Suppressive Fire

[JMA]

I recently attended and spoke at a body armour conference. The Turkish Army , based on 25 years of casualty statistics attributed body armour to 30%+ reduction in fatalities, and UK statistics from Afghanistan are very similar.

The evidence to date suggests that not issuing body armour would lead to about a 1/3rd more KIA.

I also asked a room full of British soldiers, all with multiple tours, if any had witnessed, were aware of, or had suffered small arms plate strikes, and the vast majority had. Again this jells with the statistics.

Thanks for the update.

I guess we will have to wait for the declassification of the info relating to where these potentially lethal body armour strikes were and also the data that given the torso area protection and helmet of course where the fatal GSWs were.

I would have thought the protection was higher than 1/3.

[SethB]

The evidence to date suggests that not issuing body armour would lead to about a 1/3rd more KIA.

Most of the SF and Ranger NCOs that I've talked to would choose to wear armor on in urban fighting or while mounted. Anything else and they would rather not have plates.

[JMA]

Ah... a claymore enthusiast.

It did not take me long to figure out that the means of springing an ambush by tapping the LMG gunner on the shoulder then relying on the accuracy of a bunch of riflemen to make the kills was a pretty bad option.

Rhodesia had it own home-made claymores the mini and the maxi which we used to a lesser extent until the South Africans coped the US M18A1 (or equivalent of the early 70s) and the R1M1 became available to Rhodesian forces.

The Rhodesian made Mini-Claymore was carried in a bandoleer (probably inside a pack) were smaller than the R1M1. On difficult ground they could be used at greater density than the larger R1M1 to ensure full coverage of the killing ground. Easy to be carried by 4-man sticks could be used for LUP defence or to booby trap a route with a trip wire. The SAS using 13 mini-claymores on a cordex detonated ring main on a day ambush in Mozambique got 17 kills out of 21 insurgents circa around 1976 on the sixth day in ambush.

[selil]

I also asked a room full of British soldiers, all with multiple tours, if any had witnessed, were aware of, or had suffered small arms plate strikes, and the vast majority had. Again this jells with the statistics.

Two of my line of duties injuries (law enforcement) were both shank blades below the body armor and only slightly slowed by the skirt below the armor. Not much to be done as we did everything by the book.

I've often said that the reason police fatalities increase in summer is because the body armor comes off in the heat. It is consistently argued that the real reason is because hostile contacts increase, but correlation is not causation.

[JMA]

Okay, here's the deal. It does not cause knee-jerk reaction, but it is pissing me the hell off. I'm not adding an emoticon because you need to focus on the words

We corresponded by PMs about an important historical topic to me, and I thought you had your stuff wired.

Right now you are simply becoming a very annoying poster who seems to relish in being contrary for the sake of being contrary. I would normally ignore the constant attempts to inflame the members of the board JMA, but 3/4 of your posts bring virtually nothing to this board, and frankly, that is the greatest shame of it all.

If you simply cannot control the impulse to get into a spat and use barbed language to start an argument here (and yes, you come across as doing it on purpose), I make the motion that you just go away and take a tactical time out.

This isn't a matter of closing ranks against you, but chrissakes man, in close to the year you've been here and 1,000+ posts you've managed to make, you still come across as an internet troll. I think I speak for a number of members here who do a face palm every time they see that you are the last member to post to a thread, because we know you will have typically ignored the spirit of the thread and started to go off on your own Quixote tangent.

Get some better decorum or please just go away and find a quorum of other folks who care to do nothing but bash right along with you. There are several of them. In fact, if you want a great forum to argue, go here: http://www.ar15.com/forums/board.html?b=3

Will respond to this by PM

[Compost]

This is interesting. I wonder from what level was it increased to 140 rounds per rifleman and what the dates were?

A quick look indicates it could be 18 August 1966 – The Battle of Long Tan

A typical level was 100 rounds: 60 in magazines, 40 in clips.

That correlates with another reference.

The normal 60 rounds per rifleman, carried in three magazines, had been calculated taking into account the 3RAR usage rate.

(McNeill, Ian; To Long Tan, Allen & Unwin 1993, p321)

Date of change was probably 19 August 1966.

[JMA]

A typical level was 100 rounds: 60 in magazines, 40 in clips.

That correlates with another reference.

The normal 60 rounds per rifleman, carried in three magazines, had been calculated taking into account the 3RAR usage rate.

(McNeill, Ian; To Long Tan, Allen & Unwin 1993, p321)

Date of change was probably 19 August 1966.

Thank you for that. As a matter of interest what is the rifleman's first line today?

I think these figures say a lot about the fire control and fire discipline of that time.

In the mid 70s in Rhodesia (RLI) we were still on 100 in 5 magazines and 50 in clips in a bandoleer for the FN.

This crept up and likewise resupply became always with loaded magazines and loaded belts (for the FN MAG).

The first line carried was left largely up to sub-units (but never to the troopie himself unless he wanted more within reason). On big ops it went up to 260 in magazines when contact was certain -1977-80

[Blah]

A typical level was 100 rounds: 60 in magazines, 40 in clips.

That correlates with another reference. [/ QUOTE]The normal 60 rounds per rifleman, carried in three magazines, had been calculated taking into account the 3RAR usage rate.[/ QUOTE](McNeill, Ian; To Long Tan, Allen & Unwin 1993, p321)

Wow. 100 rounds seems pretty low to me (although those are just my uneducated "feelings"). I wonder how the troops felt about the amount of ammunition they carried.

Perhaps my perceptions are skewed due to the videos I see on youtube and such featuring engagements in Iraq/Afghan. A number of them contain troops firing streams of 5 - 10 rounds at a time, in which case I do not believe 100 rounds would be adequate at all.

[Ken White]

Wow. 100 rounds seems pretty low to me (although those are just my uneducated "feelings"). I wonder how the troops felt about the amount of ammunition they carried.

a basic load of 100 rounds, 5x20 mags (but many scrounged extra mags or carried a few boxes of 20 in their rucksack. seldom used the extras); with the later issue of 30rd mags (and larger ammo pouches for them) the basic load went to 210 rounds, 7 x 30

Perhaps my perceptions are skewed due to the videos I see on youtube and such featuring engagements in Iraq/Afghan. A number of them contain troops firing streams of 5 - 10 rounds at a time, in which case I do not believe 100 rounds would be adequate at all.

No, it's not -- and that's why full auto firing should be prohibited under most circumstances. It's unnecessary, wasteful of ammo and rarely does much good. OTOH, held to semi auto, 100 rounds is adequate for most things, most days; the 210 nominally available is more than adequate provided no full auto other than for breaking contact or charging an ambush in close terrain and then no more than one mag (even that's unwarranted IMO).

[Ken White]

Any war, any army, any generation, you can spot a poser a mile off. Have you considered the knee-jerk reaction may be as a result of a nerve being touched?

One may be able to spot what you call a "poser" a mile off but so far you are 0 for 2 -- that means you've labeled someone a poser twice to my recollection and gotten called on it both times. You got called not due to your hitting a nerve but because you were just wrong.

Jon has warned you to modify your posting style and rhetoric. I've asked you twice to modify it. I'll not ask again.

[Blah]

No, it's not -- and that's why full auto firing should be prohibited under most circumstances. It's unnecessary, wasteful of ammo and rarely does much good. OTOH, held to semi auto, 100 rounds is adequate for most things, most days; the 210 nominally available is more than adequate provided no full auto other than for breaking contact or charging an ambush in close terrain and then no more than one mag (even that's unwarranted IMO).

I wasn't referring to full-auto per se, although I can tell you hate it with a passion. I was referring to really rapid semi-auto fire.

An example can be found here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bhwDZUa01go
If my counting ability is accurate, he expended 65 - 70 rounds in 2 - 3 minutes. Not sure if that's considered "fast".

[Ken White]

He's firing on full auto. Note that mostly he's firing over a large rock, I can't see what he might have seen but it appears from the video that he's just popping caps in unaimed fire. Hopefully not -- but...

Stupid

[JMA]

One may be able to spot what you call a "poser" a mile off but so far you are 0 for 2 -- that means you've labeled someone a poser twice to my recollection and gotten called on it both times. You got called not due to your hitting a nerve but because you were just wrong.

Jon has warned you to modify your posting style and rhetoric. I've asked you twice to modify it. I'll not ask again.

Responded by PM.

[jcustis]

I wasn't referring to full-auto per se, although I can tell you hate it with a passion. I was referring to really rapid semi-auto fire.

An example can be found here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bhwDZUa01go
If my counting ability is accurate, he expended 65 - 70 rounds in 2 - 3 minutes. Not sure if that's considered "fast".

It is not so much fast as it is an immediate reaction to enemy contact. That soldier (and not unlike many Marines and other soldiers) has it ingrained in his head to "seek cover and return fire". That's exactly what the schoolhouse textbooks say. Where those texts fail is in not describing it as "aimed fire."

There is a lot of full-auto fire going on, and it looks as though they really had not idea where to send it, as evident in the POV guy's lack of any commands or orientation until more rounds crack overhead and he finally calls out a direction. it's pretty clear that he isn't even achieving the stock weld necessary He alsi starts out firing at the hillside that looks to be close to 500m so that appears to be an attempt to satisfy some notion that getting rounds out - any rounds - is better that waiting to ID the threat target. That's an example of our training problem.

This also shows how, despite cracking closely overhead, close calls do not in fact always suppress. They could have walked off that hillside with probably little effect from further enemy fire.

[jcustis]

It is not so much fast as it is an immediate reaction to enemy contact. That soldier (and not unlike many Marines and other soldiers) has it ingrained in his head to "seek cover and return fire". That's exactly what the schoolhouse textbooks say. Where those texts fail is in not describing it as "aimed fire."

There is a lot of full-auto fire going on (though not from him - even though at his speed it might as well be FA), and it looks as though they really had no idea where to send it, as evident in the POV guy's lack of any commands or orientation until more rounds crack overhead and he finally calls out a direction. It's pretty clear to me that he isn't even achieving the stock weld necessary He also starts out firing at the hillside that looks to be close to 500m so that appears to be an attempt to satisfy some notion that getting rounds out - any rounds - is better that waiting to ID the threat target. That's an example of our training problem. His call of "get some rounds," is disturbing in that there is nothing is the way of any fire direction

This also shows how, despite cracking closely overhead, close calls do not in fact always suppress. They could have walked off that hillside with probably little effect from further enemy fire.

We need to train these habits out of these warriors.

[jcustis]

Can any of you vets remember the organization of the Marine Rifle Squad pre- M249 SAW? If it entered service around 1984, what were we using before that, and what TTPs were employed?

[slapout9]

Can any of you vets remember the organization of the Marine Rifle Squad pre- M249 SAW? If it entered service around 1984, what were we using before that, and what TTPs were employed?

In the 70's it was like the Army(except marines still had 3 fire teams) there was a designated AR man (automatic rifleman) who carried an m-16 with the selector switch flipped to full auto,there was no 3 round burst mode back then. At least that is how I remember it when we cross trained with them.

[Stan]

JC,
I could be mistaken, but I recall the modified M-14 with bipod to be the SAW's predecessor (in a rifle squad). In the early 70's the rifle squads still hung onto their M-14s although M-16s were already issued. Three fire teams with one each modified M-14 and two each M-14 and the squad leader with a M-79

M-60s were part of machine gun sections back then ?

[selil]

Can any of you vets remember the organization of the Marine Rifle Squad pre- M249 SAW? If it entered service around 1984, what were we using before that, and what TTPs were employed?

I entered in 1984, four man fire team (all M16s), sometimes 1 m203s, and we could upgrade in a squad to M60s.

I turned around and pulled my "Guidebook for Marines" (circa 1979) and what was issued to be in bootcamp off the shelf. It says (Chapter 29):

The current Marine Corps Rifle Squad... is made up of 13 men, a sergeant (squad leader) and three teams of four men each .. each fire team consists of a corporal (fire team leader), a lance corporal (automatic rifleman), and two privates or privates first class , one designated as grenadier/rifleman and the other as rifleman.

Picture included.

[Rifleman]

Stan,

I believe the M14E2 was shortlived. I don't think any were in use in the '70s.

Three fire teams? You must be talking about USMC squads because Army squads have always had two fire teams. 11 men for a long time, the change to nine men came in the mid-'80s when I was in Vicenza.

M60s have usually been part of a weapons squad per TOE but often showed up in rifle squads in the field.