Time for a FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency Update

[Steve the Planner]

Oh, what a tangled web we weave when we ask the Big Army to become a nation builder/political gap closer.

They are a force designed to kill, capture, etc... and, on the side, do short-term immediate response humanitarian relief/disaster recovery efforts where their unique logistical structure is both appropriate and irreplaceable.

Somehow, the lines got crossed so that the Pentagon took on missions not do-able through UN, DoS/USAID, and nobody had the gumption to say anything other than "Hua!," when they should have said "Hooey!."

The FM is a result of the political/admin/mission creep confusion that brought us to this point.

Where I disagree with Gentile is the level of critique/reassessment.

I think that Iraq today forms an excellent lab to compare what we did to what resulted. No need to draw inaccurate correlations to obscure alternatives.

The analysis, though, should be done by competent civilians, and not military, or they will just miss the whole point (over-and-over).

Steve

[Entropy]

Steve does make a good point however, better, more realistic doctrine can potentially improve militry advice given to policymakers.

Still, let's say we started updating FM3-24 tomorrow - when would the revisions be complete? 3-4 years maybe?

[William F. Owen]

Still, let's say we started updating FM3-24 tomorrow - when would the revisions be complete? 3-4 years maybe?

3-4 years for an Irregular Warfare TTP manual? Nothing about so-called COIN needs "inventing" or much "thinking about." It's a "how to kill the bad guys - AND ONLY THE BAD GUYs - book," and context would be very important so it probably deal in very broad brush strokes, because what really matter is "Theatre Specific" Manuals like the CATOM.

[JMA]

3-4 years for an Irregular Warfare TTP manual? Nothing about so-called COIN needs "inventing" or much "thinking about." It's a "how to kill the bad guys - AND ONLY THE BAD GUYs - book," and context would be very important so it probably deal in very broad brush strokes, because what really matter is "Theatre Specific" Manuals like the CATOM.

This FM 3 -24 is designed for battaluion level and above "leaders and planners". So it's not a TTP manual.

What about something for the guys battalion level and down who actually are there to do the business? A doctrinal gap?

Start with what the private soldier needs to know to effectively fight this type of war and then take it from there. It doesn't matter what the colonels know if the soldiers on the ground know Jack.

[Ken White]

What about something for the guys battalion level and down who actually are there to do the business? A doctrinal gap?

It's marginally adequate, way too big and overly pedantic but that seems to be the trend nowadays...

Follow the link provided by Cav Guy on this page (LINK - big .pdf). Not much of any import in the rest of the thread...

[Infanteer]

No need for a "tactics in COIN" manual - tactics in COIN and tactics in a conventional fight are the same, just applied to a different environment (here comes the METT-TC thing again).

Offensive and defensive operations and patrolling, patrolling and patrolling. That and learn how to eat with the locals.

[JMA]

No need for a "tactics in COIN" manual - tactics in COIN and tactics in a conventional fight are the same, just applied to a different environment (here comes the METT-TC thing again).

Offensive and defensive operations and patrolling, patrolling and patrolling. That and learn how to eat with the locals.

As simple as that? Now I am begining to understand where it is all going wrong out there...

[William F. Owen]

No need for a "tactics in COIN" manual - tactics in COIN and tactics in a conventional fight are the same, just applied to a different environment (here comes the METT-TC thing again).

Offensive and defensive operations and patrolling, patrolling and patrolling. That and learn how to eat with the locals.

only correct IF you got trained right in the first place. When I was doing my basic in 1980, all the training was peppered with Northern Ireland TTPs. The problem was that by 1988 when I was doing Recce Commanders, NI TTPs had washed out what you needed to fight a Soviet MRR.

[JMA]

It's marginally adequate, way too big and overly pedantic but that seems to be the trend nowadays...

Follow the link provided by Cav Guy on this page (LINK - big .pdf). Not much of any import in the rest of the thread...

OK, now we are making progress. FM3-24-2 "establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for tactical counterinsurgency (COIN)
operations at the company, battalion, and brigade level."

Now for platoon and section/squad level, anyone?

[Bob's World]

Steve does make a good point however, better, more realistic doctrine can potentially improve militry advice given to policymakers.

Still, let's say we started updating FM3-24 tomorrow - when would the revisions be complete? 3-4 years maybe?

IMO the problems, while significant, are largely nuance. If one just went through the current manual and addressed those points of nuance it would only take 3-4 weeks.

So, 3-4 weeks to make the fixes, 3-4 years to get such a manual approved.

Or, as WILF suggests, merely label all citizens who support violent opposition to the government as enemies of the state (regardless of the fact that they often have no legal options to effectively oppose the state) and kill them. Simple and effective. These are problems that can be easily suppressed if we would simply man up and deal with them. 4 out of 5 dictators endorse this option (the 5th was assassinated by his royal guard and unavailable for comment).

[slapout9]

Or, as WILF suggests, merely label all citizens who support violent opposition to the government as enemies of the state (regardless of the fact that they often have no legal options to effectively oppose the state) and kill them. Simple and effective. These are problems that can be easily suppressed if we would simply man up and deal with them. 4 out of 5 dictators endorse this option (the 5th was assassinated by his royal guard and unavailable for comment).

Bob, sometimes Wilf is right. There are situations where that may be the best option.

[Polarbear1605]

Just of interest...I recently attended a book signing for David Kilcullen. At the beginning of his comments to the attendees (SWJ/Quantico sponsored event 60 - 80 folks were there) he stated the FM needs to be re-written and is out of date (he also stated that it was out of date from day one because things are always changing and we are always learning). He also stated that yes part of counter insurgency is killing bad guys...that didn't come across in the FM because everyone was thinking the military already knew how to do that.

[William F. Owen]

At the beginning of his comments to the attendees (SWJ/Quantico sponsored event 60 - 80 folks were there) he stated the FM needs to be re-written and is out of date (he also stated that it was out of date from day one because things are always changing and we are always learning).

I used to have great respect for Dave, back in the day, but I think he's wrong these days, unless I am not understanding what I keep reading.
a.) FM3-24 was not out of date. It was wrong and bad.
b.) We keep learning? Sorry, what crushes a rebellion hasn't really changed. What has changed is the constraints place by policy.
NOW, - I admit, my ideas have changed. I have learnt. I have publicly viewable record of my though in the 3,000+ posts here, BUT my ideas now all conform to what got taught back in the old days and was written down a long time ago. The problem with the COIN-fusion is that is simply ignored history to pursue either the avant-garde or reputations.

He also stated that yes part of counter insurgency is killing bad guys...that didn't come across in the FM because everyone was thinking the military already knew how to do that.

....yet clearly that was the source of the problem because they weren't killing the right people and only the right people.

[Infanteer]

As simple as that? Now I am begining to understand where it is all going wrong out there...

Well, in 7 months of COIN I did three things:

1. Employed Basic Infantry Doctrine;

2. Tried, as much as possible, to know my backyard; and

3. Respected/Observed Afghan culture.

To me, nothing here requires a new manual. If I'm missing anything, please enlighten me.

only correct IF you got trained right in the first place.

Well, that is sort of implied. If I send a poorly trained person to do something, I'm probably not going to get the results I want.

b.) We keep learning? Sorry, what crushes a rebellion hasn't really changed. What has changed is the constraints place by policy.

Agreed - anyone can be defeated, we just aren't willing to acknowledge or accept much of that threshold these days (Jim Storr said that in a conversation we had). I think today's junk-COIN is an effort by the military to find something around that. Unfortunately, in my opinion, it's just farting around with no real solution (because you aren't approaching that threshold).

[Compost]

I just returned the questionnaire inviting outside comments on the revision of FM 3-24. I thought the writing committee's decision to open the process to a wider range of civilians deserved a response. I look forward to learning the results and also the findings of Colonel Gentile's current study of counterinsurgency and generalship.

Interesting comment posted by DavidPB4 on 23 November 2011 at SW Journal on COIN is Dead: US Army must Put Strategy over Tactics.


Electrical copies of JP 3-24 and FM 3-24 each dated 5 Oct 2009 seem to be the prime publicly available references on American COIN doctrine. Until now I had assumed that those and other manuals were revised on a frequent basis to incorporate feedback from current operations and then securely distributed to military users. However, the above quote and the content of this thread suggest that update of doctrine and re-issue of manuals is ad-hoc and infrequent.

The work done by armed forces benefits from having an agreed current goal and plan of action usually guided by general instructions on what is to be done, and to some extent how it is to be done. Even when that general instruction or doctrine is erroneously referred to as COIN it must assuredly provide some mix of useful and less useful - or even uselessly out-of-area/context - guidance.

All problem-solving doctrine needs to be adaptive and to some extent it may also be anticipatory. To continue stuck at some time in the past can delay improvement and achievement. Medieval monks were comforted by the belief that what they dealt with was immutable and omnipotent. They laboriously completed, copied and distributed manuscripts in a leisurely manner. They also used colour to illuminate manuscripts and support superstition.

In this modern era it is possible to revise and widely distribute soft-copy doctrine in relatively quick time. Also colour can be readily used to highlight changes in text and to assist understanding and assimilation by showing both the ‘prior’ and ‘revised’ versions.

If the above comments are valid then it is past time to improve feedback and reissue of doctrine that is in heavy current use. That is feedback from any unit, signed off by and forwarded by the commander of that unit. It should be practicable for central staff with recent field experience to evaluate all such feedback and to revise, gain approval and re-issue doctrine on a regular and fairly frequent basis, say at four or six monthly intervals.

[Bob's World]

Bob, sometimes Wilf is right. There are situations where that may be the best option.

Slap,

No worries, Wilf on warfare is typically spot on. It's when he applies warfare to COIN where he starts to drift off track. Our reasonable (or unreasonable, as its really up to others to assess that status) minds will differ, but it is such public differing that makes SWJ such a handy tool.

The killing of certain insurgents absolutely needs to be a strong, well resourced, supporting effort of any COIN campaign. Main effort must be the repair of governance and re-earning the support of the populace through change, not charity.

As to the FID force (that intervening role we find ourselves in), I would strongly advise staying out of the insurgent killing business altogether, and to keep our focus on guiding governmental reform and mediating the popular voice into that process (or staying out of the mess altogether unless national interests truly demand our presence).

AQ and non-state UW organizations like them that seek to employ such insurgent organizations and populaces to conduct their acts of terror for them are another matter altogether, and for them we should show now mercy or respite, wherever they might hide. (Just don't listen to the Intel guys who paint everyone they talk to with their same stink, as that throws us right back into killing nationalist insurgents 9 times out of 10).

[slapout9]

As to the FID force

We really gotta come with a better name....sounds like a girls softball team

[William F. Owen]

Slap,
No worries, Wilf on warfare is typically spot on.

Thank you, but I think you overstate your case..

The killing of certain insurgents absolutely needs to be a strong, well resourced, supporting effort of any COIN campaign. Main effort must be the repair of governance and re-earning the support of the populace through change, not charity.

The population will support who ever has POWER, by having the monopoly on armed violence. ONCE that is done, then the political fixing can start.

[Fuchs]

ONCE that is done, then the political fixing can start.

It wouldn't, though.

[Bob's World]

Thank you, but I think you overstate your case..

The population will support who ever has POWER, by having the monopoly on armed violence. ONCE that is done, then the political fixing can start.

Time and again it is the "power" of a populace seeking liberty from tyranny that over comes the power of even the strongest and most effective of governments.

As to the trite catch-phrase of "monopoly on armed violence," I gladly toss it to the same bone pile where so many half-right phrases commonly associated with the efforts of intervening powers to suppress such popular uprisings duly belong.

The American populace was guaranteed freedoms of speech, the press and assembly so that movements such as the Civil Rights, and now the Tea Party, could not be deemed treason or insurgency by the sitting government; and were guaranteed the possession of our arms to ensure that they never grew too bold in their possession of some concept of "monopoly" on armed violence. It is the lack of such monopoly that leads to (ultimately) the stability of good governance. It is the presence of such monopoly that leads to the stability born of oppression.