Ivory Coast

[tequila]

Cote d'Ivoire: Our Turn to Flee

ABIDJAN, 25 March 2011 (IRIN) - Rachel* is saving up to go to Ghana, pinning her hopes on a friend living in the Ghanaian border town of Elubo, three hours’ drive east of Abidjan.

Rachel told IRIN that life had become intolerable. She had landed a job in early March, offering take-home pay of FCFA8,000 (about US$18) for an evening shift in an up-market bar. But the owners announced a few days later they could not pay staff. Liquidity problems had deteriorated with the closure of most of Abidjan’s banks. Business was falling off badly as customers faded away. Rachel’s job lasted just a couple of days.

“I went with some of the other people being laid off to try for jobs elsewhere, but there was nothing. There is no money out there and everyone has bills to pay: electricity, water, food, rent. It’s impossible”.

Rachel said she could cope with the disappointment of another job gone, but was tired of the gunfire at night. Until recently she had lived in Angré, a neighbourhood that had been relatively calm, but backs on to the southern fringe of Abobo, scene of the worst violence in Abidjan since the post-election crisis began in December 2010.

“I have visited Abobo and seen corpses on the streets,” Rachel explained. “No one should be made to see that sort of thing. Do they want people to die like animals? You kill everyone and you have no one left to govern.”

...

Interesting profile of how violence combined with worsening economic conditions driven by the instability is pushing people to flee Abidjan.

[JMA]

In my personnal experience, did try this in DRC through UN.
Full spectrum failure!
The pb is that no one is really keen in investing in phase 2 and even less in phase 1 on African soil, including African powers.
The main pb is to find an African army that is not committed to take advantage of the situation to do business first.

Like in Somalia African countries will send cannon fodder in if they get paid in US$ to do so and they then pay their soldiers in local currency. Where the hard currency ends up is anyones guess.

... what you correctly indicate as being the implementation problems with such an exercise is all the more reason to get in quick and neutralise the threat before it gains a momentum of its own. Kill the snake with a quick violent blow to the head.

[ganulv]

As I understand it they are merely seeking sanctions on Gbagbo. How on earth will this stop the slide towards civil war?

My better half has done a couple of stints of long-term ethnographic research in Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso so I have a little knowledge by proxy (and I spent a month in Burkina with her last summer). Trying to wait Gbagbo out seems to me completely and utterly prudent. The recent violence as I understand it is not a slide towards civil war but rather the disruption of a ceasefire. Gbagbo’ machinations are related to broader social tensions with a time depth of decades. Aggressively pushing him out of the picture will not ameliorate those tensions in any way but a heavy hand could well contribute to a complete abandonment of the ceasefire.

Libya and Côte d'Ivoire are apples and oranges. In the Ivorian case intertwined issues of citizenship, religion, and ethnicity are as far as I can tell much more relevant to the conflict than in the Libyan case. There is a robust civil society in Côte d'Ivoire while civil society in Libya would seem to be pretty much absent. And the Ivorian rebels possess some basic soldiering skills. I suspect that this fact has actually contributed to the fact that the civil war has not fully reignited at this point. Unlike the Libyans they seem able to formulate some realistic expectations of the odds facing them should the conflict escalate.

[JMA]

JMA:

The problematic in Ivory Coast is biased by the colonial past and use the US did of it to support Bagbo in the early stages. The French president did not ease the things when he made his allocution in Dakar saying African man have not yet entered history. (What an &*&^%$# !!!).

I'm interested to hear the French perspective on this. If I recall back to the Civil War 2002 onwards the French intervention was in the main effective. This because both sides blamed the French for being partisan - which is a good indicator.

The British get scared off easily by allegations that they are trying to reassert their colonial power (see Zimbabwe) but how sensitive are the French on this? It now seems that the US is now also super sensitive to allegations of neo-colonialism. Maybe we will have wait a decade or so for the Chinese to have so much to lose (read national interest) that they start to intervene to ensure stability.

Now you have a situation where use of force by people who have a good knowhow will be problematic as stigmatized as colonial enterprise in Africa. And African nation who have a decent knowhow are not willing because it will beak the AU unity (I am so sad if it happens ).

Look one must accept these idiotic claims to surface (because they have been used and worked well in the past). Take Gaddafi's playing to the "crusader" gallery. I believe if you get the aim right and you stick to it (you will know this because both sides will accuse you of bias) and don't stay too long you (the French) will be OK.

The lession learned of how not to do it (from Obama in Libya) is not to play the "reluctant bride" but rather get in quick, do the business and in this case hand over to Nigeria (ECOWAS) than adopt a low profile.

South Africa tried to come in but that did not work because one party did not want to.
Comes a point where you have to let the things go and limit your engagement in patching the wounds. It's sad for the people but it's also the awful reality.

Well is South Africa an honest broker? There is no history of that so far too early to try to push South Africa as a diplomatic solution. SA can offer Gbagbo refuge and a pension (like they did for Aristide) beyond that we have very little to offer... (sadly).

Also, I have concerns about the African solution to African problem policy. Liberia was and remain a good example of how things started with good will at the highest level turn into the worst nightmare ever.

Of course that is a nonsense and until we have a US president or European leader with balls nothing is going to change. What the will keep saying is you fund the whole exercise and we will do it the African way (and we all know what that means).

Concerning humanitarian action, I would be even quicker to get upset than Stan. The only level things can be (and are) blurred is the financial one. On the ground soldiers do their job and humanitarian theirs. It's good to keep it like this. Actually makes it safer for everybody.

I believe that when soldiers try to get involved in the actual humanitarian process that is where the problem starts. Soldiers make the peace, then keep the peace and provided protection and security for the humanitarian workers who would be UN or NGO people. ISAF has got this badly wrong in Afghanistan where they send you officers into villages iof a culture they will never being to comprehend in their time in-country to engage with the village elders... and in so doing show cultures the ultimate disrespect. Every 6 months another set of kids come along and ask them the same questions. What would the feeling be if an occupying force sent a twenty something kid to deal with the local town council of elected community "elders"?

In the mean time, Ivorians have to solve the problem. And in Ivory Coast, Bagbo does not have any air power anymore since he bombed a french camp.

The French reacted correctly then and I can guarantee you that Gbagbo will think twice before he puts in an airstrike on the French again. The UN peacekeepers are vulnerable though. I believe he has a gunships (from Belarus supposedly) - U.N. Says Belarus Sent Attack Helicopters to Ivory Coast

If he uses tanks for crowd control: then it will be another issue.
Otherwise, the alliance has enough military equipment and training to react and place their man at the top. May be pushing some in the regular army to turn their jacket as we say in french could be a good initiative.

A million displaced people, 650-700 killed, and both sides putting together militias presents a bleak picture of the situation. Sad situation. Now the question must be asked how the UN let this situation slip away? The US it seems is not up for the challenge so to me it seems it lies with the French supported by Nigeria. (Now that's a new alliance)

[Stan]

The decision was made to take out all the air defences and whatever (which to be fair was what the world was told right up front before UNSC 1973 was passed).

There seems to be some confusion whether UNSC Res 1973 authorised the targeting of Gaddafi or not.

Not sure how outright killing COL G was part of the resolution to create a no fly zone. I think there’s sufficient evidence of what happens to a military commander who thinks and does what’s best while never being authorized to do so

Am I to assume then that neither State not the Pentagon draw on this local knowledge of US citizens? If this is the case then why deploy these people to all these exotic places in the first place? It certainly doesn't make a lot of sense.

To some extent the Pentagon does draw on us and the State Dept has a system in place in each country that allows those to be part of an emergency system. As far as those exotic places and the system that sends us there… you got me ! Only the FAO program seems to have a proven track record but not a clear record on future use of assets.

Surely not possible in a country that champions free speech?

That was actually a European that told me I was evil based on what I thought was just a question (which, has yet to be answered).

What other focus should a military have other than victory ?

After five attempts - all deleted by myself because they would yield infractions - I think I can write this:
You are in really, really evil company with this attitude and just earned a huge load of disrespect by writing that line.

Enough said for now !

That is true and that is why humanitarian demining is carried out by contractors.

Not exactly JMA. Most of the contracts for demining are just cheap and end up with many untrained locals. Similar to Africa and Cambodia, the local governments severely impact the programs and in some cases refuse assistance (not enough or no kickbacks). Contractors and locals have neither ability nor right to question the local government. Military demining is not ideal either. In cases like Georgia with demilitarized zones and availability of troops it’s just not practical.

In the case of the military component of a humanitarian intervention there are probably two or more phases. The first will be the need to stop the violence and in the places you and I know that means by using maximum violence. Once the perpetrators have been crushed you can swing over to the second phase and introduce different troops trained in civic action and all that stuff to take over and keep the peace and protect the civilian authority while they rebuild the place. The peacemakers go home after phase one. Not too many twenty-something year olds who can switch from killer-mode to kissing babies in an instant.

To some extent I agree with that. We have to eliminate the threat before we physically demine. That threat part is never defined and the way to deal with it barely explained.

While I have little good to say about politicians in any county it must be said that the respective militaries should have wised up to this requirement and taken the necessary steps to cater for it by now.

Hmmm, the politicians are going to listen to the military ?

[M-A Lagrange]

[QUOTE]

I'm interested to hear the French perspective on this. If I recall back to the Civil War 2002 onwards the French intervention was in the main effective. This because both sides blamed the French for being partisan - which is a good indicator.

The British get scared off easily by allegations that they are trying to reassert their colonial power (see Zimbabwe) but how sensitive are the French on this? It now seems that the US is now also super sensitive to allegations of neo-colonialism. Maybe we will have wait a decade or so for the Chinese to have so much to lose (read national interest) that they start to intervene to ensure stability.

About the Sarkosy speetch? All of us living in Africa have been up set (for the nice one).
Saying that we defend our colonial pre-carre? Well, it would be hypocrit to say French government does not do so. The France-Afrique (na frique= France the money dealer; a word play from Bongo father if I recall well) died, long live the king!
More seriously, France is France and is still trying to keep a strong hand in Africa. Do African want it is another question.
They probably will cry for help the day chinese soldiers will hit their ground to establish "stability". Personnaly, I am not that in hurry to see it come.

Look one must accept these idiotic claims to surface (because they have been used and worked well in the past). Take Gaddafi's playing to the "crusader" gallery. I believe if you get the aim right and you stick to it (you will know this because both sides will accuse you of bias) and don't stay too long you (the French) will be OK.

The lession learned of how not to do it (from Obama in Libya) is not to play the "reluctant bride" but rather get in quick, do the business and in this case hand over to Nigeria (ECOWAS) than adopt a low profile.

Are you impying that SA wants to hand over its African Super Power position to Nigeria? Are you sure that's a good idea?

Well is South Africa an honest broker? There is no history of that so far too early to try to push South Africa as a diplomatic solution. SA can offer Gbagbo refuge and a pension (like they did for Aristide) beyond that we have very little to offer... (sadly).

MBeki tried and failed but anyone else would have failed. Honesty has nothing to do with that. Gbagbo is the problem: he is the symbol of the african bias of democracy is a colonial stuff not made for Africa. (I just hate that posture from african leaders and military staff)
African people have the right to live with legitimate governments that listen to them. (My personnal cross...)

Of course that is a nonsense and until we have a US president or European leader with balls nothing is going to change. What the will keep saying is you fund the whole exercise and we will do it the African way (and we all know what that means).

Why is the west still the only solution? Because of above!

I believe that when soldiers try to get involved in the actual humanitarian process that is where the problem starts. Soldiers make the peace, then keep the peace and provided protection and security for the humanitarian workers who would be UN or NGO people. ISAF has got this badly wrong in Afghanistan where they send you officers into villages iof a culture they will never being to comprehend in their time in-country to engage with the village elders... and in so doing show cultures the ultimate disrespect. Every 6 months another set of kids come along and ask them the same questions. What would the feeling be if an occupying force sent a twenty something kid to deal with the local town council of elected community "elders"?

I believe we all agree

The French reacted correctly then and I can guarantee you that Gbagbo will think twice before he puts in an airstrike on the French again. The UN peacekeepers are vulnerable though. I believe he has a gunships (from Belarus supposedly) - U.N. Says Belarus Sent Attack Helicopters to Ivory Coast

Then lets get a resolution for a no sailing zone!

A million displaced people, 650-700 killed, and both sides putting together militias presents a bleak picture of the situation. Sad situation. Now the question must be asked how the UN let this situation slip away? The US it seems is not up for the challenge so to me it seems it lies with the French supported by Nigeria. (Now that's a new alliance)

Actually easier to say than to do.
In your post, I can read a will of disengagement from SA in the African pb. Is the situation in SADC that bad? Is the Mandela legacy in this organisation that bad?

[ganulv]

If I recall back to the Civil War 2002 onwards the French intervention was in the main effective.

Not as effective as the national side’s qualification for the World Cup finals tournament. In the courte durée the intervention kept the belligerents separated but we’re now seeing just how much it seems to have effected the underlying problems.

The French reacted correctly then and I can guarantee you that Gbagbo will think twice before he puts in an airstrike on the French again.

The French reaction strikes me as justified but then again I don’t know enough about the laws and customs of war to actually have an informed opinion. But given that in the wake of the retaliation French expats had to be evacuated from the country at government expense and that the French military ended up killing at least twenty people in street riots facilitated by Gbagbo’s thugs I don’t know that I think they acted correctly. I acknowledge that hindsight is 20/20, but in any case, that’s a taste of what will occur if the French and/or other Europeans decide to strong arm Gbagbo offstage and the reason I feel the international response has been responsible to this point.

[jmm99]

The 2004 French–Ivorian clashes involved several incidents - the French destruction of the Ivorian Air Force being the key point. The "French Connection" in Côte d'Ivoire translates to Operation Unicorn, part of the UNOCI mandate.

While the UNOCI venture is usually described as a "peacekeeping" mission, it is in fact based on Chapter VII - peace enforcement - and provides an "all necessary means" mandate. That, of course, is the same language as used in the current Libyan mandate.

The 2004 specifics in Resolution 1528 (2004) re: the French forces (since renewed and extended) provided (emphasis added):

16. Authorizes for a period of 12 months from 4 April 2004 the French forces to use all necessary means in order to support UNOCI in accordance with the agreement to be reached between UNOCI and the French authorities, and in particular to:

– Contribute to the general security of the area of activity of the international forces,

– Intervene at the request of UNOCI in support of its elements whose security may be threatened,

– Intervene against belligerent actions, if the security conditions so require, outside the areas directly controlled by UNOCI,

– Help to protect civilians, in the deployment areas of their units;

The French actions were taken as an intervention against belligerent actions.

While some amount of retribution and reprobation undoubtedly underlay the French motives, the destruction of the Ivorian planes and occupation of airports are best justified by the principle of specific deterrence. That is, removal of the threat (evidenced by the attack) by removing the means for future attacks of the same kind.

That response (involving deadly force) is justified under the Laws of War (as accepted by the US, and apparently France in this incident), but not under the Rule of Law.

Regards

Mike

[M-A Lagrange]

Mike,

Your legal insides are, as always, much valuable. In the particular case of French military intervention in Ivory Coast, you have to distinguish 2 elements: the UN intervention and the French intervention.

UN intervention goes as you described it. It's partly part of the problem: when you stop a war without winner, the side feeling they are cheated always makes troubles. In that case Gbagbo.

French intervention was motivated by the threat Gbagbo caused on french citizens. Do not forget that first he sent his youth against the french military camp and then, as he couldn't take it, against french civilians. France reacted on the bases: you kill (or intended to kill) my people: I will protect them with deadly violence. A fair, natural and legaly approved response. That's for the 1st french intervention, before Licorne, that lead to the dead of 20 Gbagbo sympatisers.
On the bombing: Gbagbo voluntarely targetted a french military camp part of the UN mission. The reaction was part of a normal and fully legal motivated retaliation response to an act of war against a UN mandated military force. My point being that it's not because you are part of the UN that you have to let crazy guys do what ever they want because they appologies. Here in fact the question is political rather than legal as the UN do recognise the right of selfdefense for the blue elmets.
Was the response deadlier than the threat? I personnaly do not think so. As you just said,

While some amount of retribution and reprobation undoubtedly underlay the French motives, the destruction of the Ivorian planes and occupation of airports are best justified by the principle of specific deterrence. That is, removal of the threat (evidenced by the attack) by removing the means for future attacks of the same kind.

On the question of rule of law, I would be less specific than you. But I'm not objective: i'm french.

[M-A Lagrange]

Can't remember if I saw it on the threat. In case of:

Resolution of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of Ecowas on the Situation in Cote d'Ivoire
25 March 2011
________________________________________
Abuja - Nigeria — The Authority of the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, meeting in Abuja from 23 to 24 March 2011 at its 39th Ordinary Summit;
Having exhaustively reviewed the rapidly deteriorating political, security and humanitarian situation in Côte d'Ivoire provoked by the disputed run-off presidential election of 28 November 2010;
Firmly condemning the wanton violence against civilians leading to unacceptable loss of life and property;
Deploring the deliberate targeting of innocent Ivorians, ECOWAS citizens and other foreigners, and also the attacks on personnel of the UN Mission in Cote d'Ivoire;
Deeply concerned by the large waves of refugees fleeing across borders and the swelling colonies of internally displaced persons;
Convinced that the current situation is a direct consequence of the refusal of the out-going President, Mr. Laurent Gbagbo, to cede power to Mr. Alassane Ouattara, the universally recognized winner of the 28 November 2010 election;
Recognizing that the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire has now become a regional humanitarian emergency; Recalling the Decisions of the Extraordinary Summits of the Authority of 7 and 24 December 2010, particularly regarding paragraph 10 of the latter, which states: "In the event that Mr. Gbagbo fails to heed (the) immutable demand of ECOWAS (to hand over power), the Community would be left with no alternative but to take other measures, including the use of legitimate force, to achieve the goals of the Ivorian people";
Bearing in mind that these Decisions have been endorsed by the African Union and the United Nations; Firmly decides that the time has come to enforce its Decisions of 7 and 24 December 2010 in order to protect life and to ensure the transfer of the reins of power to Mr. Alassane Ouattara without any further delay.
To this end, requests the UN Security Council to authorise the immediate implementation of the Authority Decisions of December 2010. In this context, requests the United Nations Security Council to strengthen the mandate of the United Nations' Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), enabling the Mission to use all necessary means to protect life and property, and to facilitate the immediate transfer of power to Mr. Alassane Ouattara;
Also requests the United Nations Security Council to adopt more stringent international targeted sanctions against Mr. Laurent Gbagbo and his associates;
Directs the President of the ECOWAS Commission to explore all avenues of providing the Government of Mr. Alassane Ouattara all the necessary legal and diplomatic means to exercise its authority, including admitting the Government to all meetings of ECOWAS. Urges all Member States of ECOWAS to facilitate the accreditation of Ambassadors and other representatives of Mr. Alassane Ouattara to their countries;
Further directs the President of the ECOWAS Commission to intensify contingency plans to meet all eventualities, including the provision of humanitarian corridors and the protection of civilians. Instructs the President of the ECOWAS Commission to take all appropriate measures to strengthen the ECOWAS presence in Côte d'Ivoire to facilitate the discharge of the responsibilities of the Community;
Urges the UN to request the international Community to ensure an enabling environment for the population and the UN Mission to go about their duties without any hindrance, and provide protection and welfare to the refugees and internally displaced persons generated by the crisis;
Finally, invites the African Union Commission to urgently implement the Decisions of the AU Peace and Security Council of 10 March 2011 on Côte d'Ivoire by despatching without delay the High Representative to the country and establishing the joint AU-ECOWAS facilitation team to ensure the immediate transfer of power to Mr. Alassane Ouattara.
The Authority decides to remain seized with the situation in Côte d'Ivoire.
Done at Abuja,
This 24th Day of March 2011
H.E. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan
Chairman For The Authority

http://allafrica.com/stories/201103250751.html

A lot to think about

[Stan]

The French reaction strikes me as justified but then again I don’t know enough about the laws and customs of war to actually have an informed opinion. But given that in the wake of the retaliation French expats had to be evacuated from the country at government expense and that the French military ended up killing at least twenty people in street riots facilitated by Gbagbo’s thugs I don’t know that I think they acted correctly. I acknowledge that hindsight is 20/20, but in any case, that’s a taste of what will occur if the French and/or other Europeans decide to strong arm Gbagbo offstage and the reason I feel the international response has been responsible to this point.

Street riots, automatic gunfire, burning tires, raping and pillaging -- Sounds much like my everyday life there

Not that M-A needs any defending herein...

Having attended many civil wars and assisted with countless evacuations in the region, I assure you that, whatever we do will be viewed as incorrect and excessive. The Gbagbos and Mobutus of the world will make full use of our actions and especially our inactions. As far as a "taste of what will occur" goes, imagine what an African approach to this problem would entail.

[ganulv]

The Gbagbos and Mobutus of the world will make full use of our actions and especially our inactions.

Mobutu certainly made use of the CIA action that helped oust Lumumba.

As far as a "taste of what will occur" goes, imagine what an African approach to this problem would entail.

I don’t want to put words in your mouth, but that sounds like you are implying that Africans are by nature ignorant and/or barbarous and therefore need the West to save them from themselves. Isn’t that day done?

[Stan]

No offense intended, Ganulv, but your proxy training resembles what Peace Corps, NGOs, State and AID agencies think and do for their relatively short tours on the Dark Continent. I’m afraid you need a real training session in the jungle (not in the city surrounded by whites and sleeping in a cozy apartment).

Mobutu certainly made use of the CIA action that helped oust Lumumba.

Let’s get out of the 60s and into 2009 and 2010 (although there’s little difference from say 1985 and 1990).

Agency actions may have helped Uncle Mo out, but putting him in power and keeping him there took a whole lot more than some minuscule battle with the Lumumbas and Kabilas then (and now). But this is not the issue. We neglected to tell them that one day they would fall from grace (no more money and no more ammo) and have to hold free elections and stop raping and pillaging. We ignorantly believed that we could actually tell them that, and they would simply step down with no fuss.

Now you are in the Africa I know, and not behind a desk.

I don’t want to put words in your mouth, but that sounds like you are implying that Africans are by nature ignorant and/or barbarous and therefore need the West to save them from themselves. Isn’t that day done?

I’m not intentionally implying anything and I have a decade in 11 countries to back my Bravo Sierra.

They don’t need the West at all. In fact, if we don’t intervene they will eventually take care of the problems just fine. But, can the West sit it out and watch horrific baby pictures, multiple rapes and assassinations on CCN prior to dinner and live with it? As I have already watched those imagines without the benefit of a filtered lens, I can honestly say we can’t take nor watch what we created, and now can’t stomach the appropriate action necessary to end it.

We are on a very different playing field and there is no place for the weak in any scenario, diplomatic or otherwise.

[jmm99]

from MAL
My point being that it's not because you are part of the UN that you have to let crazy guys do what ever they want because they appologies. Here in fact the question is political rather than legal as the UN do recognise the right of selfdefense for the blue elmets.

Whether the TdM trooper wears a kepi or blue hat, the TdM trooper has a right of personal self-defense. However, personal self-defense and national self-defense are two different animals

My reason for focusing on the UN resolutions is that the series of them from 2004 on provide a firm basis in I Law for the French to be in CdI and to do what they did.

As to unilateral humanitarian interventions, we enter a gray area in any given case. E.g., our 1983 Operation Urgent Fury, which is better known on Wiki as the "Invasion of Grenada". Some would argue that unilateral humanitarian interventions involving armed force in a denied entry situation are barred by the UN Charter, etc. - obviously the US and France do not totally accept that viewpoint.

The ECOWAS resolution is interesting in its request:

... to strengthen the mandate of the United Nations' Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), enabling the Mission to use all necessary means to protect life and property [JMM comment: similar to Libyan UNSC Res], and to facilitate the immediate transfer of power to Mr. Alassane Ouattara [JMM comment: goes beyond Libyan UNSC Res] ...

Both facets are within the broad legal scope of the UN Charter, Chapter VII - "Peace Enforcement".

I don't know what "targeted sanctions" are intended by ECOWAS with this language:

Also requests the United Nations Security Council to adopt more stringent international targeted sanctions against Mr. Laurent Gbagbo and his associates....

Do they include killling them ?

Colonialement

Mike

[Stan]

The ECOWAS resolution is interesting in its request:

Both facets are within the broad legal scope of the UN Charter, Chapter VII - "Peace Enforcement".

I don't know what "targeted sanctions" are intended by ECOWAS with this language:

Do they include killling them ?

Colonialement

Mike

Hei Mikko !
Targeted sanctions is an old term invented / recognized by the U.N. which most of us saw as a scape goat in the 90s (when they realized that their sanctions were actually causing more humanitarian problems that ousting the problem child).

We also thought that economic sanctions were tools to exert pressure without recourse to force... We've come a long way

Peace Enforcement is however a relatively new term replacing what the USA thought they were doing in Africa in the 90s --- We used to call it disarmament and political reconciliation as if the two had something to do with life in Africa

Terv, Stan

[Stan]

Isn’t that day done?

Just for S**ts and Grins I leave you with the following:

1990s

The Special Rapporteur, in accordance with paragraph 16 of resolution 1995/69 of the Commission of Human Rights, must evaluate the extent to which the Government of Zaire has taken its recommendations into account. Sadly, the results are disheartening.

117. In essence, there has been no progress on the following points...

The absolute power of the President is still in place; he administers politics; he controls the administration of the regions and the national bank and his deputies are the majority in the HCR-PT; the armed forces, the security services and the police follow his orders, with the result of impunity, contrary to the Sovereign National Conference agreements. A Government plan, which would create a Supreme Council of Defense and would revise the status of these bodies, is waiting for the response of the Armed Forces of Zaire, which on principle will not accept it.

Sounds like every country I have been in How 'bout those African countries you've been in ?

On to 2010 by the folks at Amnesty International

Despite an international agreement in 2003 to end the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo and two further agreements at the beginning of 2008 to end fighting in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, the DRC remains a combat zone. Millions of Congolese have perished, and over a million more have been displaced. Serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law have been committed in the eastern part of the country by armed groups and the national army.

Since the international war began in 1996, and up to the present, human rights defenders have faced threats, violence and even murder. Few of those responsible have been punished. Impunity reflects both a lack of will and the ineffectiveness of the Congolese military and civilian justice systems.

[ganulv]

but don’t assume that I understand why training in the jungle would help me understand anything about Côte d'Ivoire, a country with practically no jungle to speak of. Care to elaborate?

No offense intended, Ganulv, but your proxy training resembles what Peace Corps, NGOs, State and AID agencies think and do for their relatively short tours on the Dark Continent.

I have no clue how those guys train, but for what it is worth my on-the-ground contact describes being caught out on the streets of Bouké in the moments after the mutiny began in 2002 as among the most terrifying experiences in her life. Look, I think I made it pretty clear that I am not claiming to be a West Africa expert, but the vast majority of the media coverage and scholarly publications I have been exposed to related to the current situation in Côte d'Ivoire leave me shaking my head because despite the fact that I learned almost all I know about the situation at a remove from it I somehow know things these so-called experts apparently do not.

I didn’t chime in on this thread to get into a pissing contest, I chimed in to share some things that I know and some opinions I have. I welcome and in fact encourage any disagreement you may have with what I have to say. I acknowledge the value of what you have to add and the nature of how you came about it. You’ve spent a career putting out fires. I respect you because putting out fires is something that needs to be done in our world but something which almost no one has the onions to step up and do. What I do not respect is your apparent attitude that since I am not a firefighter I have nothing useful to say about how those fires you have fought in the past got started nor anything useful to say about how to prevent those that you might have to risk your life fighting in the future if they come to pass.

Sounds like every country I have been in How 'bout those African countries you've been in ?

The only African country I have ever been in is Burkina Faso—I was there for five weeks this summer—so what do you think? Just for ####s and giggles I leave you with the following: despite the fact that you have spent years of your life in Africa and I only five weeks of mine there, can you tell me something substantive about the history and society of Burkina Faso that I do not already know?

[jmm99]

I now know more about Targeted Sanctions than I probably want to - including Addressing Challenges to Targeted Sanctions.

Based on a quick read of the "Addressing Challenges" publication, these "targeted sanctions" end up being a legal quagmire - and a fruitless one at that. Or, am I being too cynical.

Have targeted sanctions worked in a speciifc case or cases ?

Topsi-tervi

Mikko

[M-A Lagrange]

Hey ganulv,

It's not a pissing contest. You're most welcome. Take it easy

What is your question in the end. What should US do? What should Gbagbo do? What should CIA do?

Asking the french to do the job will not work, that's for sure at the momment. But asking ECOWAS to do it will not work neither, just because they do not want to.
They can threat to use force but they will never do it because that means that one day, if they decide to contest election result in their country, their neighbours will use force against them.
So we are stuck in the mud!

I went to Burkina Faso 15 years ago and the situation was much different than now. US was a no issue (less than 5% of international aid/cooperation). Now the situation has changed.
But what was the interest of US in destabilising France influence in Ivory Coast in the first place? That's my question.

Mike,

I believe that killing a president in function does not enter into ECOWAS equation. Especially if it's a non elected president...

[carl]

I don’t want to put words in your mouth, but that sounds like you are implying that Africans are by nature ignorant and/or barbarous and therefore need the West to save them from themselves. Isn’t that day done?

This just my opinion on the very general subject of how political things get done in most of sub-Saharan Africa. Africans are not any more ignorant or barbarous than any other humans in the world. However, African political culture can be extremely violent and basic. Anybody who gets involved there should do so only if they recognize that in order to actually get things done, they have to be willing to kill people and that willingness has to be credible. Otherwise you are wasting your time.