Maybe I don't get the meaning in English, but I would certainly add "violent" as required criterion. Otherise you'd need to kill, capture and deter millions.Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Yes.
No.
Maybe I don't get the meaning in English, but I would certainly add "violent" as required criterion. Otherise you'd need to kill, capture and deter millions.
Personally I don't huge value in changing military doctrine so long as the deeply flawed, essentially colonial strategy that is it designed to execute persists. And only civilian leaders can do that.
Steve makes a great point. Will better strategy overcome bad policy? Not likely. Does bad strategy enable policy makers to avoid reform? Possibly, but this really needs a comprehensive approach.
My vote, however, is yes, we must revise the "Zombie COIN" of FM3-24. It lacks a soul, and that soul is a clear understanding of insurgency itself.
Not sure what I would call our controlling, naive approach to foreign policy that is so blinded by our inflated positive self-image that we either cannot see, or refuse to acknowledge when we do see, how it is perceived by friend and foe alike. It is definitely time to break the cycle.
We need to fix both, but confused perceptions of duty and overly narrow concepts of where the limits of advance are for military input to policy are will likely keep the military from leading the way.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Civilian Problems
Oh, what a tangled web we weave when we ask the Big Army to become a nation builder/political gap closer.
They are a force designed to kill, capture, etc... and, on the side, do short-term immediate response humanitarian relief/disaster recovery efforts where their unique logistical structure is both appropriate and irreplaceable.
Somehow, the lines got crossed so that the Pentagon took on missions not do-able through UN, DoS/USAID, and nobody had the gumption to say anything other than "Hua!," when they should have said "Hooey!."
The FM is a result of the political/admin/mission creep confusion that brought us to this point.
Where I disagree with Gentile is the level of critique/reassessment.
I think that Iraq today forms an excellent lab to compare what we did to what resulted. No need to draw inaccurate correlations to obscure alternatives.
The analysis, though, should be done by competent civilians, and not military, or they will just miss the whole point (over-and-over).
Steve
Steve does make a good point however, better, more realistic doctrine can potentially improve militry advice given to policymakers.
Still, let's say we started updating FM3-24 tomorrow - when would the revisions be complete? 3-4 years maybe?
Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.
3-4 years for an Irregular Warfare TTP manual? Nothing about so-called COIN needs "inventing" or much "thinking about." It's a "how to kill the bad guys - AND ONLY THE BAD GUYs - book," and context would be very important so it probably deal in very broad brush strokes, because what really matter is "Theatre Specific" Manuals like the CATOM.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
This FM 3 -24 is designed for battaluion level and above "leaders and planners". So it's not a TTP manual.
What about something for the guys battalion level and down who actually are there to do the business? A doctrinal gap?
Start with what the private soldier needs to know to effectively fight this type of war and then take it from there. It doesn't matter what the colonels know if the soldiers on the ground know Jack.
IMO the problems, while significant, are largely nuance. If one just went through the current manual and addressed those points of nuance it would only take 3-4 weeks.
So, 3-4 weeks to make the fixes, 3-4 years to get such a manual approved.
Or, as WILF suggests, merely label all citizens who support violent opposition to the government as enemies of the state (regardless of the fact that they often have no legal options to effectively oppose the state) and kill them. Simple and effective. These are problems that can be easily suppressed if we would simply man up and deal with them. 4 out of 5 dictators endorse this option (the 5th was assassinated by his royal guard and unavailable for comment).
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Bob, sometimes Wilf is right. There are situations where that may be the best option.
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