Quote Originally Posted by Sargent View Post
The problem with these cases is that you are trying to compare how regimes behave in their own backyards with how the US or any other western nation can behave in a foreign country.
That is not the problem with what I am saying but rather an indication of the scale of the counterinsurgency challenges for "foreign" troops.

The lessons of what Mugabe was able to get away with are not tenable for American armed forces in Afghanistan, for example. Perhaps the conclusion you want to make is that it is very difficult for a foreign power to deal successfully with insurgencies and rebellions because they cannot, in the end, utilize the sort of force necessary to defeat them.
Can't see the US allowing its troops to use "extreme" measures to pacify the local population can you? Even in the case of Sri Lanka they first had to secure support from China (knowing that they would not get support from the West) before implementing their strategy.

What I am in fact saying that it is near impossible for for a (western) foreign power to win a counterinsurgency war or put down a rebellion given the self imposed restraints they apply.

It worked better when the US trained up 1,000s of soldiers from South American countries at the School of the Americas and then let them go home and do what they needed to do themselves.

Then of course the west too often gets it wrong with the training of local forces (as is happening right now in Afghanistan). Read Kilcullen's Twenty-Eight Articles No 22: Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves.

So the US and Britain and NATO should be realistic about what can be achieved in a place like Afghanistan... and not send young soldiers into that theatre with the insane belief that they can win the hearts and minds of the locals over their own kith and kin.

In this case, the example would be the Japanese in China during WWII and their infamous "Three Alls" campaign -- which made the Rape of Nanking seem like a loving embrace. Despite every form of brutality applied against the Chinese population they continued to contest the Japanese occupation of their country, bleeding the IJA white and softening up the enemy to the best advantage of the Allies in the war as a whole. At the end of the day, the historical record significantly favors the foreign army that is intelligent and as benign as possible in its treatment of the locals.
Would you be so kind as to share this "historical record" with me?

I would say again that western armies today would not and could not conduct a war on that basis just they could not do what Mugabe did nor what Sri Lanka did. That limits the options and the likely outcomes on any counterinsurgency war.

And for what it's worth, whatever reprieve Mugabe has gained for his regime, the brutality he has visited upon segments of his country will be repaid at some point. Unfortunately, it will likely result in even greater chaos and brutality for that country, to nobody's benefit.
Maybe. Too late for the victims and their families and I suppose no chance of an apology from Jimmy Carter either. (At least Bill Clinton has shown some remorse over his failure in Rwanda).

Finally, I do not agree with your conclusion that the concessions that must be made by a foreign power in order to win are pyrrhic. Again, I look to WWII, and the tremendously effective post-hostilities COIN campaign that was conducted in Germany/Western Europe and Japan. We did end up giving our opponents in the war just about everything they had sought to obtain through force, and it was a smashing success to the ultimate policy aims of the war.

Jill
From Iraq through Afghanistan there are thousands of KIAs and even more severely wounded soldiers suffered by the US and NATO forces. So what constitutes a "victory gained at too greater cost"? IMHO that which happened in Iraq and what is now happening in Afghanistan... that is if the end result actually reflects a "victory".