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Thread: Patrol Base Density and Proximity - Too many and too close?

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  1. #1
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    Default Patrol Base Density and Proximity - Too many and too close?

    I am typing away in a crowded MWR internet center in Manas, Kyrgystan, and instead of simply sleeping until hungry, I was reading up on the Marine Corps' recommendation of a former Corporal for the Medal of Honor. First off, good on the lad for doing beyond what might have been expected in that deadly valley. I linked from that article in the Marine Corps Times, and over to onethat highlighted the struggle of 3/5 to quell the insurgents in Sangin, and it actually made me pose the subject questions.

    It seems, in the 3/5 article, that there were a number of patrol bases establised by the British in Sangin, but they consumed so much manpower securing and supplying them that the insurgents actually gained more freedom of maneuver in the process.

    This flies contrary to much of what I had come to accept as a basic truth for COIN (in certain cirumstances), which was break away from the super-FOBs, establish oneself close to the population, and actually provide security. It also stands in contrast to much of the doctrinal literature written in the past five years, which highlights how smaller and closer is better. I know there must be more to the analysis of the British effort, so I'm curious what folks here have to offer, either through first-hand experience or other pondering.

    And before this thread goes any further, I'm not keen on hearing the B.S. that the Brits didn't patrol enough, and weren't aggressive enough, or were too risk-averse to tame Sangin. Save that for the tabloids and drama yarns. I've seen a few moments of Ross Kemp that tell me otherwise when it comes to the blood the British have spilled, and although I never set foot in Sangin, I dont buy into the hype that is often spun.

    I am simply trying to look at the issue and figure out where the tipping point may be, between securing the populace at the cost of becoming over-extended. Are there any historical examples from past small wars that should be factored into the decisions to apply a patrol base methodology? What are some of the measures of effectiveness.

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    Default "COIN math"

    I don't have first hand experience with Afghanistan, but I'd assert that just like there are calculations involved in employing combat power in a "conventional" sense, the same holds true in an irregular environment. The basic answer to your question are the fundamental planning factors on what is required to secure the force, whether it be in a small COP or a large FOB, or "going mobile" ouside of the wire.
    There is an advantage to the large FOB in that for a set investment in FOB security and logistics, you may be able to generate much greater aggregate combat power outside of the wire at any one time. The obvious disadvantage, as you point out, is that fewer large FOBs means less density of presence and greater distance any force must travel outside of the FOB to cover an entire area. The lower density drives the greater travel distance and results in the "commuting to war" charge as forces spend as much time getting to/from all points of their operating area as they do actually operating in it.
    I don't think there's a single answer to your question, but its METT-T dependent. However you highlight some real considerations when choosing a laydown. Yes, big FOBs can be bad, but there are advantages. You should probably consider a mix of solutions. Even though COIN may be all about being out with the population, there are hard calculations in how you can generate the necessary persistent (or episodic) presence.

    Happy Birthday Marine!

    Phil Ridderhof
    Phil Ridderhof USMC

  3. #3
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by PhilR View Post
    I don't have first hand experience with Afghanistan, but I'd assert that just like there are calculations involved in employing combat power in a "conventional" sense, the same holds true in an irregular environment. The basic answer to your question are the fundamental planning factors on what is required to secure the force, whether it be in a small COP or a large FOB, or "going mobile" ouside of the wire.
    There is an advantage to the large FOB in that for a set investment in FOB security and logistics, you may be able to generate much greater aggregate combat power outside of the wire at any one time. The obvious disadvantage, as you point out, is that fewer large FOBs means less density of presence and greater distance any force must travel outside of the FOB to cover an entire area. The lower density drives the greater travel distance and results in the "commuting to war" charge as forces spend as much time getting to/from all points of their operating area as they do actually operating in it.
    I don't think there's a single answer to your question, but its METT-T dependent. However you highlight some real considerations when choosing a laydown. Yes, big FOBs can be bad, but there are advantages. You should probably consider a mix of solutions. Even though COIN may be all about being out with the population, there are hard calculations in how you can generate the necessary persistent (or episodic) presence.

    Happy Birthday Marine!

    Phil Ridderhof
    Agreed, Phil. Balance in all things remains fundamental. I would also add that in a Xenophobic society, flooding the zone with too many outposts, further adds to the distrust, and boosts the bad guys IO.

    Best
    Tom

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default ALMAR 1011-White

    Happy Birthday, Marines!

    Semper Fi.

    On topic, agree with PhilR and Tom -- balance /common sense are key.

    My personal belief is that the small outposts are very counterproductive. Too much effort goes into securing and resupplying them to really reap the benefit of being 'local.' Larger FOBs (Bde / Regt size, IMO; only rarely Bn (+) and almost never Co -- or ODA, that oughta rattle some cages... ).

    PhilR is correct, that does cause commuting to the war -- and there's nothing wrong with that. There's no reason Platoons and Companies cannot go out and prowl the area for days, even weeks, at a time. Unless, of course, one is excessively risk averse...

    I haven't been to Afghanistan in the current fight but I have been to a fight or two with opponents at least as good and probably more numerous and I have been in the neighborhood and in similar terrain. Everyone I've talked to who has been there recently or is there now essentially seems to agree that we are far more risk averse than necessary (one told me he's convinced the MRAP is the Devil's invention... ).

    I suspect rather than "stretched too thin" number-wise that risk aversion is the real reason for the small outpost approach. It's a way to obtain 'presence' while minimizing risks (in the eyes of some). It is essentially the theory of 'limited war' which holds that one should use minimum force applied to a COIN fight where presence is important. The flaw in the approach is that there are not enough troops (there almost never will be) to really flood the zone.

    Plus, minimum force is a good dictum for law enforcement but an extremely bad one for military forces. Trying to limit war only prolongs it and increases casualties and damage, better to slam in hard and fast and get it over with. More short term damage but far less long term pain.

    And yes, that applies in FID / COIN as well.

    And all of you "shoulda been in the Old Corps... "

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    Default Base creep

    We do tend to end up with too many bases, posts, OPS, etc, but this is partly a result of the type of thing I observed in the Korengal, Kunar, and Nuristan over the course of about a year.

    Subordinate commanders, as they become more familiar with the terrain and enemy, identify more and more places that it would be beneficial to establish some presence on. You know the deal - OPs to watch areas from which the enemy habitually fires on our bases, an extra post to keep an IED-plagued stretch of road under observation, etc. All of these individually are justifiable, but they soak up more and more manpower and reduce the number of boots that can actually patrol out the front gate. Senior commanders need to do a better job of controlling this tendency of subordinates to circumvallate themselves, but that means accepting.

    Because what we really need in these cases are not just extra posts, but more people, and that is the one resource that is extremely difficult to come by.

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    The more guys you have running around in strange looking uniforms and strange looking vehicles the easier you are for the enemy to spot! That is a tremendous advantage for a small mobile Guerrilla force. LE has to deal with that everyday we just call them criminals.

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    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Happy Birthday, Marines!And all of you "shoulda been in the Old Corps... "
    Isn't that what Lt. Presley O'Bannon said to the guys who joined the Corps after him?

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    And all of you "shoulda been in the Old Corps...
    Ken is waxing nostalgic about his first duty assignment again.

    "Beat to Quarters! Private White! To the tops!"

    I mean, I know Major Henderson was a great officer and the USS Constitution was a great ship but give it a break already.
    Last edited by Rifleman; 11-11-2010 at 04:12 AM.
    "Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper

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