Wow. Aside from the prurient war-porn aspects, and the frightening realization by many of us on this board that some circumstance could arise under which any one of us could have been that trigger puller, the fact remains that this admittedly extreme instance is within the Bell Curve of what happens in war--violence, night raids, collateral civilian damage.

But the mitigating circumstances that drive this unique example are not on the screens and sound tracks.

We have committed the US military to a series of complex internal political/civil/police engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan where the enemy was not always clear, the mission not adequately defined, planned and resourced, and with a military which, in most of the periods, was not trained, equipped or supported for this very complex political/social conflict environment.

I started out opposed to the war in Iraq, and remained so when, as a civilian adviser, I worked as part the the surge to end it. The Surge was a defined mission to get the military out (which it succeeded at), and not to defeat an enemy. Neither country could sustain a continuation.

The arm chair quarterback answer to that tape is that if we had gone into Iraq with adequate resources, intel, system and cultural understanding, and a greatly multiplied force, stability could have been gained more rapidly, and our exit would have been more likely earlier.

More important, if greater research, strategy and resources could have been brought more effectively for civilian control and administration, we would not, four years after occupation, be having Apaches and military ground patrols as our "last defense" for civilian stability.

Does anybody miss the point that soldiers on combat patrols create as much danger to a civilian population as, in some instances, the instability they seek to cure? What big military enemy necessitated that patrol on that day? Answer: The US military was the civilian administrator of last resort.

Look at Marjah. US military brought in to drive off the results of years of corrupt local police and government administrators. They are not there to fight the Taliban, but the political/governance problems that led to the Taliban. So 25,000 wise Marjans fled, and have yet to return.

Handing out $250,000 a week in CERP cash might give the appearance of economic life, but unless highly focused, the long-term result will probably follow the same pattern---war economy, war profiteers, instability.

As for the humanitarian component of CERP, it is a very inefficient, and often ineffective way to provide relief and stability. Again, the military is doing it because there is no other effective humanitarian mechanism.

As long as we continue to pursue these essentially civilian/political problems in these ways, and with these tools, we have the same results.

Afghanistan, in my opinion, poses no real obstacle to accomplishing realistic US objectives. The obstacles come from (1) a long track record of not doing things well, (2) the inability to conceptualize the problems and, then, apply the right solutions--before military engagement is the only option. The military can not fix the civilian/political problems as deployed, resources and supported.

Good soldiers, bad soldiers misses the point. In war this stuff will happen, and the more soldiers on military patrols, the more it will happen.

If, as Gen Casey says, we have another decade of these kinds of wars, we better start rethinking how to do them.