Ivory Coast

[Ken White]

It is our hoomaniterian duty to intervene. Everywhere. Everytime (unless it would really hurt, then we can let it slide...). Regardless of logic.

The fact that such foolishness almost invariably creates more problems than it solves is immaterial. The similar fact that it more often than not results in more casualties, long term, than the nominal crisis might produce is immaterial; we must be seen as doing 'good.'

Seldom are but it's the thought that counts...

As for Stan's very accurate comment on Clintonian installations or this one anyway -- there were others -- too true. Clintonia giveth and Clintonia taketh away, Indian giver be the name of the Clintonians.

Drop Somalia, Rwanda and Darfur (a case of a seminal event inhibiting reproduction leading to an abortion...). However, I'll see your Haiti and raise you a Kosovo.

[JMA]

It is our hoomaniterian duty to intervene. Everywhere. Everytime (unless it would really hurt, then we can let it slide...). Regardless of logic.

The fact that such foolishness almost invariably creates more problems than it solves is immaterial. The similar fact that it more often than not results in more casualties, long term, than the nominal crisis might produce is immaterial; we must be seen as doing 'good.'

Seldom are but it's the thought that counts...

Ken one should separate the motivation to intervene from the method of the intervention.

I can understand such a cynical attitude given the poor results track record but suggest that instead of turning one's back on humanitarian interventions the US should address the methodology.

While the US intervention in Libya has been a screw-up it is beneficial as a case study in a limited intervention without boots on the ground. If the US generals can't promise to improve on this poor performance next time then the US has a bigger problem than at first thought.

[Ken White]

Ken one should separate the motivation to intervene from the method of the intervention.

Sometimes possible, sometimes not. Sometimes driven by other factors not apparent to many. My point is simply that humanitarian interventions are rarely (read: almost never) successful, ergo they should be judged and /or entered into only very carefully. I'd also suggest the motivation no matter how altruistic to intervene can and usually will be hijacked to serve various other needs or desires and not just by the intervening party and / or those directly involved but by some nominal bystanders.

I can understand such a cynical attitude given the poor results track record but suggest that instead of turning one's back on humanitarian interventions the US should address the methodology.

It's not cynical, it's rejecting an illogical and proven failed concept.

I strongly disagree with humanitarian intervention in general and particularly think the US should avoid them. That for a variety of reasons including world attitude -- yours is typical -- toward the US which imposes significant US domestic and international constraints on types of action ans even impacts on where they might be helpful or harmful.

While the US intervention in Libya has been a screw-up it is beneficial as a case study in a limited intervention without boots on the ground. If the US generals can't promise to improve on this poor performance next time then the US has a bigger problem than at first thought.

You're mixing up your metaphors, as usual.

Not sure yet the US intervention in Libya is a screw up as viewed by you, we actually did a few things right on this one -- to include getting in and out quickly, getting Europe and the Arab League involved to at least an extent. Militarily unsound, politically quite well done.

The no boots on the ground (really silly term, that... ) was a political constraint imposed almost certainly by NATO consensus with UN connivance. So though your basic point -- that troops are required -- is correct, your rationale for why there are none is flawed as are many of your analyses which, as I've said before, are invariably militarily sound and politically naive.

Thus, the US and its Generals do not have a problem in this regard, both are really pretty good at doing what they should be doing -- I'll give you that they are not good at doing things they should not be doing.

Which is my point...

Humanitarian intervention by military force is an incongruous oxymoron.

[JMA]

Sometimes possible, sometimes not. Sometimes driven by other factors not apparent to many. My point is simply that humanitarian interventions are rarely (read: almost never) successful, ergo they should be judged and /or entered into only very carefully. I'd also suggest the motivation no matter how altruistic to intervene can and usually will be hijacked to serve various other needs or desires and not just by the intervening party and / or those directly involved but by some nominal bystanders.It's not cynical, it's rejecting an illogical and proven failed concept.

It is not only possible to separate the motivation to intervene from the operational method but essential. The military commander needs to receive his mission with any limitations to plan the operation.

It is interesting that in Woodward's book "Obama's Wars" he mentions that the chiefs seemed to stand up to the politicians in terms of the Afghanistan surge in that they apparently said there is but one option and were unwilling to provide a range of options for the politicians to dither over. A bit of spine at last?

Probably the main reason why humanitarian interventions don't seem to work is that they are only implemented when there is a major humanitarian crisis already. It takes this to spur them into action - except in Libya where it is true Obama did not wait until the mass graves were filling (but then faltered on the implementation which has led to the French and British calling for a more agressive approach from NATO.)

So in the case of the Ivory Coast the UN with troops already on the ground dithers and the country slips back into civil war. Unable to get Gbagbo out of his palace the Northern forces state that they will starve him out... until the French take them by the hand and show them just how easy it is to get him alive when you have a handful of trained soldiers to do the business.

In great fear of having shown their colonial hand the French immediately announce that they will be pulling most of their troops out of the Ivory Coast and are going to throw in hundreds of millions in aid and allow the Ouattara forces to claim that they in fact arrested Gbagbo.

So yes while it would have been militarily easy to remove Gbagbo from office many months ago and deter the military from taking his side right back in the beginning politically it was impossible for the French. The UN forces would claim they had no mandate to support the will of the people and did not until resolution 1975 have the authority to protect the civilians with any means necessary. There are lessons to be learned from all this.

Interesting to note that supposedly under the guise of going after heavy weapons they (the French and rthe UN) did in fact target Gbagbo as I'm certain that the French if no one else realised that they needed to go for the head of the snake... and they did and had in the end to intervene to bring Gbagbo in.

So I say again that the problems with humanitarian interventions is that the timing is mostly too late and the methodology leaves much to be desired.

The Somalia case study where what started as a humanitarian intervention ended up with a get Aideed dead or alive. So yes without the first principle of war being followed - the selection and maintenance of the aim - matters can soon get out of control.

etc etc

[RTK]

JMA - I'm beginning to understand where you're coming from.

The British follow 10 principles of war, closely related to the US's 9 but distinctly different. Your "selection and maintenance of the aim" is closely related to our "objective."

I think what you're saying is that by setting the aim or objective and following the principle of "mission command" methodology becomes less material than by dictating the methods used.

The mission command concept, being about trust in subordinates, intitiative, flexibility, and ingenuity, seems to be what you're really talking about.

I think mission command has a place in tactics, but less in national security strategy - I think there is still a necessity to get specific.

[JMA]

JMA - I'm beginning to understand where you're coming from.

The British follow 10 principles of war, closely related to the US's 9 but distinctly different. Your "selection and maintenance of the aim" is closely related to our "objective."

I think what you're saying is that by setting the aim or objective and following the principle of "mission command" methodology becomes less material than by dictating the methods used.

The mission command concept, being about trust in subordinates, intitiative, flexibility, and ingenuity, seems to be what you're really talking about.

I think mission command has a place in tactics, but less in national security strategy - I think there is still a necessity to get specific.

I see this on a few levels.

First when it was announced that NATO was to take over the command of Operation Odyssey Dawn I read something that made the hair on my neck stand up.

Coalition political committee to steer Libyan action, NATO to enforce no-fly zone

“The political committee will give broad directions for military action, keeping a close eye on avoiding any kind of excess use of force and also to streamline humanitarian aid that is of paramount importance as this whole operation is about humanitarian relief and saving lives from the sanguinary tactics of Gaddafi forces,” added the diplomat on condition of anonymity.

How any self respecting general can accept a command under those conditions I just don't know... maybe that's why they have two admirals

So lets start there with the need for a clear handshake between the politicians and the military. After that the chiefs should protect the force commander from political interference and any perceived need by the politicians to keep a close eye on anything.

As far as the commander is concerned the "best horse for the course" must be appointed. Not just pick the guy on top of the list or as the Brits do in Afghanistan rotate a brigadier through every six months to give all the chaps a chance.

The right guy will then make sure he gets all the intel he needs - even by flying in a bunch of old soldiers in retirement - so as to select the best operational method to achieve the mission (within any given limitations) in the current context, on the applicable terrain, against the specific enemy. Give him the tools and then let him get on with the job - with no oversight from some damn political committee.

Where the confusion seems to creep in seems to be in the hole in the US principles of war where the principle flexibility is missing.

Then the last US principle is Simple. KISS. Even the simple things can be difficult to carryout in a war. Do the politicians understand this?

Then we have what I see as the biggest problem today and that is it takes generals 30 years service and years of staff courses and the like to get into contention to command such an operation only to be tasked, overseen and second-guessed by a bunch of clowns whose only qualification is that their daddy contributed a few million to the President's campaign.

This Libya thing is really Mickey Mouse (or should have been) and was what the boys off that carrier could have wrapped up in an afternoon had the intention been there. The first 48 hours seemed to be bang on then it went all pear shaped.

Where was/is the problem? At the political/military handshake level or with the military or where?

[carl]

...only to be tasked, overseen and second-guessed by a bunch of clowns whose only qualification is that their daddy contributed a few million to the President's campaign.

You forget sir, that Daddy's son almost certainly has an advanced degree from Harvard. No mere flyover person is he.

[Ken White]

It is not only possible to separate the motivation to intervene from the operational method but essential. The military commander needs to receive his mission with any limitations to plan the operation.

With which I totally agree. However, I do have one caveat -- while I agree with your entire post, my observation has been that the political will to do what you wisely suggest is too often lacking (unless pressured by the not always consistent news media).

It is interesting that... A bit of spine at last?

Correct as nearly as I can determine and due to the current SecDef in large part, I suspect.

... except in Libya where it is true Obama did not wait until the mass graves were filling (but then faltered on the implementation which has led to the French and British calling for a more agressive approach from NATO.)

Deliberately done; the long term political aspect from a US perspective and national interests (political reality again) outweighed the plight of the Libyans and the wishes of others in NATO...

Interesting to note that supposedly under the guise of going after heavy weapons they (the French and rthe UN) did in fact target Gbagbo as I'm certain that the French if no one else realised that they needed to go for the head of the snake... and they did and had in the end to intervene to bring Gbagbo in.

That particular insight is not peculiar to you and the French. The French are notoriously unconcerned with public opinion in their foreign adventures (and good for them!). The US, in contrast, is excessively (and foolishly IMO) concerned with that.

That sad fact is highly unlikely to change in the near term.

So I say again that the problems with humanitarian interventions is that the timing is mostly too late and the methodology leaves much to be desired.

I agree -- however, I think that factor is unlikely to change and thus makes such intervention far from beneficial in too many cases. It's fine to say what should be, dealing with what is becomes far more problematical.

The Somalia case study where what started as a humanitarian intervention ended up with a get Aideed dead or alive. So yes without the first principle of war being followed - the selection and maintenance of the aim - matters can soon get out of control.

Exactly. In that case the change of direction was precipitated by media reporting -- flawed, of course -- US domestic politics and two massive egos (three if one counts Aideed ). The errors in execution were triggered by more US ego problems on the ground. Hopefully, Somalia was an exceptional case but the issue of politics will invariably significantly impact, usually adversely, any intervention and humanitarian interventions are peculiarly subject to political manipulation.

I have not said humanitarian intervention should not occur, it should -- however, I believe that only very rarely should that intervention be military. To change that and rely on a military solution, the politics of democratic nations would have to be modified and I don't believe that would be wise...

ADDED:

Then we have what I see as the biggest problem today and that is it takes generals 30 years service and years of staff courses and the like to get into contention to command such an operation only to be tasked, overseen and second-guessed by a bunch of clowns whose only qualification is that their daddy contributed a few million to the President's campaign.

Yes -- that's the root answer to a number of your posts over the past months. Sadly....