I thought I was discussing complex issues. Contentiously perhaps, but they are contentious issues.

I suspect that you're right that we agree in spirit more than we agree in words... but I still think there are some items in your model that need to be critically addressed. Most particularly I suspect that you drastically overstate the degree to which the US "enables" other governments to oppress their populaces, and I suspect that you're hugely overstating the degree of influence the US can bring to bear in any proposed effort to persuade or compel other governments to modify their domestic policies to suit our preference.

Overestimating our own influence and capacity is a very dangerous base for strategy.

I also can't see how to reconcile your criticism of US intervention with your frequent advocacy of openly interventionist positions. Trying to impose ourselves, uninvited, as "champion of the populace" in a dispute between a foreign government and its populace seems to me a recipe for disaster; I can't imagine that failing to blow up in our faces. A perfect example is the suggestion, on another thread, that we intervene in a dispute between the Chinese government and the Turkistani Islamic Party:

My recommendation is that we out-compete AQ for influence with this populace. They need an advocate to help them in their very real issues with the Chinese government.
I really can't see that pointing to anywhere we want to be. What reason have we to impose ourselves, uninvited, in a dispute between the Chinese government and a segment of its populace? Certainly we are not in a position to be laying any "tough love" on the Chinese government... they are not exactly a client state.

At least pretending to get back on topic... the problem I see with trying to address "the causation of such problems in general" is that any specific case may not reflect a general pattern: different insurgencies are going to have different causative factors, especially since we seem intent on expanding the definition of "insurgency". One example might be the southern Philippines, where a general model might lead us to assume a conflict between populace and government and overlook the populace-populace conflict that lies at the core of the dispute.

I don't think it requires any great insight to see that practices developed for cases where we are intervening as a response to insurgency, to assist an allied government threatened by insurgents, may not be entirely applicable to a regime change environment, where insurgency emerges as a response to our intervention.