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Thread: Planning and the proverbial "Squirrel!"

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    Council Member Jobu's Avatar
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    Default Planning and the proverbial "Squirrel!"

    First, if you don’t get the “Squirrel!” reference, watch this….

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YaAxzIFgNso

    I’m doing some research for a paper on the negative impact of technology on the art of planning. In particular, I’m focusing on how “current operations” centers embedded within various command posts have become bright, shiny objects that distract higher-level commanders and others from their roles in leading planning efforts.

    I’ve noticed command posts (TOC, COC, JOC, AOC, etc.) have come to look the same over the last 10 years…just at different scales. Walk in any of them and you’ll find rows and rows of positions with multiple flat screen monitors at each…plasma screens on the front wall showing “Pred porn”…and some sort of “battle cab” in the back. The amount of information ingested into these operations centers is enormous….requiring not only dozens of personnel at each location to cope with it, but dozens more to feed them and keep them running.

    The advent of blimps and other full motion video assets is compounding the problem…

    http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htintel/20101003.aspx

    To make matters worse, there are several programs that are coming down the road that could potentially exacerbate the bias for current over future ops (I won't mention them here). As distant commanders believe they have more influence on the real-time fight because of “enhanced situational awareness and decision making tools,” boundaries of behavior for those actually in the fight are likely to become more narrow. In other words, ROE will likely become even more restrictive. Decision cycles, as a result, are going to grow so that commanders can pursue perfect information in order to make perfect decisions…as if this were ever possible. Lower-level initiative is going to be stifled just at the time it’s needed the most.

    Maybe the most troubling aspect of this phenomenon is that the organizational seam between current ops and planning results in bad decisions on the fly. The shift-working current ops crowd hasn’t invested the intellectual capital into the operational environment that the planners have…they are too busy chasing squirrels. So when it’s time to take action, lets say against a high-value target, those directing the action may not understand potential consequences as well as others who have been studying it for a longer period.

    That said, to keep from making this more of a doom and gloom discussion, I’d like to look to the crowd for solutions. At the end of the day, technology is a good thing...if we put it in the right context. How do we take the goodness of technology without falling victim to the belief we can “control” the fight? Is there an example of a command post organizational construct where current and future ops (planners) live in harmony? How can technology assist in this regard? My gut tells me the answer may lie in collaborative planning…but there hasn’t been much thought placed into that concept from what I can tell…I could be wrong.
    Last edited by Jobu; 10-10-2010 at 06:55 PM.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default If I can slow things down here a bit, I'll give that some serious thought.

    It's an issue I wrestled with for years. However, two initial items based on my observation of the phenomena you mention:

    I've seen Planning Cells as a major problem for over 40 years. Three points on that:

    - The information explosion of the last 20 plus years has provided headquarters at all levels with more 'data' than they can absorb or process and the Army has failed miserably at providing effective filters for that. Filters must insure information is sent where it is needed as opposed to where the capability allows it to be sent.

    - As we got effectively over-Officered (with respect to the Leader:Led ratio) during Viet Nam when restrictions were lifted and then hung onto those extra spaces post VN and even post 1989 (as a mobilization hedge -- needed but there are better ways to do that), the Army had to find something for these not fully employed, smart, able and energetic folks to do -- so it increased the size of Staffs across the board, needed or not. Most combat echelons now have Staff numbers virtually double their WW II -pre 1975 numbers. I very strongly doubt efficiency or effectiveness have doubled. Staff size should be reduced.

    - Planning Cells may be worthwhile at Theater level but I doubt it. They can be worthwhile at Corps level, mission dependent. They are almost never beneficial at Div and lower levels. A far better process is to have two Operational Cells which rotate in a Planning / Preparation phase and an Execution phase. The guys and gals that plan Operation Wednesday take charge and execute it while the other crowd reverts to planning for the next opn or time period. I've seen that work in large and small Hq, in peace and in war. You planned, you know the ins and outs and you know you have to execute it -- so you planned sensibly and you know the Plan. There should be no plans cell, merely alternating operations teams or cells.

    Then there's this:
    As distant commanders believe they have more influence on the real-time fight because of “enhanced situational awareness and decision making tools,” boundaries of behavior for those actually in the fight are likely to become more narrow. In other words, ROE will likely become even more restrictive. Decision cycles, as a result, are going to grow so that commanders can pursue perfect information in order to make perfect decisions…as if this were ever possible. Lower-level initiative is going to be stifled just at the time it’s needed the most.
    That too is a forty year old and increasingly bad problem. It is a chimera and one would think that the last few years would have shown senior folks that theory just does not work. In addition to removing decision makers from direct contact and thus adversely impacting their SA, it is a terribly bad impactor on the morale and attitude of the troops -- not to mention its adverse effects on retention. Unless the US Army adopts AND ENFORCES a 'one-two up, one-two down rule' wherein Commanders must talk to their immediate higher and lower headquarters only, with ability to go up or down one more echelon in an emergency, the problem will exacerbate, initiative at lower echelons will be stifled and the Army will continue to drive out really good people who see the terrible flaws in overly centralized control.

    The trend developed after the lines stabilized in Korea when the Flag Officers found they had little to do so they developed the habit of interference as opposed to trust and delegation. Viet Nam, better radios and Helicopters only made that worse and thirty plus years of peace and generally poor training have elevated it to the point of, IMO, military embarrassment. The situation exists as a result of mediocre training and long peacetime service causing many commanders to have little faith in the ability or judgment of their subordinates. There are too many of them (that Leader:Led ratio again) and they're smart aggressive guys who have been trained to do something even if it's wrong. Only firm positive action, policies and enforcement from the top will preclude excessive centralization over control.

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    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    This is one of the situations where a legacy of the First World War still works, the old five-paragraph field order. Too many staff people and modern commo means that a paper version of a modern OPLAN or OPORD with all of their appendices and tabs would require two deuce-and-a-halfs to deliver them to subordinate HQs.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Jobu View Post
    I’m doing some research for a paper on the negative impact of technology on the art of planning. In particular, I’m focusing on how “current operations” centers embedded within various command posts have become bright, shiny objects that distract higher-level commanders and others from their roles in leading planning efforts.
    You need to read this. PM if you want to speak to the author and few other folks in this field, plus I have done some work on it as well.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Manstein wrote in his memoir "Verlorene Siege" about an army group commander (I think v. Rundstedt) that he did sometimes leave the HQ for a walk to distance himself from the daily activities there and to clear the mind. I assume that certain general's preference for physical workout serves a similar purpose.


    The Reichswehr/Wehrmacht leadership style which included the presence of high-ranking officers at the scene of an anticipated Schwerpunkt battle certainly helped as well. There were sometimes army commander, corps commander, division commander and battalion commander at a forward battalion commander's observation post to observe a critical attack (such as a river crossing).
    This did - unlike watching a drone footage in a theatre HQ - remove them from their own staffs. Their chief of staff would usually have full competence to run the army/corps/division in their absence, save for the units who were in the commander's reach.

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    Council Member Jobu's Avatar
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    Most combat echelons now have Staff numbers virtually double their WW II -pre 1975 numbers. I very strongly doubt efficiency or effectiveness have doubled. Staff size should be reduced.
    No question in my mind. There are too many people wasting space at the larger bases. Many of them are there to feed the "battle rhythm" (a great oxymoronic term)...which turns out to be a series of briefings and meetings intended to cope with the vast amounts of information. There are tons of worker bees counting the beans...developing data-dependent processes that require subordinate units to feed the beast. The worker bees settle into a routine and turn their brains off for 6 months to a year. It quickly becomes ineffective and inefficient just like any other bureaucracy. Organizational seams increase in number and severity.

    So maybe it's time to do what most organizations find useful in times like these...cut out middle management. That may force better collaboration between staff functions...and force the commanders to get their head out of the battle rhythm every now and then.

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    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    Regarding five-paragraph operations orders and the First World War -- Google books has a history of the 33rd U.S. Infantry Division during that war. The book has an appendix with division and corps field orders, many of which are written in the five-paragraph format. There is circumstantial evidence that the British taught us that format but I have't been able to nail that down yet.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Pete View Post
    Regarding five-paragraph operations orders and the First World War -- Google books has a history of the 33rd U.S. Infantry Division during that war. The book has an appendix with division and corps field orders, many of which are written in the five-paragraph format. There is circumstantial evidence that the British taught us that format but I have't been able to nail that down yet.
    Gold dust mate. Got a link?
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    The 33rd ID history is somewhere on Google books. You'll have to set up a Google account, which is free. Sign up for a free gmail email account, that's all it takes. Occasionally people outside of the U.S. have trouble viewing Google books -- it may be due to different countries' versions of copyright law.

    The French taught us the G1, G2, G3 and G4 form of staff organization during WW I. Guys may recall that French army intelligence is called the Deuxieme Bureau.

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    Default Your wishee is my command, Wilfie;

    but don't gnaw at the hand that feeds you - gnawing at little red riding hoods is OK.

    Illinois in the World War: an illustrated history of the thirty ..., Volume 1 By States Publications Society (pp. i-396, 30mb pdf)

    Illinois in the World War: an illustrated history of the thirty ..., Volume 2 By States Publications Society (pp. 397 et seq, 30mb pdf)

    Illinois in the World War: This history of the 33rd division, A.E.F., by Frederick Louis Huidekoper (12mb pdf) (Appendices I-XVII).

    The history of the 33rd division, A.E.F., by Frederick Louis Huidekoper (10mb pdf) (Appendices XIX-XLIII).

    and a bonus (32 ID in WWI - our Mich-Wis division)

    The 32nd Division in the World War, 1917-1919 By Wisconsin War History Commission, Michigan War History Commission (17mb pdf) (our local Upper Mich 107th Engineers, still active including our local sapper company, is rostered in the 32ID at p.30 pdf)

    Co. C, 127th Infantry, in the World War: a story of the 32nd Division and a complete history of the part taken by Co. C., Paul W. Schmidt (12mb pdf)

    Cheers

    Mike

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Cheers JMM
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    Thanks Mike. I had been racking my brain trying to find where I had seen this stuff on the net two years ago.

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    Council Member Jobu's Avatar
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    This is one of the situations where a legacy of the First World War still works, the old five-paragraph field order. Too many staff people and modern commo means that a paper version of a modern OPLAN or OPORD with all of their appendices and tabs would require two deuce-and-a-halfs to deliver them to subordinate HQs.
    I think a mission type order (in a narrative format like the five-paragraph order) can create a lot of harmony and overcome a lot of seams...for a short period. The staffing process to keep it updated with FRAGOs or complete re-writes is not feasible these days to keep pace with the fight...or organizational entropy.

    The planning happening at the lowest levels is more critical than what happens higher up. The lower-level unit's order has a limited scope...its authority won't cover all the assets/units they need they need for support.

    C2 lines are messy (arguably they always are). There has to be a better way of getting commander's intent out. Maybe FRAGOs should be replaced by blogs and tweets .
    Last edited by Jobu; 10-14-2010 at 10:31 AM.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default A FRAGO should resemble a Tweet...

    If it's more than a quarter of a page in total, it's too long.

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    Council Member TAH's Avatar
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    Default We are our own enemy

    Somewhere from the late 80s to mid 90s we became the Russians.

    We went from a commander-centric execution/end-state focused organization to a staff-focused planning centric one.

    We even publish it two FM now as oppoed to one.

    Orders and the "Orders Process" grew. So staffs grew, so more annexes could be written/published etc.

    Brigade level and below should be able to crank-out an robust FRAGO in 2 hours or less. Companies should be able to issue their orders within an hour of getting theirs from higher and it should never be longer then 30 munites. Oral only at company level.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by TAH View Post
    Oral only at company level.
    ...there may be a better way to say that!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    ...there may be a better way to say that!
    filthy beast...

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Hmm, I read an article in Armor Magazine (or was it infantry?) from the 90's which was about how a U.S. division fought its way through France and Germany iirc almost entirely without written orders.

    I do also recall a document about a U.S. Corps wargame from about 82' where the U.S. corps in Germany had invited iirc Balck and v.Mellenthin to participate. The two veterans stressed how decision-making had to be done in a few minutes, and both the two veterans and the American team were able to put together a mobile defence battle plan for the corps in a few minutes. The veteran's plan was more daring and radical, but both chose the same basic approach.

    Officers up to army commander level (above corps) had issued 'spoken' orders without written backup regularly in WW2; in Wehrmacht, Waffen SS and Patton.


    Now, could someone please tell me why only written orders should be used above Coy level? TAH?

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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    Now, could someone please tell me why only written orders should be used above Coy level? TAH?
    Very simple, Fuchs. CYA.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cover_your_ass ?

    So why exactly should a modern officer in a should-be command system have a need to cover his rear like that when officers who served under a murderous, micro-management-obsessed dictator didn't?


    Isn't "CYA" an explanation for an interim solution instead of for a really good command system?

    edit: Lest I forget; aren't spoken orders not actually preferable for "CYA" because their existence can be denied?
    Last edited by Fuchs; 10-14-2010 at 05:42 PM.

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