The Army: A Profession of Arms

[Ken White]

For one, no one has a right to volunteer for or be obligated to do something that is morally wrong in the first place.

That's a rather sweeping statement and it raises several questions. Says who? Who enforces that? Who determines what is 'right?' My version of morals say that they are very much an individual construct and I have no right to impose mine on you nor do you have a right to impose yours on me.

Thus if the governmental system says the issue is legal and moral and one disagrees, that is ones right. However, that disagreement does not automatically contravene the legality (or the morality in the eyes of that government) of the law that established the contract.

On the other side of this, no one has a right to contract another person to do something morally wrong as well.

The same questions apply.

Basically, this means that a contract for murder, rape, robbing, beating kids etc. has no obligatory force on either party.

It may have no legally binding obligatory force but it could have a morally (or immorally, dependent upon how one views such concepts as honor) binding force.

That not withstanding, the issue is not generally acknowledged criminal actions, it is the legal right granted by the People to the State to use force. That has been adjudged over the years by the majority of people in most nations and certainly including this one to be moral and, with some contraints, legal. Assuming those constraints are properly addressed and / or negated, then the contract in service of that usage is legal, period. Whether or not it is moral is an individual determination. The preponderance of evidence in this country today is is that most people assess it and the recruiting or selection of people willing -- not forced -- to accept those terms as morally acceptable (I'll insert a reminder here that a draft or conscription totally changes the rules...).

If we are going to take on the problem of selective contentious objection(SCO) as a profession, we need something better than this. The SCO's objection will be a moral claim so we need to be able to tell them why the action is moral - otherwise, we should not be surprised that the contract fails to motivate them.

Again, morality is an individual construct. Nations do not, cannot, have morals -- if they are to act 'morally' then it is in the terms of the various beholders and thus, obviously, some may not agree with the presumed correct "morality" of an issue. If one accepts a "moral" norm (some people do, some do not...) then one would presume that nations laws were crafted in "moral" terms and should account for such contingencies.

The purpose of a contract is to obligate two parties to do certain things. Generally a quid pro quo situation exists. No contract of which I am aware is intended to "motivate" anyone -- motivation, like morality is an individual thing -- so whether a given contract motivates anyone should not be a question. Whether it is legal is a valid question. Whether, in a democratic society, it is morally acceptable to the majority of the people, is also valid. Whether it is moral to an individual or small group of them is immaterial.

However, I don't see the choices as quite so freeing. What do we think should be the prescribed punishments for someone doing what they think is, ex hypothesi, moral? According to the case at hand, they are choosing the harder right over the easier wrong. Also, the problem above still looms. How can I be in violation of a contract that has no moral or legal grounds?

What case at hand? To my knowledge, no exemplary case exists in this thread. If you're using the blanket SCO postion as an example, whether the "harder right" is in fact right or even exists is not a given.

IMO, if a "moral" objection to an assignment (combat or not) is raised and is proven valid on the merits and corroborative testimony, I'd just discharge the individual (with an obligation to collect any funds not recouped). If, OTOH, it was not proven then they'd have the option of complying or receiving punishment as the modified UCMJ and a Court Martial direct.

One can be in violation of a contract that one deems to have no moral or legal grounds to ones hearts content. However, if that contract is deemed moral and legal by the people, legislature and courts of a democratic society, I'm doubtful ones opinion will count for much.

If one signed that contract on own volition, regardless of one's perception of its contents, one has accepted an obligation to comply with its terms. If one decides later that those terms are onerous or that one does not wish to comply with any or all of those terms, one has options. One can do it anyway, protesting mightily; If allowed, one can resign forfeiting all future benefits and paying any contractual debt incurred and not met; One can refuse to comply and take the contractually stipulated penalty for so doing. Either way as I said, hopefully without whining.

It is not the job of the Armed Forces in this nation to tell anyone why a given action is "moral." That is the job of the elected civilian leadership (not that they won't try to sluff it ). That is dipping into the realm of strong personal opinions and that is no place for a large unwieldy bureaucracy to try to go. Particularly not one whose very existence is itself broadly immoral in the minds of a number of the citizens it serves...

I also suggest that we as a profession do NOT need to take on the issue of Conscientious Objection other than to determine and prescribe procedures for dealing with those who elect to so object. What constitutes that objection, and all the various ramifications surrounding it are matters of national political policy. They are not and should not be military policy. The comment in the paragraph just above applies; the 'military' solution will always be suspect in the eyes of many. Our penchant for messing around in the political milieu invariably brings big problems. We ought to quit doing that...

[Pete]

Speaking of the Profession of Arms, the Army-speak that has creeped into our doctrinal writings over the last 20 years drives me up the wall. Soldiers should be plain-speaking guys who say what they mean and mean what they say, without words like "optimizing, " "integrating," "leveraging," and so on. Strunk and White's Elements of Style should be our guide for effective writing. The cerebral bl*w job graphics that accompany Army-speak publications and PowerPoint presentations don't help at all, they only make things worse. Even before this Army-speak came along 20 years ago the overuse of acronyms had gotten way out of hand. We should communicate in a way thal allows the maximum number of people to understand what it is we're saying.

[Bob Underwood]

Pete, I agree. Jargon inhibits our discourse both internally and externally. Hopefully what follows is plain spoken and clear.

Mike, I have in mind the second and third cases that seem related. Such people would have no principled objection to violence as such (that would be the pacifist in Case 1). They would only object to using it on certain people (case 2) and in certain ways (case 3).

The problem is that professionals traditionally enjoy autonomy in practice. Namely, they generally get to decide when, where, how and on whom to practice their expertise. Most would fear this level of freedom granted to our profession. So the question is: how much should we have? Can we afford this sort of autonomy?

The problem with our profession is that rights are at stake. If we fail to do our job, those we protect will lose rights (life, liberty, political community etc.). However, if we do our job incorrectly, act on the wrong people or in the wrong way, rights are lost as well. This is what makes morality appropriate to the conversation.

This brings me to Ken, and I’m unsure what to make of the discussion so here’s what I offer in reply:

First:

That's a rather sweeping statement and it raises several questions. Says who? Who enforces that? Who determines what is 'right?' My version of morals say that they are very much an individual construct and I have no right to impose mine on you nor do you have a right to impose yours on me.

Two things here: My point doesn’t necessarily depend on what is right and wrong. Whatever you suppose is right, you generally agree that you can’t be obligated to do wrong. Also, this statement seems inconsistent with your earlier claims. I take you to think it wrong to make a contract and then renege. So what would you say if I told you my version of morality tells me “don’t keep contracts”? If you think its wrong to break contracts, that’s fine, but such claims impose morality across individual constructs.

Second:

That not withstanding, the issue is not generally acknowledged criminal actions, it is the legal right granted by the People to the State to use force. That has been adjudged over the years by the majority of people in most nations and certainly including this one to be moral and, with some contraints, legal. Assuming those constraints are properly addressed and / or negated, then the contract in service of that usage is legal, period. …. Again, morality is an individual construct. Nations do not, cannot, have morals -- if they are to act 'morally' then it is in the terms of the various beholders and thus, obviously, some may not agree with the presumed correct "morality" of an issue. If one accepts a "moral" norm (some people do, some do not...) then one would presume that nations laws were crafted in "moral" terms and should account for such contingencies.

Here I cut parts of the quote together and don’t mean to do so unfairly. But, the issue is generally acknowledged criminal actions. Illegal wars are criminal, and widely thought to be so. The point holds if we extend this to moral terms as well. There is a long and well-established acknowledgement that unjust international attacks are moral wrongs in the strongest sense. What is widely accepted is the right to use defensive force. It might be true that nations do not have morals in the way individuals do. However, this does not mean that morality should not or cannot apply to state/national action. People take such actions, these actions affect people, and are meant to benefit still other people. These are moral issues.

Some common ground:

IMO, if a "moral" objection to an assignment (combat or not) is raised and is proven valid on the merits and corroborative testimony, I'd just discharge the individual (with an obligation to collect any funds not recouped). If, OTOH, it was not proven then they'd have the option of complying or receiving punishment as the modified UCMJ and a Court Martial direct.

I think there is something here worth talking about. However, this would be a significant departure from current policy. Does this mean the Army, National Command authority, or other agency have an obligation to tell its professionals on the merits and with corroborative testimony that the combat assignment is legal and moral? I think it might.

Parting shot:

It is not the job of the Armed Forces in this nation to tell anyone why a given action is "moral." That is the job of the elected civilian leadership (not that they won't try to sluff it ). That is dipping into the realm of strong personal opinions and that is no place for a large unwieldy bureaucracy to try to go. Particularly not one whose very existence is itself broadly immoral in the minds of a number of the citizens it serves...

This is interesting because it is clearly in tension with what you say above. Also, I think we have a duty to explain the morality of our actions when those actions involve killing people, ordering others to kill people, and ordering others to die. None of that makes any sense to me unless it is in a moral context. If you fear a large bureaucracy getting involved in moral issues, then first among those must be those that involve the deaths of thousands of people. Maybe that is exactly why it should be a personal and not governmental choice.

Regards,
Bob

[jmm99]

might want to slog through this.

Cheers

Mike

[Ken White]

might want to slog through this.

Yet again the concept of the morality of a nation is introduced as 'normative.'

I could cite the 1/3 rule and its pertinence to the jus (or lack of juice) and such normativity but I'll spare everyone.

[Bob Underwood]

might want to slog through this.

Cheers

Mike

And all I get is an "interesting"?


Ken, as to the tension in your comments: You make arguments that claim we should subordinate our moral judgements to legal requirements. Fine, but this is a moral claim, and one you think should apply to all people (so far as I can tell). But you also say that we have no right to impose such claims on anyone.

Regards,
Bob

[Ken White]

...as to the tension in your comments: You make arguments that claim we should subordinate our moral judgements to legal requirements. Fine, but this is a moral claim, and one you think should apply to all people (so far as I can tell). But you also say that we have no right to impose such claims on anyone.

I do not make the claim that we should subordinate our moral judgments to legal requirements. Just the opposite, thus my purposely repeated "One always has choices."

Morals are an individual construct and each person has an absolute right to their own. Legality is a consensual construct that may or may nor accept a particular moral view.

The fact of life I apparently failed to clearly state is that legal requirements today will override individual moral concerns. The politicians set the norms generally IAW majority opinion; individual opinions are trumped. That's my point in this sub thread. One can do what they believe morally correct but if it runs afoul of the statutory factors those factors will prevail and a loss is inevitable.

In event of such loss, I did and do advocate taking responsibility for one's actions without whining...

[slapout9]

The fact of life I apparently failed to clearly state is that legal requirements today will override individual moral concerns. The politicians set the norms generally IAW majority opinion; individual opinions are trumped. That's my point in this sub thread. One can do what they believe morally correct but if it runs afoul of the statutory factors those factors will prevail and a loss is inevitable.

Very profound Ken, and that's part of the problem Politicians have no morals but they do have opinions. I was talking to a friend about this the other day relative to Economics and I asked him do you really,really believe God is a capitalist? just cut taxes on the rich and everything will be just fine bit of a digression but it also applies to war.

[Bob Underwood]

The fact of life I apparently failed to clearly state is that legal requirements today will override individual moral concerns. The politicians set the norms generally IAW majority opinion; individual opinions are trumped. That's my point in this sub thread. One can do what they believe morally correct but if it runs afoul of the statutory factors those factors will prevail and a loss is inevitable.

In event of such loss, I did and do advocate taking responsibility for one's actions without whining...

This is interesting to talk about. Do we have no choice as a profession to make this a bit better? Is this the way things ought to be simply because it happens to be true?

I think we could do a bit better with regards to protecting the individual in the face of the majority.

Regards,

Bob

[Ken White]

The problem is that professionals traditionally enjoy autonomy in practice. Namely, they generally get to decide when, where, how and on whom to practice their expertise...So the question is: how much should we have? Can we afford this sort of autonomy?

I'm disposed to think it a trade and not a profession -- I think aspirations to be a profession create several problems -- however, that's a digression. What is certain is that the Armed forces of the US have a very mixed bag in the autonomy arena. Those forces deploy to missions only on orders of the national government and the civilian masters of the force. That is far from autonomous in the largest sense.

The problem with our profession is that rights are at stake. If we fail to do our job, those we protect will lose rights...However, if we do our job incorrectly, act on the wrong people or in the wrong way, rights are lost as well. This is what makes morality appropriate to the conversation.

I agree with most of that but will point out that the decision to deploy to do the job is made by the politicians. Thus they have the onus to decide the vagaries of conscientious objection. If we deploy and then err, thus turning some willing US participants into unwilling participants (as happens in all wars), then the onus is on the service(s) involved for errors of commission, i.e. they didn't do their job competently (as unfortunately happens in all wars). Regardless, the responsibility for the determination of what qualifies as Objector status and what should be done about claimants lies with the civilian law makers, not the Armed Forces.

Two things here: My point doesn’t necessarily depend on what is right and wrong. Whatever you suppose is right, you generally agree that you can’t be obligated to do wrong.

Essentially correct IMO. Unless of course that generic you wants to do wrong...

It is important to note that the "generic you's" determination of wrong may or may not be supported by legal and public more considerations. Just because you or I think 'X' is wrong doesn't mean that it is legally wrong or morally deficient in the determination of the broader public.

Also, this statement seems inconsistent with your earlier claims.

Obviously, I see no inconsistency so you'll have to point that out to me, please.

I take you to think it wrong to make a contract and then renege. So what would you say if I told you my version of morality tells me “don’t keep contracts”? If you think its wrong to break contracts, that’s fine, but such claims impose morality across individual constructs.

Yes, I do think its wrong to make contracts then renege because because something one failed to foresee occurs. That is admittedly my opinion and many do not share that view. I have no problem with that.

However, the issue is not one of disparate moral views, it is one of legal requirements. Whatever one's moral approach to the issue, if the contract is legal and binding, then the legal aspects will overrule everyone's moral concerns. Whether they should or not is irrelevant, they will.

Second:Here I cut parts of the quote together and don’t mean to do so unfairly. But, the issue is generally acknowledged criminal actions. Illegal wars are criminal, and widely thought to be so.

Possibly correct though "widely" could be problematic. Still, I'll accept that. What I do question is who determines the legality of a given war. Everyone does not accept the ICJ and the invasion of Iraq for one example was adjudged illegal by many. Now what? We're still there and in a role blessed to a degree by the UN.

The point holds if we extend this to moral terms as well. There is a long and well-established acknowledgement that unjust international attacks are moral wrongs in the strongest sense.

My goodness. Again, WHO determines these things? Unjust? Moral wrongs? If you mean public opinion, well and good -- but I'll mention that it generally is divided and getting true consensus on 'unjust' and 'morally wrong' is difficult. Certainly that was not obtained for the Iraqi adventure. Even if that consensus existed and was overwhelmingly opposed, it is still only public opinion. That the public believes a thing does not make it so. Five years ago they believed we were all going to die of heat stroke before 2010 due to global warming...

What is widely accepted is the right to use defensive force.

We can agree on that. What we might not agree on is when and how that force can be applied and what should happen to those in a volunteer force who are to be part of such application but decide they do not want to participate.

It might be true that nations do not have morals in the way individuals do.

I do not not believe "it might be true," it is a fact.

However, this does not mean that morality should not or cannot apply to state/national action. People take such actions, these actions affect people, and are meant to benefit still other people. These are moral issues.

Ah, yes. Different thing and we can agree on that. The issue then becomes a moral consensus on which a or the decision maker(s) operate. In a democratic society, can we accept that will generally be the sensing of what the majority -- not all -- of the population is believed to think appropriate or moral?

I think there is something here worth talking about. However, this would be a significant departure from current policy.

Really? Not in my experience. I've been retired for a while but we used to do both those things pretty much as I laid them out.

Does this mean the Army, National Command authority, or other agency have an obligation to tell its professionals on the merits and with corroborative testimony that the combat assignment is legal and moral? I think it might.

My suspicion is that social mores are trending in that direction. I personally think that is not good for the Armed forces or the National Command Authority but they seldom seek my opinion.

My answer to that would be no, the constraints I mentioned earlier, the checks and balances in this governmental, the ease and rapidity of communication today and other factors really mean that any mission commitment is going to meet or exceed and reasonable criteria for legality (as most of the Legion of Lawyers determines) and morality (as viewed by most of the populace or politicians). Thus, any quibbles along that line are generally going to be outliers and no one should cater to them. Regardless, the politicians have the responsibility to explain to the voters (including those serving) their rationale -- though they are past masters at sluffing this off to the services -- who should IMO stoutly resist playing that game.

Parting shot: This is interesting because it is clearly in tension with what you say above.

Sorry, once again I do not see any tension or disagreement. Please enlighten me. Obviously, I was unclear somewhere but a couple of revisits leave me unsure just where...

Also, I think we have a duty to explain the morality of our actions when those actions involve killing people, ordering others to kill people, and ordering others to die.

First and foremost, Armies kill people, by definition (and by law in this country) that's what they do. So no one should be confused on that Score. To include those who sign or intend to sign enlistment or accession contracts...

I don't disagree with the duty to explain unless by 'we' you mean the Armed Forces, then I disagree. If the national government commits a force, then that government has the responsibility to justify its action legally and morally.

None of that makes any sense to me unless it is in a moral context. If you fear a large bureaucracy getting involved in moral issues, then first among those must be those that involve the deaths of thousands of people.

I'm unsure of your meaning. Yes, I do fear a large bureaucracy getting involved in moral issues, particularly if it is an organization that is viewed as only marginally moral by a good many citizens. I believe that to be an invitation to problems. Politicians are elected by the citizens to make decisions, hopefully legal and moral decisions. It is their responsibility to explain to the public -- and to those serving who will do their bidding -- the rationale and to assure all of the legality and morally acceptable dimensions of the mission.

Maybe that is exactly why it should be a personal and not governmental choice.

If you mean it should be a personal choice to enter the Armed forces, I totally agree. If you mean that once one has entered the force that any decision to not comply with orders or participate in an action should be (and currently, as well as in my future view, is) a personal choice, I also agree. I not only agree one can make such a choice, I have no animosity toward those that elect to do so. I do, however, have little sympathy for anyone that inconsistent.

If you mean the government has or should have no entry into those choices, I also agree. If you mean the government should have no recourse if an individual reneges on a contract voluntarily undertaken, I do not agree, many members of the public do not agree nor does the Congress or US Code. The Courts have also been known to disagree.

As I said yesterday, One always has choices.

[wm]

The problem with our profession is that rights are at stake. If we fail to do our job, those we protect will lose rights (life, liberty, political community etc.). However, if we do our job incorrectly, act on the wrong people or in the wrong way, rights are lost as well. This is what makes morality appropriate to the conversation.

I submit that the problem with this discussion of morality is that it is based on a notion that rights are primary. On such a view, duties (which are the "musts" of moral claims) are artifactual on rights. In other words, because you have a right to life, I have a duty not to kill you.

An alternative point of view is that duties are primary and that rights are artifacts derived from those duties. On this view, your right to life is artifactual on my duty not to harm others.

I suspect that the view of rights as secondary may be somewhat tough to swallow given what the Declaration says about inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. But, I submit for reflection the idea that rights derived from duties may be just as inalienable as rights that are primary.

If one wishes to hold that rights are primary, then I think one should be able to explain from where those rights proceed in a way that does not require some appeal to consequences as the source of the rights.
Morality, by its very nature must be universal. That is, the truths of its claims must apply to all people at all times in all places. Otherwise we are simply dealing with useful rules of societal conduct. I submit, along with that eccentric East Prussian Immanuel Kant, that any theory that is based on consequences for evaluating the truth of its moral claims cannot be universal because every one of its prescriptions is conditional--of the form "if..., then...". Should one not desire the antecedent, then the rule of action found in the consequent would not apply.

Universal truths are unconditional. So are duties.

[Pete]

There's morality and then there's morality. When I was in OCS in '77 we had a lecture on the Law of Land Warfare in the auditorium of Infantry Hall at Fort Benning. The instructor described a hypothetical situation -- an NVA machine gunner opens fire on an infantry platoon in Vietnam and blows half of them away. When a G.I. sees his buddies get killed he rushes the MG and when he's 10 feet away the NVA gunner throws up his arms in surrender. The G.I. kills him anyway. The school solution -- a war crime has just been committed. I asked a fellow OCS candidate, an 11B 101st Vietnam veteran, what he thought about that. He said that you should give the guy a medal. Terry's first officer assignment was with the Old Guard at Fort Myer because he was a second lieutenant with a CIB.

[slapout9]

I suspect that the view of rights as secondary may be somewhat tough to swallow given what the Declaration says about inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. But, I submit for reflection the idea that rights derived from duties may be just as inalienable as rights that are primary.

I believe the Constitution does say that. Everyone remembers about their rights from their creator but they forget the part about "In order to secure these rights Governments are instituted among men." IOW you have to have laws to enforce responsibilities (duties).

[Bob Underwood]

I submit that the problem with this discussion of morality is that it is based on a notion that rights are primary.

Well, nothing I've said is inconsistent with a Kantian conception of rights. And holding these rights to be primary in this context doesn't necessarily require a consequentialist appeal.

Universal truths are unconditional. So are duties.

Perhaps, but duties are not the only source of moral value. And certainly not the only one relevant to the ethics of war.

[wm]

Well, nothing I've said is inconsistent with a Kantian conception of rights. And holding these rights to be primary in this context doesn't necessarily require a consequentialist appeal.



Perhaps, but duties are not the only source of moral value. And certainly not the only one relevant to the ethics of war.

These responses dodge the point I made--that a moral theory whose metaphysical underpinning holds rights claims to be primary in establishing values is not likely to be able adequately to address the issues of morality in war.
And, I submit that the US Army is rooted in a morality that is duty based.

"Duty-Honor-Country. Those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, and what you will be. They are your rallying points: to build courage when courage seems to fail; to regain faith when there seems to be little cause for faith; to create hope when hope becomes forlorn." Speech Upon Receiving the Sylvanus Thayer Medal, United States Military Academy, May 12, 1962

But an officer on duty knows no one -- to be partial is to dishonor both himself and the object of his ill-advised favor. What will be thought of him who exacts of his friends that which disgraces him? Look at him who winks at and overlooks offenses in one, which he causes to be punished in another, and contrast him with the inflexible soldier who does his duty faithfully, notwithstanding it occasionally wars with his private feelings. The conduct of one will be venerated and emulated, the other detested as a satire upon soldiership and honor.

I would really like to see an argument (in the philospher's use of that term) in defense of the primacy of rights that does not appeal to consequences for its proof.

[jmm99]

since I am not going to be doing legal philosophy. My focus is as a legal practitioner, where I have to look at what the "law" is and how it will be applied today, and a certain amount of prophecy about the future (perhaps a decade or so out).

As one with a practitioner's focus, I will definitely not satisfy those who actually believe in Wilf's signature line - without his big grin at the end:

"I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

Therefore, I avoid getting involved in legal philosophical arguments (as a philosopher would voice them).

If wm and bob underwood join in such a discussion, much of it will be over my head. As you can see from Jurisprudence - Wiki, there are many different takes. Most of them are quite theoretical and are frankly outliers to the legal practitioner.

The closest "school" fitting the practitioner is probably that of Legal realism - Wiki:

The essential tenet of legal realism is that all law is made by human beings and is therefore subject to human foibles, frailties and imperfections.

In accord with that soundbite, legal realists and legal practitioners are an unruly bunch of cats, whose "philosophies" and "logic systems" tend to be more or less "fuzzy" (see Fuzzy Logic - Wiki).

That description fits the granddaddy tiger of US realism, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, whose best soundbite was this one, tailored especially for Ken:

Holmes, in his last years, was walking down Pennsylvania Avenue with a friend, when a pretty girl passed. Holmes turned to look after her. Having done so, he sighed and said to his friend, "Ah, George, what wouldn't I give to be seventy-five again?" Isaac Asimov, (writing as "Dr. A"), The Sensuous Dirty Old Man (1971).

Of course, Holmes was very much shaped by his brief, but bloody military career as a Lt. and Cpt. in the 20th Massachusetts, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Magnificent Yankee". That experience lay behind another of his soundbites (more pertinent to the present thread):

This responsibility will not be found only in documents that no one contests or denies. It will be found in considerations of a political or social nature. It will be found, most of all in the character of men.

In that, Holmes was cognizant of the Heroes (e.g., as described by Brian Linn), but also the Anti-Heroes.

From the legal practitioner's standpoint, the most important Holmesian soundbites are these:

The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.

General propositions do not decide concrete cases.

Those satisfy me; probably will satisfy Wilf; but probably will not satisfy he or she who demands: "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

Adding to this same train of thought are some longer Holmesianisms:

...men make their own laws; that these laws do not flow from some mysterious omnipresence in the sky, and that judges are not independent mouthpieces of the infinite. The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky.

The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development of the race. The practice of it, in spite of popular jests, tends to make good citizens and good men. When I emphasize the difference between law and morals I do so with reference to a single end, that of learning and understanding the law.

The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.

I don't want this to turn into a three-sided debate; but I felt obligated to the readers who are not into legal philosophy (jurisprudence) to point out that legal practice is a very different breed of cat - to whom, the theorists are generally very much outliers.

None the less, I'm looking forward to a debate between philosophers about Just Law Theory, duties and rights (or should it be rights and duties ?). I leave one last Holmesianism for our philosophers:

Any two philosophers can tell each other all they know in two hours.

Cheers and regards

Mike