Time for a FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency Update

[Ron Humphrey]

Policy School 101---An accurate PROBLEM DEFINITION.

Dayuhan's observation that, in Iraq and Afghanistan, we removed an unwanted government---opposition/conflict emerged in the wake.

Ambassador Crocker was recently quoted along the lines that, at last, the Iraqis can get on with the messy process of sorting out their differences, and future without us in the middle.

A lot of echos to above comments.

My closing comment was to question whether in the light of history the US/Brits and others believe that what was/is being achieved was/is worth the cost. Time will tell and my gut tells me that history will judge the cost of the victory as too high.

Although I'll admit that you may well be correct There is also a good possibility that the actual judging finds that the cost were higher then should have been, due mainly to our belated recognition or perhaps better stated recollection of many principles we should have remembered from the start.

There are many examples out there but not many recent ones where counterinsurgency wars were won without having had to give away the farm.

Yes, I agree that the US will not allow itself the freedom to crush an insurgency but rather just assist the beleaguered country to reach some sort of peace through (eventual) negotiation. The US must know that there is no possibility of any great victory only a negotiated peace where their friendly regime will probably have to give the farm away to achieve that.

There again; although in the end this may be an accurate description of end states, would that not in and of itself mean that those governments in question had re-established a position of great enough strength to have regained ownership of aforementioned farms.

Kilcullen certainly has value. The more I read his stuff the more little gems I find buried in there. Read him read Galula, read McCuen, read the whole lot and fill your database with possibilities.

It is the government which needs to address the grievances which lie behind the insurgency. US/Brit/NATO intervention can merely assist to provide stability while this process runs its course. It might take a while for the regime to accept that the grievances need to be seriously/genuinely addressed.

Agreed on both with addition of a question

Doesn't the latter sound an awful lot like what we are doing?

That difficulty lies at the top and at probably division and brigade level. By the time it gets down the line the troops have their RoE and their SOPs and the like and are free of the really sensitive "joint" planning and strategy headaches.

At platoon level it gets quite simple. "There are some insurgents in them thar hills, go find them and kill them, and make sure you don't kill any civvies or break their stuff in the process."

I'll leave that alone except to respectfully disagree

The goal in any analysis of past events to inform current policy is to find comparable examples. It is a simple and known principle. It exists so as to provide the best possible conclusions.

I'd personally put this differently

The goal in any analysis of past events to inform current policy is to find comparable principles.
It is a simple and known fact. It exists so as to provide
the most accurate list of possible conclusions or expected end states.

Thats just me though...

I have to agree heartely with the rest of your post,
especially--

It's particularly difficult for Americans because ours is a culture of doing, not sitting and waiting for something to happen. We are impatient. It has helped us in many things -- the exploration and settlement of the territory (at the cost of a terribly brutal campaign against the native tribes), the development of industry and mass transportation -- but it does not serve foreign counterinsurgency. Maybe that's a small price to pay -- or it is perhaps a weakness that enemies will note and play upon. So, it would be better if the US can figure out a means to effective COIN practices.



The problem for military doctrine and COIN is that, unlike conventional war, where you fight and defeat first, and then do the recovery piece second, in an insurgent war you must do both simultaneously. So, every piece of military activity must accord with the social, political, and economic policies that are simultaneously being pursued. This is mightily difficult.

Jill