Patrol Base Density and Proximity - Too many and too close?

[Eden]

We do tend to end up with too many bases, posts, OPS, etc, but this is partly a result of the type of thing I observed in the Korengal, Kunar, and Nuristan over the course of about a year.

Subordinate commanders, as they become more familiar with the terrain and enemy, identify more and more places that it would be beneficial to establish some presence on. You know the deal - OPs to watch areas from which the enemy habitually fires on our bases, an extra post to keep an IED-plagued stretch of road under observation, etc. All of these individually are justifiable, but they soak up more and more manpower and reduce the number of boots that can actually patrol out the front gate. Senior commanders need to do a better job of controlling this tendency of subordinates to circumvallate themselves, but that means accepting.

Because what we really need in these cases are not just extra posts, but more people, and that is the one resource that is extremely difficult to come by.

[slapout9]

The more guys you have running around in strange looking uniforms and strange looking vehicles the easier you are for the enemy to spot! That is a tremendous advantage for a small mobile Guerrilla force. LE has to deal with that everyday we just call them criminals.

[tequila]

I would disagree with this one on the LE front - the NYPD employs the "flood-the-zone" tactic regularly and adjusts its deployments on a precinct level with Compstat. Despite some obvious gaming that has to light, overall as a longtime resident of NYC I would argue that the NYPD's tactics are overall quite effective as a deterrent to street violence and open-air drug markets.

[slapout9]

I would disagree with this one on the LE front - the NYPD employs the "flood-the-zone" tactic regularly and adjusts its deployments on a precinct level with Compstat. Despite some obvious gaming that has to light, overall as a longtime resident of NYC I would argue that the NYPD's tactics are overall quite effective as a deterrent to street violence and open-air drug markets.

But that tactic is based on Intelligence ,that is what is what makes them effective. Not a magic force to space ratio.

[Ken White]

Flooding the zone puts so many unigrams out there that the bad guys knowing where they are is immaterial. Yes, it relies on good intel -- but it can and does also rely very much on patterns -- and low level initiative. It also can (and should) involve folks the bad guys will not see until it's too late.

The military equivalent of patterns also relies on terrain analysis and determination of natural lines of drift -- and alternatives to those lines. Channeling works...

LE is forced by the numbers (Cops vs. bad guys) game to play 'reaction.' Military forces are also strength constrained as Eden says but they have more flexibility and are less constrained by public attitudes. All that's required is to apply mass locally, aim for surprise and possess a strong desire to initiate contacts instead of responding to them.

On balance, Armed Forces can initiate more contacts provided acceptance of risk is the norm, not the exception. That can put the emphasis on prevention where it should be. However, the word I get from the 'Stan is a tremendous amount of ennui and 'we're leaving soon' angst, an unintended consequence of the domestic US politically induced announcement of a 2011 drawdown.

Add that we don't do patterns all that well because of the change of analytical teams (and Cdrs with differing idea...) annually or more often, that we go out of our way to discourage initiative at low levels and that force protection ranks well above initiating contacts and you have a recipe for risk avoidance. Thus we react instead of prevent.

[slapout9]

Folks the bad guys will not see until it's too late.

And that is really the key IMO....also helps that most Folks speak English in the US and most Folks are generally glad to see the Police in those types of situations, not so true overseas.


Force to space is good where you know the enemy will be coming across a certain border or from a known sanctuary or where you are operating in a cleared village because his behaviors (carrying weapons toward an objective) will identify him as the enemy. So until you have recruited a local counter-guerrilla force I don't see how saturating a zone with strange looking foreigners is really going to do much good. But I could very well be wrong to.

[Red Rat]

Happy birthday Marine! Always nice when there is a new kid on the block!!!

Speaking as a Brit I think that where we got it wrong is that we established a large number of patrol bases to dominate the ground with the purpose of securing the population. But we over-extended. We dominated the ground and in turn secured the population (eventually), but we fixed ourselves in PBs and at unit and formation level lost the ability to flex combat power around the AO to disrupt and attrit the enemy. We ended up establishing a semi-secure zone (little overt enemy activity) and established a recognisable FLET (Forward Line Enemy Troops), but with little ability to flex beyond the FLET. That ceded at local level a degree of initiative and freedom of manoeuvre to the enemy that was unhelpful in many ways.

I think it boils down to planning. When you establish a PB you need troops to secure the PB and dominate the ground around it, but you also need to maintain the ability to keep the enemy on the backfoot. In AFG I think greater synchronisation (although I believe it is better now) with ANSF so as ISAF pushes the security bubble out ANSF fill the space behind is the key. This enables ISAF (or ANSF, does not really matter) to continue to conduct offensive operations.

Successful COIN operations require many things, not least mass time and presence to 'secure the population', but it also requires effective manoeuvre operations to strike the enemy. I think we lost the ability to do that for a wee while because we overextended. It is a lesson that has been recognised.

Lastly to quote a Law Enforcement analogy I recently heard: "It is not police stations that make people feel safe, but policemen on the beat".

[Red Rat]

And another thing!

The questions is not necessarily 'how many patrol bases and how close', but 'what do I want to achieve and what is the best way of achieving it?' It is just possible we became fixated by the US surge success and 'living among the people' in Iraq and tried to translate it to Afghanistan, without really understanding what happened in Iraq and what was happening in Afghanistan.

Things continually change and move on, so must we.

[Infanteer]

1. I think there are a few more factors that need to be added to the equation of "population / counter-insurgents = force ratio and/or "bed-down" density. These are:

a. As Tom mentioned, the cultural factor. There certainly is a "too much", this is probably based on (b);

b. What your forces are doing in said bases; and

c. The relationship of static to mobile forces. Putting all your forces into static bases doesn't give you much room to flex.

2. More on (b) above; what you're doing is based off your mission. I think, at the tactical level, if you use "secure the populace" as your mission, you're setting yourself up for the fall.

3.

we established a large number of patrol bases to dominate the ground with the purpose of securing the population. But we over-extended. We dominated the ground and in turn secured the population (eventually), but we fixed ourselves in PBs and at unit and formation level lost the ability to flex combat power around the AO to disrupt and attrit the enemy. We ended up establishing a semi-secure zone (little overt enemy activity) and established a recognisable FLET (Forward Line Enemy Troops), but with little ability to flex beyond the FLET. That ceded at local level a degree of initiative and freedom of manoeuvre to the enemy that was unhelpful in many ways.

Hey, sounds like my tour!