As one point of reference concerning this issue please see "Gentile: How I would revise the Army's counterinsurgency manual" at Tom Ricks' Best Defense.
Yes.
No.
As one point of reference concerning this issue please see "Gentile: How I would revise the Army's counterinsurgency manual" at Tom Ricks' Best Defense.
With the greatest respect to Gian Gentile, I think he's slightly over complicating the solution. The aim to is Kill, Capture, and Deter any armed opposition to central authority and/or the policy in place at the time. That's it. You need a pretty slim manual to get that across.
Basically FM3-24 needs burning because it should never have been required and the solution does not require it either. A "Small Wars / Irregular Enemy" manual would more than suffice.
If the enemy is dead, any clown can "re-build" because no one is going to stop him doing it. To paraphrase the Sultan of Oman, "Defeat the rebels SO THAT, we can begin development."
Last edited by William F. Owen; 11-17-2010 at 08:05 AM.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Personally I don't huge value in changing military doctrine so long as the deeply flawed, essentially colonial strategy that is it designed to execute persists. And only civilian leaders can do that.
Steve makes a great point. Will better strategy overcome bad policy? Not likely. Does bad strategy enable policy makers to avoid reform? Possibly, but this really needs a comprehensive approach.
My vote, however, is yes, we must revise the "Zombie COIN" of FM3-24. It lacks a soul, and that soul is a clear understanding of insurgency itself.
Not sure what I would call our controlling, naive approach to foreign policy that is so blinded by our inflated positive self-image that we either cannot see, or refuse to acknowledge when we do see, how it is perceived by friend and foe alike. It is definitely time to break the cycle.
We need to fix both, but confused perceptions of duty and overly narrow concepts of where the limits of advance are for military input to policy are will likely keep the military from leading the way.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Oh, what a tangled web we weave when we ask the Big Army to become a nation builder/political gap closer.
They are a force designed to kill, capture, etc... and, on the side, do short-term immediate response humanitarian relief/disaster recovery efforts where their unique logistical structure is both appropriate and irreplaceable.
Somehow, the lines got crossed so that the Pentagon took on missions not do-able through UN, DoS/USAID, and nobody had the gumption to say anything other than "Hua!," when they should have said "Hooey!."
The FM is a result of the political/admin/mission creep confusion that brought us to this point.
Where I disagree with Gentile is the level of critique/reassessment.
I think that Iraq today forms an excellent lab to compare what we did to what resulted. No need to draw inaccurate correlations to obscure alternatives.
The analysis, though, should be done by competent civilians, and not military, or they will just miss the whole point (over-and-over).
Steve
Steve does make a good point however, better, more realistic doctrine can potentially improve militry advice given to policymakers.
Still, let's say we started updating FM3-24 tomorrow - when would the revisions be complete? 3-4 years maybe?
Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.
Bookmarks