Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
...and once you get told "get on it," with go do it. It is then the Policy makers job to alter the military objectives to fit an altering policy - again, soldiers can advise at to Ways and Means. - Witness Allenby who was given more to do with less forces and just did it, without complaint.

Proves my point. Powell was dead wrong and crippled US Foreign Policy as a result. He should have stuck to his pay grade.

The evidence would thus show most of the military men who seek to dabble in policy are misguided.

As far as I know, Clausewitz never said "extension." He did say "continuation" on two occasions. In 1827, on his 10 July Note, and on page 605.
....but the military serves policy, once it is in place. These actions "cost" so you see a modification and adaptation. If the military start formulating policy then to what end would they craft to policy? To be better served by war?
War is a very blunt instrument. It can only serve certain policies. To quote Ashkenazi "Do not ask me what to do. Tell what you wish done and I will tell you if it is possible."
Well this is a discussion worth having.

Colin Gray addresses the military role in policy formulation and execution in his book "Another Bloody Century", published in 2005, pg 363.

"The question, 'who controls whom' in the conduct of war, does not admit of a simple answer, except as a matter of principle. There is no dispute over the theoretical primacy of policy and policymaker in relation to the military instrument. In practice, though, different cultures and changing historical contexts can ignite, or re-ignite, ancient difficulties in civil-military relations. To cite just one recent example, in the summer of 2002 Eliot Cohen argued in his major study of Supreme Command that war is much too important to be left to the generals. 36 Political leaders need to assert themselves over the military conduct of war if they are to be certain that war will be waged as vigorously as policy requires."

Gray uses the analogy of a doctor patient relationship with the Army profession of arms represented by the medical profession and the political leadership as the patient.

"It is argued that just as a person with a brain tumour is obliged to trust his expert brain surgeon, so a society at war should be obliged to take the military advice of its military experts."

I see a very blurred distinction between doctor and patient roles and responsibilities, at least in practice. It seems to me, the profession, either medical or 'of arms', must dialogue with the patient or the political leaders in our case. Each must complement the other influencing policy, strategy, operations, and at time even tactics. However clearly these roles are spelled out in purely legalistic terms in practice the distinctions are far less recognizable. For example, political leaders are still ultimately responsible for setting policy and strategy but these are developed with the advice and often advocacy of the military.

The acts of setting and developing strategy are so intertwined and inseparable that the political and military leaders must do this as a combined team effort and not, as Bob Woodward's book "Obama's Wars" depict, military leaders making strategy irrespective of political input.

Is our profession of arms role to provide advocacy or merely advice?