View Poll Results: Should FM 3-24 be updated?

Voters
23. You may not vote on this poll
  • Yes.

    22 95.65%
  • No.

    1 4.35%
Page 1 of 6 123 ... LastLast
Results 1 to 20 of 106

Thread: Time for a FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency Update

  1. #1
    Small Wars Journal SWJED's Avatar
    Join Date
    Sep 2005
    Location
    Largo, Florida
    Posts
    3,989

    Default Time for a FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency Update

    Should FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency be updated?

  2. #2
    Small Wars Journal SWJED's Avatar
    Join Date
    Sep 2005
    Location
    Largo, Florida
    Posts
    3,989

    Default One Reference Point

    As one point of reference concerning this issue please see "Gentile: How I would revise the Army's counterinsurgency manual" at Tom Ricks' Best Defense.

  3. #3
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by SWJED View Post
    As one point of reference concerning this issue please see "Gentile: How I would revise the Army's counterinsurgency manual" at Tom Ricks' Best Defense.
    With the greatest respect to Gian Gentile, I think he's slightly over complicating the solution. The aim to is Kill, Capture, and Deter any armed opposition to central authority and/or the policy in place at the time. That's it. You need a pretty slim manual to get that across.

    Basically FM3-24 needs burning because it should never have been required and the solution does not require it either. A "Small Wars / Irregular Enemy" manual would more than suffice.

    If the enemy is dead, any clown can "re-build" because no one is going to stop him doing it. To paraphrase the Sultan of Oman, "Defeat the rebels SO THAT, we can begin development."
    Last edited by William F. Owen; 11-17-2010 at 08:05 AM.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  4. #4
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    3,189

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    The aim to is Kill, Capture, and Deter any armed opposition to central authority and/or the policy in place at the time.
    Maybe I don't get the meaning in English, but I would certainly add "violent" as required criterion. Otherise you'd need to kill, capture and deter millions.

  5. #5
    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jan 2007
    Location
    Carlisle, PA
    Posts
    1,488

    Default

    Personally I don't huge value in changing military doctrine so long as the deeply flawed, essentially colonial strategy that is it designed to execute persists. And only civilian leaders can do that.

  6. #6
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2008
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    2,706

    Default

    Steve makes a great point. Will better strategy overcome bad policy? Not likely. Does bad strategy enable policy makers to avoid reform? Possibly, but this really needs a comprehensive approach.

    My vote, however, is yes, we must revise the "Zombie COIN" of FM3-24. It lacks a soul, and that soul is a clear understanding of insurgency itself.

    Not sure what I would call our controlling, naive approach to foreign policy that is so blinded by our inflated positive self-image that we either cannot see, or refuse to acknowledge when we do see, how it is perceived by friend and foe alike. It is definitely time to break the cycle.

    We need to fix both, but confused perceptions of duty and overly narrow concepts of where the limits of advance are for military input to policy are will likely keep the military from leading the way.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  7. #7
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Apr 2009
    Location
    Maryland
    Posts
    827

    Default Civilian Problems

    Oh, what a tangled web we weave when we ask the Big Army to become a nation builder/political gap closer.

    They are a force designed to kill, capture, etc... and, on the side, do short-term immediate response humanitarian relief/disaster recovery efforts where their unique logistical structure is both appropriate and irreplaceable.

    Somehow, the lines got crossed so that the Pentagon took on missions not do-able through UN, DoS/USAID, and nobody had the gumption to say anything other than "Hua!," when they should have said "Hooey!."

    The FM is a result of the political/admin/mission creep confusion that brought us to this point.

    Where I disagree with Gentile is the level of critique/reassessment.

    I think that Iraq today forms an excellent lab to compare what we did to what resulted. No need to draw inaccurate correlations to obscure alternatives.

    The analysis, though, should be done by competent civilians, and not military, or they will just miss the whole point (over-and-over).

    Steve

  8. #8
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Mar 2008
    Posts
    1,457

    Default

    Steve does make a good point however, better, more realistic doctrine can potentially improve militry advice given to policymakers.

    Still, let's say we started updating FM3-24 tomorrow - when would the revisions be complete? 3-4 years maybe?
    Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.

  9. #9
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    Still, let's say we started updating FM3-24 tomorrow - when would the revisions be complete? 3-4 years maybe?
    3-4 years for an Irregular Warfare TTP manual? Nothing about so-called COIN needs "inventing" or much "thinking about." It's a "how to kill the bad guys - AND ONLY THE BAD GUYs - book," and context would be very important so it probably deal in very broad brush strokes, because what really matter is "Theatre Specific" Manuals like the CATOM.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  10. #10
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2008
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    2,706

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    Steve does make a good point however, better, more realistic doctrine can potentially improve militry advice given to policymakers.

    Still, let's say we started updating FM3-24 tomorrow - when would the revisions be complete? 3-4 years maybe?
    IMO the problems, while significant, are largely nuance. If one just went through the current manual and addressed those points of nuance it would only take 3-4 weeks.

    So, 3-4 weeks to make the fixes, 3-4 years to get such a manual approved.

    Or, as WILF suggests, merely label all citizens who support violent opposition to the government as enemies of the state (regardless of the fact that they often have no legal options to effectively oppose the state) and kill them. Simple and effective. These are problems that can be easily suppressed if we would simply man up and deal with them. 4 out of 5 dictators endorse this option (the 5th was assassinated by his royal guard and unavailable for comment).
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  11. #11
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Posts
    4,818

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Or, as WILF suggests, merely label all citizens who support violent opposition to the government as enemies of the state (regardless of the fact that they often have no legal options to effectively oppose the state) and kill them. Simple and effective. These are problems that can be easily suppressed if we would simply man up and deal with them. 4 out of 5 dictators endorse this option (the 5th was assassinated by his royal guard and unavailable for comment).
    Bob, sometimes Wilf is right. There are situations where that may be the best option.

  12. #12
    Council Member Polarbear1605's Avatar
    Join Date
    Sep 2008
    Location
    Raleigh, NC
    Posts
    176

    Default David Agrees!

    Just of interest...I recently attended a book signing for David Kilcullen. At the beginning of his comments to the attendees (SWJ/Quantico sponsored event 60 - 80 folks were there) he stated the FM needs to be re-written and is out of date (he also stated that it was out of date from day one because things are always changing and we are always learning). He also stated that yes part of counter insurgency is killing bad guys...that didn't come across in the FM because everyone was thinking the military already knew how to do that.

  13. #13
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2008
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    2,706

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    Bob, sometimes Wilf is right. There are situations where that may be the best option.
    Slap,

    No worries, Wilf on warfare is typically spot on. It's when he applies warfare to COIN where he starts to drift off track. Our reasonable (or unreasonable, as its really up to others to assess that status) minds will differ, but it is such public differing that makes SWJ such a handy tool.

    The killing of certain insurgents absolutely needs to be a strong, well resourced, supporting effort of any COIN campaign. Main effort must be the repair of governance and re-earning the support of the populace through change, not charity.

    As to the FID force (that intervening role we find ourselves in), I would strongly advise staying out of the insurgent killing business altogether, and to keep our focus on guiding governmental reform and mediating the popular voice into that process (or staying out of the mess altogether unless national interests truly demand our presence).

    AQ and non-state UW organizations like them that seek to employ such insurgent organizations and populaces to conduct their acts of terror for them are another matter altogether, and for them we should show now mercy or respite, wherever they might hide. (Just don't listen to the Intel guys who paint everyone they talk to with their same stink, as that throws us right back into killing nationalist insurgents 9 times out of 10).
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  14. #14
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Posts
    4,818

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post

    As to the FID force
    We really gotta come with a better name....sounds like a girls softball team

  15. #15
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    3-4 years for an Irregular Warfare TTP manual? Nothing about so-called COIN needs "inventing" or much "thinking about." It's a "how to kill the bad guys - AND ONLY THE BAD GUYs - book," and context would be very important so it probably deal in very broad brush strokes, because what really matter is "Theatre Specific" Manuals like the CATOM.
    This FM 3 -24 is designed for battaluion level and above "leaders and planners". So it's not a TTP manual.

    What about something for the guys battalion level and down who actually are there to do the business? A doctrinal gap?

    Start with what the private soldier needs to know to effectively fight this type of war and then take it from there. It doesn't matter what the colonels know if the soldiers on the ground know Jack.

  16. #16
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, came out last year

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    What about something for the guys battalion level and down who actually are there to do the business? A doctrinal gap?
    It's marginally adequate, way too big and overly pedantic but that seems to be the trend nowadays...

    Follow the link provided by Cav Guy on this page (LINK - big .pdf). Not much of any import in the rest of the thread...

  17. #17
    Council Member Infanteer's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jul 2009
    Location
    Canada
    Posts
    347

    Default

    No need for a "tactics in COIN" manual - tactics in COIN and tactics in a conventional fight are the same, just applied to a different environment (here comes the METT-TC thing again).

    Offensive and defensive operations and patrolling, patrolling and patrolling. That and learn how to eat with the locals.

  18. #18
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Infanteer View Post
    No need for a "tactics in COIN" manual - tactics in COIN and tactics in a conventional fight are the same, just applied to a different environment (here comes the METT-TC thing again).

    Offensive and defensive operations and patrolling, patrolling and patrolling. That and learn how to eat with the locals.
    As simple as that? Now I am begining to understand where it is all going wrong out there...

  19. #19
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Infanteer View Post
    No need for a "tactics in COIN" manual - tactics in COIN and tactics in a conventional fight are the same, just applied to a different environment (here comes the METT-TC thing again).

    Offensive and defensive operations and patrolling, patrolling and patrolling. That and learn how to eat with the locals.
    only correct IF you got trained right in the first place. When I was doing my basic in 1980, all the training was peppered with Northern Ireland TTPs. The problem was that by 1988 when I was doing Recce Commanders, NI TTPs had washed out what you needed to fight a Soviet MRR.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  20. #20
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Polarbear1605 View Post
    At the beginning of his comments to the attendees (SWJ/Quantico sponsored event 60 - 80 folks were there) he stated the FM needs to be re-written and is out of date (he also stated that it was out of date from day one because things are always changing and we are always learning).
    I used to have great respect for Dave, back in the day, but I think he's wrong these days, unless I am not understanding what I keep reading.
    a.) FM3-24 was not out of date. It was wrong and bad.
    b.) We keep learning? Sorry, what crushes a rebellion hasn't really changed. What has changed is the constraints place by policy.
    NOW, - I admit, my ideas have changed. I have learnt. I have publicly viewable record of my though in the 3,000+ posts here, BUT my ideas now all conform to what got taught back in the old days and was written down a long time ago. The problem with the COIN-fusion is that is simply ignored history to pursue either the avant-garde or reputations.
    He also stated that yes part of counter insurgency is killing bad guys...that didn't come across in the FM because everyone was thinking the military already knew how to do that.
    ....yet clearly that was the source of the problem because they weren't killing the right people and only the right people.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •