the last 6-7 years, but the difference, relative to the very grim 1990s, is really striking to me. The oil price surge provided a lot of latitude and the rulers have been fairly canny in plowing back in domestically, most unlike the late 70s-early 80s oil boom. Lots of money around, lots of jobs, incomes way up. Averages don’t tell you much in the land of skewed distribution, but consumption of middle-class goods has skyrocketed, and that tells you something. I suspect that as with China, significant popular impetus for political change in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf may have to wait for a significant economic dislocation.

Again I have to ask... even if your analysis is accurate, which you clearly believe it is... what do you propose that we do about it? Do you really believe that the US has the right, the responsibility, or the capacity to adjust the way other governments relate to their populaces... or that anyone, populace, government, or insurgent, wants us meddling in their domestic affairs?

[Dayuhan]

Wilf,

I believe the point Mike is trying to make is that sometimes a response perceived as too strong or too violent by a governement can actually participate to build support to the insurgents and not rally support to a government.

It is true and normal that a government respond to violence by tracking down the insurgent. But the way it is perceived by the population is important too. You need to take in consideration not only the part of population that support the government but also the population that is potentially supporting the insurgents.
As with Ireland.

M-A

As usual, Wilf is looking at the issue from the perspective of a soldier charged with executing a political policy that has already been decided upon, RCJ is looking at it from the perspective of a soldier charged with advising the policy makers on what decision to make. Naturally these perspectives lead to very different conclusions.

You're right of course, if the effort to kill one insurgent leads 10 more to take up arms, you haven't gained much. This is something that practitioners of State terrorism, like practitioners of non-state terrorism, often forget. Sometimes the people you're trying to terrorize into submission just get pissed off.

[Bob's World]

How do you know what the goals of these individuals are? It’s best to remember that AQ was able to recruit foreign fighters just as easily, maybe more easily, for his jihad against the Soviets, which had nothing at all to do with the home front. A charismatic recruiter with a good pitch and an audience of testosterone-addled young males can pull a few hundred to fight for practically anything, there’s no basis there to deduce an insurgency. I think you're imposing assumptions here.

If we want to solve the foreign fighter problem, we might want to think less about changing the governments in their home countries, which we can't change anyway, and more about the basic conditions enabling them: the existence of a jihad. They can't travel to join the fight if there's no fight to join. Foreign fighters aren't created by bad governance in Saudi Arabia or Turkey or Libya or Germany, they're created by the opportunity to go fight a foreign invader in Muslim lands. If we want fewer foreign fighters, fewer large scale extended military occupations in Muslim space will achieve that goal... and unlike change to foreign governments, this is at least within our control. We cannot change the way the governments of these countries treat their people. We can change our own habit of providing foreign fighters with a standing target. We can "address the conditions that give rise to these guys" simply by reducing direct, extended, large scale military intervention and by eschewing regime changes that require us to provide extended military sustenance to the regimes we install.



An excellent summary of those Western assumptions that were discussed earlier, but does nothing at all to measure local sentiment, local attitudes toward governance, or local conditions… and therefore a completely inadequate way of measuring the proposed condition of insurgency. How do you measure the attitudes of a populace except through their actions?



Why start at 1945? And why assume that US foreign policy is the cause of what we’re seeing? Maybe this is simply the local habit of governance… has it altered significantly since 1945? What basis have we to assume that US foreign policy has shaped local patterns of governance?



I think you drastically overestimate that supposed enabling factor, and I can’t see any evidence that it’s there at all. What government do you think is so enabled, and why exactly do you think it is so enabled?



Might also look at the perspective of the 40 year olds, and reflect that few nations anywhere allow 20 year olds to set policy… for good reasons.

Here’s another example of an externally imposed assumption, from a prior post…



I doubt that many people in the region under discussion, or even in the West, share that definition. For most, “hope” lies in the belief that next year will be better than this year, that our children’s lives will be better than ours, and that we will have security and a little more prosperity than we do now.

I think you look too much for what you want, and thus assume others want, and not enough at what people fear. After many years around the Arabian Gulf area, I think people there fear chaos far more than they fear tyranny: they know very well that they are sitting on top of something the whole world wants, and many believe – with good reason – that if they show any internal dissension or inconsistency the outsiders will come in and take it. Two comments that reappear with almost metronomic regularity in conversation in that part of the world, with only minor variation…

Osama is good, he is brave and pious and we support his jihad… but if he takes power here we will go to war and we will lose everything.

America wants us to have democracy so we will fight each other and the CIA can manipulate our elections and take our oil for nothing.

I actually think that if the bulk of that region’s populace had a choice between AQ-style Isalmism, American-sponsored democracy, and the status quo, they would take the status quo… not because they like it best but because they fear it least.

I don’t know how much time you’ve spent in the Gulf in the last 6-7 years, but the difference, relative to the very grim 1990s, is really striking to me. The oil price surge provided a lot of latitude and the rulers have been fairly canny in plowing back in domestically, most unlike the late 70s-early 80s oil boom. Lots of money around, lots of jobs, incomes way up. Averages don’t tell you much in the land of skewed distribution, but consumption of middle-class goods has skyrocketed, and that tells you something. I suspect that as with China, significant popular impetus for political change in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf may have to wait for a significant economic dislocation.

Again I have to ask... even if your analysis is accurate, which you clearly believe it is... what do you propose that we do about it? Do you really believe that the US has the right, the responsibility, or the capacity to adjust the way other governments relate to their populaces... or that anyone, populace, government, or insurgent, wants us meddling in their domestic affairs?

We focus on symptoms, which should be a supporting effort. We ignore causation, which should be a main effort.

We focus on changing others, when we should focus on what we must change about ourselves first.

We focus on insurgents, when we should focus on insurgency.

We focus on the defeat of "threats", when we should focus on addressing why they became "threats" to begin with.

We focus on ideology, when we should focus on why an ideology that has existed for hundreds of years is leading to a surge of violent backlash at government now.

We focus on ourselves wherever we go, thinking how do we shape a situation to support our needs, and do so in the way ones particular profession likes to operate; when we should focus on the locals and either leaving well enough alone or enabling them to achieve what they need based on their perspectives and thereby garnering their support.

We put the maintenance of friendly dictators above the maintenance of friendly populaces.

etc.

I only argue for a shift in priority and focus, not an abandonment of the hard security work that must support, that is often very very much war-like combat, but still best not approached as "war" all the same.

And fine point, I defined hope as a term of art for my model. Certainly there are all kinds of hope and usages of that word. The usage I focus on is the one that goes to the heart of providing the type of off ramps that can best prevent insurgency even when governments are weak, uncaring, or even evil.

[Dayuhan]

We focus on symptoms, which should be a supporting effort. We ignore causation, which should be a main effort.

A main effort for who? If you're talking about the internal politics of other countries, how is that a place for us to be exerting effort? We cannot change the governments of other countries, we cannot change the way they relate to their populaces, and nobody - not government, populace, nor insurgent - wants us to try.

We focus on ideology, when we should focus on why an ideology that has existed for hundreds of years is leading to a surge of violent backlash at government now.

You're assuming a backlash at government, rather than what we actually observe: a backlash at foreign intervention. It's also to a large extent a "backlash" against a pattern of modernization that threatens some, but which many see as highly desirable. I think you're drastically oversimplifying the conditions that produce these events and pushing them into a US-centric Cold War paradigm where it doesn't fully fit. We are neither the cause of nor the solution to all of the world's problems.

when we should focus on the locals and either leaving well enough alone or enabling them to achieve what they need based on their perspectives and thereby garnering their support.

We put the maintenance of friendly dictators above the maintenance of friendly populaces.

Assigning ourselves, uninvited, the role of enabling other populaces is hubris of a quite extreme - and I suspect quite dangerous - degree.

Where exactly do we maintain friendly dictators? Again, I thing you wildly overstate the degree of sustenance we provide anyone. Our infuence and our aid are just not that great.

I only argue for a shift in priority and focus, not an abandonment of the hard security work that must support, that is often very very much war-like combat, but still best not approached as "war" all the same.

I know. But if your new focus expects us to impose ourselves on the domestic affairs of other countries in an effort to impose our values - even if we assign those values to others and pretend they aren't ours - please stop the train, because I want to get off. It's not going anywhere good, despite the best of intentions.

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan,

If you persist in twisting everything I say into something I've never said or even insinuated just so you can argue a counter position, it doesn't help the debate, as you are really debating yourself at that point more than any of the ideas I have presented.

Afghanistan and Iraq are the least of the U.S. concerns in terms of insurgent populaces. I realize you have your definition that you like to work with, that's fine; but that does not make my positions invalid simply because I recognize the conditions of insurgency as existing long before they erupt in organized violence. By the time militaries are brought in the Civil authorities failures are already long in time and severe in nature. The horse is out of the proverbial barn.

Nothing I write is intended as a prescription for any particular insurgency, but rather as insights based up my study and experience into why these types of disturbances tend to occur and the advice that dealing with the insurgent should be a supporting effort, that creating effective government services is nice but won't in of itself solve the problem; but that understanding how a particular populace feels about their governance on a few key issues and working with the governments to address those perceptions should be the focus of engagement.

Many places we should engage far less or not at all. But if we engage or not, it should be a decision that takes into account more effectively what the risks and problems are than much of current doctrine recognizes.

In a paper I just completed I look at whether or not President Obama is during his tenure seeking to finally retire a grand strategy of Containment (that has had patches of "Interventionism" and "Preemption" slapped on it by his two predecessors) and wheeling out a brand new Grand Strategy that I suggest would best be called "Empowerment."

At one point I highlight the President's oft stated position that "refuses the false division between our values and our security." My personal observation being:

"While Containment often required compromising our values to maintain control, what Empowerment will likely require is compromising control to maintain our values."

Personally, I'm pulling for Empowerment; but also realize there is an inertia of thought and action that make such a change difficult at best.

[William F. Owen]

I believe the point Mike is trying to make is that sometimes a response perceived as too strong or too violent by a governement can actually participate to build support to the insurgents and not rally support to a government.

That would be my point as well. Tactics must not undermine the policy. Sometimes that is unavoidable and unknowable, but where known, should be avoided. Having said that the concept of deterrence should be central to the outcome you seek.

[jmm99]

from jmm99
What I am saying is that exclusive reliance on an absolutist cookie-cutter course of action (whether hard or soft) can and probably will lead to unexpected negative consequences.

from Wilf
OK, but what I am saying is that is the government policy is to "counter the insurgents" then the destruction/defeat/suppression of the enemy armed force is required. What makes it "required" is the outcome of not seeking to do it = the "rebels" win.

from M-A Lagrange
I believe the point Mike is trying to make is that sometimes a response perceived as too strong or too violent by a governement can actually participate to build support to the insurgents and not rally support to a government.

from Wilf
That would be my point as well. Tactics must not undermine the policy. Sometimes that is unavoidable and unknowable, but where known, should be avoided. Having said that the concept of deterrence should be central to the outcome you seek.

As with all forms of armed conflict, the basic concept for each party is to neutralize the other party via kill, capture or convert - not necessarily in that order. In what order is why they pay practitioners the big bucks.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

As with all forms of armed conflict, the basic concept for each party is to neutralize the other party via kill, capture or convert - not necessarily in that order. In what order is why they pay practitioners the big bucks.

Regards

Mike

Perhaps both appropriate to this thread:

"For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."

and

"All men can see these tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved."


Sun Tzu

[jmm99]

"For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."

and

"All men can see these tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved."

The first is a platitude, unless one can present evidence that Sun Tzu actually won multiple non-violent victories. In the absence of such evidence, his theory is berift of practice. At least, with Subotai, I know what he actually did (in strategy, campaigns and tactics; where in the last he personally was not as strong).

The second, read literally, presents a situation of little utility. I.e., if "what none can see is the strategy", that strategy is confined to one mind and cannot be transmitted.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

Mike,

I think Sun Tzu isn't an old Chinese guy so much as hundreds of years of lessons learned compressed into poetic sound bites of wisdom.

As to applying these two sayings to COIN it's largely the "stitch in time saves nine" aspect of COIN, in that when Civil governance recognizes it is their duty to serve the populace in a civil way, much of what we now see as COIN (Gov't forces vs insurgent forces) can be prevented. Or, as to AQ and their UW campaign, by adjusting our foreign policy to reduce the Cold War induced ass-hat factor, and by pressuring allied governments to make reasonable accommodations with their populaces in terms of fundamental issues such as a just judicial process; or reasonable rights to comment or affect government legally based on their respective cultures, we rob AQ of much of their base of support. Something 100 drone strikes will never do.

As to Strategy, well, I take this as strategy isn't obvious, it isn't intuitive, it is often not seen for the battles, much as the forest is not seen for the trees. We see far too much 'strategy of tactics' of late. As if I pile up enough tactics it will equal strategy; or if I pile up enough violence an insurgency becomes a civil war. We have a COSTCO mentality that more of a little thing equal a different thing. That is not always the case.

[Dayuhan]

If you persist in twisting everything I say into something I've never said or even insinuated just so you can argue a counter position, it doesn't help the debate, as you are really debating yourself at that point more than any of the ideas I have presented.

I don't see myself trying to twist anything, just responding to the words I read.

Afghanistan and Iraq are the least of the U.S. concerns in terms of insurgent populaces.

What other insurgent populace is a US concern or requires action from the US?

I realize you have your definition that you like to work with, that's fine; but that does not make my positions invalid simply because I recognize the conditions of insurgency as existing long before they erupt in organized violence.

This may well be true, but you seem to take it to the point of assuming that any government not meeting western criteria for good governance (e.g. Freedom House rankings) must therefore have an insurgent populace. I'm not sure that's valid. I think you need some way of assessing that condition that reflects internal standards, not external ones, and I can't imagine what that would be. I also think you need to differentiate between the active insurgency, which can to some extent be measured and assessed in terms of goals, motivation, and popular support, and your condition of insurgency (maybe pre-insurgency would be better?) which you seem to measure uncertainly and by externally imposed standards.

In a paper I just completed I look at whether or not President Obama is during his tenure seeking to finally retire a grand strategy of Containment (that has had patches of "Interventionism" and "Preemption" slapped on it by his two predecessors) and wheeling out a brand new Grand Strategy that I suggest would best be called "Empowerment."...

Personally, I'm pulling for Empowerment; but also realize there is an inertia of thought and action that make such a change difficult at best.

Fine, but whom do you propose to empower? The US does not have the right, responsibility, or - most important - the capacity to empower citizens of other countries. In most of these countries even the citizens don't want us mucking about in their internal affairs; they assume that our "help" is intended to advance our interests, not theirs, and they're generally right.

The obstacle is not just inertia, it's the quite formidable problem, and potential for adverse consequences, of inserting ourselves uninvited into other people's business.

[Bob's World]

Freedom house rankings are based on how the populaces of each country feel. It is not some western team showing up with a western ruler and judging by western perspectives.

[jmm99]

from BW
I think Sun Tzu isn't an old Chinese guy so much as hundreds of years of lessons learned compressed into poetic sound bites of wisdom.

but then one should be able to point to hundreds of non-violent victories won over those "hundreds of years of lessons learned". My point remains the same: the record is berift of Chinese practice to prove the theory delivered in those "poetic sound bites of wisdom" that you cite.

The first aphorism you cite (Griffith Trans., III Offensive Strategy, pt.3) is preceded by two others:

1. Generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this.

2. To capture the enemy's army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a battalion, a company or a five-man squad is better than to destroy them.

Those two (pts. 1&2; emphasizing neutralization by capture), combined with pt.3, lead to this "Thus":

4. Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy.

The first annotation comment to pt.4 (by Tu Mu) advises pre-threat deterence - but, how to resolve difficulties "before they arise", or to triumph "before threats materialize". To do so, one must adopt some kind of "1% solution" of preventive strikes (ala Suskind of VP Cheney), or massive programs that seek to cure all of the "Conditions" that might lead to the threat. The latter seems more akin to your prescription than the former. I reject former and latter.

The second annotation comment to pt.4 (by Li Ch'uan) takes the statement "Attack plans at their inception" quite literally. The ultimately winning general there, being confronted by his opponent's "stubborn and rude Planning Officer" acting as a envoy, simply beheaded the Planning Officer. The general noted that: "The supreme excellence in war is to attack the enemy's plans."

Li Ch'uan's example is a targeted killing; and is scarcely non-violent - although the end result was the enemy's surrender once the Planning Officer was killed.

I'll certainly look at your concept of "Empowerment" whenever you link the article; but that to me sounds only like a more benign form of interventionism.

Since I'm a "Never Again, but ..." type, any form of US interventionism is suspect, especially outside of pre-defined areas. We (you and I) have, I believe, a fundamental policy difference on the scope of US intervention in the affairs of others.

My "platitudes" re: "insurgency" and "counter-insurgency" are aimed at an indigenous vs indigenous mixup, unless otherwise stated. Just to make that clear. If we do intervene, we should read Sun Tzu's (Griffith's), XIII Employment of Secret Agents - which to me is more of the "political struggle" than of the "military struggle" (though both are necessarily linked).

Obviously, we have to defend ourselves against external threats such as AQ waging special operations warfare vs US. But, we do not have to occupy ourselves with the entire World, nor do we have to occupy large chunks of the World, to neutralize that threat.

Regards

Mike

[Pete]

I think Sun Tzu isn't an old Chinese guy ...

Did you ever have the opportunity to meet him? I never served in Asia during my military service, but I've always wondered what kind of guy this Mr. S. Tzu was. Does he like Scotch or bourbon?

[jmm99]

obviously not Chinese, Sun Tzu spent his misguided youth in Japan and became addicted to Umesha (plum "wine").

Honest

Mike

[Backwards Observer]

As far as I can tell, "Sun Tzu", is virtually unknown outside of the United States, and certainly does not figure prominently in any of the Asian studies of war or warfare. The most important Chinese philosopher is probably Dale Carnegie who I believe was a contemporary of Mo Tzu.

[Backwards Observer]

In my limited estimation, a cursory study of contemporary strategic thought suggests that the cutting-edge theorists have, through a sheer act of will, freed themselves from the tyranny of "reality", which after all can be used to justify any number of falsehoods.

Thusly, the most effective manner in which to reduce friction is to assert that it does not and will not exist. The swiftest way to claim the moral high ground is to merely assert repeatedly that one has already done so. The best method of fool-proofing a plan is to say, "Trust me, this plan is fool-proof".

Needless to say, there will always be small-minded detractors who inevitably refuse to comprehend the almost mystical nature of these strategic configurations. Their feverish fulminations do no more than illuminate the darkness of their collective failure of the imagination.

[M-A Lagrange]

"For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."

Bob,

Actually I do have some concernes with the approach you refer to. I did witness this in many times and it always had the same result.
First you buy your opponent to "defeat" him without fighting.
Secondly the opponent takes the money, stay quiete for a short time and then restart the fight.
(Dozen of exemples in Africa)

I personnaly do not see were you do defeat your opponent, you just delay the confrontation (at the best).

This could be proven to be true if you surround your ennemy with a force that is so mighty that the only option left to him is to surrender.
But that would never happen as in assymetric war (and I am teaching you nothing new) the opponent use the fact that his forces are "small" as his best advantage against his super mighty opponent.

I do agree that for political rest, a government has to respond/please some of the exigences of the populations in the geographic area the insurgent get support if it cannot defeat through force the insurgent. (As in Malaysia by promissing independance, the core political demand from the insurgents).

Now, in "modern" insurgencies (as Astan or Irak) which are protracted (nothing really new here), or with AQ more specifically, the Sun Tzu statement does not work neither as the insurgents are just the visible part of an iceberg. This would mean you have to basically terrorise or rally to your cause all middle east populations + a great part of Asian population + all the Muslims of Europ and America (north and South). This is just not possible and does not work.

As a tactic a very small scale level: this works. (Most of the police work is based on that).

But I may have abused of Umesha yesterday night.