http://www.knox.army.mil/center/ocoa...00/5wood00.pdf


After viewing his division’s first written order in combat, MG John S.
Wood, commander of the 4th Armored Division, told his G3 (operations officer)
not to issue any more. Wood believed the formatted, five-paragraph
order taught to U.S. Army officers at the Command and General Staff College
at Fort Leavenworth would only slow down his division’s decision cycle
in combat.
The fact that MG Wood could dispense with written orders while leading
his division across France highlights the level of training, cohesion, and education
that a unit would need to achieve in order to execute verbal mission orders.
The 4th Armored Division’s “daring, hard-riding, fast-shooting style” was
made possible through the execution of mission orders. But only by “throwing
away the book,” ironically, did the division accomplish the armored warfare
envisioned by the writers of FM 17-100, Armored Command Field Manual,
The Armored Division.2
The war exposed Regular officers to responsibilities far beyond anything
they had experienced, and forced them to rely on subordinates who were
essentially commissioned amateurs.
Most division commanders and their regimental commanders, who were
largely pre-war regulars, turned toward authoritarian, top-down methods of
command. They issued detailed orders, insisted on unquestioned obedience,
and used their staff officers to check on compliance. Reposing trust and confidence
in a subordinate entailed the possibility that he might fail, and embarrass
his ambitious superiors with their eyes on one of the many commands
being formed.13
Wood was the exception to this trend, taking the pain of creating autonomy
that would allow his officers to learn from their mistakes. He won their loyalty,
and developed subordinate leaders not afraid to take risks in the face of
German actions.
Wood speeded up decisions by using this ability to change task organizations
to solve a particular tactical problem. From the first day of his command,
Wood did his utmost to ensure that his commanders and their staffs were not
focused on processes or formulas. Wood understood that over time,
through constant training, officers memorized and verbalized a seemingly
complex decision-making process He was against these tidy methods of control
and written prescriptions for ensuring control.
The division trained on how to task organize for a particular
mission, and then, on Wood’s orders, reform the task forces while on the
move to meet a new threat. Wood did this with no fancy briefings or lengthy
rehearsals. He used the radio, and face to-face oral instructions to train his
division to operate without written directives.
Speed was always on Wood’s mind as he trained, not just speed of
motion, but speed in everything the division executed. The training enabled
the division’s officers to do away with many standardized procedures that
would slow down their actions, such as abiding by strict radio procedures.
For example, Wood’s battalion commanders and the division command
learned to recognize each other by voice — authentication by familiarization.
This increased flexibility, and translated into the ability of commanders
to change directions more quickly, without worrying that the orders received
were false. Rapid decisionmaking increased with operating procedures
that eased the ability of commanders to make decisions. This translated
into fluid tactics.
The article is probably a bit coloured by the fact that Vandergriff is a Maneuver Warfare mafia guy.