The Army: A Profession of Arms

[Bill Jakola]

In retrospect, clearly it was a mistake to not maintain COIN expertise in our profession, but what areas of expert knowledge are we now neglecting?

In short, what are we missing?

[William F. Owen]

In retrospect, clearly it was a mistake to not maintain COIN expertise in our profession, but what areas of expert knowledge are we now neglecting?

In short, what are we missing?

How long you got? Some consultant will charge you millions for stating what follows here,

Based on speaking to many US Officers and what gets written here, it seems to me you do not have a teaching as what War is, or any basic theory as to how to fight or how to conduct Warfare.

What you have in place is loose collections of concepts, opinions and TTPs, none of which are actually based on a coherent agreement as to the aim, purpose and limitations of armed force.

FM3 says

"Winning battles and engagements is important but alone is not sufficient. Shaping the civil situation is just as important to success."

That is utterly wrong, and clearly proves that the US Army is confused as to its purpose, and the US Government does not understand the use of armed force. Fix that and the rest will fall into place.

[Bob's World]

We are missing a variety of things, but to get at them we need to gain a better perspective of both ourselves and the threats we face. In short "know our enemy and know ourself"

So, as a paradigm shift, if I want "know my enemy" in a tactical way, I ask the Intel guys. If I want to "know my enemy" in a strategic way, I need to tell the Intel guys to take a knee and go talk to my strategy guys instead.

As powerful nations transition from building Empires to holding Empires, their military capacity shifts from one designed, trained, organized and equipped for warfighting to one that is designed, trained, organized and equipped for maintaining control of the populaces and governments within that empire. I, for one, see a lot of that going on in the Pentagon in the post-Cold War era.

One factor that blinds us is the position that the US is not an Imperial power. Perhaps, but we sure act like one.

The challenges of Somalia, the Balkans, the OEFs and OIF, hell - even much of residual Cold War positions; are all rooted in this sustaining of a sphere of security and economic influence. That is a whole lot like sustaining an Empire.

What happens to these countries is that someone tends come along, or more often multiple someones team-up and come along, with a military designed specifically to defeat the Empire's Empire-sustaining military capability.

I would suggest to the Army:
1. Stop agonizing so much over how to build an Empire-sustaining army.
2. Stop being so Intel-Driven, and become more Strategy-Driven.
3. Make the focus of the military the capabilities needed to deter and defeat major threats to the US (A capability and intent to blow up an Embassy or a ship is not a major threat to the US, these are largely law enforcement matters).
4. Re-prioritize FID and other support to Department of State activities as a supporting activity.
5. Down-size the Intel community back to pre-9/11 levels
6. Begin identifying, training and employing strategists before the current Intro to Strategy that is given at the War College. Strategy is not just for Colonels and above, and frankly, those old dogs are not very good at picking up new tricks at that point.
7. Send the COS and the SECArmy into the SECDEF's office and demand that we stop calling Afghanistan and Iraq "Wars."
8. Submit a proposal at the same time that reduces General Officer billets by 50% and publicly challenge the other services to match that commitment and to implement it when they do. (Make it a 80% reduction for the Marine Corps as they are totally out of control in that regard).

Bill this list could go on and on, but the first 4 points are critical, the rest are important, but would naturally follow getting the first part right.

[Ken White]

I'd go for the loss of a higher percentage of Flags -- and Sergeants Major.

Wilf's succinct comment really encapsulates the problem well. He made it with respect to shaping the civil situation but it really applies far more broadly than to just that:

That is utterly wrong, and clearly proves that the US Army is confused as to its purpose, and the US Government does not understand the use of armed force. Fix that and the rest will fall into place. (emphasis added / kw)

Absolutely correct on both counts.

That statement has been true for most, not all, of my adult life. That 'most' encompasses the vast majority of the last 50 years almost precisely (it'll be 50 years next January...) and it includes Administrations from both parties with only rare and tantalizingly brief interludes of good sense from some.

In fairness to the Army, that is in part due to a series of unintended consequences mostly caused by Congress, due in large measure to their shameful pandering and to their budgeting chicanery. Not least of of the problems is the literal shoving of DoD into foreign affairs and civil policy roles they should not have. Congress may change; the voters are getting fed up with their foolishness (long overdue, that...) but it is incumbent upon DoD and the Army to take a hard look at themselves and totally scrap the outmoded World War models of mediocre to poor education, training and personnel mismanagement and the post World War excessive intrusion into the civil realm.

In summation, what we are missing is that the world has changed significantly since we instituted those models and tinkering around the edges has exacerbated all the problems and will not allow adequate adaptation, much less optimal adaptation.

Oh, and do NOT try to 'fix' it with a Congressional Panel, a massive QDR like effort, a PBAC / POM exercise, a GOSC or a Council of Colonels. Those are precisely what put us where we are...