Time for a FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency Update

[Dayuhan]

This oft stated position is simply not the case. AQ has no populace, true. AQ also has no power without its ability to leverage the populaces of others. AQ takes sanctuary in it's non-state status and employs an Islamist ideology to leverage and incite both individuals and organizations experiencing conditions of insurgency to support actions that advance the AQ cause, while advancing their own causes at the same time. Without the existance of significant conditions of insurgency in the many distinct states that AQ leverages their influence, this movement would be little more effective than that of Tim McVeigh and his little group of buddies.

AQ has been singularly ineffective at leveraging insurgency. What AQ has managed to leverage effectively is widespread resentment in the Islamic world toward foreign military intervention in Muslim lands. This is a very different thing. AQ’s efforts to muster insurgency against Muslim leaders they dislike have fallen flat on their faces: they have never drawn anything near the popular support needed to generate insurgency. The narrative that works for them is “expel the infidel from the land of the faithful”… they’ve tried others, but generally without much success. That’s why they have to keep provoking the infidel to make sure they keep intervening: without an intervening infidel to challenge, they have nothing.

AQ really got going in the first Gulf War. The KSA rejected Bin Laden's offer to protect them and brought in a very overt Western, US-led presence for that mission. A significant presence remained following the defeat of Saddam's push south; and not insignificant in this is that the Soviet threat no longer existed.

AQ really got going against us during the first Gulf War. They actually enjoyed far broader and deeper support during the anti-Soviet jihad, but we didn’t so much notice, because they were on our side.

The US presence in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s was only half of what AQ exploited. The other half, at least as important, was the global oil glut, the extremely low oil price, and the consequent extremely poor economic environment in Saudi Arabia. That created the perception, inaccurate but widespread, thet US troops were somehow forcibly keeping the price of oil low and impoverishing them. That was, of course, something AQ could and did exploit.

We do not, of course, have to change current policies to address this perception, because the conditions that generated it no longer exist. The US troops are no longer there, the oil glut is ancient history, oil prices are sky high, the Saudi economy is booming. The 1990s are gone, we no longer have to concern ourselves with that environment because it's already gone.

We may not like the Saudi government, but they know their people better than we do, and they know that if they provide security, stability, and prosperity, the vast majority of their people will not oppose them. As long as times are good, there will be no functional insurgency. A bit of terrorism here and there, but nothing they can’t handle, and as long as the boat has a solid tail wind the bulk of the populace won’t object if they lock up those who rock it.

US policy is to GWOT as Domestic Policy is to insurgency. Just as each state shapes the degree of the conditions of insurgency within their populace through the domestic policies they adopt and enact; so too does the US shape the degree of the conditions of international terrorism directed against us through the foreign policies we adopt and enact.

I think you vastly overestimate the degree to which we shape anything. There are many other influences out there, and many effects for which we are not the sole cause… and for which we are not the cause at all.

Actually Afghanistan had a very active insurgency in the Northern Alliance vs. the Taliban. We picked side and helped them to prevail to suit our goals against AQ....There was little insurgency by the Taliban until we enabled the current Karzai regime to emerge. Once it became clear what type of government we had enabled the Taliban insurgency quickly grew in strength to oppose it and our support to it.

I didn’t say there wasn’t insurgency in Afghanistan, I said we didn’t go there because of insurgency, certainly not to defend an allied government from insurgency. Realistically, the Taliban would have opposed any government we installed.

As to Iraq, much like the Balkans under Tito, Iraq under Saddam was a powderkeg of suppressed insurgency. We took the lid off and lit the fuse when we took Saddam out, and then naively were surprised when the whole thing blew up.

Again, there may have been insurgency, but that’s not why we went there… and while we may have removed the lid, what ensued was less “insurgency” than the very predictable armed competition to fill the vacuum left by Saddam’s removal. We may have backed one faction and called it “Government” and the others “insurgent”, but those distinctions existed in our minds, not in Iraq.

Most of these states call their insurgents "terrorists" and if you think the US is not a big supporter of counter-terrorism programs across our allied governments in the Middle East you are not paying attention. We know these are some of the most despotic regimes on the planet, and yet we support them as by and large they have been willing to work with us in the pursuit of our national interests in the region over the years.

They would say that you are calling their terrorists “insurgents”, and redefining the term “insurgency” to suit your arguments. How many of these states actually depend on US assistance to suppress their dissidents? Certainly not the Saudis.

As to the U.S. having the right or the influence to get these governments to address their domestic policies? Excellent point. We certainly have no right, and our influence is shrinking daily... Currently we are enabling destructive behavior. We need to change ourselves, and we need to then apply such tough love with our partners.

Tough love? Surely you jest… we’re not talking about cranky teens here, these are sovereign states, not our wards or dependents. We didn’t create their policies, we don’t meaningfully enable their policies, and we don’t have sufficient influence to force or persuade them to change their policies. Your proposition assumes that we hold a position of influence and authority that we simply do not have.

Since the fall of the Soviets we've been feeling a lot less contained, and the list of sovereign countries we have bombed, invaded, or economically attacked through sanctions is growing larger and larger, while the rationale for doing so is becoming smaller and smaller.

Is this really true? Add up our intervention rates pre and post cold war; it may be surprising.

(As to the Philippines, every GCC was looking for some place to get into the fight. PACOM picked the Philippines as the Government agreed to allow them in under strict constraints and the auspicies of the training exercise "BALIKATAN". If not for 9/11 we would not be there in the manner we are today. I believe that the Government of the Philippines and their security forces have evolved in very positive ways through our intervention, but you are right, this was and remains largely a family squabble between a variety of distinct segments of the Philippine populace and their government. I fear that our presence enables the government to avoid making really hard decisions on substantive changes of domestic policies that could reduce the conditions of insurgency in a more enduring manner.)

Questionable. The conflict in the southern Philippines is at root not a fight between “a variety of distinct segments of the Philippine populace and their government”. It’s a fight between two distinct and fundamentally irreconcilable segments of the populace. The government has failed to act as referee, and has taken the side of the segment from which it is almost entirely drawn and to which it is effectively accountable. Can’t address that conflict until we face up to the reality that it is populace vs populace, not populace vs government. The proposed "solution" that we supported failed to address that reality, and crashed in flames before it left the runway. If we'd opened at least one eye we would still have had no solution, but we could have avoided association with a dysfunctional proposal.

I don’t think the Philippine government and security forces have evolved at all. They’ve learned to tell us what we want to hear and show us want to see (actually they learned this long ago), but the moment we’re out of sight they reset to default mode. If our presence was removed there would be no substantive change, just a return to the status quo ante.