I already did.....it was bad.....really bad.Originally Posted by JMA
Yes.
No.
I already did.....it was bad.....really bad.
There you go then... what are the marines thinking?
Different war, different enemy, different Armies, different Tanks.
The Canadians and the Danes have had Tanks there for some time - with good success and no real problems or 'bad' things...
Found this piece on the Canadian use of armour in Afghanistan enlightening.
... but if I hear the word risk again I think I will scream.
To quote Para 6-84, of FM3-24
So no MBT or IFV? Thanks for bad advice FM3-24 writers."In COIN operations, having many versatile vehicles that require simple maintenance is often better than having a few highly capable armored
vehicles or combat systems that require extensive maintenance."
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Been thinking about this. Maybe there is a ROE connection to this?
If you can't get CAS without a whole bunch of confirmations with attendant delay then it is better to have the direct fire power of tanks immediately available where they deem it necessary at that moment?
Highly recommend discussing (and reviewing) the emotion over tanks spilled in this thread:
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3951
You'll see where I stand.
Armor has no inherent goodness or badness in COIN, only effects by the user.
Yea,you guys understand Maneuver almost by some kind of genetic adaption, so do most guerrillas, sadly a lot of infantry don't
I guess the supposed need for armour tends to indicate that the insurgency is moving to Phase 3 where the insurgents are holding ground and launching counter offensives. Maybe it means things are not going so well for the Marines in Helmand?
Actually, I suspect it reflects the restrictions on the use of close air, attack air, and indirect fires; the very real need to minimize innocent casualties; and the insurgent tactic of occupying and fighting from compounds where such innocent parties reside.
The tank provides a very effective way to deal with such problems short of ordering a squad to conduct fire and maneuver across 100 yards of knee deep much in an open field; or to try to move an MRAP down a narrow IED laden roadway.
This insurgency fluctuates with the season and by location, but it is no where near phase III; nor would I expect the Taliban to even attempt surging to Phase III tactics so long as the coalition is present. Phase I and II tactics are far more effective against effective Phase III forces like ours.
Plus, it is always wise to remember that the insurgent can prevail in any phase, and flows up and down between them as best suits his purposes. There is no requirement to progress, but such progression is natural in certain circumstances. (I.e., the Taliban is not intellectually burdened by dogmatic adherence to doctrine like some western military personnel/organizations can tend to be. They simply fight the fight before them.)
The real danger in bringing in Tanks is that, like the Strykers, like the MRAPs; (like patrol cars for policemen) they separate the soldiers from the populace and also lead to Means-based approaches to problems.
Can anyone imagine a Stryker commander leaving his Strykers in the motorpool? Or an Armor commander leaving his tanks? I have not talked to any Marines about their intent, but I would expect that they would plan to use these tanks in infantry support mode, much like the way we employed armor in WWII.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Bob,
Left 8 of my 14 tanks at home in 2006. Rest of tankers walked or took HMMWV's. It's actually very common the past 5-6 years for tankers, artillerymen, and mech infantry to act dismounted without vehicle overwatch.
In a Stryker unit now, training heavily to operate with and without them. We expect to do both, as have the previous two stryker units. A Stryker IN company is basically same as an Airborne IN Company when you subtract the vehicles.
As Ken would say, METT-TC rules. Problem is the vehicles bring unique capabilities (protection, long range comms, digital connectivity, advanced sights, mobility) you lose when you separate from them.
Contact with the population is mainly influenced by command climate and training - for example, one TTP is to lager the vehicles outside the town and foot patrol in, keeping the vehicles for QRF. More than one way to do it.
Well yes, when tanks are used by a 3rd rate army.
Tanks are just a tool. Skilfully employed, they solve a vast array of problems.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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