Time for a FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency Update

[Sargent]

The problem with these cases is that you are trying to compare how regimes behave in their own backyards with how the US or any other western nation can behave in a foreign country. The lessons of what Mugabe was able to get away with are not tenable for American armed forces in Afghanistan, for example. Perhaps the conclusion you want to make is that it is very difficult for a foreign power to deal successfully with insurgencies and rebellions because they cannot, in the end, utilize the sort of force necessary to defeat them. In this case, the example would be the Japanese in China during WWII and their infamous "Three Alls" campaign -- which made the Rape of Nanking seem like a loving embrace. Despite every form of brutality applied against the Chinese population they continued to contest the Japanese occupation of their country, bleeding the IJA white and softening up the enemy to the best advantage of the Allies in the war as a whole. At the end of the day, the historical record significantly favors the foreign army that is intelligent and as benign as possible in its treatment of the locals.

And for what it's worth, whatever reprieve Mugabe has gained for his regime, the brutality he has visited upon segments of his country will be repaid at some point. Unfortunately, it will likely result in even greater chaos and brutality for that country, to nobody's benefit.

Finally, I do not agree with your conclusion that the concessions that must be made by a foreign power in order to win are pyrrhic. Again, I look to WWII, and the tremendously effective post-hostilities COIN campaign that was conducted in Germany/Western Europe and Japan. We did end up giving our opponents in the war just about everything they had sought to obtain through force, and it was a smashing success to the ultimate policy aims of the war.

Jill

Exactly... and that is why western or civilised countries can't "win" counterinsurgencies or suppress rebellions.

Take Zimbabwe for example. Mugabe, that darling of western liberals (in the US sense of the word) faced a rebellion of sorts in Matabeleland through the actions of a number of armed dissidents....

Conservative estimates were that Mugabe's (North Korean trained) 5th Brigade killed 30,000 men, women and children until the Matabele population reached tipping point. The Matabele were crushed.

That's the way you do it... and you don't have to fix the political thing because even today if the people of Matabeleland hear of soldiers in the area wearing red berets the whole nation has a collective bowl movement. All you need to say if they become problematic again is "do you some some more of the same"?

Then (in a tamer example) we see Sri Lanka first securing support from China (that great nation with supposedly thousands of years of civilisation but still no human rights conscience) then they too apply a little "poison" to the water in which the (Tamil Tiger) fish were swimming. The rest is history.

That's how you put down rebellions and win counterinsurgency wars... brute force.

Now which western country would dare employ such an approach? So that is why in most cases one has to give away the farm to "win" the war. Always a Pyrrhic victory to be sure.

[JMA]

The problem with these cases is that you are trying to compare how regimes behave in their own backyards with how the US or any other western nation can behave in a foreign country.

That is not the problem with what I am saying but rather an indication of the scale of the counterinsurgency challenges for "foreign" troops.

The lessons of what Mugabe was able to get away with are not tenable for American armed forces in Afghanistan, for example. Perhaps the conclusion you want to make is that it is very difficult for a foreign power to deal successfully with insurgencies and rebellions because they cannot, in the end, utilize the sort of force necessary to defeat them.

Can't see the US allowing its troops to use "extreme" measures to pacify the local population can you? Even in the case of Sri Lanka they first had to secure support from China (knowing that they would not get support from the West) before implementing their strategy.

What I am in fact saying that it is near impossible for for a (western) foreign power to win a counterinsurgency war or put down a rebellion given the self imposed restraints they apply.

It worked better when the US trained up 1,000s of soldiers from South American countries at the School of the Americas and then let them go home and do what they needed to do themselves.

Then of course the west too often gets it wrong with the training of local forces (as is happening right now in Afghanistan). Read Kilcullen's Twenty-Eight Articles No 22: Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves.

So the US and Britain and NATO should be realistic about what can be achieved in a place like Afghanistan... and not send young soldiers into that theatre with the insane belief that they can win the hearts and minds of the locals over their own kith and kin.

In this case, the example would be the Japanese in China during WWII and their infamous "Three Alls" campaign -- which made the Rape of Nanking seem like a loving embrace. Despite every form of brutality applied against the Chinese population they continued to contest the Japanese occupation of their country, bleeding the IJA white and softening up the enemy to the best advantage of the Allies in the war as a whole. At the end of the day, the historical record significantly favors the foreign army that is intelligent and as benign as possible in its treatment of the locals.

Would you be so kind as to share this "historical record" with me?

I would say again that western armies today would not and could not conduct a war on that basis just they could not do what Mugabe did nor what Sri Lanka did. That limits the options and the likely outcomes on any counterinsurgency war.

And for what it's worth, whatever reprieve Mugabe has gained for his regime, the brutality he has visited upon segments of his country will be repaid at some point. Unfortunately, it will likely result in even greater chaos and brutality for that country, to nobody's benefit.

Maybe. Too late for the victims and their families and I suppose no chance of an apology from Jimmy Carter either. (At least Bill Clinton has shown some remorse over his failure in Rwanda).

Finally, I do not agree with your conclusion that the concessions that must be made by a foreign power in order to win are pyrrhic. Again, I look to WWII, and the tremendously effective post-hostilities COIN campaign that was conducted in Germany/Western Europe and Japan. We did end up giving our opponents in the war just about everything they had sought to obtain through force, and it was a smashing success to the ultimate policy aims of the war.

Jill

From Iraq through Afghanistan there are thousands of KIAs and even more severely wounded soldiers suffered by the US and NATO forces. So what constitutes a "victory gained at too greater cost"? IMHO that which happened in Iraq and what is now happening in Afghanistan... that is if the end result actually reflects a "victory".

[Sargent]

JMA --

The goal in any analysis of past events to inform current policy is to find comparable examples. It is a simple and known principle. It exists so as to provide the best possible conclusions. Where bad comparisons are knowingly used, the objective is usually to prove a conclusion arrived at ahead of time. It seems to me that the point you want to make, especially with the closing comment, is that it is bad policy, either generally or in the specific case of Iraq or Afghanistan, and that the US should not participate in COIN operations. There may in fact be good arguments for this, but to argue that COIN can only be best pursued with a doctrine of brutality is not one of them. The mass slaughter of civilians is not war. Brutal though the experience of war may be, brutality, on its own, is not war.

If it is your intention to speak credibly on the matter of counterinsurgency, then it behooves you to be well acquainted with the historical record for yourself. However, when I spoke of it in my message, I was thinking of the history of foreign interventions in the domestic politics of other countries during the period since the rise of nationalism, which I would generally date to the American Revolution. The British failed to understand the extent to which a shared identity had developed, and behaved in a fashion likely only to alienate the populace they were attempting to pacify. New Jersey is the perfect example, as its population was not strongly patriotic, and could easily have been turned against the cause. However, the actions of the army in that state in the winter of 76-7 did a tremendous amount to spoil that opportunity. Let's not even discuss Burgoyne's horribly mistaken Northern campaign, stupid appeal to the populace, and failure to recognize that the Revolutionary ideal was quite strong outside of New England. On the other hand, it is instructive how careful Washington was in any actions the army would take that might make civilians and local populations unhappy. In fact, he let the army suffer rather than impress necessary goods to the level authorized by Congress, and did so only when such impressments would serve the dual good of providing for his men and depriving the British, as in those conducted arounded Valley Forge in the Winter of 77-8. Finally, how the French participated in that war was exceedingly savvy -- they did not come in as the leading army, to defeat the British for the Americans. They participated as an ally, as the second force in support of the primary, the Continental Army. It was a truly brilliant example of how to intervene in the matter of regime change, not to be repeated until the Allies retook and rebuilt Western Europe almost two centuries later. From the Revolutionary War on, foreign armies would operate at a tremendous disadvantage on foreign soil unless they were very careful. Short term brutality might gain ephemeral advantage, but it was always the rare case that it could endure.

There is not a particularly good record for successful foreign intervention because the temper of modern conventional warfare is not built for the needs of such wars. But rather than lacking in necessary brutality, I would submit that this model lacks the proper restraint, the willingness to sacrifice not for territorial or geographical advantage, but simply for the protection and betterment of local populations. It's particularly difficult for Americans because ours is a culture of doing, not sitting and waiting for something to happen. We are impatient. It has helped us in many things -- the exploration and settlement of the territory (at the cost of a terribly brutal campaign against the native tribes), the development of industry and mass transportation -- but it does not serve foreign counterinsurgency. Maybe that's a small price to pay -- or it is perhaps a weakness that enemies will note and play upon. So, it would be better if the US can figure out a means to effective COIN practices.

As for Kilcullen, I've seen the man speak. He seems intelligent. While I'm sure he believes that he has arrived at a good model, I can hardly believe he wants his ideas raised to the level of a religion to be quoted as dogma. Slapout got there before me with his point that doctrine ought to be a starting point, a thing to get personnel thinking, but it is not a prescription. Specifically as concerns the "mirror" point, to be nothing more than a photocopy of the insurgent would be folly, as the need is to be better. My impression is that good COIN practice requires that you address the issues of concern that the insurgent has raised and which resonate with the populace.

The problem for military doctrine and COIN is that, unlike conventional war, where you fight and defeat first, and then do the recovery piece second, in an insurgent war you must do both simultaneously. So, every piece of military activity must accord with the social, political, and economic policies that are simultaneously being pursued. This is mightily difficult.

Jill

[JMA]

JMA --

The goal in any analysis of past events to inform current policy is to find comparable examples. It is a simple and known principle. It exists so as to provide the best possible conclusions. Where bad comparisons are knowingly used, the objective is usually to prove a conclusion arrived at ahead of time. It seems to me that the point you want to make, especially with the closing comment, is that it is bad policy, either generally or in the specific case of Iraq or Afghanistan, and that the US should not participate in COIN operations. There may in fact be good arguments for this, but to argue that COIN can only be best pursued with a doctrine of brutality is not one of them. The mass slaughter of civilians is not war. Brutal though the experience of war may be, brutality, on its own, is not war.

My closing comment was to question whether in the light of history the US/Brits and others believe that what was/is being achieved was/is worth the cost. Time will tell and my gut tells me that history will judge the cost of the victory as too high.

In the case of foreign intervention (by a western power) against an insurgency one needs to accept that 1) there are grounds for a rebellion/uprising/insurgency, 2) that peaceful means to have these issues addressed would have already been exhausted. If sheer brutality was to be used to crash the aspirations of the people it would have already been done (like in Zimbabwe, Tibet and Sri Lanka for example).

Peace under such circumstances would require a political accommodation which would undermine the stated aims and objectives of the insurgents.

You are probably correct in that the US should not get involved to any great extent in counter insurgency wars... unless they start to accept there is a difference between conventional warfare (Dessert Storm) and what is needed in Afghanistan.

Can the US achieve this? Sure. It will just require a paradigm shift in the mental approach to warfare.

snip

There are many examples out there but not many recent ones where counterinsurgency wars were won without having had to give away the farm.

There is not a particularly good record for successful foreign intervention because the temper of modern conventional warfare is not built for the needs of such wars. But rather than lacking in necessary brutality, I would submit that this model lacks the proper restraint, the willingness to sacrifice not for territorial or geographical advantage, but simply for the protection and betterment of local populations. It's particularly difficult for Americans because ours is a culture of doing, not sitting and waiting for something to happen. We are impatient. It has helped us in many things -- the exploration and settlement of the territory (at the cost of a terribly brutal campaign against the native tribes), the development of industry and mass transportation -- but it does not serve foreign counterinsurgency. Maybe that's a small price to pay -- or it is perhaps a weakness that enemies will note and play upon. So, it would be better if the US can figure out a means to effective COIN practices.

Yes, I agree that the US will not allow itself the freedom to crush an insurgency but rather just assist the beleaguered country to reach some sort of peace through (eventual) negotiation. The US must know that there is no possibility of any great victory only a negotiated peace where their friendly regime will probably have to give the farm away to achieve that.

As for Kilcullen, I've seen the man speak. He seems intelligent. While I'm sure he believes that he has arrived at a good model, I can hardly believe he wants his ideas raised to the level of a religion to be quoted as dogma. Slapout got there before me with his point that doctrine ought to be a starting point, a thing to get personnel thinking, but it is not a prescription. Specifically as concerns the "mirror" point, to be nothing more than a photocopy of the insurgent would be folly, as the need is to be better. My impression is that good COIN practice requires that you address the issues of concern that the insurgent has raised and which resonate with the populace.

Kilcullen certainly has value. The more I read his stuff the more little gems I find buried in there. Read him read Galula, read McCuen, read the whole lot and fill your database with possibilities.

It is the government which needs to address the grievances which lie behind the insurgency. US/Brit/NATO intervention can merely assist to provide stability while this process runs its course. It might take a while for the regime to accept that the grievances need to be seriously/genuinely addressed.

The problem for military doctrine and COIN is that, unlike conventional war, where you fight and defeat first, and then do the recovery piece second, in an insurgent war you must do both simultaneously. So, every piece of military activity must accord with the social, political, and economic policies that are simultaneously being pursued. This is mightily difficult.

Jill

That difficulty lies at the top and at probably division and brigade level. By the time it gets down the line the troops have their RoE and their SOPs and the like and are free of the really sensitive "joint" planning and strategy headaches.

At platoon level it gets quite simple. "There are some insurgents in them thar hills, go find them and kill them, and make sure you don't kill any civvies or break their stuff in the process."

[Steve the Planner]

Policy School 101---An accurate PROBLEM DEFINITION.

Dayuhan's observation that, in Iraq and Afghanistan, we removed an unwanted government---opposition/conflict emerged in the wake.

Ambassador Crocker was recently quoted along the lines that, at last, the Iraqis can get on with the messy process of sorting out their differences, and future without us in the middle.

A lot of echos to above comments.

[Bill Moore]

I agree that the study of history for military professionals is critical for their development, but the study of history alone without classes on critical thinking and a command climate that fosters critical thinking can actually be a detriment.

Sargent wrote,

The goal in any analysis of past events to inform current policy is to find comparable examples. It is a simple and known principle. It exists so as to provide the best possible conclusions. Where bad comparisons are knowingly used, the objective is usually to prove a conclusion arrived at ahead of time.

All too often, especially today, we have military professionals who have a read a couple of books on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and based on this limited knowledge base they have formed biases that encourage them to bring preconceptions to the table (or as Sargent wrote, prove a conclusion arrived at ahead of time). Often, and without so much as a second thought, they'll spout out the center of gravity is the populace (or another accepted truth), and the planners will be directed to focus on methods to win their hearts, while ignoring other issues. Of course there is are no historical examples where we have won by solely focusing our efforts on winning the hearts of the populace, but that doesn't seem to matter when you have a limited understanding of history and are not required to think critically.

Steve the Planner got it right, policy 101 is correctly identifying the problem, but that so much easier said than done.

[Ron Humphrey]

Policy School 101---An accurate PROBLEM DEFINITION.

Dayuhan's observation that, in Iraq and Afghanistan, we removed an unwanted government---opposition/conflict emerged in the wake.

Ambassador Crocker was recently quoted along the lines that, at last, the Iraqis can get on with the messy process of sorting out their differences, and future without us in the middle.

A lot of echos to above comments.

My closing comment was to question whether in the light of history the US/Brits and others believe that what was/is being achieved was/is worth the cost. Time will tell and my gut tells me that history will judge the cost of the victory as too high.

Although I'll admit that you may well be correct There is also a good possibility that the actual judging finds that the cost were higher then should have been, due mainly to our belated recognition or perhaps better stated recollection of many principles we should have remembered from the start.

There are many examples out there but not many recent ones where counterinsurgency wars were won without having had to give away the farm.

Yes, I agree that the US will not allow itself the freedom to crush an insurgency but rather just assist the beleaguered country to reach some sort of peace through (eventual) negotiation. The US must know that there is no possibility of any great victory only a negotiated peace where their friendly regime will probably have to give the farm away to achieve that.

There again; although in the end this may be an accurate description of end states, would that not in and of itself mean that those governments in question had re-established a position of great enough strength to have regained ownership of aforementioned farms.

Kilcullen certainly has value. The more I read his stuff the more little gems I find buried in there. Read him read Galula, read McCuen, read the whole lot and fill your database with possibilities.

It is the government which needs to address the grievances which lie behind the insurgency. US/Brit/NATO intervention can merely assist to provide stability while this process runs its course. It might take a while for the regime to accept that the grievances need to be seriously/genuinely addressed.

Agreed on both with addition of a question

Doesn't the latter sound an awful lot like what we are doing?

That difficulty lies at the top and at probably division and brigade level. By the time it gets down the line the troops have their RoE and their SOPs and the like and are free of the really sensitive "joint" planning and strategy headaches.

At platoon level it gets quite simple. "There are some insurgents in them thar hills, go find them and kill them, and make sure you don't kill any civvies or break their stuff in the process."

I'll leave that alone except to respectfully disagree

The goal in any analysis of past events to inform current policy is to find comparable examples. It is a simple and known principle. It exists so as to provide the best possible conclusions.

I'd personally put this differently

The goal in any analysis of past events to inform current policy is to find comparable principles.
It is a simple and known fact. It exists so as to provide
the most accurate list of possible conclusions or expected end states.

Thats just me though...

I have to agree heartely with the rest of your post,
especially--

It's particularly difficult for Americans because ours is a culture of doing, not sitting and waiting for something to happen. We are impatient. It has helped us in many things -- the exploration and settlement of the territory (at the cost of a terribly brutal campaign against the native tribes), the development of industry and mass transportation -- but it does not serve foreign counterinsurgency. Maybe that's a small price to pay -- or it is perhaps a weakness that enemies will note and play upon. So, it would be better if the US can figure out a means to effective COIN practices.



The problem for military doctrine and COIN is that, unlike conventional war, where you fight and defeat first, and then do the recovery piece second, in an insurgent war you must do both simultaneously. So, every piece of military activity must accord with the social, political, and economic policies that are simultaneously being pursued. This is mightily difficult.

Jill