View Poll Results: Should FM 3-24 be updated?

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Thread: Time for a FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency Update

  1. #41
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Exactly... and that is why western or civilised countries can't "win" counterinsurgencies or suppress rebellions.
    Whoah there Mudhara! You're about 50% right, but....

    Western or civilised countries can suppress rebellions IF they recognise the limit of the military instrument, to using armed force against armed force, and the employment of criminal convictions to those sustaining it.

    The political problem may continue, BUT you use violence (military AND Police) to ensure it remains a political problem that the rebels will not seek to resolve by force. The ONLY thing armed force does is stop the other guy (rebels) using armed force. That is the key thing FM3-24 doesn't get.
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    Wilf:

    Today's KGS Nightwatch does a pretty good job of summing up the new changes:

    Return to Air Power, Tanks and a higher war tempo as the way to break the stalemate, and actually impact the Taliban by returning US "invincibility," at the expense of "hearts and minds."

    A fourth consequence is that the coalition might begin to start making its own luck. Diligent prosecution of the fight in a more warlike fashion is more likely to shorten the conflict than the mixture of fighting with development projects to win hearts and minds. Under the pressure from no withdrawal date and increased losses, the Taliban inside Afghanistan might be more receptive to negotiations.

    If the changes are implemented consistently, and are not just piecemeal, spot fixes, they should improve security conditions. However, they also are likely to produce significant negative consequences in property damage, civilian and militant casualties and bad press, all consistent with a war. On the other hand, the stalemate will continue if the most important change is a longer conflict.
    I suspect that the above, if accurate, speaks strongly against the mixed concept of nice guys gently extricating evil from an otherwise happy and democratic Lake Wobegon.

    Reality. People in war zones must respect those in power---the goal is to protect yourself/family. Period.

    Security is much more important than obscure western concepts, which might be great to think about once security and minimal life-safety/food security is in place.

    Steve

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    There you go then... what are the marines thinking?
    Been thinking about this. Maybe there is a ROE connection to this?

    If you can't get CAS without a whole bunch of confirmations with attendant delay then it is better to have the direct fire power of tanks immediately available where they deem it necessary at that moment?

  4. #44
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Highly recommend discussing (and reviewing) the emotion over tanks spilled in this thread:

    http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3951

    You'll see where I stand.

    Armor has no inherent goodness or badness in COIN, only effects by the user.
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  5. #45
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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    Highly recommend discussing (and reviewing) the emotion over tanks spilled in this thread:

    http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3951

    You'll see where I stand.

    Armor has no inherent goodness or badness in COIN, only effects by the user.
    Yea,you guys understand Maneuver almost by some kind of genetic adaption, so do most guerrillas, sadly a lot of infantry don't

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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    Highly recommend discussing (and reviewing) the emotion over tanks spilled in this thread:

    http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3951

    You'll see where I stand.

    Armor has no inherent goodness or badness in COIN, only effects by the user.
    I guess the supposed need for armour tends to indicate that the insurgency is moving to Phase 3 where the insurgents are holding ground and launching counter offensives. Maybe it means things are not going so well for the Marines in Helmand?

  7. #47
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    I guess the supposed need for armour tends to indicate that the insurgency is moving to Phase 3 where the insurgents are holding ground and launching counter offensives. Maybe it means things are not going so well for the Marines in Helmand?
    Actually, I suspect it reflects the restrictions on the use of close air, attack air, and indirect fires; the very real need to minimize innocent casualties; and the insurgent tactic of occupying and fighting from compounds where such innocent parties reside.

    The tank provides a very effective way to deal with such problems short of ordering a squad to conduct fire and maneuver across 100 yards of knee deep much in an open field; or to try to move an MRAP down a narrow IED laden roadway.

    This insurgency fluctuates with the season and by location, but it is no where near phase III; nor would I expect the Taliban to even attempt surging to Phase III tactics so long as the coalition is present. Phase I and II tactics are far more effective against effective Phase III forces like ours.

    Plus, it is always wise to remember that the insurgent can prevail in any phase, and flows up and down between them as best suits his purposes. There is no requirement to progress, but such progression is natural in certain circumstances. (I.e., the Taliban is not intellectually burdened by dogmatic adherence to doctrine like some western military personnel/organizations can tend to be. They simply fight the fight before them.)


    The real danger in bringing in Tanks is that, like the Strykers, like the MRAPs; (like patrol cars for policemen) they separate the soldiers from the populace and also lead to Means-based approaches to problems.

    Can anyone imagine a Stryker commander leaving his Strykers in the motorpool? Or an Armor commander leaving his tanks? I have not talked to any Marines about their intent, but I would expect that they would plan to use these tanks in infantry support mode, much like the way we employed armor in WWII.
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  8. #48
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post

    The real danger in bringing in Tanks is that, like the Strykers, like the MRAPs; (like patrol cars for policemen) they separate the soldiers from the populace and also lead to Means-based approaches to problems.

    Can anyone imagine a Stryker commander leaving his Strykers in the motorpool? Or an Armor commander leaving his tanks? I have not talked to any Marines about their intent, but I would expect that they would plan to use these tanks in infantry support mode, much like the way we employed armor in WWII.
    Bob,

    Left 8 of my 14 tanks at home in 2006. Rest of tankers walked or took HMMWV's. It's actually very common the past 5-6 years for tankers, artillerymen, and mech infantry to act dismounted without vehicle overwatch.

    In a Stryker unit now, training heavily to operate with and without them. We expect to do both, as have the previous two stryker units. A Stryker IN company is basically same as an Airborne IN Company when you subtract the vehicles.

    As Ken would say, METT-TC rules. Problem is the vehicles bring unique capabilities (protection, long range comms, digital connectivity, advanced sights, mobility) you lose when you separate from them.

    Contact with the population is mainly influenced by command climate and training - for example, one TTP is to lager the vehicles outside the town and foot patrol in, keeping the vehicles for QRF. More than one way to do it.
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  9. #49
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Niel,

    I know, everyone is out there doing their best. Personally I don't read too much into the tanks, the guys need something to compensate for the reduced ability to employ indirect fires. There is a place for a 120mm sniper on this battlefield.

    My bigger concerns is the lack of interest to bring in the policy version of tanks to put some heavy pressure on Karzai reconcile the issues of poor governance that pour out of his government; to reform the constitution that codifies and enables so much of the corruption and illegitimacy, etc.

    Similar concern is that I didn't see anything about tanks for the ANA. I thought this was their fight...
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  10. #50
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Niel,

    I know, everyone is out there doing their best. Personally I don't read too much into the tanks, the guys need something to compensate for the reduced ability to employ indirect fires. There is a place for a 120mm sniper on this battlefield.

    My bigger concerns is the lack of interest to bring in the policy version of tanks to put some heavy pressure on Karzai reconcile the issues of poor governance that pour out of his government; to reform the constitution that codifies and enables so much of the corruption and illegitimacy, etc.

    Similar concern is that I didn't see anything about tanks for the ANA. I thought this was their fight...
    Agree all. As someone commented - this is a tactical solution to a tactical problem, nothing more. The coax is also precision to 1100m, which is useful.

    I think those who see this as something other than a solution to a problem in one particularly brutal area are over-reaching.
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  11. #51
    Council Member Sargent's Avatar
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    Default The Comparisons Don't Work

    The problem with these cases is that you are trying to compare how regimes behave in their own backyards with how the US or any other western nation can behave in a foreign country. The lessons of what Mugabe was able to get away with are not tenable for American armed forces in Afghanistan, for example. Perhaps the conclusion you want to make is that it is very difficult for a foreign power to deal successfully with insurgencies and rebellions because they cannot, in the end, utilize the sort of force necessary to defeat them. In this case, the example would be the Japanese in China during WWII and their infamous "Three Alls" campaign -- which made the Rape of Nanking seem like a loving embrace. Despite every form of brutality applied against the Chinese population they continued to contest the Japanese occupation of their country, bleeding the IJA white and softening up the enemy to the best advantage of the Allies in the war as a whole. At the end of the day, the historical record significantly favors the foreign army that is intelligent and as benign as possible in its treatment of the locals.

    And for what it's worth, whatever reprieve Mugabe has gained for his regime, the brutality he has visited upon segments of his country will be repaid at some point. Unfortunately, it will likely result in even greater chaos and brutality for that country, to nobody's benefit.

    Finally, I do not agree with your conclusion that the concessions that must be made by a foreign power in order to win are pyrrhic. Again, I look to WWII, and the tremendously effective post-hostilities COIN campaign that was conducted in Germany/Western Europe and Japan. We did end up giving our opponents in the war just about everything they had sought to obtain through force, and it was a smashing success to the ultimate policy aims of the war.

    Jill

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Exactly... and that is why western or civilised countries can't "win" counterinsurgencies or suppress rebellions.

    Take Zimbabwe for example. Mugabe, that darling of western liberals (in the US sense of the word) faced a rebellion of sorts in Matabeleland through the actions of a number of armed dissidents....

    Conservative estimates were that Mugabe's (North Korean trained) 5th Brigade killed 30,000 men, women and children until the Matabele population reached tipping point. The Matabele were crushed.

    That's the way you do it... and you don't have to fix the political thing because even today if the people of Matabeleland hear of soldiers in the area wearing red berets the whole nation has a collective bowl movement. All you need to say if they become problematic again is "do you some some more of the same"?

    Then (in a tamer example) we see Sri Lanka first securing support from China (that great nation with supposedly thousands of years of civilisation but still no human rights conscience) then they too apply a little "poison" to the water in which the (Tamil Tiger) fish were swimming. The rest is history.

    That's how you put down rebellions and win counterinsurgency wars... brute force.

    Now which western country would dare employ such an approach? So that is why in most cases one has to give away the farm to "win" the war. Always a Pyrrhic victory to be sure.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Sargent View Post
    The problem with these cases is that you are trying to compare how regimes behave in their own backyards with how the US or any other western nation can behave in a foreign country.
    That is not the problem with what I am saying but rather an indication of the scale of the counterinsurgency challenges for "foreign" troops.

    The lessons of what Mugabe was able to get away with are not tenable for American armed forces in Afghanistan, for example. Perhaps the conclusion you want to make is that it is very difficult for a foreign power to deal successfully with insurgencies and rebellions because they cannot, in the end, utilize the sort of force necessary to defeat them.
    Can't see the US allowing its troops to use "extreme" measures to pacify the local population can you? Even in the case of Sri Lanka they first had to secure support from China (knowing that they would not get support from the West) before implementing their strategy.

    What I am in fact saying that it is near impossible for for a (western) foreign power to win a counterinsurgency war or put down a rebellion given the self imposed restraints they apply.

    It worked better when the US trained up 1,000s of soldiers from South American countries at the School of the Americas and then let them go home and do what they needed to do themselves.

    Then of course the west too often gets it wrong with the training of local forces (as is happening right now in Afghanistan). Read Kilcullen's Twenty-Eight Articles No 22: Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves.

    So the US and Britain and NATO should be realistic about what can be achieved in a place like Afghanistan... and not send young soldiers into that theatre with the insane belief that they can win the hearts and minds of the locals over their own kith and kin.

    In this case, the example would be the Japanese in China during WWII and their infamous "Three Alls" campaign -- which made the Rape of Nanking seem like a loving embrace. Despite every form of brutality applied against the Chinese population they continued to contest the Japanese occupation of their country, bleeding the IJA white and softening up the enemy to the best advantage of the Allies in the war as a whole. At the end of the day, the historical record significantly favors the foreign army that is intelligent and as benign as possible in its treatment of the locals.
    Would you be so kind as to share this "historical record" with me?

    I would say again that western armies today would not and could not conduct a war on that basis just they could not do what Mugabe did nor what Sri Lanka did. That limits the options and the likely outcomes on any counterinsurgency war.

    And for what it's worth, whatever reprieve Mugabe has gained for his regime, the brutality he has visited upon segments of his country will be repaid at some point. Unfortunately, it will likely result in even greater chaos and brutality for that country, to nobody's benefit.
    Maybe. Too late for the victims and their families and I suppose no chance of an apology from Jimmy Carter either. (At least Bill Clinton has shown some remorse over his failure in Rwanda).

    Finally, I do not agree with your conclusion that the concessions that must be made by a foreign power in order to win are pyrrhic. Again, I look to WWII, and the tremendously effective post-hostilities COIN campaign that was conducted in Germany/Western Europe and Japan. We did end up giving our opponents in the war just about everything they had sought to obtain through force, and it was a smashing success to the ultimate policy aims of the war.

    Jill
    From Iraq through Afghanistan there are thousands of KIAs and even more severely wounded soldiers suffered by the US and NATO forces. So what constitutes a "victory gained at too greater cost"? IMHO that which happened in Iraq and what is now happening in Afghanistan... that is if the end result actually reflects a "victory".

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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    Bob,

    Left 8 of my 14 tanks at home in 2006. Rest of tankers walked or took HMMWV's. It's actually very common the past 5-6 years for tankers, artillerymen, and mech infantry to act dismounted without vehicle overwatch.
    Don't see the point in this.

    When you have enough problems with the quality of infantry training what (for crying out aloud) is the point of taking armour trained soldiers all the way to a foreign theatre to act in the infantry role?

    If there is a need for a handful of tanks in Afghanistan then deploy them and leave the rest of the regiment at home.

    It just gets stranger and stranger.

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Whoah there Mudhara! You're about 50% right, but....

    Western or civilised countries can suppress rebellions IF they recognise the limit of the military instrument, to using armed force against armed force, and the employment of criminal convictions to those sustaining it.

    The political problem may continue, BUT you use violence (military AND Police) to ensure it remains a political problem that the rebels will not seek to resolve by force. The ONLY thing armed force does is stop the other guy (rebels) using armed force. That is the key thing FM3-24 doesn't get.
    Its all about timing isn't it.

    By the time the army gets involved its too late already as the shooting has already begun. And to stop the shooting you either have to pull a Mugabe on the population or give away the farm.

  15. #55
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Don't see the point in this.

    When you have enough problems with the quality of infantry training what (for crying out aloud) is the point of taking armour trained soldiers all the way to a foreign theatre to act in the infantry role?

    If there is a need for a handful of tanks in Afghanistan then deploy them and leave the rest of the regiment at home.

    It just gets stranger and stranger.
    Simple - necessity. We can't afford to leave the rest at home.

    Simple fact is we didn't have enough infantry/dismounts to support repeated Iraq rotations, and therefore routinely have converted tankers, artillery, and sometimes engineers into ad hoc infantrymen. They did pretty well too - at a cost to their core skillsets which are beginning to get rebuilt.

    None of it is ideal. We did this from the occupation phase of OIF 1 forward because of the decision to go in with a "light footprint". My Stryker CAV squadron will fundamentally act as infantrymen in Afghanistan next year. The cavalry hasn't trained actual recon in about 5 years, but have served as another infantry unit.
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  16. #56
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Its all about timing isn't it.

    By the time the army gets involved its too late already as the shooting has already begun. And to stop the shooting you either have to pull a Mugabe on the population or give away the farm.
    Well the UK effectively suppressed the rebellions in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, and even South Arabia, without measures that - at the time - drew large scale international criticism.
    The success of the Rhodesian Armed Forces was that the transition to majority Government took place, under a negotiated peace, and not by force of arms as intended.
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    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Well the UK effectively suppressed the rebellions in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, and even South Arabia, without measures that - at the time - drew large scale international criticism.
    The success of the Rhodesian Armed Forces was that the transition to majority Government took place, under a negotiated peace, and not by force of arms as intended.
    I suggest all those "victories" came at a high cost.

    Yes to Rhodesia and the same with the efforts of the South Africans in Namibia/South West Africa.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    Contact with the population is mainly influenced by command climate and training - for example, one TTP is to lager the vehicles outside the town and foot patrol in, keeping the vehicles for QRF. More than one way to do it.
    Just like the Russian concept of bronegruppa? I refer to the soviet tactical use of their mechanised items like reported in Lester Grau books.

    Cheers

  19. #59
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    I suggest all those "victories" came at a high cost.
    OK, but in what sense? Certainly "victories" as military force achieved the political objective set for it. As to cost, the British Army lost <750 men across all four campaigns.
    Other "human costs" may have been much higher.
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    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    OK, but in what sense? Certainly "victories" as military force achieved the political objective set for it. As to cost, the British Army lost <750 men across all four campaigns.
    Other "human costs" may have been much higher.
    The thousands of (all) lives lost in the respective struggles... and Britain lost the colonies (on a take it we're out of here basis).

    ... now I wonder why you did not include the suppression of the Boer insurgency in your list? Some skeletons in that cupboard on that one? ... and in the Sudan?

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