The Army: A Profession of Arms

[slapout9]

Watch this by Chief Elders on the Moral Question as the Governing process. You can skip to about 4:30 and watch that part or watch the whole thing. A lot of situation ethics in here.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9piIz...eature=related

[jmm99]

wm makes an excellent practical point:

The second tempest---whether the source of "the right" is the law or morality--is not so trivial. One can be right in many ways. But when it comes to conduct, we tend to narrow that down to two categories--doing what is morally right and doing what is legally right. However, let us not forget that some things that are morally right are nor necessarily legally right and vice versa. Whether the source of what is morally right is what is legally right is open to serious debate. Likewise with whether the origin of legal rectitude is moral rectitude. I happen to disagree with both positions but do not think this thread is the place to rehearse the reasons for that position. I will note that sometimes it happens that a given action is both legally and morally right (or wrong), but it may also be the case that a legally right action is morally wrong and vice versa.

The review of the professional ethic needs, in my opinion, to consider what is the basis of right and wrong in the formulation of the ethic. In other words, is the ethic based on law or is it based on morality. It may based on both. If so, then in those cases where the two sources may conflict, the ethic nees to specify which has primacy. If neither, then the ethic needs to expalin what other way(s) members of the military should resolve the conflict.

We also need to remember that right and wrong do not perfectly divide the world of judgments about actions. Actions may be morally/legally required, prohibited, and permitted. I think that judgments about right and wrong in the third category--permitted--are usually inappropriate. For example, were I walking down a dark street alone at night, I might decide to whistle. Unless I happen to live in some odd place where a law has been passed that forbids whistling, my choice is neither required nor forbidden, is neither right nor wrong. The review of the military ethic should try to make sure that it captures this threefold distinction and not stop with delineating just what the profession requires and forbids.

It follows along with what I looked at last night. I've not for a long time looked at the question of a conscientious objection to an otherwise lawful order. If we posit that the conscientious objection is genuinely held, then we have a clear collision between what is morally right (to that person) and what is legally right (to his or her superiors).

So, I hit the 2010 Criminal Law Deskbook, vol II, Crimes and Defenses, The Judge Advocate General’s School, US Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, Summer 2010 (Military Legal Resources).

In it, we find a number of citations which are unfavorable to the conscientious objector in refusing an otherwise lawful order:

pdf p. 66 -
8. Conscientious objection is not a defense to disobedience of lawful orders. United States v. Johnson, 45 M.J. 88 (C.A.A.F. 1996); United States v. Walker, 41 M.J. 462 (1995); United States v. Austin, 27 M.J. 227 (C.A.A.F. 1988).

pdf p. 70 -
B. Disobedience. A superior’s order is presumed to be lawful and is disobeyed at the subordinate’s peril. To sustain the presumption, the order must relate to military duty, it must not conflict with the statutory or constitutional rights of the person receiving the order, and it must be a specific mandate to do or not to do a specific act. In sum, an order is presumed lawful if it has a valid military purpose and is a clear, specific, narrowly drawn mandate. United States v. Moore, 58 M.J. 466 (C.A.A.F. 2003). The dictates of a person’s conscience, religion, or personal philosophy cannot excuse disobedience. United States v. Stockman, 17 M.J. 530 (A.C.M.R. 1973).

pdf p. 265 -
3. The processing of a conscientious objector application does not afford an accused a defense against his obligation to deploy, even if the orders to do so violate service regulations concerning conscientious objections. United States v. Johnson, 45 M.J. 88
(C.A.A.F. 1996).

The most recent case cited in the Deskbook makes it very clear that legal right will prevail over moral right in the CO area:

pdf p. 270 -
F. Religious Convictions. United States v. Webster, 65 M.J. 936 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2008). The accused pled guilty to missing movement to Iraq by design and disobeying orders from two superior commissioned officers to deliver his bags for deployment. The accused had converted to Islam in 1994 and had doubts about whether he should participate in a war against Muslims. After consulting Islamic scholars on the Internet, the accused determined that the consensus was that Muslims are not permitted to participate in the war in Iraq. By participating as a combatant, the accused believed that he would be placed “in an unfavorable position on the Day of Judgment.” The accused filed a conscientious objector packet prior to the deployment, but withdrew it. He filed another conscientious objector packet on the same day that he missed movement. During the guilty plea inquiry, the military judge ruled that his religious beliefs would not provide a defense to disobeying orders. The ACCA first held that the accused’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and provident. First, the accused confirmed that the defense of duress did not apply to him. Second, there is no authority for the proposition that conscientious objector status provides a defense for missing movement or violating lawful orders. Third, under AR 600-43, conscientious objector requests made after an individual has entered active duty will not be favorably considered when the objection is to a certain war, which was the case here. Finally, it is irrelevant that the offenses involving missing movement and failure to obey orders were based on religious motives where such motives and beliefs did not rise to the level of a duress defense and did not constitute any other defense. The court then held that the First Amendment does not require anything more to accommodate the accused’s free exercise of religion than was offered here, and the accused’s rights were not violated. The ACCA first identified the applicable standard for analyzing alleged government infringement on the free exercise of religion. Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, the state must have a “compelling state interest” before it can burden the free exercise of religion. Additionally, courts are enjoined to apply judicial deference when strictly scrutinizing the military’s burden on the free exercise of religion. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). Applying these two standards, the ACCA concluded that the government had a compelling interest in requiring soldiers to deploy with their units. The government furthered this compelling interest using the least restrictive means. The Army offers soldiers an opportunity to apply for conscientious objector status, and in this case, his command offered the accused the opportunity to deploy in a non-combat role. In applying the duly required judicial deference, the ACCA concluded that the Army furthered its compelling interest in the least restrictive manner possible. The accused “had no legal right or privilege under the First Amendment to refuse obedience to the orders, and the orders were not given for an illegal purpose.” (citing United States v. Barry, 36 C.M.R. 829, 831 (C.G.B.R. 1966) (internal brackets omitted).

Thus, creating a "safe harbor" for moral-ethical objections would require an extensive revision of the UCMJ and its underlying philosophy as to lawful orders. That could be done, but I've yet to see from any proponent (such as LTC Milburn) the legal provisions that would allow moral-ethical primacy.

A similar (but even larger) problem exists if one asserts that "Just War Theory" (which one, of course) should prevail in the Laws of War (LOAC, IHL; both treaty and customary). That is so, especially in the rules governing the conduct of warfare (jus in bello); where the ICRC casebook, vol I, says:

Any past, present, and future theory of just war only concerns ius ad bellum and cannot justify (but is in fact frequently used to imply) that those fighting a just war have more rights or less obligations under IHL than those fighting an unjust war.

This comment by LTC Milburn is simply wrong:

The United States and its allies are committed by treaty and policy to conduct military operations within the framework of just war theory.[14] Just war criteria fall into two categories: jus ad bellum, the reasons for going to war, and jus ad bello, the manner in which war is conducted.[15]

14. Just War theory is embodied in the United Nations Charter and the Law of War. Its intent is also reflected by the wording of the National Security Strategy.

15. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

and frankly could mislead the non-expert reader. NOT

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

jmm99, the UCMJ should be revised and include concepts of qualified immunity and exigent circumstances which are based on situational ethics and that is also why I believe it should be taught as part of Officer PME.

[jmm99]

I can't say whether I agree or disagree - not because my new nickname is "John Kerry"; but because I'd have to see the actual proposed legal revisions that incorporate "concepts of qualified immunity and exigent circumstances which are based on situational ethics."

That's no different than saying we need: a new weapons system, armored vehicle, fighter-bomber, etc., etc. The devil is always in the details - design and implementation. So, such projects, including proposed legal provisions, are up to the proponents of revision.

Frankly, the present UCMJ and Laws of War don't look bad to me - perhaps some "tweaking" as Tom Hanks might say.

Regards

Mike

[Pete]

In 1982 when I was in a 105mm howitzer battalion I was given the assignment of interviewing one of our soldiers who had decided he was a conscientious objector and wanted to be released from the Army. He was a mechanic or spare parts clerk who had discovered Jesus. I thought he was sincere in his convictions but also very naive, and that's what I said in my typewritten report.

For a few months of 1971 I had been an 18-year-old Vietnam War protester and I always wondered whether the Army gave me that job of interviewing the CO to smoke me out on that issue. In hindsight My Lai was a disgrace but it didn't condemn the entire U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. What the hell, I was 18 at the time. Had I been looking for an easy billet I wouldn't have enlisted for combat arms in the Army in 1977, so I've paid my dues.

[slapout9]

Frankly, the present UCMJ and Laws of War don't look bad to me - perhaps some "tweaking" as Tom Hanks might say.

Regards

Mike

More likely what it would look like. In situation ethics the Law is still supreme UNTIL you encounter a situation where there is no governing law or the law can make the situation worse, at which time the principle of what is best for the people is applied until the law can be changed or updated. Or situations where the Enemy will consciously try to manipulate the law and use it as a weapon against you like COINfusion warfare. Not much else to it. The original book was only like 50 pages because it was no where near as radical as people thought it was, but the 60's were like that, everyone under 30 was considered a radical.

[slapout9]

For a few months of 1971 I had been an 18-year-old Vietnam War protester .

You old Hippie

[Pete]

Oh wow man, kinda makes you want to freak out, you know?

[Bill Jakola]

...and once you get told "get on it," with go do it. It is then the Policy makers job to alter the military objectives to fit an altering policy - again, soldiers can advise at to Ways and Means. - Witness Allenby who was given more to do with less forces and just did it, without complaint.

Proves my point. Powell was dead wrong and crippled US Foreign Policy as a result. He should have stuck to his pay grade.

The evidence would thus show most of the military men who seek to dabble in policy are misguided.

As far as I know, Clausewitz never said "extension." He did say "continuation" on two occasions. In 1827, on his 10 July Note, and on page 605.
....but the military serves policy, once it is in place. These actions "cost" so you see a modification and adaptation. If the military start formulating policy then to what end would they craft to policy? To be better served by war?
War is a very blunt instrument. It can only serve certain policies. To quote Ashkenazi "Do not ask me what to do. Tell what you wish done and I will tell you if it is possible."

Well this is a discussion worth having.

Colin Gray addresses the military role in policy formulation and execution in his book "Another Bloody Century", published in 2005, pg 363.

"The question, 'who controls whom' in the conduct of war, does not admit of a simple answer, except as a matter of principle. There is no dispute over the theoretical primacy of policy and policymaker in relation to the military instrument. In practice, though, different cultures and changing historical contexts can ignite, or re-ignite, ancient difficulties in civil-military relations. To cite just one recent example, in the summer of 2002 Eliot Cohen argued in his major study of Supreme Command that war is much too important to be left to the generals. 36 Political leaders need to assert themselves over the military conduct of war if they are to be certain that war will be waged as vigorously as policy requires."

Gray uses the analogy of a doctor patient relationship with the Army profession of arms represented by the medical profession and the political leadership as the patient.

"It is argued that just as a person with a brain tumour is obliged to trust his expert brain surgeon, so a society at war should be obliged to take the military advice of its military experts."

I see a very blurred distinction between doctor and patient roles and responsibilities, at least in practice. It seems to me, the profession, either medical or 'of arms', must dialogue with the patient or the political leaders in our case. Each must complement the other influencing policy, strategy, operations, and at time even tactics. However clearly these roles are spelled out in purely legalistic terms in practice the distinctions are far less recognizable. For example, political leaders are still ultimately responsible for setting policy and strategy but these are developed with the advice and often advocacy of the military.

The acts of setting and developing strategy are so intertwined and inseparable that the political and military leaders must do this as a combined team effort and not, as Bob Woodward's book "Obama's Wars" depict, military leaders making strategy irrespective of political input.

Is our profession of arms role to provide advocacy or merely advice?

[Ken White]

The acts of setting and developing strategy are so intertwined and inseparable that the political and military leaders must do this as a combined team effort and not, as Bob Woodward's book "Obama's Wars" depict, military leaders making strategy irrespective of political input.

And to do that means the answer to this:

Is our profession of arms role to provide advocacy or merely advice?

Must be yes to both.

Both are required today due to the lack of military knowledge on the part of most professional * politicians today; their relative ignorance helped place us where we are today. The failure of the Armed Forces advocate sensible solutions and to just do what they were told with only minimal advice provided is also partly responsible.A question thus formed is at what point the advocacy must cease and the Guidon becomes planted.

That's really the question...

* They aren't really professional other than in the sense that's what they do for a living. Some of them are Professionals, Doctors and Lawyers. The Armed Forces are not themselves professionals, warfare it is not a profession, it an endeavor and it can be a trade for some or even for many but it isn't a profession any more than playing baseball, basketball or football for a living is a profession. Attempts to make it a 'profession' are in fact a part of the problem this thread discusses. Professions are allowed to have their own rules and to police themselves -- armed forces are not really permitted to do either.

[Bill Jakola]

* They aren't really professional other than in the sense that's what they do for a living. Some of them are Professionals, Doctors and Lawyers. The Armed Forces are not themselves professionals, warfare it is not a profession, it an endeavor and it can be a trade for some or even for many but it isn't a profession any more than playing baseball, basketball or football for a living is a profession. Attempts to make it a 'profession' are in fact a part of the problem this thread discusses. Professions are allowed to have their own rules and to police themselves -- armed forces are not really permitted to do either.

Right, "warfare it is not a profession"; but that is not what we are talking about. We are attempting to define the profession of arms, a group that specializes in the application of lethal force to achieve political ends. Because there are many things a military can do that other non-military organizations can do as well, e.g. build roads, schools, or provide humanitarian relief. However, only the profession of arms speciallizes in the application of lethal force, (and yes, there are exceptions, like police and mercenaries). And there are times when these other groups cannot operate due to security considerations and only the military will do. In these cases, where we require an organization that can build infrastructure while also providing secuirty and conduct combined arms maneuver or counterterrorism, in such cases only the profession of arms will do.

I agree, "warfare it is not a profession". Quoting Gray pg 37, "war is a relationship between beligerants, warfare is the conduct of war", but neither is a profession. War is such dangerous business that we need a profession of arms to maximize our ability to conduct war; that is, rather than warfare as a profession, the profession is expertise in warfare.

The problem is how do we develop, cultivate, standardize, evaluate this expertise. If the military is to provide advice and advocacy to the political leaders, when and how do we learn to do this. Do we learn in any coherent manner or is this largely self taught? If we are to be this profession of arms that is truely the expertise in warfare, how does the profession gain this expertise?

[slapout9]

The problem is how do we develop, cultivate, standardize, evaluate this expertise. If the military is to provide advice and advocacy to the political leaders, when and how do we learn to do this. Do we learn in any coherent manner or is this largely self taught? If we are to be this profession of arms that is truely the expertise in warfare, how does the profession gain this expertise?

Bill,I don't think that is the problem. Your are very professional(expert), the Army is very professional(expert) but politicians are often temporally elected amateurs or opportunist and that can be deadly to a expert.

[Pete]

The problem is how do we develop, cultivate, standardize, evaluate this expertise. If the military is to provide advice and advocacy to the political leaders, when and how do we learn to do this. Do we learn in any coherent manner or is this largely self taught? If we are to be this profession of arms that is truely the expertise in warfare, how does the profession gain this expertise?

Most of our decisions to go to war are driven by domestic politics. Usually that translates into the ill-defined goal of "doing something" to solve or have the appearance of solving a foreign policy problem. In those situations it is the duty of flag officers when asked to explain what can and cannot reasonably be expected to be accomplished given a certain level of military force. One of the real dangers of using the military to "do something" is the danger of compromise solutions that send in forces but at the same time try to maintain a small footprint or level of engagement. It's like sending in the U.S. Cavalry to seek out the enemy and telling them not to become decisively engaged. When things like that go on for more than three years the American public tends to get fed up with it.

[Ken White]

Right, "warfare it is not a profession"; but that is not what we are talking about. We are attempting to define the profession of arms, a group that specializes in the application of lethal force to achieve political ends... In these cases, where we require an organization that can build infrastructure while also providing secuirty and conduct combined arms maneuver or counterterrorism, in such cases only the profession of arms will do.

I respectfully submit that the trade of soldiering is what you mean but understand the desire to be a 'profession.' That carries a a far better cachet than 'trade.'

I would note the Talibs and others in South Asia are specializing in the application of lethal force and that they are not and do not aspire to be professionals.

I agree that armed force is necessary in many cases and there is much that cannot be done without it. That a requirement exists and that people fulfill it does not make those practitioners professional any more than a Plumber is a professional. A Profession requires a discrete vocabulary (we have that), dedication to its norms (we have that), a body of specialist knowledge (we have that), is trusted to be self regulating (not present) and self policing (also not present). Those items are listed in order of importance, least to greatest. The 'profession of arms' fails on the two most critical tests. Having said all that, I realize that too many are enamored with being accorded professional status in the fullest sense for me to turn the usage around and that's okay. I was a professional (small 'p') soldier for years. My son is one today -- but we both know we are or are practicing a trade and not a Profession.

If the occupation of soldiers was self regulating and self policing as are law and medicine, then it might be a profession. Since it is not those things -- and should not be if it is to serve the State -- then it doesn't really exist as a profession.

...rather than warfare as a profession, the profession is expertise in warfare.

Much as a 'professional' beach volleyball player is expert in volleyball?

The problem is how do we develop, cultivate, standardize, evaluate this expertise. If the military is to provide advice and advocacy to the political leaders, when and how do we learn to do this. Do we learn in any coherent manner or is this largely self taught?

Assuming that is not a rhetorical question, my answer based on a great many years of observation and participation would be a bit of both. All persons do not learn in a coherent manner, people differ. However most do learn when exposed to decent education -- and the US Army has that. Not great by a long shot, but decent and better than most. Still, an institution can only do such much and it is incumbent upon all who would be soldiers to learn a great deal on their own initiative. Therein lies the rub, as they say -- some people devote themselves to that learning and self development more than do others. Still other people have a natural talent for the trade. Thus every attempt to produce a number of square pegs that are identical will fail -- has failed -- and we are thus confronted with the fact that some folks make better advisers and / or better advocates (the two things are not synonomous) than others. Some in fact make better commanders or soldiers than others, yet they system makes no effort to place those people in positions where they can do the most good, it insists that all must take their turn in strange jobs and thus luck of the draw determines who is going to advise or advocate.

As an example, Tommy Franks was an exceptionally poor advocate, David Petreaus is better. Luck of the draw. One could wonder what might have happened in 2001-3 had Anthony Zinni still been CinCCent or Hugh Shelton CJCS...

If we are to be this profession of arms that is truely the expertise in warfare, how does the profession gain this expertise?

Not to be a smart aleck but true expertise is gained by practice in any field of endeavor. The US Army personnel system, aimed at producing generalists and with an 'up or out' promotion regimen is absolutely inimical to the development of expertise, all most can develop is competence -- and most do that; some few do better (in spite of the system) and actually develop expertise. Most do not.

The dichotomy is that a really good, proficient Army will spend most of its time at peace, terrible place to develop warfighting expertise. The real experts are those who learn very quickly once committed to combat. In a sense, that's bad but since each war is different, it has the saving grace of not having everyone in lock step for the wrong war at the wrong time -- as we saw in the movement of folks from Iraq to Afghanistan. Different wars require different TTP -- and approaches; the really good tradesmen will cope, the others will not. That effectively means that if we want the 'experts' in the right places (Command, policy Advisory, mission advocacy) we can simply place the best people in the positions instead of using today's shotgun and duty roster approach. I believe that's what a profession would do and it seems we are not doing that...

ADDENDUM: Specific answers to Bill Jakola's comment below, posted just after this one.

The system is broken, the personnel processes suitable for WW I (and adapted to WWII) and mass armies does not work for a smaller volunteer force. The PME process is fairly decent but most courses are far longer than needed to give Officers and senior NCOs (in particular) some 'down' and family time. There are better ways to do that.

Everyone should not be, can not be, a true generalist. Required for officers are two Command tacks and two Staff tracks, both divided into Unit and EAC segments. All start in the unit segment and then advance to the EAC segment based on proven performance attested by senior, peer and subordinate ratings.

The process of routing all officers through large staffs -- a subterfuge to keep officer end strength and spaces as opposed to any real military need is incredibly wasteful. That process and 'up or out' need to go.

In fairness, the Army's hands are tied to an extent by Congress, DOPMS, OPM 21 and a bunch of arcane and silly laws. Frankly, some are unlikely to be abolished. However, the Army will never know until it tries. The Army can go into the business as usual mode and tinker around the edges or they can truly fix a broken personnel system and an equally broken training process.

[Bill Jakola]

Bill,I don't think that is the problem. Your are very professional(expert), the Army is very professional(expert) but politicians are often temporally elected amateurs or opportunist and that can be deadly to a expert.

Well you may have identified a problem, but beyond voting and individual participation in the political process members of the professions of arms are prohibited from political action as a group. So you are highlighting an issue that is both beyond the scope of this discussion and something the profession of arms cannot legally impact.

However, we can provide expertise in the conduct of war form the tactical through strategic, and as I attempted to argue before, our profession also informs, and often helps shape policy.

So again I ask, if we are to provide this expertise how do we credencial ourselves? How do we quantify or grade our expertise? Do general officers, who have a majority of thier experience and training in tactical command intuitvely gain this advisory expertise once they pin on their stars? Because a few weeks at charm school or even broadening educational experiences like the War colleges, or staff assignments are unlikely to build the expertise required of a profession of arms that is required to provide strategic and policy level guidance.

[Bill Jakola]

The US Army personnel system, aimed at producing generalists and with an 'up or out' promotion regimen is absolutely inimical to the development of expertise, all most can develop is competence -- and most do that; some few do better (in spite of the system) and actually develop expertise. Most do not

Ken, great point. So how do we change this for the better? As you say practice make perfect or expertise so how do we change the personnel system, I like to call is talent management, so that we maximize the development of expertise?

[Ken White]

I'm firmly convinced that a two track system is necessary, gut wrenching as that thought may be to many. The Per community will trot out Congressional objections to such a move, a partly valid complaint but their underlying objection to such a process will be that it is far more work, accusations of unfairness will be rampant and they would prefer to not have to deal with those. More importantly, they may make a mistake for which they might be held accountable. There are many arguments to oppose it and the only real argument for it is more combat effectiveness. How important is that?

A secondary argument for it is the opportunity all will have to truly develop expertise in a filed instead of being marginally competent generalists -- as one Generalist, a two star, once told me: "Every time I'd almost learned what I needed to know about doing a job, they moved me to new and different job..." If you want persons with expertise to advise and advocate, they need, as you noted, to be developed. The current system discourages that for too many.

We have padded the Staff numbers at all levels and Parkinson's Law is in effect. We did that to build an Officer strength cushion and a mobilization base -- something Congress generally opposes for some odd reason -- there are better ways to do that. As an aside, we're trying to make NCOES emulate the Officer system and that is really bad mistake which will adversely impact mobilization should it be necessary...

Up or out needs to go. In my last job, I had a problem with a rogue Colonel and needed to rope him in. We had a Major, due for mandatory retirement. I called him in and said "Bill, I need you to do this..." No dummy he, he said "Okay you figure since I've got to retire, he can't hurt me and I can rein him in a bit?" Yep. Worked quite well and no poor major got his career wrecked by a loose cannon. Point of all that is the current OER system and Army philosophy totally discourage initiative and risk taking. That is just flat criminal. Combat is a risk and initiative is necessary, it should be encouraged, not stifled. Peer and subordinate ratings should be required as well as senior ratings for all ranks (that will be even more gut wrenching than a dual track officer system ) . The form should be a 3x5 card...

The Task, Condition and Standard system has developed a generation of leaders who can do certain tasks well but do not really know how to amalgamate tasks for mission accomplishment. Really smart guys figure it out and make it work -- too many do not because of that flawed training process which force concentration of enabling skills and knowledges and not on mission sets.

[Bill Jakola]

I'm firmly convinced that a two track system is necessary, gut wrenching as that thought may be to many. The Per community will trot out Congressional objections to such a move, a partly valid complaint but their underlying objection to such a process will be that it is far more work, accusations of unfairness will be rampant and they would prefer to not have to deal with those. More importantly, they may make a mistake for which they might be held accountable. There are many arguments to oppose it and the only real argument for it is more combat effectiveness. How important is that?

A secondary argument for it is the opportunity all will have to truly develop expertise in a filed instead of being marginally competent generalists -- as one Generalist, a two star, once told me: "Every time I'd almost learned what I needed to know about doing a job, they moved me to new and different job..." If you want persons with expertise to advise and advocate, they need, as you noted, to be developed. The current system discourages that for too many.

We have padded the Staff numbers at all levels and Parkinson's Law is in effect. We did that to build an Officer strength cushion and a mobilization base -- something Congress generally opposes for some odd reason -- there are better ways to do that. As an aside, we're trying to make NCOES emulate the Officer system and that is really bad mistake which will adversely impact mobilization should it be necessary...

Up or out needs to go. In my last job, I had a problem with a rogue Colonel and needed to rope him in. We had a Major, due for mandatory retirement. I called him in and said "Bill, I need you to do this..." No dummy he, he said "Okay you figure since I've got to retire, he can't hurt me and I can rein him in a bit?" Yep. Worked quite well and no poor major got his career wrecked by a loose cannon. Point of all that is the current OER system and Army philosophy totally discourage initiative and risk taking. That is just flat criminal. Combat is a risk and initiative is necessary, it should be encouraged, not stifled. Peer and subordinate ratings should be required as well as senior ratings for all ranks (that will be even more gut wrenching than a dual track officer system ) . The form should be a 3x5 card...

The Task, Condition and Standard system has developed a generation of leaders who can do certain tasks well but do not really know how to amalgamate tasks for mission accomplishment. Really smart guys figure it out and make it work -- too many do not because of that flawed training process which force concentration of enabling skills and knowledges and not on mission sets.

Violently agree!

[slapout9]

However, we can provide expertise in the conduct of war form the tactical through strategic, and as I attempted to argue before, our profession also informs, and often helps shape policy.

That may be the answer, that may be the best you can do in a democracy. Reminds me of the movie "7 days in May" which is about a Military Coup of America by the Air Force and Army Special Forces over the President signing a peace treaty with Russia. In the end a Marine officer prevents the Coup but he actually believes the Air Force has the right policy and strategy for our defense, but civillian decsion making vetos Miltary expertise

Scene from "7 Days In May"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b6YLVOjTcHg

[Bill Jakola]

That may be the answer, that may be the best you can do in a democracy. Reminds me of the movie "7 days in May" which is about a Military Coup of America by the Air Force and Army Special Forces over the President signing a peace treaty with Russia. In the end a Marine officer prevents the Coup but he actually believes the Air Force has the right policy and strategy for our defense, but civillian decsion making vetos Miltary expertise

Scene from "7 Days In May"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b6YLVOjTcHg

Slap, interesting clip.

This movie gets at what I view as an extreme example of advocacy that clearly enters the realm of treason. However, we should be able to provide advice and inform policy in such a manner to complement and balance political leadership as a team. The profession of arms must stay well clear of even the appearance of treason or, as the president points out in this movie, we create a weak government and invite adversaries to attack us.

Though this is a fictional example of political military tension, General Lemay advocating strongly for the bombing of Cuba during the missile crisis is another real example of the type of advocacy that goes beyond informing or shaping policy. His role as a leader in the profession of arms was not to set policy that is the role of the President. However, I view General Lemay as acting outside the bounds of the profession of arms by attempting to set policy.

My question is how do we, as a profession of arms, establish clear roles and develop our military leaders to operate within those established boundaries?

Dr. Don Snider talks about the profession of arms.

http://m.youtube.com/index?desktop_u...&v=dwQEP1CGY7E

Here is the full discussion:
http://www.fpri.org/audio/20071015.m...icsdissent.mp3