Suppressive Fire

[Blah]

Greetings SWC,

Infantry tactics has always been a topic of interest to me, and here has always been a certain aspect that has been of particular interest me. As you can probably guess from the thread title, that aspect is suppressive fire.

I've read about the value of suppressive fire in an attack in order for the maneuver element to close in and destroy the enemy. I have little doubt regarding the validity of such a statement.

There is one particular point I'm having some difficulty wrapping my head around however, and it has to do with what I believe is the US doctrine on the matter. I believe the US instructs its infantry to fire in the general direction of the incoming during a contact with the enemy in order to suppress them.

The problem in my mind arises with the fact that suppression is psychological in nature, therefore, what if the individual(s) receiving said suppressive fire simply... don't keep their heads down. I imagine that the more disciplined the soldier, the more accurate the fire would need to be in order to successfully suppress them.

The way I understand it, there are two facets to suppressive fire: volume and accuracy. I have no doubt that both in tandem are the most effective means of suppression, but I cannot help but feel that accuracy is the more effective of the two.

While the threat of being hit with a stray bullet is ever present when one is taking a high volume of inaccurate fire, would not the discipline soldier realize that being "pinned down" is a more long-term danger against an enemy of similar capabilities, as it allows the enemy to freely maneuver. Not to mention making him a ripe target for indirect fire. Therefore, would the disciplined soldier not will himself to be unsuppressed?

Accurate fire on the other hand, is a significant danger. A near miss has a reasonable chance of turning into a hit within the next 1 or 2 rounds. As the threat to his life is more immediate if he stays exposed, he has an incentive to take cover over remaining unsuppressed.

I feel that there is a danger in the mere firing of one's weapon without effect as well. Firing your weapon makes you more visible to the enemy through your muzzle flashes If the enemy is not suppressed, then you have just presented him with a (more) visible target.

Which brings us back to the US... What I've gleaned from the testimonies of soldiers returning from Iraq/Afghan is that many of the riflemen carry around 500-600 (some have claimed as many as 1000) rounds of 5.56 ammunition with them on patrols, not to mention all of the other munitions and equipment they have to carry. This seems awfully excessive to me, and I wonder if this is due to the nature of their approach to suppression. I wouldn't be surprised if "firing in the general direction of the enemy" works on the insurgents there, however I wonder if it would work if the US were to face a similarly capable military.

Of course, I have never been in combat, nor do I claim to know what it's like, so everything I've just written could be a load of garbage for all I know. In that event, I apologize. Regardless, I'd be interested in hearing your opinion on the matter.

Thank you for reading, hope my thread is to the standards of this fine forum.

[Fuchs]

You'll be interested in this.

Accuracy can be overstated, though. U.S. infantry was trained to shoot aimed fire when it arrived in Europe in '42-'43. The semi-auto Garand rifle had twice the practical rate of fire of bolt-action rifles and this required increased fire discipline because of limited ammunition.

The infantrymen didn't see much of their enemies on the battlefield, though. Consequently, they shot less and were often suppressed. In the end, they had to be allowed to be more active and shoot into the general direction of the enemy, through concealment and inadequate cover.


My greatest concern with suppression is that at times you might not even guess the general direction of incoming fire right because you're not prepared to expect fire from all directions. That's most of the trick behind parapet and flanking fighting positions, after all.

I remember a report of an infantry regiment's river crossing in France. The river crossing's success was delayed for half an hour with many losses by a single light machine gun which was well-sited in a building for flanking fire along the river. They simply didn't identify that fighting position until the third or fourth attempt or so (I have no clue why the flanking nature of the fire wasn't obvious because of the small fountains on the water surface.)

[Ken White]

Which brings us back to the US... What I've gleaned from the testimonies of soldiers returning from Iraq/Afghan is that many of the riflemen carry around 500-600 (some have claimed as many as 1000) rounds of 5.56 ammunition with them on patrols, not to mention all of the other munitions and equipment they have to carry. This seems awfully excessive to me, and I wonder if this is due to the nature of their approach to suppression. I wouldn't be surprised if "firing in the general direction of the enemy" works on the insurgents there, however I wonder if it would work if the US were to face a similarly capable military.

The significant overuse of automatic fire by Riflemen is one such habit. The US Forces 'learned' to do that in Viet Nam and it became embedded. It is, as you discern, a terrible waste of ammunition and -- probably really more importantly, load carrying and general logistic capability. Basically, I'm firmly convinced that your perception is quite accurate and that pun is intended. Volume of fire is not nearly as important as the accuracy of that fire. A nominal basic load of seven Mags, 210 rounds, per rifle is more than adequate for most things but the carrying of an additional 3-400 rounds started in Viet Nam and is still allowed. It should not be.

As Fuchs writes, accuracy can be overstated but not by much -- the real issue is location of the correct targets --as the Storr article linked by Fuchs states and as the anecdote on the river crossing illustrates. The issue is not pinpoint, one shot - one target accuracy, the issue is the amount of relatively accurate fire placed on or near the correct target area. As you note, well trained opponents will not be deterred for a second by poorly place fire, no matter the volume.

The US failure is to adequately train in two areas; fire discipline or control and target detection. The old target detection ranges, created as a result of hard won WW II experience, essentially fell into disuse after Korea and the availability of a full automatic individual weapon and tons of ammunition in Viet Nam effectively killed the knowledge of the importance of the skill. The Army's adoption of the terribly flawed Task, Condition and Standard 'training' system -- it is not training, it is instruction and a poor instructional methodology at that -- mean that we send folks off to war missing essential, life saving skills. Doctrine states that NCOs and Officers control fire -- reality states they cannot actually do that all too often, thus Joe has to know what to do -- and he has to be trained in order to do that. Unfortunately, it's easier to 'train' him to "Fire when and where your Squad Leader tells you..."

We should generally preclude full automatic fire unless the METT-TC factors call for it and in my experience that is relatively, even surprisingly, rarely. Correctly assessing the METT-TC factors is critically important, basic individual skills provide the ability to do that, every lowly Rifleman should be able to do that and we do not train them to do so -- they have to learn by doing in combat and that kills too many needlessly before they figure it out. We should better train both target detection AND marksmanship; the Troops are capable of doing more than we allow them to do...

We should also reduce the allowable amount of ammunition.

Getting rid of the SAW / M249 would also be a step forward. The Marines are on the right track with an Automatic Rifle, one per fire team...

[Granite_State]

Getting rid of the SAW / M249 would also be a step forward. The Marines are on the right track with an Automatic Rifle, one per fire team...

Beat me to it. OP, you might be interested in reading up on the IAR:

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news...istan-120610w/

I have no combat experience, but can say as a very recent graduate of the USMC infantry officer training pipeline that accurate suppression is what is being taught and stressed.

[Granite_State]

The US failure is to adequately train in two areas; fire discipline or control and target detection. The old target detection ranges, created as a result of hard won WW II experience, essentially fell into disuse after Korea

Can you explain how those functioned?

[Pete]

During the First World War in the U.S. Army suppressive fire had a precedent, marching fire. I'm not sure whether the term made it into official doctrine or if it was an innovation made on the spot. The Pedersen Device that converted the M1903 rifle into a semiautomatic weapon was intended to make marching fire possible but the device was only made in small quantities and not used in combat. Patton uses the term marching fire several times in his WW II memoirs War As I Knew It.

[Ken White]

Can you explain how those functioned?

Take about a square Kilometer of local terrain either with or modified to have some wooded areas, some scrub or low brush areas and some open gently rolling terrain and emplace at selected locations and various distances and angles from a base point or line silhouette targets and / or items to represent targets insuring that they range from little to much concealment and none to significant cover -- varied degrees of difficulty to locate being the object -- and, if available, firing simulators (or support personnel who can fire blanks) for some sets of targets. Ideally, a few buildings might be present, lacking them, CONEXs, MilVans or containers could be used.

Troops are placed on a base point or firing line like location and are tasked to locate a set number of targets. The training must be repeated a minimum of three times, more is better -- and it should be progressive. Start with 10 target fairly visible to be located, then got to fifteen with slightly more obscured targets, then 25 with about half being pretty well concealed. They should be shown targets they missed or did not report, particularly the ones that were most likely to be significant threats.

Even though it is a non-firing effort, the use of some covered targets is necessary so the Troops learn what cover looks like from their side and how difficult it can be to get to targets who have adequate cover. This integrates terrain appreciation, target detection, reporting, use of the map, observation and other skills.

That's the generic, peacetime training approach as it used to conducted. Obviously, if the training is to be theater specific as it should be in war time, then modifications for that theater and terrain set should be made.

After the minimum three repetitions a week or so apart, move on to a field firing range / trainfire like setup that combines target detection AND live firing. That also should be for a minimum of three repetitions. US Field Firing (prehistoric stuff, that...) preceded the Rhodesian developed Drake shoot (LINK). there are a lot of variants. Training requires only a little imagination and a lot of work.

Here's the Army's current Field Firing idea (LINK). It's okay but it should be preceded with the non-firing target detection effort -- it also should be conducted at least three times. My perception is that is done once and my suspicion is that a lot of the integrated training is often not conducted and the goal merely becomes to get the Troops to fire acceptable scores one time. I could be wrong and I hope I am.

This (LINK) may have some good info.

Pete:

Marching fire efforts are things that are beloved of Generals and movie makers because they look neat. It's really a holdover from an idealized and stupidly ultra romantic view of the wars of the early 19th Century. The US Civil War proved it to not be a good idea -- and yet as late as Viet Nam, some still tried it.

A long skirmish line of Infantry moving forward, firing from the hip or pausing briefly to aim (and get shot... ) looks impressive, particularly if vehicles are in the line and also firing on the move (before there was Stab... ). Awesome. Also incredibly stupid, it only looks impressive, it is not actually so.

In practice, they're a huge waste of ammunition and are a really dumb attempt to tie mobility (marching) and mass (volume of fire) together and they do not impress halfway trained opponents even a little bit. Said opponents are likely to thank the idiot who orders it for the target array presented. Agility is greatly preferable to a blunt force frontal assault.

[Pete]

I haven't read about anything like marching fire in Civil War accounts, but Patton in War As I Knew It is emphatic about having all weapons firing at the objective during an assault. In a way he parallels what SLA Marshall said about soldiers not firing their weapons, even though what Marshall wrote was exaggerated. Had he lived longer I'm pretty sure Patton was enough of a master of his craft to have seen when suppressive fire reaches the point of diminishing returns.

This leads us back to the old FM 22-5 tactics drill tactics of the Civil War and First World War that nobody has ever been able to answer -- how do junior officers and NCOs re-establish fire control after the initial bursts of suppressive fire? What next after that? Find a flank? Call in artillery?

[Fuchs]

The Germans also experimented with all-assault rifle platoons and attacks using full auto assault rifle fire of the attack element. Some enthusiastic officers even asserted that success in battle showed no need for machine guns on the attack any more.
These reports were from about the same time when more normal mechanized infantry squads were strengthened by a second MG42...

It appears that the effect of suppressive fires is first and foremost dependent on the enemy. Late 1944 Germans attacking Russian infantry in a local surprise attack probably met much more brittle opposition than was usual in other conflicts.

The post-war German army didn't even attempt anything like that, in fact it introduced the FAL and then the G3. These battle rifles were less well-suited for a high volume of fire and more generally combat out to about 200 or 300m (I forgot the exact figure from the relevant early 90's test which compared G3 and AKM) than the StG 44 and similar weapons.

[Ken White]

I haven't read about anything like marching fire in Civil War accounts...

Not with muzzle loaders, of course not. The broader point though is that the power of the even poorly dug in defense and the relative rapidity of reloading with the Minie Ball plus the few repeaters made frontal assaults bloody as all get out.

...Patton in War As I Knew It is emphatic about having all weapons firing at the objective during an assault.

That's the issue isn't it -- assaults. They are a particularly poor way to do business and the Armed forces of the US use the and have used the 'techniques' entirely too often. Patton was almost as fond of them as Grant...

T.J.Jackson, John Buford, Walter Kreuger and James Gavin had more sense.

Had he lived longer I'm pretty sure Patton was enough of a master of his craft to have seen when suppressive fire reaches the point of diminishing returns.

I wouldn't bet on that. He was a master at manipulating people. I'll give him that. Consider the fact that a good many Majors today have more combat experience than Patton had.

This leads us back to the old FM 22-5 tactics drill tactics of the Civil War and First World War that nobody has ever been able to answer -- how do junior officers and NCOs re-establish fire control after the initial bursts of suppressive fire? What next after that? Find a flank? Call in artillery?

It hasn't been answered to your satisfaction you mean? Colud that be because it, as you state it, is a big open ended question lacking in any context and specificity and -- wait for it -- METT-TC applies. Always.

Our marginally trained troops may seem to need such NCO / Officer control and do in some units. Realistically in combat they have to know what to do at first contact and most figure it out after a couple of contacts. After that first rattle, they must know to look for and keep an eye on their leaders to watch for hand and arm signals -- the advent of individual troopies having radios will not totally change that aspect. Any good unit will develop that capability internally and since all leaders are different, most will do it in different ways. As for flank, call for fire, etc. -- all very much situation dependent.

The real constant is proper training and response to fire while keeping an eye on the leaders for cues. For the leaders, it should all be about what they need to have done to keep people alive and get on with the job. That can entail anything from a rapid departure from the area; to just going to ground; to trying to flank left or right (left or right are bad ju-ju, leaders should always use Compass directions, N,E,S,W, NW, etc. to preclude confusion which is generally around when under fire); to establish a base of fire; to a suicidal frontal assault supported by three DS and two GS Arty units -- and everything in between. It's really simple...

[Old Eagle]

Suppressive fire doesn't.

[Infanteer]

Getting rid of the SAW / M249 would also be a step forward. The Marines are on the right track with an Automatic Rifle, one per fire team...

We've had the weapon for some 20 years and I've never had a problem with it. If a LMG Gunner is well trained in fire control (as all machinegunners should be) I don't see what advantage would be accrued by replacing the LMG with an AR - and yes I've read all of CWO Eby's stuff.

[Pete]

Oh well, it seems that military leadership in the Infantry all boils down to bringing order out of chaos. It's almost as though because in combat they're all improvised solutions that are all unique, there are no larger lessons or solutions to be derived. Damn, all those Vu-Graph slides in '77-'78 in Infantry Hall were for nothing.

[Ken White]

We've had the weapon for some 20 years and I've never had a problem with it.

It's employment as a Squad /Section weapon is the problem -- and if you've never had a problem, I'm happy for you. Personally, I've never seen any belt fed weapon that did not have problems with feeding, often belt problem caused, at least occasionally and with breakage of the feeding mechanism parts once in a while, much more so than with mag fed weapons. Anyway you couch it, belt fed weapons are more expensive, less mechanically reliable, often less accurate (a particular M249 problem) and require more training. Machine guns are necessary and important -- too important to allow proliferation to a level where high casualties in a more intense combat will eventually result in untrained machinegunners...

I won't even mention the logistics and ammunition expenditure for results gained.

If a LMG Gunner is well trained in fire control (as all machinegunners should be) I don't see what advantage would be accrued by replacing the LMG with an AR - and yes I've read all of CWO Eby's stuff.

I have not read any of Eby's stuff, whoever he is. My comments are based on my own observations and experience. The advantages are simplicity, less weight, more reliability, less maintenance, no spare barrels (much less tripods) to carry at Squad / Section level, lessened ammunition consumption (waste???), hopefully and probably a more durable weapon and the ability to put your Machine Guns where they belong, in a dedicated MG Platoon (YMMV ).

Every one does not take the time that Canada does to train folks. Perhaps they should but most do not and are unfortunately not likely to do so. Nor do most get the long service, multi skilled Corporals that Canada has. Hopefully that will continue for you because it has merit, however, the probability in high intensity conflict is more turnover, abbreviated training and less experienced leaders and gunners. Military weapons should be selected with that probability in mind, not peace time optimal conditions, training time and support.

[Ken White]

Oh well, it seems that military leadership in the Infantry all boils down to bringing order out of chaos. It's almost as though because in combat they're all improvised solutions that are all unique, there are no larger lessons or solutions to be derived. Damn, all those Vu-Graph slides in '77-'78 in Infantry Hall were for nothing.

In reverse order, probably true on the Vu-graphs as is true for most of the foolishness that comes out of Bunker 4.

Not just the Infantry. Armor and Cavalry have exactly the same sorts and sets of problems -- as do Attack and Scout aircraft crews and the Engineers on occasion. The other combat and combat support arms can have the same sort of problems every now and then but those are rather rare and they seldom train for such efforts. Thus they tend to be more orderly and less chaotic. They tend to seek and use checklists, metrics and can actually apply larger lessons effectively and can also generally apply derived or patterned solutions

Maneuver combat OTOH is indeed a series of really unique situations and essentially undiffrentiated chaos requiring rapid assessments and intuitive responses and thinking. The problems of leadership and command in combat are many for all branches -- but those problems are far less structured and much more diverse for the maneuver arms and they are ferociously exacerbated for those guys BECAUSE we foolishly try to encapsulate 'doctrine' in larger lessons and solutions derived from other situations that were just enough different to be problematic...

At about the time you were cruising the Snack Bar in Muskogee County, Georgia that is the meeting place of the Army, had you instead gone to Leavenworth the Tactics Department there would have informed you first thing something along this line: "What we are going to teach you will work in gently rolling open terrain on a mild June day against a peer competitor with approximately equal strength and equipment provided you have all your authorized personnel and equipment and they are trained and it is all operational. If any of those factors differ, you will have to adapt."

That means that if it is raining pitchforks, you've got a problem. If the opponent is a mess of Go-rillas instead of a generally like unit, you've got problems. If you are short 20% of your folks and have only a 70% OR, it's snowing and you have to fit those guerrillas AND a like sized and equipped opponent, you got bi-i-g-g-g problems. Like I said, it's simple...

[Pete]

... the Snack Bar in Muskogee County, Georgia that is the meeting place of the Army ...

Pick up your cheeseburger and 'Follow Me'
We are the Building Four Infantry

[Pete]

My thoughts aren't completely clear on this subject, so the point I've been trying to make is probably obscure. When we fought the First World War the old FM 22-5 way of doing things was how we deployed for combat -- column for traveling, line for fighting, with many permutations in between-- platoons in column, etc.

Our doctrine during WW II is said to have been oversimplified so it could be taught in a hurry -- one element puts down a base of fire, the other finds a flank. Decades later, in a speech at Fort Benning Gen. DePuy said the main thing his company during WW II did was to transport his forward observer from one hill to another.

I've heard a lot about SOPs and battle drills. Given that 70 years ago what later became FM 22-5 was relegated to parades and change-of-command ceremonies, isn't it time to come up with a similar manual for infantry combat? It's as though the old way to fight -- how to move around and fight -- was rescinded and replaced with oversimplified talking points. We need a new way of doing it by the numbers. A new manual could be like DePuy's basic tactical formations in the old FM 100-5, but much more detailed.

Please forgive me -- I'm merely a broken-down old cannon-cocker.

[Fuchs]

I fail to see the point of formations.

Self-discipline, confidence and wit of its NCOs and officers are decisive for survival and mission success.


It's about the attitude, not about formations and recipes.
We had way too many stupid fashions and specialised 'solutions' since the mid-90's and need to have a close look at OPFOR HE-frag effects again.
The "AK+RPG" opposition led to tailored responses that would be suicidal even against a 1944 army.

[Pete]

Fuchs, it has to do with how likely contact with the enemy is. The more probable it is the more important it becomes to have one's weapons able to fire at the enemy. When a traveling element makes contact it often has to change formation for fire and maneuver. There is also an advantage to being able to form without the need for detailed instructions about how to do it.

[Ken White]

When we fought the First World War the old FM 22-5 way of doing things was how we deployed for combat ... Our doctrine during WW II is said to have been oversimplified so it could be taught in a hurry -- one element puts down a base of fire, the other finds a flank...

Yes and that started being questioned after Kasserine Pass and after the Bulge really fell by the wayside and had been totally discredited (at that time, not by the Bulge specifically). We in essence fought WW II with WW I tactical precepts until the tail end, by then we had so much mass employed that tactical nicety wasn't required.. Good thing because we did not know how to do that...

I'm not at all sure we can do it today -- I know there are units and people than can and do operate with excellent tactical acumen but I'm not at all sure the broader US Army does or can. Or even wants to, the tendency to rely on mass an firepower is strong -- because its easy. Unfortunatel, all the hard earned lessons of WW II were discarded and a return to 'real peacetime soldiering' took place. Our training and personnel system today are both flawed -- badly -- and both are relics of WW I and WW II -- just as tha dumbe 22-5 is. No parade ever won a war, no good haurcut ever killed a bad guy and unless someone has strangled one with it, neither has a stupid Reflective Safety Belt (NSN 8465-01-163-8835).

Decades later, in a speech at Fort Benning Gen. DePuy said the main thing his company during WW II did was to transport his forward observer from one hill to another.

Rather than slam De Puy for ineptitude and say that was his fault if he was the Commander, since I wasn't there and do not know if that's correct, I can and will say that comment applied to him and his Company in one small area in one large Theater in an even larger global war. Having talked to and served under a number of people who commanded Companies in that war, my sensing is that most would not agree with him. I know those from the Pacific Theater would grin, mirthlessly, at the absolutely dangerous naivete of the comment.

That principle almost certainly did not apply to most Companies in that War -- yet, it got embedded in the mind of a young Captain and years later, he tried as a General to structure an Army based on his brief experience in one geographic area, in one command in one war.

I do not think that was wise. Recent history proves it was far from helpful.

Thus my point earlier: ""...those problems are far less structured and much more diverse for the maneuver arms and they are ferociously exacerbated for those guys BECAUSE we foolishly try to encapsulate 'doctrine' in larger lessons and solutions derived from other situations that were just enough different to be problematic..."" (emphasis added /kw).

I've heard a lot about SOPs and battle drills.

That's a function of the Army in which you served. It trained to Tasks, Conditions and Standards and had a large quantity of less than stellar soldiers and few experienced NCOs to train those folks because way too many of the good and experienced got killed in Viet Nam. Those SOPs and Battle Drills were seen as a cheap and easy way for marginally competent trainers to train marginally competent individuals. Those days, fortunately, are gone --but too many are still trying to 'train' much smarter and more capable people the same way.

Drills are necessary but not the simplistic type that we picked up in the 80s. What's needed are complex, multi scenario drills that force the inclusion of multiple tasks and no pre-determined outcome.

"No pre determined out come" is what happens in combat...

Given that 70 years ago what later became FM 22-5 was relegated to parades and change-of-command ceremonies, isn't it time to come up with a similar manual for infantry combat?

There's one out there. (LINK). It's only three years old and it's not too bad. Go to Chapter 3, Tactical Movement. It's fair. It's greatest problem as would be true with any doctrinal pub or technique is that it must be very generic in tone. For example, look at Figure 3-15. It suggests a 20m interval between Teams. That's okay for many places and times -- that "rolling open terrain on a mild June day" but it will not work in the jungle where less than five meters is necessary -- it is poor for place like much of Afghanistan where 60 to 100m would be better. METT-TC HAS to be considered by the guy fighting but the Book cannot do that, too many variables.

That's where the Task, condition and Standard of BTMS fails -- the conditions vary widely. Task: Clear a building. Conditions: Fragile mud hut in Viet Nam? Hardened, tough mud hut in Afghanistan? Frame house in Central America? Reinforced Concrete Police Staion in Iraq? Ten Story Apartment? The Tower of Dubai?...

You, as they said at Leavenworth in the old days, have to adapt.

The problem with manuals is they embed thoughts and images in minds and then when folks get in a scrap in places and ways the manual did not depict (or often could not predict...), they simply don't know what to do. Training -- repetitive conduct of combat like activities in different settings and against differing opponents is the answer, manuals are not. Tha training should be harder, more diifcult and more complex than is most combat, then combat will be easy. right now because the training is marginal, combat is more difficult than it should be.

It's as though the old way to fight -- how to move around and fight -- was rescinded and replaced with oversimplified talking points.

I disagree. Strongly. That old way to fight got people killed and we've gotten a bit smarter, we should not regress, we should improve even more. 'METT-TC' and 'depends on the situation' are not talking points, they are very real concerns. An even greater concern is too rigid adherence to doctrine...

We need a new way of doing it by the numbers. A new manual could be like DePuy's basic tactical formations in the old FM 100-5, but much more detailed.

Scary thought. You cannot fight by the numbers. Period.

That "by the numbers rationale" is predicated on the dumb enlisted swine model. It may be needed for mobilization but it is absolutely wrong for a supposed professional force.

Not to mention that100-5 was a very flawed document...

Please forgive me -- I'm merely a broken-down old cannon-cocker.

No forgiveness required. As Brother Dave Gardner used to say, "Dear Hearts, you can't tell someone if they haven't never..."

Sadly, even some who have and should know better still produce flawed items. Witness DePuy who did a lot of good, really. He also did some harm...

As Fuchs said:

""Self-discipline, confidence and wit of its NCOs and officers are decisive for survival and mission success.""