at least, some of us think that is true.

In short, Reid v Covert has probably not withstood the positive changes in the military justice system since it was decided - and it was decided well before the era of PMCs (and PICs based on the changes at CIA and other agencies).

Here are some background sources on Section 552 (now Article 2(a)(10) of the UCMJ).

Congressional Research Service Summary
.....
Subtitle C - Military Justice and Related Matters
.....
Section 552 -
Applies UCMJ provisions to declared wars or contingency operations (currently, only "war").
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill...22&tab=summary

TITLE VIII--ACQUISITION POLICY, ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT, AND RELATED MATTERS

Subtitle F - Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan

NDAA Section

SEC. 861. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON MATTERS RELATING TO CONTRACTING.

(a) Memorandum of Understanding Required- The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall, not later than July 1, 2008, enter into a memorandum of understanding regarding matters relating to contracting for contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan.

(b) Matters Covered- The memorandum of understanding required by subsection (a) shall address, at a minimum, the following:
....
(6) Responsibility for the collection and referral to the appropriate Government agency of any information relating to offenses under chapter 47 of title 10, United States Code (the Uniform Code of Military Justice) or chapter 212 of title 18, United States Code (commonly referred to as the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act), including a clarification of responsibilities under section 802(a)(10) of title 10, United States Code (article 2(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), as amended by section 552 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364).
http://www.wifcon.com/dodauth8/dod08_861.htm

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The updated MCM 2008 incorporates Section 552.

MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES
(2008 EDITION)
....
(p. PREFACE-4)

Other UCMJ Articles contained in Appendix 2 of the MCM:

Article 2(a)(10) was amended to apply jurisdiction to persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field in time of declared war or contingency operation.
....
(p. A2-2)

§ 802. Art. 2. Persons subject to this chapter

(a) The following persons are subject to this chapter:
.....
(10) In time of declared war or contingency operation, persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field.
The Manuel does issue a caution in its discussion of RCM 202.

(MCM 2008 pp. II-13-14)

Rule 202. Persons subject to the jurisdiction of courts-martial

(a) In general. Courts-martial may try any person when authorized to do so under the code.
....
Discussion

(1) Authority under the code. Article 2 lists classes of persons who are subject to the code. These include .... and, under some circumstances, specified categories of civilians (Article 2(a)(8), (9), (10), (11), and (12); see subsection (3) and (4) of this discussion).
.....
(3) Public Health Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Members of the Public Health Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration become subject to the code when assigned to and serving with the armed forces.

(4) Limitations on jurisdiction over civilians. Courtmartial jurisdiction over civilians under the code is limited by judicial decisions . The exercise of jurisdiction under Article 2(a)(11) in peacetime has been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States. Article 2(a)(10) has also been limited. Before initiating court-martial proceedings against a civilian, relevant statutes and decisions should be carefully examined.
The specific "civilian" provisions of § 802 (a) (8)-(12) are:

(p. A2-2)

§ 802. Art. 2. Persons subject to this chapter

(a) The following persons are subject to this chapter:
.....
(8) Members of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Public Health Service, and other organizations, when assigned to and serving with the armed forces.

(9) Prisoners of war in custody of the armed forces.

(10) In time of declared war or contingency operation, persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field.

(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States and outside the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.

(12) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons within an area leased by or otherwise reserved or acquired for the use of the United States which is under the control of the Secretary concerned and which is outside the United States and outside the Canal Zone, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.

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An excellent article, which presaged the 2007 amendment, is here.

AUTHOR: Colonel Kevan F. Jacobson
TITLE: Restoring UCMJ Jurisdiction over Civilian Employees during Armed Hostilities
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 15 March 2006
......
Abstract

Modern United States military operations have become increasingly reliant upon services provided by civilian employees of the Department of Defense, other federal employees, and contractors. The range of such services is remarkably diverse. Large numbers of civilians now accompany Armed Forces on virtually all deployments, including combat operations. In short, civilian personnel are key members of the modern military team. Their actions, like those of uniformed military members, may have profound effects upon national interests. While commanders are now heavily reliant upon civilian services, commanders have relatively little disciplinary authority over the conduct of deployed civilian personnel.

This paper proposes extending Uniform Code of Military Justice jurisdiction to United States citizen civilian personnel accompanying United States Armed Forces outside the United States in theaters of armed hostilities. It reviews and analyzes existing statutory bases of jurisdiction over civilians and the case law which has interpreted it. It also analyzes relevant evolutions of military jurisdiction and criminal practice in recent decades which call into question older case law which restricts UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the Armed Forces. Finally, it recommends how the law may be shaped to effectively re-establish UCMJ jurisdiction over deployed civilian personnel in combat environments.
.....
(pp.18-19)

The 25 years following the end of World War II witnessed significant Supreme Court litigation regarding the extent of courts-martial jurisdiction and a definite erosion of the authority of military courts to try civilians. When analyzed, however, the decisions of the Supreme Court reveal that the Constitutional foundation for the exercise of military jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the Armed Forces on the battlefield remains intact.

Congressional action to amend Article 2(a)(10) of the UCMJ to state that jurisdiction exists “during periods of armed hostilities” is necessary to re-establish the legislative basis for jurisdiction. Should Congress act, case law suggests a significant body of authority upon which the courts could sustain Congressional action.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...es/ksil374.pdf

The guts of Jacobson's article - the erosion of the anti-UCMJ cases since Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987) - are found at pp, 10-17.

Because of the expanded role of PMCs (whether engaged by DoD or other agencies, for that matter), the Congressional enactment of amended § 802 (a) (10) suggests that the test will hinge on the existence of an "armed conflict" and whether the contractor accompanies ("supports the mission of") the armed forces. That has already been recognized in The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000:

(Jacobson, p.11)

In pertinent part, such civilians include civilian employees of the Department of Defense (including nonappropriated fund instrumentality employees); Department of Defense civilian contractors, subcontractors, and their employees; and the civilian employees of other federal agencies or provisional authorities when serving in support of overseas Department of Defense missions. [98]

[98] 98 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1) (2000). As originally enacted, this provision did not include civilian employees of federal agencies or departments outside the Department of Defense. Public Law 108-375 ( 2005) (the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005) amended 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1) to extend MEJA jurisdiction to civilian employees of federal agencies and provisional authorities “…to the extent such employment relates to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas.” As of this writing, this change is not reflected in the published text of the United States Code. The amendment is nevertheless operative.
Because SCOTUS cuts slack in favor of the Executive and Congress - when they act together and do not stomp on the essential jurisdiction of the Federal courts (such as habeas), the old cases (Toth and Reid, for example) seem a bit shaky today.