Planning and the proverbial "Squirrel!"

[Jobu]

First, if you don’t get the “Squirrel!” reference, watch this….

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YaAxzIFgNso

I’m doing some research for a paper on the negative impact of technology on the art of planning. In particular, I’m focusing on how “current operations” centers embedded within various command posts have become bright, shiny objects that distract higher-level commanders and others from their roles in leading planning efforts.

I’ve noticed command posts (TOC, COC, JOC, AOC, etc.) have come to look the same over the last 10 years…just at different scales. Walk in any of them and you’ll find rows and rows of positions with multiple flat screen monitors at each…plasma screens on the front wall showing “Pred porn”…and some sort of “battle cab” in the back. The amount of information ingested into these operations centers is enormous….requiring not only dozens of personnel at each location to cope with it, but dozens more to feed them and keep them running.

The advent of blimps and other full motion video assets is compounding the problem…

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htintel/20101003.aspx

To make matters worse, there are several programs that are coming down the road that could potentially exacerbate the bias for current over future ops (I won't mention them here). As distant commanders believe they have more influence on the real-time fight because of “enhanced situational awareness and decision making tools,” boundaries of behavior for those actually in the fight are likely to become more narrow. In other words, ROE will likely become even more restrictive. Decision cycles, as a result, are going to grow so that commanders can pursue perfect information in order to make perfect decisions…as if this were ever possible. Lower-level initiative is going to be stifled just at the time it’s needed the most.

Maybe the most troubling aspect of this phenomenon is that the organizational seam between current ops and planning results in bad decisions on the fly. The shift-working current ops crowd hasn’t invested the intellectual capital into the operational environment that the planners have…they are too busy chasing squirrels. So when it’s time to take action, lets say against a high-value target, those directing the action may not understand potential consequences as well as others who have been studying it for a longer period.

That said, to keep from making this more of a doom and gloom discussion, I’d like to look to the crowd for solutions. At the end of the day, technology is a good thing...if we put it in the right context. How do we take the goodness of technology without falling victim to the belief we can “control” the fight? Is there an example of a command post organizational construct where current and future ops (planners) live in harmony? How can technology assist in this regard? My gut tells me the answer may lie in collaborative planning…but there hasn’t been much thought placed into that concept from what I can tell…I could be wrong.

[Ken White]

It's an issue I wrestled with for years. However, two initial items based on my observation of the phenomena you mention:

I've seen Planning Cells as a major problem for over 40 years. Three points on that:

- The information explosion of the last 20 plus years has provided headquarters at all levels with more 'data' than they can absorb or process and the Army has failed miserably at providing effective filters for that. Filters must insure information is sent where it is needed as opposed to where the capability allows it to be sent.

- As we got effectively over-Officered (with respect to the Leader:Led ratio) during Viet Nam when restrictions were lifted and then hung onto those extra spaces post VN and even post 1989 (as a mobilization hedge -- needed but there are better ways to do that), the Army had to find something for these not fully employed, smart, able and energetic folks to do -- so it increased the size of Staffs across the board, needed or not. Most combat echelons now have Staff numbers virtually double their WW II -pre 1975 numbers. I very strongly doubt efficiency or effectiveness have doubled. Staff size should be reduced.

- Planning Cells may be worthwhile at Theater level but I doubt it. They can be worthwhile at Corps level, mission dependent. They are almost never beneficial at Div and lower levels. A far better process is to have two Operational Cells which rotate in a Planning / Preparation phase and an Execution phase. The guys and gals that plan Operation Wednesday take charge and execute it while the other crowd reverts to planning for the next opn or time period. I've seen that work in large and small Hq, in peace and in war. You planned, you know the ins and outs and you know you have to execute it -- so you planned sensibly and you know the Plan. There should be no plans cell, merely alternating operations teams or cells.

Then there's this:

As distant commanders believe they have more influence on the real-time fight because of “enhanced situational awareness and decision making tools,” boundaries of behavior for those actually in the fight are likely to become more narrow. In other words, ROE will likely become even more restrictive. Decision cycles, as a result, are going to grow so that commanders can pursue perfect information in order to make perfect decisions…as if this were ever possible. Lower-level initiative is going to be stifled just at the time it’s needed the most.

That too is a forty year old and increasingly bad problem. It is a chimera and one would think that the last few years would have shown senior folks that theory just does not work. In addition to removing decision makers from direct contact and thus adversely impacting their SA, it is a terribly bad impactor on the morale and attitude of the troops -- not to mention its adverse effects on retention. Unless the US Army adopts AND ENFORCES a 'one-two up, one-two down rule' wherein Commanders must talk to their immediate higher and lower headquarters only, with ability to go up or down one more echelon in an emergency, the problem will exacerbate, initiative at lower echelons will be stifled and the Army will continue to drive out really good people who see the terrible flaws in overly centralized control.

The trend developed after the lines stabilized in Korea when the Flag Officers found they had little to do so they developed the habit of interference as opposed to trust and delegation. Viet Nam, better radios and Helicopters only made that worse and thirty plus years of peace and generally poor training have elevated it to the point of, IMO, military embarrassment. The situation exists as a result of mediocre training and long peacetime service causing many commanders to have little faith in the ability or judgment of their subordinates. There are too many of them (that Leader:Led ratio again) and they're smart aggressive guys who have been trained to do something even if it's wrong. Only firm positive action, policies and enforcement from the top will preclude excessive centralization over control.

[Pete]

This is one of the situations where a legacy of the First World War still works, the old five-paragraph field order. Too many staff people and modern commo means that a paper version of a modern OPLAN or OPORD with all of their appendices and tabs would require two deuce-and-a-halfs to deliver them to subordinate HQs.

[William F. Owen]

I’m doing some research for a paper on the negative impact of technology on the art of planning. In particular, I’m focusing on how “current operations” centers embedded within various command posts have become bright, shiny objects that distract higher-level commanders and others from their roles in leading planning efforts.

You need to read this. PM if you want to speak to the author and few other folks in this field, plus I have done some work on it as well.

[Fuchs]

Manstein wrote in his memoir "Verlorene Siege" about an army group commander (I think v. Rundstedt) that he did sometimes leave the HQ for a walk to distance himself from the daily activities there and to clear the mind. I assume that certain general's preference for physical workout serves a similar purpose.


The Reichswehr/Wehrmacht leadership style which included the presence of high-ranking officers at the scene of an anticipated Schwerpunkt battle certainly helped as well. There were sometimes army commander, corps commander, division commander and battalion commander at a forward battalion commander's observation post to observe a critical attack (such as a river crossing).
This did - unlike watching a drone footage in a theatre HQ - remove them from their own staffs. Their chief of staff would usually have full competence to run the army/corps/division in their absence, save for the units who were in the commander's reach.

[Jobu]

Most combat echelons now have Staff numbers virtually double their WW II -pre 1975 numbers. I very strongly doubt efficiency or effectiveness have doubled. Staff size should be reduced.

No question in my mind. There are too many people wasting space at the larger bases. Many of them are there to feed the "battle rhythm" (a great oxymoronic term)...which turns out to be a series of briefings and meetings intended to cope with the vast amounts of information. There are tons of worker bees counting the beans...developing data-dependent processes that require subordinate units to feed the beast. The worker bees settle into a routine and turn their brains off for 6 months to a year. It quickly becomes ineffective and inefficient just like any other bureaucracy. Organizational seams increase in number and severity.

So maybe it's time to do what most organizations find useful in times like these...cut out middle management. That may force better collaboration between staff functions...and force the commanders to get their head out of the battle rhythm every now and then.

[Pete]

Regarding five-paragraph operations orders and the First World War -- Google books has a history of the 33rd U.S. Infantry Division during that war. The book has an appendix with division and corps field orders, many of which are written in the five-paragraph format. There is circumstantial evidence that the British taught us that format but I have't been able to nail that down yet.

[William F. Owen]

Regarding five-paragraph operations orders and the First World War -- Google books has a history of the 33rd U.S. Infantry Division during that war. The book has an appendix with division and corps field orders, many of which are written in the five-paragraph format. There is circumstantial evidence that the British taught us that format but I have't been able to nail that down yet.

Gold dust mate. Got a link?

[M.L.]

I've been doing some research on a related topic. I believe the staff issue is part of a larger culture issue. I believe our root problem is that we collectively think of the Army as a mechanical or biological system, when it is not.

We use mental models to conceptualize complex systems. This allows us to mentally simulate actions in our minds in order to predict likely outcomes. Our collective mental model of the Army is that of a mechanism or an organism. We trend toward organism, but there are elements of mechanistic models within the Army system. I won't go into the history of why this is. Suffice it to say it is a combination of Jominian influence and 20th century management thinking.

This mental model is implicit - you won't find it written down anywhere, but the evidence is all around us. We use terms like "Esprit de Corps" (Spirit of the Body). Elements in our formations are "organic." Command and control happens at the "Head" Quarters. The Captain (from the latin caput or head) leads the company (from the latin corpus or body)

This is not just a matter of semantics - it explains a great deal about why we operate the way we do, including the large (and growing) size of our staffs. The headquarters is the "brain" of the operation. The brain is the only place in the body where decisions are made, therefore, it must have a constant flow of information. Mission command, or empowering subordinates to take initiative within the commander's intent without having to ask permission, is against our intuitive conceptualization of a biological model. The last thing we need is our right leg going off on its own, or our liver deciding that it needs to rapidly exploit an opportunity.

Biological systems work best when the parts respond with predictable regularity to every signal from the brain. Indeed, otherwise we say that the body is sick. Consider that a recently published study of students at the Army War College showed that Army leaders believed the Army culture should emphasize “flexibility, discretion, participation, human resource development, innovation, creativity, risk-taking, and a long-term emphasis on professional growth and the acquisition of new professional knowledge and skills.” However, it also found these same leaders believed that current Army culture emphasizes “an overarching desire for stability, control, formal rules and policies, coordination and efficiency, goal and results oriented, and hard-driving competitiveness. “

Current Army culture emphasizes these things because these things are desirable in a biological system.

In a biological system, the emphasis on information flow from and to the brain is the overriding factor in organizational structure. The ultimate goal is real-time omnipotence. This explains our never ending quest for the Corps Commander to have real-time predator video of your platoon operation.

What is the solution?

In a nutshell, we must recognize the Army for what it is: not an organism, but a socio-cultural system. There are three primary differences between a socio-cultural system and other systems.

1. Socio-cultural systems are composed of people who each have choices. Therefore, in order to move a socio-cultural system toward a collective purpose a leader cannot control, rather he/she must inspire in a way that subordinates choose to follow, or said another way, aligns the purposes of the agents within the system with the purpose of the system as whole.

2. Socio-cultural systems are bonded by information, versus physical and chemical bonding in biological systems. Therefore, leaders must communicate with subordinates. This does not mean sending emails or pushing out powerpoint slides. The relationship is similar to a horse and rider, who must communicate through a series of mutually understood signals. Communication means constantly seeking and ensuring common understanding.

3. Socio-cultural systems have a common culture. Culture figures a great deal into what people do and why they do it. Two people that share a common culture are likely the perceive the same information in the same way, and therefore act in a way that benefits the system, even if they aren't in direct communication. Current Army thinking focuses on controlling behavior and choices through an ever-expanding labyrinth of complex orders, SOPs, rules, regulations, doctrine, and so on. Leaders would get much more bang for the buck focusing on building common culture, which ensures that subordinates make good decisions when they (inevitably) find themselves out of contact without a order, SOP, rule, regulation, or doctrinal manual to tell them what to do.

Not only will moving toward a socio-cultural model alleviate many of our problems, it will also enhance effectiveness. Small unit leaders and even individual Soldiers who can make on-the-spot decisions based on common culture and understanding of commander's intent (without having to ask the brain permission) are not only more effective, but they exponentially increase the decision cycle speed of the unit through reduced friction.

Apologies for the length...had to fit 4000 words worth of stuff in the post...

[Pete]

Although I'm not positive of it and I admit I may be wrong, I think operations research had a role in designing our personnel system, in terms of input-throughput-output. At the entrance to the personnel pipeline there are accessions, which in turn feed the scoolhouses, and after that TOE units. Throw in all the mid-career schools for different specialties and so forth, then the planning gets complicated. The system works after a fashion, but it treats everyone of the same MOS and grade as though they're interchangeable and it doesn't always put the best qualified people in the best slots. Training is another ball of wax, but that's TRADOC, not personnel.