Should FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency be updated?
Yes.
No.
Should FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency be updated?
As one point of reference concerning this issue please see "Gentile: How I would revise the Army's counterinsurgency manual" at Tom Ricks' Best Defense.
With the greatest respect to Gian Gentile, I think he's slightly over complicating the solution. The aim to is Kill, Capture, and Deter any armed opposition to central authority and/or the policy in place at the time. That's it. You need a pretty slim manual to get that across.
Basically FM3-24 needs burning because it should never have been required and the solution does not require it either. A "Small Wars / Irregular Enemy" manual would more than suffice.
If the enemy is dead, any clown can "re-build" because no one is going to stop him doing it. To paraphrase the Sultan of Oman, "Defeat the rebels SO THAT, we can begin development."
Last edited by William F. Owen; 11-17-2010 at 08:05 AM.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Personally I don't huge value in changing military doctrine so long as the deeply flawed, essentially colonial strategy that is it designed to execute persists. And only civilian leaders can do that.
Steve makes a great point. Will better strategy overcome bad policy? Not likely. Does bad strategy enable policy makers to avoid reform? Possibly, but this really needs a comprehensive approach.
My vote, however, is yes, we must revise the "Zombie COIN" of FM3-24. It lacks a soul, and that soul is a clear understanding of insurgency itself.
Not sure what I would call our controlling, naive approach to foreign policy that is so blinded by our inflated positive self-image that we either cannot see, or refuse to acknowledge when we do see, how it is perceived by friend and foe alike. It is definitely time to break the cycle.
We need to fix both, but confused perceptions of duty and overly narrow concepts of where the limits of advance are for military input to policy are will likely keep the military from leading the way.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
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